The Law and Legal Research in Zambia

Alfred S. Magagula is a graduate fellow from the University of Swaziland. He holds B.A. law and LLB degree from the same university. He has done research with various consultancy firms in Swaziland before. He is a part-time researcher with Centre for Human rights and development and Panacea Consulting. Currently he is the Municipal AIDS Program Manager with AMICAALL.

Zambia derives its name from the Zambezi River. The river runs across the western and southern border and then forms Victoria Falls and flows into Lake Kariba and on to the Indian Ocean. It is a landlocked country with several large freshwater lakes, including Lake Tanganyika, Lake Mweru, Lake Bangweulu, and the largest man-made lake in Africa, Lake Kariba. The terrain consists of high plateaus, large savannas, and hilly areas; the highest altitude is in the Muchinga Mountains, at 6,000 feet (1,828 meters). The Great Rift Valley cuts through the southwest and Victoria Falls, the most visited site in Zambia, is in the South. Zambia lies between the Democratic Republic of Congo to the north, Tanzania to the northeast, Malawi to the east, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia to the south, and Angola to the west. The country measures approximately 752,618 square kilometres with a population of approximately 11 862 740. The country’s leadership is democratic.

Zambia’s population comprises more than 70 Bantu-speaking ethnic groups. The population is comprised primarily (97 percent) of seven main tribes and a collection of seventy-five minor tribes. There is also a small percentage of citizens from other African nations. The remaining population is of Asian, Indian, and European descent. Because of conflicts in the border countries of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola, there has been a large influx of refugees in recent years. Some ethnic groups are small, and only two have enough people to constitute at least 10% of the population. Most Zambians are subsistence farmers. The predominant religion is a blend of traditional beliefs and Christianity; Christianity is the official national religion. Expatriates, a majority of whom are British (about 15,000) and South African, live mainly in Lusaka and in the Copper belt in northern Zambia, where they are employed in mines and related activities. Zambia also has a small but economically important Asian population, most of whom are Indians.

The indigenous hunter-gatherer occupants of Zambia began to be displaced or absorbed by more advanced migrating tribes about 2,000 years ago. The major waves of Bantu-speaking immigrants began in the 15th century, with the greatest influx between the late 17th and early 19th centuries. They came primarily from the Luba and Lunda tribes of southern Democratic Republic of Congo and northern Angola but were joined in the 19th century by Ngoni peoples from the south. By the latter part of that century, the various peoples of Zambia were largely established in the areas they currently occupy. Except for an occasional Portuguese explorer, the area lay untouched by Europeans for centuries.

After the mid-19th century, it was penetrated by Western explorers, missionaries, and traders. David Livingstone, in 1855, was the first European to see the magnificent waterfalls on the Zambezi River. He named the falls after Queen Victoria, and the Zambian town near the falls is named after him. In 1888, Cecil Rhodes, spearheading British commercial and political interests in Central Africa, obtained mineral rights concession from local chiefs. In the same year, Northern and Southern Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe, respectively) were proclaimed a British sphere of influence. Southern Rhodesia was annexed formally and granted self-government in 1923, and the administration of Northern Rhodesia was transferred to the British colonial office in 1924 as a protectorate. In 1953, both Rhodesians were joined with Nyasaland (now Malawi) to form the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Northern Rhodesia was the center of much of the turmoil and crisis that characterized the federation in its last years. At the core of the controversy were insistent African demands for greater participation in government and European fears of losing political control.
A two-stage election held in October and December of 1962 resulted in an African majority in the legislative council and an uneasy coalition between the two African nationalist parties. The council passed resolutions calling for Northern Rhodesia’s secession from the federation and demanding full internal self-government under a new constitution and a new national assembly based on a broader, more democratic franchise. On December 31, 1963, the federation was dissolved, and Northern Rhodesia became the Republic of Zambia on October 24, 1964.

At independence, despite its considerable mineral wealth, Zambia faced major challenges. Domestically, there were few trained and educated Zambians capable of running the government, and the economy was largely dependent on foreign expertise. Abroad, three of its neighbors–Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola–remained under white-dominated rule. Rhodesia’s white-ruled government unilaterally declared independence in 1965. In addition, Zambia shared a border with South African-controlled South-West Africa (now Namibia). Zambia’s sympathies lay with forces opposing colonial or white-dominated rule, particularly in Southern Rhodesia. During the next decade, it actively supported movements such as the Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA), the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), and the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO).

Conflicts with Rhodesia resulted in the closing of Zambia’s borders with that country and severe problems with international transport and power supply. However, the Kariba hydroelectric station on the Zambezi River provided sufficient capacity to satisfy the country’s requirements for electricity. A railroad to the Tanzanian port of Dar-es-Salaam, built with Chinese assistance, reduced Zambian dependence on railroad lines south to South Africa and west through an increasingly troubled Angola.

By the late 1970s, Mozambique and Angola had attained independence from Portugal. Zimbabwe achieved independence in accordance with the 1979 Lancaster House agreement, but Zambia’s problems were not solved. Civil war in the former Portuguese colonies generated refugees and caused continuing transportation problems.

The Benguela Railroad, which extended west through Angola, was essentially closed to traffic from Zambia by the late 1970s. Zambia’s strong support for the ANC, which had its external headquarters in Lusaka, created security problems as South Africa raided ANC targets in Zambia. In the mid-1970s, the price of copper, Zambia’s principal export, suffered a severe decline worldwide. Zambia turned to foreign and international lenders for relief, but as copper prices remained depressed, it became increasingly difficult to service its growing debt. In response to growing popular demand, and after lengthy, difficult negotiations between the Kaunda government and opposition groups, Zambia enacted a new constitution in 1991 and shortly thereafter became a multi-party democracy. Kaunda’s successor, Frederick Chiluba, made efforts to liberalize the economy and privatize industry, but allegations of massive corruption characterized the latter part of his administration. By the mid-1990s, despite limited debt relief, Zambia’s per capita foreign debt remained among the highest in the world.

Although poverty continues to be a significant problem in Zambia, its economy has stabilized, attaining single-digit inflation in 2006-2007, real GDP growth, decreasing interest rates, and increasing levels of trade. Much of its growth is due to foreign investment in Zambia’s mining sector and higher copper prices on the world market. In 2005, Zambia qualified for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative, consisting of approximately U.S. $6 billion in debt relief.

Government

Zambia became a republic immediately upon attaining independence in October 1964. The constitution promulgated on August 25, 1973, abrogated the original 1964 constitution. The new constitution and the national elections that followed in December 1973 were the final steps in achieving what was called a “one-party participatory democracy.” The 1973 constitution provided for a strong president and a unicameral National Assembly. National policy was formulated by the Central Committee of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the sole legal party in Zambia. The cabinet executed the central committee’s policy. In accordance with the intention to formalize UNIP supremacy in the new system, the constitution stipulated that the sole candidate in elections for the office of president was the person selected to be the president of UNIP by the party’s general conference. The second-ranking person in the Zambian hierarchy was UNIP’s secretary general.

In December 1990, at the end of a tumultuous year that included riots in the capital and a coup attempt, President Kenneth Kaunda signed legislation ending UNIP’s monopoly on power. Zambia enacted a new constitution in August 1991, which enlarged the National Assembly from 136 members to a maximum of 158 members, established an electoral commission, and allowed for more than one presidential candidate who no longer had to be a member of UNIP. The first multi-party elections in November 1991 resulted in the victory of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) and the election of President Frederick Chiluba, a former trade Unionist. The present Constitution dates from June 1996. While similar to the 1991 Constitution, it contains amended provisions regarding the qualifications of presidential candidates and grants the President and the National Assembly increased powers in respect of their relationship with the judiciary. The May 1996 amendment set new limits on the presidency (including a retroactive two-term limit, and a requirement that both parents of a candidate be Zambians-by birth or descent). This amendment had the direct effect of excluding former President Kaunda, whose parents were Malawian, from standing in the presidential elections. The UNIP boycotted the November 1996 elections that confirmed the government of MMD and President Chiluba. Executive power is vested in the President, who is elected directly by universal suffrage for a term of five years and may be re-elected only once. The President is the Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief.

On 2 August 1991, the adoption of a new Constitution introduced a multi-party system, thereby ending the monopoly of Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP). The President appoints the Ministers of his Cabinet from among the members of the National Assembly, and they are collectively answerable to the National Assembly. The President has the power to declare a state of emergency and to dissolve the National Assembly. Article 45 of the Constitution provides for the office of the Vice-President, who is appointed from among the members of the National Assembly and performs such functions as are assigned to him by the President of the Republic. Legislative power is vested in the Parliament, which consists of the President and the National Assembly. The National Assembly is composed of 150 members elected by universal, direct suffrage, with not more than eight members nominated by the President, and the Speaker, nominated by the members of the National Assembly. Traditional chiefs are not qualified to be elected as members of the Parliament. Legislation passed by the National Assembly must be assented to by the President in order to become law. Members of the Parliament form parliamentary committees with the mandate to consider specific matters or bills.

The Constitution also provides for a House of Chiefs, an advisory body composed of 27 chiefs from the various provinces[1]. A House of Chiefs (or House of Traditional Leaders) is a post-colonial assembly, either legislative or advisory, that is recognised by either a national or regional government as consisting of and providing a collective, public voice for an ethnic group‘s pre-colonial authorities. Although often influential within the indigenous culture, its members do not usually function as a modern nation’s primary law-making body (cf. British House of Lords), being neither representative (i.e. democratically elected) nor consisting of members appointed individually by the government in power, whether democratic or not. It consists of all or some of the “traditional leaders”, historically known in English as chiefs, of a country or a sub-division thereof.

A House of Chiefs is not, constitutionally, a partisan institution within the body politic. Members of a House of Chiefs are selected neither by a universal suffrage process of those they represent nor by the state executive or legislature they advise: Their function is to express a cultural, historical and/or ethnic point of view on public policies. The process by which individuals qualify for membership varies, but is based on tradition specific to his or her (e.g. the Rain Queen) historic community or ethnic group. Sometimes the qualifying position is obtained through heredity within a local dynasty, sometimes through selection by consensus of a ritually or socially prominent subset of a community, and sometimes by a combination thereof. Historically, chiefs were the last indigenous rulers before colonisation of a people, and their modern versions often continue to play a local cultural role of varying significance. Especially in colonial times, chiefs were often used as instruments of indirect rule, and/or convenient alternatives to elective institutions[2].

The country is divided into nine provinces, including the capital of Lusaka, each of which is administered by a centrally appointed Provincial Secretary and a partially elected Provincial Council. The provinces are subdivided into 55 districts, each administered by a centrally appointed Governor and a partially elected District Council. Presidential and parliamentary elections are to be held on 27 December 2001.

At the beginning of 2001 President Chiluba had seemed eager to amend the Constitution in order to seek a third term, but on 8 May 2001, following pressure from the opposition, international donors and even by members of his own cabinet, Chiluba announced that he would not stand for an unconstitutional third term in office. In the meantime, more than 20 dissident members of the ruling MMD party including the country’s Vice-President and eight ministers have been expelled from the Parliament. In May 2001, an impeachment petition was filed against President Chiluba before the House Speaker of the National Assembly. The petitioners, mostly MMD parliamentarians, obtained 65 signatures, enough to compel the Speaker to convene parliament to hear charges of gross misconduct against President Chiluba, who had come under intense criticism for corruption in his government. On 30 May 2001, the Parliament postponed the debate on the impeachment motion.

In December 1990, at the end of a tumultuous year that included riots in the capital and a coup attempt, President Kaunda signed legislation ending UNIP’s monopoly on power. In response to growing popular demand for multi-party democracy, and after lengthy, difficult negotiations between the Kaunda government and opposition groups, Zambia enacted a new constitution in August 1991. The constitution enlarged the National Assembly from 136 members to a maximum of 158 members, establishing an electoral commission, and allowed for more than one presidential candidate who no longer had to be members of UNIP. The constitution was amended again in 1996 to set new limits on the presidency (including a retroactive two-term limit, and a requirement that both parents of a candidate be Zambian-born.) The National Assembly is comprised of 150 directly elected members, up to 8 president- appointed members and a speaker. Zambia is divided into nine provinces, each administered by an appointed governor.

Political and Economic outlook- Independence to date

Zambia achieved independence from Britain in 1964 and since then, there have been three Republics, starting with multi-party politics[3] that ensured that opposition political parties existed until 1972 when the one-party system came into being. Although Zambia ceased to be a multi-party democracy in 1972, the country still remained a one-party-participatory democracy essentially meaning that the people still participated in elections[4] to elect their leaders. The competitiveness[5] of the elections especially at parliamentary and local government levels remained very high but that was not the case at presidential[6] where effectively no competition existed.

In 1990, the country reverted[7] to pluralism adopting a multi-party democratic system. In the elections that followed the following year, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) emerged as part of the multi-partisan political system that followed the 27-year rule of Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP). UNIP remained in opposition to the MMD thereafter. The country used the political changes to set pace to key democratic tenets for those who govern and how to ensure that a high standard of democracy and accountability exists[8]. Since 1991the country has held a number of general elections which have been hailed as representing a growth in Zambia’s democracy, including not so impressive or ‘perceived’ fraudulent elections in 1996 and 2001. In the case of the 2001 elections, most local and international[9] election observer’s concluded that the Government of Zambia and the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) failed both to administer a fair and transparent election and to address electoral irregularities that may have affected the outcome of what proved to be a very close race. According to provisional final results, the MMD’s Levy Mwanawasa defeated Anderson Mazoka of the opposition United Party for National Development by less than two percentage points (28.7 % for Mwanawasa versus 26.8 % for Mazoka). The aggrieved parties, mainly Anderson Mazoka, Godfrey Miyanda and Christon Tembo went to court with a petition. After a long-protracted hearing and ruling, the Court ruled in favour of Mwanawasa. Elections held thereafter have been under close scrutiny amidst allegations of rigging, and in all fairness Zambia has had to strive to build confidence in the outcomes of recent elections including those held in 2006, 2008 and 2011.

Relentlessly, the Patriotic Front (PF), founded as a break-away from the MMD in 2001, challenged the MMD in the fourth election, defeating the previous ruling party in an election which featured a close race between two main contenders[10] whose mutual distrust occasioned concern especially against a harsh party polarization that characterized the run-up to the 2011 elections. Michael Chilufya Sata triumphed over Rupiah Banda, to make him the 5th Zambian President, since independence. The smooth and peaceful handover of power following the announcement of, particularly the presidential results, following the September 2011 Elections, raised Zambia’s democratic credentials in a continent that had experienced several election reversals and contestations[11].

In the views of many, the outcome of Zambia’s September 2011 elections reflected the general wide consent of the population to multi-party democracy, which once more received affirmation[12]. The elections were widely considered free and fair[13] EU-Elections Observer Mission to Zambia (2011) Elections Report, Southern Africa Development Community-PF Report on Zambia’s 2011 September Elections and Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) and the shift of power was nationally and internationally accepted.

Political/Economic Perspectives since 1991

From 1991 up to 2011 the MMD dominated the national politics. During this period MMD implemented reforms steering Zambia towards a more liberal and free-market economy. The country most recently enjoyed more than 10 years of sustained economic development. The World Bank declared the country as a lower middle income country in 2011. Many Zambians are yet to understand and appreciate the shifting of Zambia from a least developed country to a low middle income country because of the fact that poverty levels are still very high, manifested in a continuously increasing cost of living. This is against a background of the country’s stable economic growth of above 6% per annum over the last five years.”

Despite attempts to make the economy more diversified, the growth still is highly dependent on revenues from the Zambian mining industry causing the Zambian economy to be very sensitive to fluctuations in commodity prices at international market.

The study notes that between 2006 and 2009, there was deterioration in people’s access to basic needs, including food, medical care, and clean water, cooking-fuel (electricity, charcoal and kerosene) and cash income[14]. Poor living conditions have encouraged citizens and civil society organizations[15] to demand that the State provides clean water, housing, food, employment and equitable access to employment through the inclusion of such rights in the Constitution. They contend that the development of Zambia will only be facilitated and achieved through the government’s observance of economic, social and cultural rights.[16]

Despite these being included in Policies, plans and programs there has not been a point of reference for Zambians to hold the government accountable beyond stakeholder meeting and advocacy efforts, which in many instances the government has overlooked with impunity, as there is no legal binding on the part of government. It must also be noted that Zambians have been demanding for the enactment of a law that will enable public leaders, especially members of parliament, to be recalled if they have not performed to the expectations of the electorate. In the current 1996 Constitution such provision does not exist.

The Zambia Afrobarometer survey of 2009 shows that in the period 1999 to 2005, the country’s democratic process was in decline and even though support for democratic processes remains high[17], a majority of Zambians remained unsatisfied at about 50% between 2005 and 2009. The demand for representation was high, with indications that most Zambians were getting more together with others to raise a problem or issue. Engagement with formal and informal representatives, especially in rural areas was also active. Despite all this most Zambians continue to face logistical challenges associated with distances from government offices and infrastructure which limits their capacity to interact with government officials and formal representatives.

Notwithstanding, it is observed that democratic institutions in Zambia fundamentally perform their functions. However, with extended powers given to the presidency, legislators (the national assembly) have limited possibilities to supervise the government effectively. The Executive dominance is one of the disconcerting features of modern African governance systems, and Zambia is not in anyways insulated from the practice[18]. In such a political environment checking executive power is a major factor in good governance. Not much has been done to invigorate checks and balances, strengthen separation of powers or constrain the executive[19]. In the case of Zambia, the aspect of shifting power bases or indeed balancing power between and among the arms of government underlies callings for constitutional guarantees, especially in the on-going constitutional making process.

Despite all this, Zambia has achieved a considerable level of progress in regard to democracy, good governance and leadership institutions compared to the years before 1991. The 2011 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance rates Zambia as having improved its overall governance quality, especially between 2006 and 2010 and thus received a score of 57 out of 100 for governance quality. According to the Mo Ibrahim Index the country is ranked 16th out of 53 countries. In 2011, Zambia improved from a hybrid to a flawed democracy on the Economist Intelligent Unit Democracy Index[20]. The overall Democracy Index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Countries are placed within one of four types of regimes: full democracies; flawed democracies; hybrid regimes; and authoritarian regimes.

One of the factors that can be attributed to this improvement is the increase of information on democracy through community radio stations. Currently, each province has a community radio station based in one or two districts. The community radio stations have been offering a platform that never existed before where citizens can freely debate and discuss issues affecting the country. There are however, still many rural districts in Zambia which have no access to any Zambian radio or television and do not even have community radio stations. Those near the border with neighboring countries end up listening to foreign radio stations. Chiengi and Milenge district in Luapula plus Shangombo and Sesheke in Western are just a few of the examples that are cited, particularly that the current project supported by the EU through Diakonia Zambia is operating in such areas.

Secondly President Mwanawasa’s fight against corruption and the quest to pursue cases involving former president Chiluba and the desire to clean the civil service improved the general perception of the government. The survey also demonstrated that Zambia’s population does not support authoritarian regimes or government and further showed that many Zambians are against military rule, one-party rule or one-man rule. Analysis of the findings in 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2009 showed that Zambians have consistently rejected military rule as well as one-party rule and one-man rule.

A recent EU Report[21] notes that government effectiveness is the area of governance in which Zambia is worst performing, below the Sub-Saharan average. Public services are plagued by staff shortages, unmotivated and often ineffective or absent staff. Until recently, most financial releases from the Treasury to spending ministries and agencies was very minimal, unpredictable and focused on meeting personal emolument expenses for civil servants with trickling funding to development projects[22]. It further noted that the government still struggles with accountability for public resources and inability to effectively deliver services. While levels of participation in accountability can be considered as high, approaches to this differ widely and this is largely localized. Accountability takes various forms but primarily solutions are addressed by community, religious or traditional leaders. In some instances, civil society has taken up some of the problems identified by local communities to government and policy makers. In recent years, especially in cases where community radio is established, citizens have used this media form to hold local government accountable.

Economic Gains, Electoral Dissatisfaction

While the MMD’s record on improving the economy is noted, it is also clear that economic gains during its reign did not translate into improvement in the livelihood of the majority of the citizens. In addition, the positive economic record is largely attributed to the time and leadership of late President Levy Mwanawasa (2001-8), with the earlier privatization of state owned enterprises under the late Frederick Chiluba (1991-2001) being the reason for the high job losses and economic stagnation until 2001. Notwithstanding, more than 60% of the Zambian population is still living under the poverty line[23].

According to the government of the Republic of Zambia, 61% of Zambians live below the income poverty line[24]. The concentration of poverty is especially high in rural areas where as many as 78% of the households can be characterised as living in poverty with limited or no access to educational opportunities, housing, health, clean water and sanitation. Many of the poorest households are headed by women. In addition, the youth, mostly in the age 12-24, constitute a large demographic group, estimated at about 70% of the population. During the last September 2011 Elections, they constituted more than 50% of the electorate and hence played a crucial role in the outturn of the election. However, their representation in politics and national development remains inferior.

The dissatisfaction with democracy can also be attributed to the high levels of poverty in the country. A study by Simon[25] in 2002 found that economic trends helped shape patterns of political participation in the first five years of Zambia’s new democracy, with economic difficulties depressing voter registration and turnout. In his study, Simon observed that many of the countries that underwent transitions to democracy in the ‘Third Wave’ did so under conditions of severe poverty–conditions that pose a high barrier to the consolidation of democracy. Poverty threatens the generation of democratic institutions and patterns of behaviour because it affects political participation.

Poverty does indeed appear to reduce political participation in Zambia. Evidence from district-level data as well as from individual-level survey data lends support to the notion that poverty undermines participation according to either of the means suggested above. Simutanyi made a similar observation at a conference on participatory democracy in South Africa, when he noted the following about Zambia’s poverty:

“Under Chiluba, poverty and inequality increased while Zambia’s democratic performance regressed. Zambia was much poorer in 2001 than it was ten years earlier, with 8 in every 10 Zambians living below the poverty line. All social indicators were negative, including the high unemployment levels of more than 40 percent, highest maternal mortality rates in the world, high infant and child mortality, inhabitable urban dwellings and homelessness, declining literacy rates and poverty wages. HIV and AIDS prevalence of 16 percent was high by world standards, especially when the absolute number of infected persons was 1,200,000 and close to 900,000 deaths per year against a population of less than 12 million”[26]

The poverty situation described above has not changed very much under the successive governments of the late President Mwanawasa, former president Rupiah Banda and now under President Sata.

In a nutshell, issues of economy have a direct bearing on the manner in which politics are shaped and invariably play out. In both the ‘revolutionary’ changes illuminated in the 1991 change of government, and similar trend of 2011, fundamentals around political economy and how they influence participation levels and positions taken by citizens are critical. There is belief that MMD lost power as citizens became more fatigued that they were not so accountable, growing intolerance of the MMD to divergent views leading to reduced participation space for key stakeholders in the governance process. MMD had not responded to pertinent issues people were looking forward to such as employment, growing concerns of raising corruption going on unabated. Behind all this was the issue of people’s welfare and livelihood amidst concerns of wealth creation and distribution.

Foreign Relations

Zambia is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the African Union, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which is headquartered in Lusaka. President Kaunda was a persistent and visible advocate of change in southern Africa, supporting liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and South Africa. Many of these liberation organizations were based in Zambia during the 1970s and 1980s. President Chiluba assumed a visible international role in the mid- and late 1990s. His government sponsored Angola’s peace talks that led to the 1994 Lusaka Protocols. Zambia provided troops to UN peacekeeping initiatives in Mozambique, Rwanda, Angola, and Sierra Leone. Zambia was the first African state to cooperate with the International Tribunal investigation of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

In 1998, Zambia took the lead in efforts to establish a cease-fire in Democratic Republic of the Congo. After the signing of a cease-fire agreement in Lusaka in July and August 1999, Zambia was active in supporting the Congolese peace effort, although activity diminished considerably after the Joint Military Commission tasked with implementing the ceasefire relocated to Kinshasa in September 2001.

During President Mwanawasa’s administration, Zambia contributed troops to support UN peacekeeping operations in southern Sudan. During his tenure as SADC Chair, President Mwanawasa brought the issue of Zimbabwe to the fore in the SADC, taking a lead role in pressuring President Mugabe for reforms in his country. Zambia’s history of stability and its commitment to regional peace has made it a haven for large numbers of refugees. Currently, Zambia hosts approximately 87,000 refugees (down from a high of 203,000 in 2002), including roughly 51,000 Congolese, 27,000 Angolans, and 9,000 other nationalities (mainly Rwandans, Burundians, and Somalis). In recent years, Zambia has made serious efforts to repatriate many of these refugees, including organized repatriation for 74,000 Angolan and 17,000 Congolese refugees.

ECONOMY

Economic policies soon after independence

At independence in 1964, Zambia’s economy grew the British South Africa Company (BSAC, originally setup by the British imperialist Cecil Rhodes) retained commercial assets and mineral rights that it acquired from a concession signed with the Litunga of Barotseland in 1892 (the Lochner Concession). Only by threatening to expropriate the BSAC, on the eve of independence, did the incoming Zambian government manage to get the BSAC to relinquish the mineral rights. The Federation’s government assigned roles to each of the three territories: Southern Rhodesia was assigned the responsibility of providing managerial and administrative skills; Northern Rhodesia provided copper revenues; and Nyasaland provided the Black labour.

After independence, Zambia followed in the steps of the Soviet Union by instituting a program of national development plans, under the direction of a National Commission for Development Planning: the Transitional Development Plan (1964–66) was followed by the First National Development Plan (1966–71). These two plans, which provided for major investment in infrastructure and manufacturing, were largely implemented and were generally successful. This was not true for subsequent plans.

The Mulungushi Economic Reforms (1968)

A major switch in the structure of Zambia’s economy came with the Mulungushi Reforms of April 1968: the government declared its intention to acquire equity holdings (usually 51% or more) in a number of key foreign-owned firms, to be controlled by a parastatal conglomerate named the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO). By January 1970, Zambia had acquired majority holding in the Zambian operations of the two major foreign mining corporations, the Anglo American Corporation and the Rhodesia Selection Trust (RST); the two became the Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) and Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM), respectively. The Zambian government then created a new parastatal body, the Mining Development Corporation (MINDECO). The Finance and Development Corporation (FINDECO) allowed the Zambian government to gain control of insurance companies and building societies. However, foreign-owned banks (such as Barclays, Standard Chartered and Grindlays) successfully resisted takeover. In 1971, INDECO, MINDECO, and FINDECO were brought together under an omnibus parastatal, the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO), to create one of the largest companies in sub-Saharan Africa, with the country’s president, Kenneth Kaunda as Chairman of the Board. The management contracts under which day-to-day operations of the mines had been carried out by Anglo American and RST were ended in 1973. In 1982 NCCM and RCM were merged into the giant Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd (ZCCM).

Unfortunately for Kaunda and Zambia, the programs of nationalization were ill-timed. Events that were beyond their control soon wrecked the country’s well-laid plans for economic and national development. In 1973 a massive increase in the price of oil was followed by a slump in copper prices in 1975, resulting in a diminution of export earnings. In 1973 the price of copper accounted for 95% of all export earnings; this halved in value on the world market in 1975. By 1976 Zambia had a balance-of-payments crisis, and rapidly became massively indebted to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Third National Development Plan (1978–83) had to be abandoned as crisis management replaced long-term planning.

By the mid-1980s Zambia was one of the most indebted nations in the world, relative to its gross domestic product (GDP). The IMF was insisting that the Zambian government should introduce programs aimed at stabilizing the economy and restructuring it to reduce dependence on copper. The proposed measures included: the ending of price controls; devaluation of the kwacha (Zambia’s currency); cut-backs in government expenditure; cancellation of subsidies on food and fertilizer; and increased prices for farm produce. Kaunda’s removal of food subsidies caused massive increases in the prices of basic foodstuffs; the country’s urbanized population rioted in protest. In desperation, Kaunda broke with the IMF in May 1987 and introduced a New Economic Recovery Programme in 1988. However, this did not help him and he eventually moved toward a new understanding with the IMF in 1989. In 1990, with the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (on which Kaunda’s philosophy of Zambian Humanism had been fashioned), Kaunda was forced to make a major policy volteface: he announced the intention to partially privatize the parastatals. Time, however, was running out for him. As Mikhail Gorbachev announced perestroika and glasnost, small-time dictators who had copied Joseph Stalin‘s policies had no choice but to realise that their days were numbered. This included Kaunda. Kaunda called multiparty elections in 1991, and lost them to the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Kaunda left office with the inauguration of MMD leader Frederick Chiluba as president on 2 November 1991.

Chiluba’s economic reforms

The Frederick Chiluba government (1991–2001), which came to power after democratic multi-party elections in November 1991, was committed to extensive economic reform. The government privatised many state industries, and maintained positive real interest rates. Exchange controls were eliminated and free market principles endorsed. It remains to be seen whether the Mwanawasa government will follow a similar path of implementing economic reform and undertaking further privatization. Zambia has yet to address issues such as reducing the size of the public sector, which still represents 44% of total formal employment, and improving Zambia’s social sector delivery systems.

After the government privatized the giant parastatal mining company Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), donors resumed balance-of-payment support. The final transfer of ZCCM’s assets occurred on March 31, 2000. Although balance-of-payment payments are not the answer to Zambia’s long-term debt problems, it will in the short term provide the government some breathing room to implement further economic reforms. The government has, however, spent much of its foreign exchange reserves to intervene in the exchange rate mechanism. To continue to do so, however, would jeopardize Zambia’s debt relief. Zambia qualified for HIPC debt relief in 2000, contingent upon the country meeting certain performance criteria, and this should offer a long-term solution to Zambia’s debt situation. In January 2003, the Zambian Government informed the International Monetary Fund and World Bank that it wished to renegotiate some of the agreed performance criteria calling for privatization of the Zambia National Commercial Bank and the national telephone and electricity utilities.

Copper

The Zambian economy has historically been based on the copper-mining industry. The discovery of copper is owed partly to Frederick Russell Burnham, the famous American scout who worked for Cecil Rhodes.[4] By 1998, however, output of copper had fallen to a low of 228,000 tonnes, continuing a 30-year decline in output due to lack of investment, and until recently, low copper prices and uncertainty over privatization. In 2001, the first full year of a privatized industry, Zambia recorded its first year of increased productivity since 1973. The future of the copper industry in Zambia was thrown into doubt in January 2002, when investors in Zambia are largest copper mine announced their intention to withdraw their investment. However, surging copper prices from 2004 to the present day rapidly rekindled international interest in Zambia’s copper sector with a new buyer found for KCCM and massive investments in expanding capacity launched. China has become a major investor in the Zambian copper industry, and in February 2007, the two countries announced the creation of a Chinese-Zambian economic partnership zone around the Chambishi copper mine. Today copper mining is central to the economic prospects for Zambia, but concerns remain that the economy is not diversified enough to cope with a collapse in international copper prices.

Inflation

Lack of balance-of-payment support meant the Zambian government did not have resources for capital investment and periodically had to issue bonds or otherwise expand the money supply to try to meet its spending and debt obligations. The government continued these activities even after balance-of-payment support resumed. This has kept interest rates at levels that are too high for local business, fuelled inflation, burdened the budget with domestic debt payments, while still falling short of meeting the public payroll and other needs, such as infrastructure rehabilitation. The government was forced to draw down foreign exchange reserves sharply in 1998 to meet foreign debt obligations, putting further pressure on the kwacha and inflation. Inflation held at 32% in 2000; consequently, the kwacha lost the same value against the dollar over the same period. In mid- to late 2001, Zambia’s fiscal management became more conservative. As a result, 2001 year-end inflation was below 20%, its best result in decades. In 2002 inflation rose to 26.7%. However in 2007 inflation hit 8%, the first time in 30 years that Zambia had seen single digit inflation. On January 27, 2011, it was reported by the Central Statistical Office that inflation rose to 9%.

Agriculture

The agriculture sector represented 20% GDP in 2000. Agriculture accounted for 85% of total employment (formal and informal) for 2000. Maize (corn) is the principal cash crop as well as the staple food. Other important crops include soybean, cotton, sugar, sunflower seeds, wheat, sorghum, pearl millet, cassava, tobacco and various vegetable and fruit crops. Floriculture is a growth sector, and agricultural non-traditional exports now rival the mining industry in foreign exchange receipts. Zambia has the potential for significantly increasing its agricultural output; currently, less than 20% of its arable land is cultivated. In the past, the agriculture sector suffered from low producer prices, difficulties in availability and distribution of credit and inputs, and the shortage of foreign exchange.

Growth

There are, however, positive macroeconomic signs, rooted in reforms implemented in the early and mid-1990s. Zambia’s floating exchange rate and open capital markets have provided useful discipline on the government, while at the same time allowing continued diversification of Zambia’s export sector, growth in the tourist industry, and procurement of inputs for growing businesses. Some parts of the Copper Belt have experienced a significant revival as spin-off effects from the massive capital reinvestment are experienced.

Salaula (second-hand clothing imported from the West)

Standard economic theory and empirical data indicates that second-hand clothing import can have positive effects in a country like Zambia (one of the least developed countries in the world). The salaula market reduces the proportion of income that a family has to spend on clothing. It also helps to keep employments like repairs and alterations in business and forces tailors to proceed into more specialize production of styled garments.

There is a downside to such imports, however; the massive importation of used clothing from the developed world has resulted in a near-total collapse of the Zambian indigenous textile industry. In the face of cheap used clothing, tailors’ specialized production may be irrelevant – customers will buy the least expensive clothing available, irrespective of style. Those who might otherwise work at textile mills or clothing factories are left jobless, or else make significantly less money in the salaula resale business.

About two-thirds of Zambians live in poverty. Per capita annual incomes are well below their levels at independence and, at $852, place the country among the world’s poorest nations. Life expectancy at birth is about 51 years, and maternal mortality is 649 per 100,000 pregnancies. The country’s rate of economic growth cannot support rapid population growth or the strain which HIV & AIDS-related issues (i.e., rising medical costs, decline in worker productivity) place on government resources. Zambia is also one of Sub-Saharan Africa’s most highly urbanized countries. Over one-third of the country’s 12.9 million people are concentrated in a few urban zones strung along the major transportation corridors, while rural areas are under-populated. Unemployment and underemployment are serious problems. HIV & AIDS is the nation’s greatest challenge, with 14.3% prevalence among the adult population.

HIV & AIDS will continue to ravage Zambian economic, political, cultural, and social development for the foreseeable future. Once a middle-income country, Zambia began to slide into poverty in the 1970s when copper prices declined on world markets. The socialist government made up for falling revenue by increasing borrowing. After democratic multi-party elections, the Chiluba government (1991-2001) came to power in November 1991 committed to an economic reform program. The government was successful in some areas, such as privatization of most of the parastatals, maintenance of positive real interest rates, the elimination of exchange controls, and endorsement of free market principles. Corruption grew dramatically under the Chiluba government. Zambia has yet to address effectively issues such as reducing the size of the public sector and improving Zambia’s social sector delivery systems.

Zambia is one of sub-saharan african ‘s most highly urbanized countries. About one-half of the country’s 11.5 million people are concentrated in a few urban zones strung along the major transportation corridors, while rural areas are under-populated. Unemployment and underemployment are serious problems. National GDP has actually doubled since independence, but due in large part to high birth rates and AIDS per capita annual incomes are currently at about two-thirds of their levels at independence. This low GDP per capita, which stands at $1400, places the country among the world’s poorest nations. Social indicators continue to decline, particularly in measurements of life expectancy at birth (about 50 years) and maternal and infant mortality (85 per 1,000 live births). The high population growth rate of 2.3% per annum makes it difficult for per capita income to increase. The country’s rate of economic growth cannot support rapid population growth or the strain which HIV/AIDS-related issues (i.e., rising medical costs, street children, and decline in worker productivity) places on government resources.

For the first time since 1989 Zambia’s economic growth reached the 6%-7% mark (in 2007) needed to reduce poverty significantly. Copper output has increased steadily since 2004, due to higher copper prices and the opening of new mines. The maize harvest was again good in 2005, helping boost GDP and agricultural exports. Cooperation continues with international bodies on programs to reduce poverty, including a new lending arrangement with the IMF in the second quarter of 2004. A tighter monetary policy will help cut inflation, but Zambia still has a serious problem with high public debt.

For 30 years, copper production declined steadily from a 1973 high of 700,000 metric tons to a 2000 low of 226,192 metric tons. The decline was the result of poor management of state-owned mines and lack of investment. With the privatization of the mines in April 2000, the downward trend in production and exports was reversed as a result of investments in plant rehabilitation, expansion, increased exploration, and high copper prices on the international market. Copper production rose to 535,000 metric tons in 2007, but slumping copper prices in late 2008 put significant pressure on the mining companies and government revenue. Zambia experienced positive economic growth for the ninth consecutive year in 2007 with a GDP of U.S. $10.9 billion and a real growth rate of 6% (according to preliminary IMF estimates). The rate of inflation dropped from 30% in 2000 to single-digit inflation of 8.9% by December 2007 due to fiscal and monetary discipline and the growth of the domestic food supply.

Year-on-year inflation grew to double digits in late 2008, due to rising fuel and food prices. In April 2005, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) provided Zambia significant debt service relief and debt forgiveness under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Zambia was the 17th country to reach the HIPC completion point and has benefited from approximately U.S. $6 billion in debt relief. In July 2005, the G-8 agreed on a proposal to cancel 100% of outstanding debt of eligible HIPC countries to the IMF, African Development Fund, and IDA. Zambia is among the beneficiaries of this additional multilateral debt relief.

Zambia also completed a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) arrangement with the IMF for the period 2008-2011. The Zambian Government is pursuing an economic diversification program to reduce the economy’s reliance on the copper industry. This initiative seeks to exploit other components of Zambia’s rich resource base by promoting agriculture, tourism, gemstone mining, and hydropower. The government is also seeking to create an environment that encourages entrepreneurship and private-sector led growth. Zambia’s economy has been affected by the global economic crisis and the fall in world copper prices. High inflation, currency volatility, rising unemployment, and restricted access to capital are likely to dampen Zambia’s economic performance in 2009.

Zambia’s Economic Growth Program-Increased private sector competitiveness

Despite Zambia’s potential in the agricultural and natural resources sectors, the country has been unable to register itself as a competitive market player locally, regionally and internationally. The main constraints to agricultural development and small-scale rural agribusiness competitiveness in the last decade have been:

I. Lack of capacity, clarity and consistency within Zambian Government to generate and implement liberalization policies conducive to private sector-led agricultural growth;

II. Poor market access and under-developed markets that limit production;

III. Inadequate sources of finance and capital;

IV. Low farm and firm-level production and productivity due to inadequate provision of technical information, limited use of modern production and value-adding technologies, and absence of business management services

To respond to these issues, the Economic Growth Program, as part of USAID/Zambia’s Country Strategic Plan for 2004-2010, aims to contribute towards increasing competitiveness of Zambian farmers and firms, and has adopted “Increased Private Sector Competitiveness” as the theme of its program. Activities under the program focus on attaining significant improvements in Zambia’s competitive position within the region and internationally, enabling Zambia to achieve trade-based rural economic growth and poverty reduction.

Zambia Development Agency

The Zambia Development Agency[27] (ZDA) was established in 2006 by an Act of Parliament No. 11 of 2006 and became operational in January 2007 after the amalgamation of five statutory bodies that hitherto operated independently to foster economic growth and development by promoting trade and investment through an efficient, effective and coordinated private sector led economic development strategy. These institutions were the Zambia Investment Centre (ZIC), Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA), Export Board of Zambia (EBZ), Small Enterprise Development Board (SEDB) and Zambia Export Processing Zones Authority (ZEPZA).

The Act gives powers to the ZDA in key areas of trade development, investment promotion, enterprise restructuring, development of green fields’ projects, small and enterprise development, trade and industry fund management, and contributing to skills training development.

The amalgamated Agency is therefore a semi-autonomous institution with its Board of Directors appointed, by the Minister of Commerce Trade and Industry. The Board comprises members of the public and private sector as well as civil society organisations, while both the Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson are appointed from the private sector. The agency also has the challenge to develop an internationally competitive Zambian economy through innovations that promote high skills, productive investment and increased trade. The ZDA principally furthers the economic development by promoting efficiency, investment and competitiveness in businesses, as well as promoting exports. It also addresses the high cost of doing business in the country by simplifying the processing of various business formalities, such as licensing. It builds and enhances the country’s investment profile for increased capital inflows, capital formation and employment creation. It also promotes the growth of the SME sector by providing incentives that can propel long-term sustainable domestic growth. ZDA is a one stop shop for all investors and this is evidence that Zambia is open for all to do business.

USAID FUNDED PROJECTS

United States economic assistance to Zambia predates the country’s independence. In the mid-1950s, a number of Zambians received scholarships to study in the United States. In the 1960s, an expanded USAID-financed program provided training and food aid. At independence in 1964, Zambia was the second richest nation in Africa south of the Sahara. However, by the late 1970s, the strong post-independence economy had stalled. Copper prices had collapsed and copper ore exports declined. In 1977, the United States responded to these problems by formally creating the USAID mission in Zambia.

Two decades after independence, Zambia went from being one of the richest countries in sub-Saharan Africa to one of the poorest. By the late 1980s, the economy had effectively collapsed and important social indicators, such as infant mortality, were increasing. This period coincided with the onset of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which strained the already beleaguered public health system to the breaking point[28]. Hindered by destructive policies similar to those weakening the economy, the health and education systems collapsed. There were acute shortages of essential medical supplies, facilities fell into disrepair and many Zambian health professionals began moving abroad in search of liveable wages. Large numbers of HIV/AIDS orphans became another major social problem.

For many years, political constraints frustrated economic assistance and development efforts in Zambia. However, in 1991, Zambia saw its ruling party swept from power. A new government came in with a platform based on liberalizing the economic and political systems. Since this change, there have been dramatic improvements in the structure and performance of the economy. Zambia is now more open in many respects and the economic situation is more promising, but much more remains to be done. USAID’s principal goal in Zambia is to help the country realize the immense economic potential it possesses. USAID supports programs that work towards growth with equity.

PROFIT (Production, Finance and Improved Technologies) Project – CLUSA[29]

The project’s aim is to increase smallholder client production and productivity by reducing costs of production and, together with private and public sectors, extend services to some 100,000 small farmers in high economic potential areas in Zambia. The project focuses on value chains and on the development of support industries, such as financial services and inputs.

MATEP (Market Access, Trade and Enabling Policies) Project – DAI

MATEP focuses on increasing the level of Zambian agriculture and natural resources exports into regional and international markets through overcoming policy, tariff, non-tariff barriers to trade and forging linkages[30]

FSRP (Food Security Research Project) – Michigan State University

FSRP builds capacity among agricultural sector planners to achieve improved policy making through applied agricultural economic research, policy analysis, outreach and dialogue[31].

Land O’Lakes

The Land O’Lakes dairy development program targets vulnerable small-scale farmers who are taught animal husbandry and fodder crop production, and subsequently provided with one dairy cow and veterinary services. Milk collection centers are provided with technical assistance to ensure quality and timely sale to urban-based processors.

USAID FUNDING TO ZAMBIAN INSTITUTIONS

Although Zambia has experienced 12 straight years of impressive economic growth and its average income of $1,460 makes it a lower-middle-income country, that growth has not benefited the two-thirds of Zambians who live in poverty. Reflecting considerable U.S. Government investment over time in one of the countries most affected by HIV/AIDS, some social indicators have improved, with life expectancy at birth now at 52 years (up from 39) and maternal mortality at 591 per 100,000 live births (down from 729). Zambia’s challenge is to promote broad-based, pro-poor economic growth, create employment and develop its human capital. Accordingly, USAID’s assistance concentrates on increasing agriculture-led economic growth to reduce rural poverty and food insecurity; improving the health of Zambians; reducing the incidence and impact of HIV/AIDS; raising the quality of basic education; and enhancing democratic governance[32].

Zambia Agribusiness Technical Assistance Center (ZATAC) – Copper belt Economic Diversification Project

This is a public-private partnership (Global Development Alliance), providing technical assistance and equipment to farmer business groups in a traditional Copper belt mining area. These groups are engaged in adding value to primary commodities through modern farming methods such as irrigation, and small-scale processing, as well as developing market linkages[33].

Zambia Agricultural Commodity Agency (ZACA)

ZACA issues warehouse receipts against agricultural commodities stored in warehouses, which they certify to be safe and secure. The receipts, defining the quality and quantity of a given commodity are used as collateral (instruments of title) in obtaining commercial loans against the stored commodities[34].

The Agricultural Consultative Forum (ACF)

The Agricultural Consultative Forum (ACF), established in 1998, is a platform for stakeholder consultation, information sharing, networking, and institutional capacity strengthening within the agricultural sector. Through ACF Advisory Notes, the government is provided with key inputs for policy decisions, representing the views of sector stakeholders[35].

World Bank-Historical Perspective

Well before attaining its independence, Zambia began to receive World Bank support in 1955, amounting to US$4.6 billion for a total of 250 projects. As of September 2013, IDA’s net commitments in Zambia totalled US$575.2 million for eight active projects, supporting programs in infrastructure, energy, the environment, agriculture, finance and private sector development, and human development. Agriculture has been the largest area of support in the last few years and more recently there has been the inclusion of direct budget support[36].

After Zambia reached the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion point in 2005, financial support was increased. The World Bank, under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) and HIPC, provided a total of US$2.7 billion in debt relief to Zambia. As a result of these initiatives, Zambia saved US$233 million in debt service obligations between 2000 and 2007. This has resulted in a reduction of debt service obligations as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) from 4.2% in 2000 to 0.8% in 2006.

The World Bank is one of nine cooperating partners to provide direct budget support to the Zambian government to help fund the government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers through the fifth and sixth national development plans. Since 2005 the Bank has provided two budget support credits worth US$100 million supporting government reforms, namely the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP), civil service pension system, sale of Zambia National Commercial Bank, public sector reform, pension reform and macroeconomic management particularly the creation of credit reference bureau. The Bank also provides analytical and advisory services designed to help Zambia improve its policy environment and accelerate its development efforts. This non-lending technical assistance program has helped augment the government’s capacity to provide quick support to implement policy reforms. The Bank has also helped in the development of legislation on agricultural marketing, strengthening government capacity and reducing the cost of doing business in Zambia.

Economic Review

Independent since 1964, Zambia has experienced five successful multiparty elections since 1991. The peaceful general election held in September 2011 further strengthened the country’s democratic credentials and underscored the country’s enormous economic potential grounded in its rich endowment of natural resources that include abundant land and water[37].

The country has defined its own development agenda through its Vision 2030 and the Sixth National Development Plan (FNDP). The Plan is organized around the theme of “broad based wealth and job creation through citizenry participation and technological advancement.” Specific development goals include fostering a competitive and outward-oriented economy, significantly reducing hunger and poverty, and reaching middle income status. The first step came in July 2011 when Zambia was classified a lower middle income country by the World Bank.

Zambia has had a decade of rapid economic growth. A combination of prudent macroeconomic management, market liberalization and privatization efforts, investments in the copper industry and related infrastructure, and steep increase in copper prices helped achieve an average annual growth of about 5.7% during the last decade. Foreign direct investment rose from approximately US$164.9 million in 2003 to US$1.73 billion in 2010 with most investments going to mining, manufacturing wholesale and retail trade. The Zambian government consolidated macroeconomic stability under International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs (latest concluded in 2011) and successfully navigated the shocks connected with the 2008 global economic and financial crises. Annual inflation declined from about 30% in 2000 to 7.2% in 2011. Debt relief improved Zambia’s external position and helped build foreign-exchange reserves to a comfortable level.

However, Zambia’s economic growth has not translated into significant poverty reduction. Sixty percent of the population lives below the poverty line and 42% are considered to be in extreme poverty. Moreover, the absolute number of poor has increased from about six million in 1991 to 7.9 million in 2010, primarily due to population growth. The urban picture is far better than the rural: in the Copper-belt and Lusaka provinces, for example, poverty incidence is fairly low (22% and 34% respectively), whereas in the rest of the country, which is dominated by agriculture, poverty rates are greater than 70%. Almost 90% of Zambians who live below the extreme poverty line are concentrated in rural areas, and the poverty gap ratio (a measure of how far average incomes fall below the poverty line) is far higher for the rural population than their urban counterparts (20% and 3.7%, respectively). Accelerating growth and reducing poverty will necessitate increasing the competitiveness of the Zambian economy by reducing the cost of doing business and ensuring that the rural economy, upon which much of the population depends for its livelihood, contributes meaningfully to overall growth. Despite vast potential and stated commitments to diversification, the mining sector continues to dominate the economy.

Zambia’s economy extended its growth momentum in 2012. Growth was driven by expansion in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, transport and finance. Economic prospects for the future appear bright if growth can be sustained and broadened to accelerate job creation and poverty reduction. After a successive slump in output, copper mining is expected to rebound in 2013, and is projected to reach 1.5 million tonnes by 2015. This is largely due to investment in new mines and the expansion of capacity at existing plants. Robust international copper prices will provide additional stimulus to mining.

Growth in other sectors is expected to remain equally robust, supported by infrastructure development and improvements in the business environment. In the agriculture sector, the government’s input subsidy to smallholder farmers will continue while growth in construction and transport will benefit from the government’s Link 8000 road infrastructure project. Expansion in energy infrastructure, a boost in the services sector from rising urban incomes and improvements in the regulatory environment will further strengthen Zambia’s medium-term growth.

However, Zambia’s growth will remain redundant unless there is a corresponding increase in job creation and progress on poverty reduction, and further progress in tackling the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Zambia’s natural resources have not been harnessed to foster structural transformation and inclusive job creation. The country is dependent on copper mining, which accounts for about 80% of foreign exchange earnings and only 6% of total revenues. Thus, Zambia’s long-term economic prospects hinge on the prudent capture and deployment of copper revenues as well as harnessing the potential of non-copper minerals and other natural resources. Ultimately, manufacturing activity, driven by the private sector, and directly or indirectly linked to these natural resources, will be critical to the country’s long-term prosperity.

Zambia Economic progress

The outlook for the Zambian economy remains favourable in the medium term, underpinned by robust growth and single-digit inflation. The economy is projected to grow 6.9% in 2012, picking up to 7.3% in 2013, while inflation should remain in single digits, at 8.0% and 8.5% respectively. The country, however, remains vulnerable to external shocks, with a sluggish global economic recovery a concern for its key mining exports. High youth unemployment and slow progress in poverty reduction may also overshadow the gains made from strong growth and limited inflation[38].

Zambia’s economic growth slowed to 6.6% in 2011 from 7.6% in 2010, mainly as a result of a weaker mining sector performance. However, the medium-term economic outlook appears favourable, underpinned by sustained expansion in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, transport and communications, and by a rebound in mining. Inflation is projected to remain in single digits, reflecting prudent monetary policy, while the objective of exchange rate policy is to maintain external competitiveness. Increasing domestic revenue collection remains a priority for the medium term and large infrastructure developments will require additional resources. The government plans to raise USD 700 million (US dollars) via a bond issue in 2012 to cover a funding gap for infrastructure projects. This infrastructure investment is expected to boost growth by up to 2 percentage points per annum. Risks to the outlook include Zambia’s vulnerability to external shocks and a sluggish global economic recovery, which could reduce demand for exports. Moreover, maintaining investor confidence has emerged as a key issue after the government reversed the privatisation of Zambia’s telecoms company.

Tackling high youth unemployment and poverty remains a top priority, with as much as 60% of the population below the poverty line, although there are wide disparities between rural and urban areas. Part of this high level of poverty is due to lack of employment opportunities for youth. As a proportion of the labour force, 63% of the urban 15-19 age group are out of work and this improves to only 48% in the 20-24 age category. In rural areas, 16% of the 15-19 age group and 7% of the 20-24 age group are unemployed but these figures mainly reflect informal agricultural employment. Significant gender disparities are also prevalent. With about 300 000 young people entering the labour market each year, the government has put in place a National Youth Policy and the Youth Enterprise Fund which focus on promoting business activity to create jobs. The government has also announced plans to transform Zambian national service into a Zambian youth training service with a mandate to strengthen youth skills training.

Recent Developments & Prospects

Zambia’s growth slowed to 6.6% in 2011 from 7.6% in 2010, mainly because of a weaker mining sector performance. The main contributors to growth were agriculture, manufacturing, transport and communications, wholesale and trade, and construction, which collectively accounted for more than 70% of gross domestic product (GDP). After two successive years of strong growth, the gain in mining faltered to 1.3% reflecting a 2.2% reduction in mineral output.

The country’s medium-term prospects look favourable, with real GDP growth projected to increase to 6.9% in 2012 and then 7.3% in 2013. Growth will be underpinned by sustained gains in construction, manufacturing, and transport and communications and a rebound in mining activity. An expected expansion in non-maize agriculture may also add impetus. So far, Zambia has not been significantly affected by the European debt crisis but remains vulnerable to risks posed by any global economic slowdown, which could dampen the country’s export performance. Agriculture, accounting for 21% of the economy, is vulnerable to weather conditions and could also suffer from reduced rainfall.

Agriculture has been robust in recent years, producing bumper harvests since 2009, with staples and maize in particular to the fore. Non-maize production, however, is gaining pace, reflecting increasing diversification in the sector. Although agriculture is expected to be the main contributor to growth in 2012, this is likely to be below the three-year average mainly because of delayed rains and rural infrastructure challenges which continue to hamper timely distribution of agriculture inputs. To address infrastructure deficiencies, the government has increased the agriculture budget allocation in 2012 by 6.1%, with the bulk of the funding going to the Farmer Input Support Programme and crop purchases for the strategic food reserve.

Other key areas are development of irrigation infrastructure, and livestock, fisheries and aquaculture development. Output in the mining and quarrying sector fell 0.7% in 2011 as uncertainty over the outcome of presidential elections saw investment decisions on major projects deferred. As a result copper output was down 2.2%. With the elections having gone smoothly, mining investment should now pick up, barring any adverse international developments. The mining sector accordingly is projected to grow 10.6% and 10.3% in 2012 and 2013.

The construction sector has been pivotal to Zambia’s growth in recent years, accounting for some 21.1% of the economy in 2011. The rebound in mining activity and increased public expenditure on infrastructure are expected to boost construction, giving an average sector growth rate of 17% in 2012 and 2013. Growth in transport and communications slowed to 12.7% in 2011 from 15% in 2010, mainly because of problems with railway infrastructure and slower growth in air transport and communication. In 2012, growth in the sector could fall further as the reversal of Zamtel’s privatisation may dampen investor confidence and hamper investment. Zambia’s prospects for sustained growth depend on increased economic diversification, away from mining.

The manufacturing sector is especially important to the country’s long-term growth and employment strategy. In 2011, manufacturing growth was 5%, in line with industry estimates, but the sector accounted for 9.1% of the economy, down from 11.2% in 2006. Growth was mainly driven by increased investment, particularly in agro processing; in response to prudent economic management and business reforms Sustained growth in manufacturing and other sectors depends on improved access to affordable finance and continued implementation of structural reforms to spur private sector participation. High interest rates remain a barrier to accessing credit, especially for small businesses. In a bid to reduce lending rates the government cut the corporate tax rate in the banking sector from 40% to 35%. Additionally, the central bank lowered the statutory reserve ratio requirement to 5% from 8% to free up more of the commercial banks’ resources for private sector lending. At the same time, however, the government increased the bank sector’s minimum capital base to ZMK 104 billion (Zambian kwacha) for local banks and ZMK 520 billion for foreign banks, from the previous ZMK 12 billion across the industry.

Following the expiry of Zambia’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in June 2011, discussions on a new arrangement began. During the ECF period, Zambia’s economic performance and policy management were deemed satisfactory and in line with agreed benchmarks. Accordingly, the World Bank reclassified Zambia as a lower middle-income country and it secured a “B+” credit rating from Fitch and Standard and Poor’s. These gains need to be consolidated for Zambia’s growth to be inclusive.

Fiscal Policy

To maintain macroeconomic stability in 2011, the fiscal deficit, at 2.6% of GDP, was kept within the sustainable limit of not more than 3% of GDP whilst strengthening domestic resource mobilisation. Total government expenditure stood at 19.3% of GDP in 2011, down from 21.5% in 2010. The main spending pressures in 2011 were related to the general elections and larger-than-anticipated maize purchases. However, recurrent expenditure was kept largely in line at 15.4% of GDP, compared with 15.8% in 2010, with salary costs unchanged at 7.7%. Capital expenditure increased marginally to 3% of GDP from 2.8%, reflecting additional spending on infrastructure, particularly the maintenance of urban roads. Domestic revenues fell to 14.7% of GDP in 2011 from 16% in 2010 and are projected to fall further to 13.6% and 12.6% in 2012 and 2013.

The overall balance in the public finances showed a deficit of 2.6% of GDP in 2011, down from 3.0% in 2010, but the shortfall is expected to increase to 3.6% in 2012 before easing again to 3.0% in 2013. The expected widening of the public deficit in 2012 reflects the new government’s policy of increased expenditure on social and infrastructure development. Domestic revenues are expected to fall to 13.6% of GDP in 2012, largely because of an increase in the tax relief granted to low income earners. To partly cushion the impact of this measure, the government has raised the mineral royalty rate to 6% from 3%. Grants are expected to be unchanged at 1.2% of GDP in anticipation of reduced aid flows.

Additional spending on infrastructure will be financed by external borrowing, of which the USD 700 million bond issue will be the major component. The main challenge for fiscal policy remains that of widening the tax base, increasing the tax take from the mining sector and allocating these resources to productive uses. Vision 2030 and the Sixth National Development Plan continue to provide overall guidance in fiscal management. Reforms are needed, among them a gradual withdrawal of widespread tax breaks and the introduction of a property tax. A 2012 budget proposal to remove copper and cobalt ores and concentrates from the Import VAT Deferment Scheme would significantly enhance revenue mobilisation efforts.

Monetary Policy

Monetary policy in 2011 focused on sustaining macroeconomic stability by restricting inflation to single digits while ensuring adequate levels of liquidity for the growing economy. Market-based instruments remained the hallmark of the central bank’s monetary policy supported by a flexible exchange rate regime, aimed at absorbing external shocks to contain inflationary pressures. Inflation in 2011 was held at 8.7%, up from 8.5% in 2010. Tight monetary policy and a reduction in fuel prices towards the end of the year helped slow the increase in non-food inflation while food prices were kept in check by adequate stocks following successive bumper harvests. Food price inflation declined to 3.9% in 2011 from 4.4% in 2010 while non-food inflation fell to 10.2% from 11.3%. Inflation in 2012 and 2013 is projected at 8.0% and 8.5% respectively. The government’s expansionary fiscal policy to fund increased infrastructure spending and possible accommodation of wage demands in the public sector may add to inflation pressures. The Zambian kwacha depreciated 5.3% in 2011, mainly because of uncertainty about the outcome of the elections, which heightened risk aversion towards the local currency. The rate of depreciation would have been higher but for central bank intervention to smooth out sharp movements in the exchange rate and maintain external competitiveness. The Bank of Zambia remains committed to a floating exchange rate regime.

Economic Cooperation, Regional Integration & Trade

Zambia remains committed to a liberal trade regime and efforts to deepen this process further have continued through regional and multilateral arrangements. This is important in promoting export-led growth and economic diversification. Zambia hosts the headquarters of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and remains active in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). It is a founder member of both groups. Zambia’s pro-trade policies and improved trade-related infrastructure such as the One Stop Border Post at Chirundu with Zimbabwe and Kasumbalesa with the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the launch of the Simplified Trade Regime at the Mwami border post with Malawi, have yielded benefits. The 2011 Global Competitiveness Report showed that Zambia was ahead of many of its peers in institutional strength and in financial and goods markets efficiency.

The external sector remained strong in 2011, with an increase in the current account surplus to USD 951 million, equal to 5.4% of GDP, from USD 614.7 million or 3.6% in 2010 as mining sector exports grew 15% to USD 7 billion from USD 5.8 billion, accounting for more than 80% of total merchandise exports. The strong external performance bolstered the level of gross international reserves to more than four months of import cover. In 2012, the current account surplus is expected to narrow to 3.6% of GDP, largely thanks to elevated oil prices and a possible reduction in mining earnings in view of the sluggish global economic recovery. In 2013, a recovery in the global economy will benefit metal prices and revive demand for Zambia’s non-traditional products, which should boost the current account surplus back to 4.0% of GDP. There is growing concern that the dominance of the extractive sector in Zambia’s exports is a major source of vulnerability and efforts to diversify away from its traditional reliance on copper should be accelerated.

Debt Policy

Zambia’s risk for external debt distress remains low, mainly because of the government’s cautious approach following a significant reduction in borrowings under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and Multilateral Debt Relief initiatives of 2005 and 2006. These initiatives significantly improved Zambia’s external debt sustainability, with the debt service to exports ratio falling to less than 4% in 2011 from 11% in 2005. The government’s current debt strategy focuses on limiting non-concessional borrowing to economically productive investments. In 2011 the government contracted some USD 505 million to finance infrastructure projects, compared with debt repayments worth USD 200 million in the year. In 2012 the government plans to issue a USD 700 million bond to cover an infrastructure finance gap estimated at USD 500 million. This will increase Zambia’s external debt but the current level of economic growth means it should be sustainable.

The government is trying to improve and consolidate debt management, tightening up oversight procedures. The government has also agreed to share information with the IMF before contracting any non-concessional loans. In 2011 a debt management performance assessment made recommendations in areas needing improvement.

Economic & Political Governance

Private Sector

Since 2004 the government has been implementing institutional and other structural reforms in line with the Zambia Private Sector Development Reform Programme (PSDRP), which aims to improve the business environment, encourage competitiveness and promote export diversification. These reforms have paid off with improvements in the general business environment. In 2010, the World Bank hailed Zambia as one of the best reformers in Africa. However, risks to further progress remain and there has been some slippage. In the latest World Bank Ease of Doing Business survey, Zambia dropped to 84 from 80 in the overall rankings. At the same time, Zambia was ranked 8, second only to South Africa on the continent, on ease of obtaining credit. The government has also embarked on a programme of harmonising business sector legislation but the controversy over the Zamtel privatisation risks damaging private investment.

Financial Sector

The banking sector accounts for more than 90% of Zambia’s total financial industry assets. At the end of 2011 there were 19 commercial banks in Zambia, up from 18 in 2010. Credit supplied to the private sector, however, was below 10% of GDP in 2011 as the commercial banks prefer to invest in public debt instruments. In 2011 they accounted for more than half of total treasury security holdings. Some 67% of the population is without access to financial services, meaning that effective savings mobilisation is inhibited. Low domestic savings in turn are another hindrance to financial intermediation, with the country lacking the critical mass of resources to finance investment and spur growth.

High interest rates upwards of 25% have also shut out many borrowers. Improved macroeconomic stability manifested by the fall in inflation, the reduction in government borrowing and the central bank’s moves to reduce statutory reserves justify lower interest rates. The authorities also want to improve access to credit by encouraging competition in the banking sector and improving the reach of innovative banking and financial services. The government’s Financial Sector Development Plan resulted in the establishment of the Credit Reference Bureau in 2009 to increase credit information. However, the banks’ response to this policy initiative has been slow, as manifested by continued low private sector credit availability, an issue that is especially acute for small and medium-sized enterprises.

Generating long-term finance requires incentives to encourage new entrants, especially institutional investors, to improve market liquidity. The Lusaka Stock Exchange has only 20 listed companies with a combined market capitalisation of about 60% of GDP.

Public Sector Management, Institutions & Reform

Zambia’s constitution provides a dual legal system based on customary or statute law for the ownership of land and housing. The availability of land covered by statutory law is limited, while customary land allocation is at the mercy of local traditional chiefs, many of whom are reluctant to release it for investment. As a result, many people have either limited or no access to land title and property rights in general are weak, constituting a major obstacle to development. Statutory law requires proof of financial capacity to develop land and such proof is most often deemed to be provided by having a bank account. Given low rates of access to financial services, however, few people have the capacity to acquire land under statutory law. Under customary law, Zambians can apply to the traditional authority in the area who in turn may allocate land for individual use over a limited period of time or for indefinite use, but without title of ownership. The resulting limited access to land has serious implications for economic growth since banks require title of ownership to provide credit, dampening investment and growth, and thereby slowing down poverty reduction.

The country’s push towards better public sector management and administration continues to revolve around the ongoing implementation of public sector reforms. In October 2011 the government launched new procurement guidelines to improve transparency and efficiency in an effort to combat corruption. The main concern has been slow progress towards implementation of the decentralisation and pay reform programmes. Zambia’s participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has enhanced transparency in the utilisation of resource revenues. In August 2011 the EITI board noted the country’s “significant progress” in implementing EITI due processes. An audit conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers at the initiative of the government noted some misreporting of earnings by some mining companies and the new government has called for the extractive industries to ensure beneficial gains for Zambians, including creating more jobs.

The Environment Council of Zambia (ECZ) was set up in 1992 to manage environmental policy but it was criticised for failing to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In June 2011 the ECZ was replaced by the Zambia Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA) which has a broader mandate to ensure environmental protection and proper management of natural resources. The major challenge facing ZEMA is lack of adequate financing to allow it to enforce regulations. The recent merger of the Environment and Lands ministries may streamline ZEMA’s overall performance and improve service delivery.

Political Context

Zambia has held democratically contested elections since 1991, culminating in the September 2011 polls won by the opposition Patriotic Front, with Michael Sata becoming president on promises to help the poor and ensure all get the benefits of the country’s mineral wealth. Zambia has ratified the UN Convention against Corruption and introduced a number of measures aimed at both preventing and prosecuting corrupt practices. In 2010 the government began work on legislation to protect “whistle blowers” and transformed the anti-fraud and money-laundering unit into the much stronger and independent Financial Intelligence Unit. The office of the auditor general has improved the time it completes the audit process. Out of 53 African countries in 2011, Zambia was ranked 16 on the Mo Ibrahim Index of governance while the fight against graft saw its ranking improve to 91 in 2011 from 101 in 2010 out of 183 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index compiled by Transparency International.

Social Context & Human Development

Building Human Resources

In 2011, Zambia was ranked 164 out of the 187 countries on the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI) with a score of 0.43, which was lower than sub-Saharan Africa’s mean HDI of 0.46 and Angola’s 0.49, a country that was until a decade ago afflicted by civil war. However, the country has recorded improvements in some of social indicators. According to the 2011 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) progress report, there was full primary education enrolment by 2009, up from 80% in 1990, supported by the increased construction

of schools and the adoption of Free Basic Education and Re-entry Policies. The primary school completion rate rose to 91.7% in 2009 from 64% 1990. The main challenges are to improve adult literacy levels, at 71% in 2008, and a low secondary school completion rate of 19% in 2009. More emphasis should go on improving quality and not just quantity of education, and access to post-secondary education and skills training. A 2010 report on technical and literacy levels indicates that Zambia lags behind all its regional peers.

The latest figures show a decline in the infant mortality rate to 86 per 1 000 live births in 2009 from 88 in 2008, compared with the MDG target of 63.6. The pattern for under-5 infant mortality is similar, showing a decline to 141 per 1 000 live births in 2009 from 145 in 2008, compared with a target of 35.7 by 2015. The figures point to the importance of continued and effective child immunisation programmes, alongside improved prevention and management of common childhood illnesses if the country is to achieve the MDG targets. Zambia also faces a serious challenge in terms of maternal mortality, despite the decrease from 649 deaths per 100 000 live births in 1996 to 591 in 2007. Improvement here requires training, oversight and incentives for midwives in conjunction with improved access to and monitoring of rural health posts, and curbing unsafe home-based birth practices.

Poverty Reduction, Social Protection & Labour

Some 59% of the population were classified as living in extreme poverty in 2006, up from 58% in 2004. In rural areas, it is higher at 67% compared with 20% in urban areas. To reverse the increase in poverty, Zambia’s economy needs to grow by more than 7% while policy should ensure that growth is inclusive. Macroeconomic and structural policies that promote job creation, social empowerment and significant levels of investment in health and education are essential to achieve economic inclusion. In particular, investment in infrastructure and commercialisation of small scale agriculture and diversification of the rural economy offer potential benefits. Direct help for households needs to be more widely available in order to protect the most vulnerable from the adverse effects of poverty.

The government’s Social Protection Strategy of 2005 continues to guide and co-ordinate social protection. The plan stresses the importance of social protection as both a relief for the poor while encouraging them to become engaged in the productive economy. Institutionally, the social protection sector advisory group operates under the supervision of the Ministry of Community Development. The work includes providing subsidised agriculture inputs to vulnerable but viable farmers, micro-credit funding for women and other vulnerable sectors of the community and a public works programme. Recent reports suggest progress is being made in the basics of providing adequate food and improved health care. Key challenges are limited capacity and inadequate funding while the increase in rural poverty presents an additional burden. There is also concern about weaknesses in coordination and insufficient monitoring and evaluation to ascertain the direct impact of the programmes on poverty reduction.

Gender Equality

Zambia is a signatory to a number of protocols protecting women and girls and has established a gender ministry to address issues related to gender and development. However, progress on gender equality has been slow. Women’s representation in parliament stood at 14% in 2009 relative to the MDG and SADC target of 30%. In 2011, this figure fell to 11.3%. Some achievements have been made, especially in primary education. The ratio of girls to boys in primary education improved from 0.90 in 1990 to 0.96 in 2009 – but fell to 0.88 in 2009 from 0.92 in 1990 in secondary education. This figure suggests that the government’s policy of allowing school re-entry for pregnant girls may not be fully understood. Early marriages based on traditional cultural and social factors have deterred girls from continuing in school and the policy was designed to enable them to return to education.

Thematic analysis: Promoting Youth Employment

The problem of youth unemployment in Zambia poses significant policy challenges to the country’s long-term growth, with nearly half of its some 14 million people under the age of 15. A 2008 survey showed that in the urban areas 63% of the 15-19 age group were out of work while the rate of unemployment for those in the 20-24 age categories was 48%. In rural areas 16% of the 15-19 age group and 7% of those aged 20-24 were unemployed although these figures mainly reflect informal agricultural employment. Significant gender disparities are also prevalent.

About 300 000 young people enter the labour market each year and with few employment opportunities the large number of unemployed youth is creating political and economic tensions in the country. It is widely understood that growing youth disillusionment over unemployment was one of the reasons behind the defeat of the incumbent government in the last election. Obstacles to youth employment include the inability of the educational system to equip people with relevant skills required by the job market, high school dropout rates, a lack of entrepreneurial opportunities and poor access to labour market information for job seekers and employees.

The new government has made it a priority to implement projects and programmes stressing creation of youth employment through entrepreneurship. To address the issue of technical skills, the government reorganised the Zambia National Service into the Zambian Youth Training Service with a mandate to strengthen youth skills training. In the 2012 budget the government increased funding for education and skills development by 26.7%. In 2011 the government carried out national consultations under the theme “Let the Youth Be Heard: Dialogues and Mutual Understanding” as it sought to address this key issue for the country. Calls were heard for a review of the education system to tailor it towards an entrepreneurial system and for more tertiary institutions, education loans and youth scholarships.

Establishment of Industrial Development Corporation (IDC)

Zambia has launched the Industrial Development Corporation, (IDC) which has just been incorporated under the Companies Act and is a 100% government owned corporation which will be the holding company of all state owned enterprises that are incorporated under the Companies Act or the Banking and Financial Services Act[39].

Its initial authorized capital is K20 millions of which K10 million is already paid up using funds from the Privatisation Revenue Account as sanctioned by Section 39 Subsection (2) (J) of the Privatisation Act, Cap 386 of the Laws of Zambia. President Sata has directed that a Sovereign Fund, which will initially be supported by the IDC after Parliament passes a statute to give effect to the Sovereign Fund be constituted with due dispatch. 75% of the dividends from the IDC itself and its subsidiaries will be paid into the Sovereign Fund. Some of the balances of the Privatisation Revenue Account which are substantial will provide the initial capital stock of the Sovereign Fund. The Sovereign Fund will and should be an inescapable duty and obligation of a responsible nation. The Sovereign Fund constitutes Zambia’s positive legacy to posterity.

The IDC has been incorporated to promote an open economy in order to attract investment and expand Zambia’s export opportunities through the accelerated development of multi-facility economic zones and thus create jobs. Its focus is on developing labour-intensive industries and enterprises in the key areas of agriculture, construction, manufacturing, tourism, science and technology.

The role of a parastatal is to develop human resource capacity in Zambia, encourage transfer of skills from more developed economies. It will attract foreign investment into Zambia due to its capacity to show that certain investment areas are viable. And because IDC is a parastatal with Government backing and guarantees, it can bring into Zambia equipment and technology that the private sector would struggle to achieve those results. China’s economic success is an example as it was largely developed by parastatal, which became the motivators and facilitators of private sector investment. The government is not resurrecting INDECO but establishing a whole new public holding company, necessitated by today’s realities. The IDC will come with a new strategic vision and mandate to be an alternative engine of economic growth. The Government will put in place viable management structures and systems and ensure that there is no political interference.

Zambia and Germany ink agro deal

Zambia and Germany have signed a Joint Declaration of Intent on a Bilateral Cooperation Project aimed at promoting sustainable and modern agriculture in the country. The Joint Declaration of Intent on the establishment of the agricultural demonstration and training centre on the premises of the Golden Valley Agricultural Research Trust (GART) was signed on the side-lines of the Global Forum for Food and Agriculture conference in Berlin.
The aim of the project is to provide sustained support of cereal and potato cultivation in Zambia through training and the professionalization of production systems.
The establishment of the centre will enable farmers and technicians to receive hands-on training in modern agricultural engineering, sustainable cultivation techniques and good farm management[40].

Zambia’s agriculture sector is progressing reasonably well, and there’s for inspiring partnerships such as the Agriculture Bilateral Cooperation Project. The country is progressing well in terms of production of maize and that increased yield could be achieved with the acquisition of improved German technologies. The bilateral agreement is aimed enhancing the capacity to support the farmers in accessing credit on an annual basis, provision of extension services, access to research and development of seeds, products and programmes such as conservation farming, and also to ensure that farmers have enough commodities that they can sell to improve their standard of living.

Construction of new oil refinery plant

The construction of the Bwana Mkubwa Oil Refinery project through a joint venture has been set for 2016 at a cost of about US$1.6 billion. Maysen and Borowski Claymont Joint Venture (MBCJV) of Australia in partnership with Phoenix Material and Constructing Company will construct the new refinery with a capacity to process about five million metric tonnes of oil per annum. The new refinery pipeline will triple the current national crude oil supply. Bwana Mkubwa Oil Refinery, which will be situated at the Sub-Sahara Gemstone Exchange (SGE) Industrial Park in Ndola is anticipated to employ over 13,000 jobs.

The capital cost of the Bwana Mkubwa pipeline is approximately at US$1.6 billion. Once fully operational, the new refinery will be capable of processing up to five million metric tonnes of crude oil per annum. The construction of the project is expected to start in 2016 and if successful, the project will be one of the biggest infrastructure projects in Zambia. The new plant will be fed with crude oil through a new pipeline that will be built alongside the 1,800-kilometre Tazama pipeline. The new refinery, which will stimulate the growth of other auxiliary industries, will also include the development of commercial entities, warehousing, dry port, container depot, a skills training centre, houses and a green space.

The project will also include developing two new exporting lines to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania to provide efficient regional distribution of refined oil products.
In 2013 the Government gave approval to conduct a bankable feasibility study. The group will spend close to US$3 million this year in completing the study. The project is being developed in co-operation with a number of companies including Samsung Engineering of South Korea. Zambia’s oil demand is projected to increase beyond the current capacity of Indeni Petroleum Refinery resulting in inflated prices. The SGE industrial park project will be built at a cost of about US$1.7 billion and will be a multi-function economic development zone located next to the current Indeni refinery site in Ndola[41].

Smallholder farmers receive support

ABOUT K2 million has been disbursed to nine smallholder farmers under the Bunjimi Asset plus programme, – aimed at enhancing productivity and value addition among the farmers. The programme that is being spearheaded in partnership of Zambia National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU) and National Savings and Credit Bank (NATSAVE) was launched in October to improve smallholder farmer access to financial services using nonfixed asset collateral. ZNFU senior agribusiness manager Mwaka Kayula said, nine smallholder farmers have so far benefit from the programme.

The Bunjimi Asset plus will increase capacity of smallscale farmers to service debt through improved bankable business plans and forward market contracts and will access financial services from NATSAVE bank. Under the programme, farmers will obtain loans from the bank to purchase tractors, irrigation and treadle pumps, and other agricultural equipment. The value, crop diversification and mechanisation among smallholder farmers play a critical role in the development of agriculture sector. About 1,000 farmers are expected to benefit from the project by the end of 2014 because the ultimate goal is to empower the small-scale farmers so that they graduate to emergent farmers and eventually to commercial farmers. ZNFU and NATSAVE are already processing loans for 200 farmers planning to acquire diary animals and milk processing equipment[42].

MINING

The mining industry has been the economic and social backbone of Zambia since the first major phase of exploitation of the Copper belt’s Cu-Co deposits commenced in the early 1930’s. Since that time a wide spectrum of other metalliferous and non-metalliferous resources have been discovered in Zambia and, although exploitation of these has been limited, they clearly demonstrate the considerable opportunities for further exploration and mining[43].

The Government has adopted a pragmatic mineral policy which is designed to enhance investment in the mining industry and to ensure the development of a self-sustaining minerals-based industry. The recent privatization of the copper mining industry, formerly managed under the parastatal umbrella of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd (ZCCM), is a clear demonstration of this intent. Enactment of this policy is being promoted by the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development through the technical support available from its three constituent departments – Geological Survey, Mines Development and Mines Safety[44].

The Mining Policy

Key objectives of the Government’s Mining Policy, published in 1995, are as follows:

• To make the private sector the principal producer and exporter of
  mineral products through putting in place a privatization programme and to promote private sector initiative in the development of new mines in order to increase and diversify mineral and mineral-based products and exports. This will maximize long-term economic benefits to the country.
• To promote the development of the small-scale mining industry which has the potential to significantly contribute to the economy
• To promote the development of gemstone mining and facilitate liberalized marketing arrangements in order to realize the industry’s potential to contribute to the development of the economy.
• To promote the exploration and exploitation of industrial minerals and energy minerals and to encourage the establishment of a ferrous industry.
• To reduce the danger of ecological damage arising from mining operations as well as damage to the health of workers and inhabitants of the neighbourhood through air, water and land.
• To promote the local processing of mineral raw materials into finished products for added value.

vii. The policy is aimed in particular at encouraging private investment in exploration and in the development of new mines. In addition to returning the major copper mines to the private sector, thus encouraging cost-effective management and greater exploitation of the enormous copper resources, the policy seeks to direct attention to the exploitation of the very diverse range of metalliferous deposits, industrial minerals, gemstones, and energy resources that are present throughout Zambia.

Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development

Policy decisions within the ministry are made by the Minister, assisted by the Deputy Minister. The chief executive is the Permanent Secretary who directs four statutory departments – Geological Survey, Mines Development, Mines Safety and Headquarters, the latter being devoted to administrative matters[45].

In its role as the national depository for geological information the Geological Survey has accumulated a wealth of maps, publications, reports, and data generated by the Survey staff and also derived from external sources including exploration reports and international journals. These are archived and maintained by the Technical Records office, Archive, and Library which comprise the Information Section.

Mines Safety Department

The Department is divided into four technical sections – Mining, Explosives, Machinery and Environment – which variously enforce the relevant legislative and statutory instruments, formulate new legislation and regulations, evaluate all aspects of safety in mining operations, appropriate offer technical advice and training, and offer exemptions from the relevant regulations where appropriate.

Mines Development Department

Key responsibilities for the Mines Development Department are the issuance of all prospecting, retention and mining licences, together with the monitoring of mining operations to ensure that development is in line with approved programmes of operations and in accordance with the Mines and Minerals Act. The Department also issues Gemstones Sales Certificates and undertakes reconnaissance surveys, demarcation of plots, placement of beacons and mine pit surveys.

In line with its stated Mining Policy, the Government of Zambia enacted new legislation – the Mines and Minerals Act (1995) – which greatly simplifies licensing procedures, places minimum reasonable constraints on prospecting and mining activities, and creates a very favourable investment environment, whilst allowing for international arbitration to be written into development agreements, should this be deemed necessary. A framework for responsible development has also been created through publication of the Environmental Protection and Pollution Control (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, 1997.

Licensing System

Three types of licence are available to the large-scale operator[46]:

• Prospecting Licence: this confers the right to prospect for any mineral over any size of area for a period of two years renewable.
• Retention Licence: the right to retain an area, subject to the Minister’s agreement, over which feasibility studies have been completed but market conditions are unfavourable to development of a deposit at that time. Size of the area may be that covered by a Prospecting Licence or smaller area as redefined by the Licence holder. Duration would be for three years renewable for another single period of three years.
• Large Scale Mining Licence: this confers exclusive rights to carry out mining operations and other acts reasonably incidental thereto in the area for a maximum of 25 years. The area to be held should not exceed the area reasonably required to carry out the proposed mining operations. Applications need to be accompanied by environmental protection plans and by proposals for the employment and training of citizens of Zambia.

Similar rights are available to smaller operators, but on a reduced scale

• Prospecting Permits: relate to areas of 10 km2 and have duration of 2 years non-renewable.
• Small Scale Mining Licences: relate to areas not exceeding 400 hectares and have duration of 10 years renewable.
• Artisans Mining Rights: give the right to local people to mine on an artisanal basis an area not exceeding 5 hectares for a period of 2 years non-renewable.
• Gemstone Licences: holders may carry out mining operations over an area not exceeding 400 hectares for a period of not more than 10 years.

Environment Framework

Key steps in establishing a project as laid down by the 1997 regulations are:

• Preparation of a project brief to the Director of Mines Safety describing the site, proposed activities, and all aspects of potential environmental impact.
• Director may request more information or can forward the project brief to the Environmental Council of Zambia recommending one of: rejection; acceptance after submission of a full Environmental Impact Statement; the project be accepted and allowed to proceed immediately.
• Preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement and submission to the Director of Mines Safety.
• The Director of Mines Safety submits his recommendations to the Environmental Council which makes the final decision.
• Environmental Impact Statements, if called for, to be updated annually or within fifteen months of the first statement.
• Environmental audits of projects to be completed annually.
• If a developer finds the provisions of any regulation unduly onerous, he may apply to the Minister or Director of Mines Safety for an exemption from that regulation. The exemption may be granted under prescribed conditions.
• Developers of large-scale mining projects to contribute to the Environmental Management Fund for rehabilitation purposes.

Export Procedures

In all cases a Customs and Excise Declaration form has to be completed, usually accompanied by a letter of authorization from the Mines Development Department. Additional procedures have to be followed for different commodities:

• Gemstones: Valuation Certificate required from Government Recognised Valuer.
• Precious metals: provision of a sample for analysis.
• Base metals: a one-year letter of authority is issued by the Mines Development Department, rather than for individual shipments.
• Rock and soil samples of no commercial value: the samples to be physically checked before export.

Mineral Endowment

Zambia is internationally recognized as a major producer of copper and cobalt; in 1966 it ranked as the world’s seventh largest producer of copper, generating 3.8% of the western world’s production, and the world’s second highest producer of cobalt (21.8%) behind the leading producer, D. R. Congo which sources its Cu-Co ore from the strike-extension of Zambia’s Copper belt mineralization. Significant quantities of selenium (18.6t in 1996) and silver (8.7t), together with minor gold and platinum group elements, are produced as important by products of the copper mining and processing.

Mining and the Economy

The mining sector contributed US$822 million to the total export earnings of US$1050 million in 1997 and of this; US$798 was realized from sales of copper and cobalt. The balance of mining-sector earnings come from sales of gold, silver, and selenium, mostly by-products of copper mining, and from emerald sales[47].

i. Contributions of industrial and manufacturing sectors to Zambia’s export earnings
(Total value=US$1050million)

ii. The vulnerability of Zambia’s economy due to its reliance on copper mining has been exposed in the very recent past by the falling copper price and by falling production as a result of limited re-investment in the mining industry. However, the privatization process has already led to significant inflow of investment to the mining sector, and a reversal of fortunes is confidently predicted for the copper mining industry within the next 2-3 years. Re-inforced by future production of additional metals and minerals, there is no doubt that the mining industry will continue to provide both a sound base and a stimulus for growth in the other sectors of the economy, leading to long-term prosperity.

iii. Value of mineral sales in Zambia during 1997
(Total value=US$914million)

Surcharges on mineral production compare very favourably with most countries in terms of royalties and taxes, and a number of financial incentives have been created specifically to encourage investment in the mining industry.

Royalties
A royalty is payable calculated at 2% of the market value of minerals f.o.b. less the cost of smelting, refining and insurance, handling, and transport from the mining area to the point of export or delivery within Zambia. Royalty payments may be deferred if the cash operating margin of a holder of a Large Scale Mining Licence falls below zero.

Corporate Tax

Exporters of copper and cobalt are levied 35% of taxable income whereas other mineral and ‘non-traditional’ commodities (i.e. excluding copper and cobalt) attract a levy of 15%. Companies listed on the Lusaka Stock Exchange are levied at 30% of taxable income.

Relief from Income Tax

Any investment in mining, including prospecting, attracts deductions from income tax on the following expenditures:

• capital expenditure: allowances of:
• • 25% on plant, machinery, and commercial vehicles;
  • 20% on non-commercial vehicles;
  • 5% on industrial buildings.
• Prospecting expenditure under special circumstances.
• Mining expenditure under special circumstances.
• Mining expenditure on a non-producing mine.
• Mining expenses incurred by a mine of irregular production close to the end of its life.

Relief from Other Surcharges

A holder of a mining right is exempt from customs, excise and VAT duties in respect of all machinery and equipment (including specialized motor vehicles) required for exploration or mining activities.

Remissions
There are no restrictions in respect of the amount of profits, dividends, or royalties that may be externalized, although a withholding tax of 15% is levied. Zambia’s diverse mineral endowment is entirely a function of the variety of geological terrains and the multiplicity of thermal and tectonic events that have overprinted and shaped these terrains. The resulting geological domains each have specific metallogenic characteristics in terms of known mineral occurrences that can be successfully utilized to direct further exploration. Equally importantly, the understanding of the processes that formed these domains has reached a level at which lateral thinking and conceptual modelling can be used to generate important new exploration targets.

Industrial Minerals

A wide range of known industrial minerals in Zambia include feldspar, silica sand, talc, barite, phosphate (in carbonatite and syenite), limestone, clays (mostly ball clay and brick clay), graphite, and many varieties of possible dimension stone. Since 1967, coal has been produced continuously by Maamba Collieries from the fault-controlled Karoo basins of southern Zambia. Production in 1997 was 164,000t but the open-pit mining operation has the potential to return to past production levels of 500,000t.p.a.

Hydrocarbons
Limited exploration for hydrocarbons to date has been unsuccessful but evaluation of existing data and re-interpretation of the sequence stratigraphy indicates significant potential in the lower and mid-Karoo sequences of the Luangwa and Mid-Zambezi graben.

Geology

The complex geology and multiplicity of tectono-thermal events reflect Zambia’s somewhat unique position effectively sandwiched between the Kasai, Zimbabwe-Kaapvaal, and Tanzania cratons. Differential movements between these stable blocks, together with their buttressing effects, have played an important role in the geological evolution of the country and hence in the genesis of the country’s mineral and energy resources.

Stratigraphy
The oldest succession of rocks in the country, the Basement Supergroup, consists mostly of granitic gneisses and migmatites which are evident throughout eastern, central and southern Zambia, in places in-folded with meta-carbonate, meta-quartzite, and meta-pelite units. The Super group rocks are mostly younger than 2050Ma.

The overlying meta-sedimentary Muva Supergroup generally exhibits a tectonized contact with the Basement sequences. In central and eastern Zambia the sequence of meta-pelites and meta-quartzites is commonly infolded and even imbricated with the Basement rocks, the two sequences being later folded to form the core of the Irumide Belt extending north-eastwards from Kabwe to Mpika, and also forming a major component of the Zambezi Belt south and east of Lusaka. Within the Bangweulu Block of northern Zambia the sedimentary sequence is very different, comprising a lower 5000m-thick succession of cont-inental sediments (rudites, arenites, quartzites and argillites) – the Mporokoso Group, overlain by quartzites, hematitic sandstones, mudstones and minor conglomerates of the Kasama Formation which ranges in thickness from c.100m over the Bangweulu Block to 3500m southwards into the Irumide Belt. Sedimentation commenced around 1800Ma and ended c.1250Ma.

The Katanga Supergroup overlies the Basement and Muva sequences with marked angular unconformity and spans an approximate time interval of 1000Ma – 500Ma. The rocks are exposed throughout the Copperbelt and north-western Zambia, partially overlie the southern edge of the Bangweulu Block, and also occur within the Zambezi Belt south and east of Lusaka. The lower part of the almost exclusively sedimentary sequence is the economically important Mine Series Group which hosts the bulk of the copper-cobalt mineralization of the Copperbelt. This sequence was deposited in response to a NE-directed marine incursion across a deeply dissected continental landscape, the lowest unit – the Lower Roan Formation – comprising conglomerate and aeolian sandstones succeeded by siliciclastic sediments and finally by argillites, dolostones and arenites. The overlying Upper Roan is a predominantly dolomite-argillite sequence which is succeeded conformably by carbonaceous shales, argillite and minor carbonate rocks of the Mwashia Formation.

A hiatus of as much as 100 million years was succeeded by a period of glaciation and the deposition of a tillite unit, the “Grand Conglomérat”, at the base of the Kundelunguu Group. This was followed by a thick sequence dominated by dolomitic limestones, shale, a further tillite and a fine shale-dominated unit. A poorly defined unit, the Kataba Group, comprising unmetamorphosed marine sandstones and mudstones, has been intersected by drilling beneath basal Karoo rocks and has been broadly dated as Ordovician-Silurian. The extent of the unit is not known.

Rocks of the Karoo Supergroup (late Carboniferous to Jurassic) occupy the rift troughs of the Mid-Zambezi, Luangwa, Luano-Lukusashi and Kafue valleys and also outcrop in western Zambia. The Lower Karoo Group comprises a basal conglomerate, tillite and sandstone overlain unconformably by conglomerate, coal, sandstone and carbonaceous siltstones and mudstones (the Gwembe Formation), and finally fine grained lacustrine sediments – the Madumabisa Formation. The unconformably overlying Upper Karoo essentially comprises a series of arenaceous continental sediments and overlying mudstones capped by basalts of the Batoka Formation.

In western Zambia and within the Zambezi Valley, the Batoka basalts are unconformable overlain by up to 100m of continental sandstones and mudstones of Cretaceous age, and much of western Zambia is covered by aeolian sands and minor epiclastic sediments of Quaternary – to – Present age comprising the Kalahari Group.

Tectono-thermal Events

A number of major tectono-thermal events have affected Zambia and have often contributed directly to the accumulation of metals, minerals and even energy resources. The earliest recognizable event in the region was the Ubendian Orogeny, c.2000-1800Ma, which generated the NW-SE-trending fold belt of high-grade metamorphic rocks that demarcates the north-eastern margin of the Bangweulu Block. Intrusive granitic magmatism accompanied the orogeny in the Choma-Kalomo Block (1345-1200Ma), and charnockitic granites were emplaced in the Basement-Muva terrain east of the Luangwa Valley at about 1100Ma.

The Irumide Belt has been interpreted as a NW-facing, 350km-wide foreland folds and thrust belt resulting from NW-SE-directed crustal shortening. In the northern sector of the belt, this contraction was accommodated by the Luongo Fold and Thrust Zone near the southern margin of the Bangweulu Block and by the Shiwa Ngandu Fold. Shortening in the south-western part of the belt was taken up within the Mkushi Gneiss Complex, which has been interpreted as a “pop-up” structure. The subsequent Lomamian and Lufilian Orogenies, the latter broadly equivalent to the continent-wide Pan-African Orogeny, were represented by a complex series of tectonic and thermal events in the approximate time interval 950 – 450Ma.
Two somewhat different domains were generated – the Lufilian Arc and the Zambezi-Mozambique Belts, separated by the Mwembeshi Shear Zone. Key events have been recognized in the formation of these still poorly understood terrains:

• Early recumbent folding of the Lower Roan sequence during the c.950Ma Lomamian Orogeny (although there is some debate as to whether this represents a discrete major orogenic event).
• ENE-directed thrusting contributing to the development of the Kafue Anticline and other Domes as Basement culminations. Concommittant WSW-directed thrusting of the Zambezi Belt, the Zambezi and Lufilian Arc terrains being separated by the Mwembeshi Shear Zone, a transform shear forming part of a major inter-cratonic zone of dislocation.
• “Lusakan Folding” event at c.850Ma that accompanied deep burial of the Lower Roan.
• Main phase of NE-directed thrusting, probably c.850-750Ma, with nappe emplacement in the Shaba Province of D. R. Congo and possibly also in the Copperbelt. Syntectonic emplacement of batholithic granites into the Zambezi Belt c.820Ma.
• Strike-slip faulting and late folding c.690-540Ma.
• Emplacement of syn- to post-tectonic granites: Mtuga Granite and Mkushi aplites c.607Ma; Hook Granite Complex 570-530Ma; Sinda Batholith near Petauke at c.490Ma.

The final tectono-thermal event was the Karoo Rifting associated with the break-up of Gondwanaland during the Permian followed by opening of the proto-Indian Ocean in the Jurassic; and a final episode of rifting related to the development of the East African Rift system in late Cretaceous and early Tertiary times. The Permian rifting was accompanied by reactivation of the Mwembeshi Shear Zone. The complex history of rifting in the region accounts for the marked variations in sedimentation within Zambia’s rift valleys, culminating in the eruption of the late-Karoo Batoka basalts.

Zambia’s amazingly wide spectrum of mineral resources spans a range of metals, particularly copper-cobalt and gold, gemstones, a variety of industrial minerals and potential energy resources – uranium, coal and hydrocarbons. Ranging in size from world-class operating mines to small prospects, the multiplicity and variety of resources demonstrate clearly the opportunities for further exploration and exploitation.

Copper
Copper mineralization was first discovered at the turn of the century but large-scale production only commenced in the 1930’s with the start-up of Roan Antelope (Luanshya – 1931), followed rapidly by Nkana (1932), Mufulira (1933), and then Nchanga in 1939[48]. Copper production exceeded 400 000 t.p.a. in the late 1950’s and passed the 600 000 t.p.a. mark in the mid-1960’s before beginning a progressive decline in 1976-77 and sinking to a 1996-low of 350 000 t.p.a. However, the move to privatization of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) should halt this decline and, with a total mineral resource of at least two billion tonnes on the Copper belt alone, there is no doubt that copper and cobalt production will soon begin a dramatic upward trend.

In excess of one billion tonnes of ore (c.2.7% Cu) have been mined from the mines of the Copper belt and conservative estimates suggest that a further two billion tonnes await exploitation. The copper-cobalt mineralization is stratabound within arenites, shales and carbonate rocks of the lower-Katanga Mine Series Group. Copper resources have also been identified in the thrust zones of north-western Zambia which represent zones of detachment between Basement and Katanga sequences, and in western and central Zambia where shearing and intrusion emplacement through the lower Katanga succession have generated a considerable number of lode, stockwork, breccia and skarn deposits. Other types of deposit include the disseminated copper mineralization in the granites and aplites of the Mkushi area and copper-bearing stratiform sulphides in the Lusaka area.

Gold
Zambia has a history of gold mining on a relatively small scale, with the twenty larger deposits having produced slightly more than 2t of gold since modern mining began in 1902. The largest past producers are Dunrobin (990kg gold), Sasare (390kg), and Matala (225kg); Dunrobin has recently been re-opened by Reunion Mining and is scheduled to produce 500-600kg gold per annum. More than 300 gold occurrences have been reported throughout the country and some of these are currently being-re-evaluated. The other important metal production has been zinc and lead from the carbonate-hosted deposits of Kabwe which, with a total of 11Mt of ore containing 40% combined zinc and lead, ranks as one of the highest grade Zn-Pb deposits of probable Mississippi Valley – type in the world. Similar styles of mineralization have been recognized over a wide area to the north of Kabwe.

More than 300 gold occurrences have been recorded but most are only prospects; largest historical producers are Dunrobin (990kg) and Matala (225kg) in the Mumbwa area, Jessie (390kg) in the Rufunsa area, and Sasare (390kg) in eastern Zambia. Dunrobin was re-opened by Reunion Mining in 1997 as an open-pit, heap-leach operation and is producing 50kg gold per month. The majority of the deposits are lode-type bodies associated with the Mwembeshi Shear Zone and related syntectonic intrusions. Significant gold mineralization also occurs, variously with copper and uranium, in major thrust zones near the base of the Katanga succession Minor palaeo-placer gold has also been reported in the Mporokoso Group in the Bangweulu Block.

Iron
Substantial resources of iron are known in central and western Zambia, occurring as ironstones and lesser skarn deposits but have yet to be exploited. Amongst other metalliferous occurrences reported are sedimentary and fracture-hosted manganese and orthomagmatic and shale-hosted nickel, together with tin and tungsten.Substantial resources of iron have been identified, occurring primarily as sedimentary ironstones in the lower-Katanga Mine Series successions of central and western Zambia. Total resources of more than 900Mt with an iron content around 50% have been provisionally estimated, with some individual deposits up to 200Mt in size. Small, high-grade skarn and replacement deposits are associated with Pan-African felsic and mafic intrusions that have penetrated the lower Katanga succession in western Zambia, particularly around the Hook Granite Complex, but such deposits have rarely been fully evaluated.

Zinc and Lead

Carbonate-hosted Zn-Pb ore has been mined from the Kabwe deposit in central Zambia where 11Mt of ore averaged close to 25% Zn and 15% Pb. The stratabound mineralization comprises massive, breccia and replacement sulphides within carbonate rocks marking the transition from Lower Roan to Upper Roan. Similar styles of mineralization at the same stratigraphic position, some copper-rich, are evident throughout the Kabwe area and northwards to Kapiri Mposhi. Carbonate-hosted Pb-Zn has also been recorded in Lower Roan limestones in the Copperbelt and in lower Kundelungu rocks in western Zambia. Stratabound, probably exhalative, Cu-Zn-Pb deposits occur in Basement and Muva sequences of south-eastern Zambia.

Manganese
Occurrences are numerous but mostly small, occurring as tabular, probably stratiform exhalative, deposits within Basement and Muva sequences, and as supergene enrichments, either capping low-grade sedimentary accumulations or concentrated within sub-vertical fractures of limited vertical extent. Nickel and Platinum Group Elements Orthomagmatic nickel occurrences are known in the Basement sequences east and south of Lusaka and include one near Mpala Gorge which may be a faulted remnant of ZimbabweÕs Great Dyke. Sediment-hosted nickel deposits in Mwashia and Mine Series rocks of north-western Zambia are associated with gabbroic intrusions and often show evidence of hydrothermal enrichment. Minor platinum group elements are produced as a by-product of copper-refining on the major Copperbelt mines.

Tin (-tantalum)

Small quantities of cassiterite have been recovered from complex quartz-muscovite-feldspar pegmatites of probable Irumide age in the Choma-Kalomo area in southern Zambia. Columbite-tantalite has also been extracted in very minor quantities.

Tungsten

Wolframite has been noted in pegmatite of the Choma Tin Belt, and lode-type scheelite-bismuth mineralization is associated with a two-mica granite of early Lufilian age at Unda Unda, 80km east of Lusaka.

GEMSTONES

Diamonds
Alluvial diamonds have been reported throughout much of northern, north-eastern and western Zambia and in many places are accompanied by indicator minerals. Kimberlite and lamproite intrusions occur within and near to the western flank of the Luangwa River and also in southern Zambia but no diamond-bearing diatremes have yet been discovered.Alluvial diamonds have been recovered throughout Zambia, accompanied in places by indicator minerals but, despite the discovery of a number of kimberlite and lamproite intrusions, the sources of the diamonds have yet to be found. Zambia’s high-quality deep green emeralds are in demand world-wide and, since 1970, have been mined continuously on the southern margin of the Copperbelt where they are hosted by pegmatite bodies. Pegmatites are also common in eastern Zambia where they have been exploited for aquamarine and tourmaline.

Other gemstones

Aquamarine and tourmaline are mined in the Lundazi and Nyimba areas of eastern Zambia where they occur in pegmatites that were broadly synchronous with the c.486Ma Sinda batholith. Amethyst is currently being mined in the Mwakambwiko Hills near Lake Kariba where it occurs in veins and stockworks generated during late-Karoo or post-Karoo tectonism.

Emeralds
Zambia produces about 20% of the world’s emeralds and they are much sought after due to their deep green colour. The gemstones are recovered exclusively from the Ndola Rural area of the southern Copper belt where they are hosted by Muva-age talc schists intruded by tourmaline- and phlogopite-bearing pegmatite bodies

Industrial Minerals

Zambia boasts a wide range of industrial minerals capable of underpinning the anticipated growth in the mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors.

Feldspar
In recent years the demand for feldspar has been from local ceramic producers and also from Kapiri Glass Products Ltd., based at Kapiri Mposhi. Production has mostly come from two pegmatite deposits – a 4m-thick body of alkali-feldspar-pegmatite containing minor muscovite and quartz near Siavonga and a 5m-thick, partially kaolinized, pegmatite at Shipingu, near Kapiri Mposhi.

Silica Sand

Sands of various specifications occur throughout Zambia but the only occurrence to have been exploited is the deposit of high-quality glass sand at Kapiri Mposhi which was the basis for glass manufacture by Kapiri Glass Products Ltd., until the recent closure of the company. The sand is an unconsolidated eluvial deposit derived by the weathering of quartzites of the Muva Supergroup.

Talc
The current small demand for talc within Zambia is met partly by local production but good quality white talc for the pharmaceutical industry is imported. Deposits in Zambia have not been extensively evaluated but range from talc derived during metamorphism of dolomites near Lusaka to a hydrothermally altered mafic to ultramafic intrusion, also in the Lusaka area, and talc schist occurring in the footwall of copper mineralization near Ndola.

Barite
A variety of deposit-types are known, the most significant being the vein and replacement bodies hosted by red shales and marls of the Mporokoso Group within the Luongo Fold and Thrust Zone of the Bangweulu Block. Vein-type mineralization also occurs within the Irumide Belt and rare occurrences have been reported associated with the Hook Granite Complex and also hosted by Karoo sediments within the Mid-Zambezi Rift.

Phosphate
Apatite, the most important potential source of phosphate, occurs in significant concentrations in syenitic intrusions and carbonatite bodies. Significant syenite-hosted deposits include the apatite-quartz bodies of Chilembwe, near Petauke in eastern Zambia, and breccia and pegmatite bodies in syenite intrusions near the north-eastern margin of the Hook Granite Complex. Carbonatites in Zambia are mostly related to Karoo-age rifts and very substantial low-grade apatite deposits have been noted in two of these – Kaluwe in the Rufunsa-Feira area and Nkombwa Hill at the northern end of the Luangwa Rift.

Limestone
Carbonate rocks are a common component of the Katanga Supergroup and also occur within the Basement Supergroup. Limestone and dolomite are abundant in the area around Lusaka and these and other deposits in the Southern, North Western, Northern and Luapula Provinces have been identified as being suitable for agricultural use. High-purity, low-MgO limestones are currently being exploited from the lower Katanga succession near Ndola on the Copperbelt.

Dimension Stone

A very wide variety of potential dimension stones are present in Zambia but they have rarely been evaluated fully as to their suitability. They are mostly of igneous origin and include gabbroic and doleritic rocks of the Basement and Muva terrains in eastern and central Zambia, granites of the Mpika area in north-eastern Zambia, and the extensive granitic and charnockitic rocks of the Chipata area in eastern Zambia. A very attractive pink and green, sodalite-rich, syenite occurrence has been exploited near Solwezi, and grey and white marbles are currently being mined for export on the western outskirts of Lusaka.

Clays
A considerable number of deposits of ball clay and brick clay are known but they have rarely been subjected to bench tests and firing tests. Large deposits of ball clay occur at Solwezi and at Kasanka, 60km north of Serenje, and kaolinite-rich clays have been recorded at Masuku in southern Zambia and near Shiwa Ngandu. Brick clays are exploited at an artisanal level throughout Zambia.

Industrial Minerals

Zambia is favoured with considerable resources of feldspar (Pan-African pegmatite bodies), silica sand (Muva-age quartzites), limestone (mostly lower Katanga), and a variety of rock types potential suitable for dimension stone. Numerous occurrences of ball clay and brick clay are evident throughout the country but the quality of the clays has rarely been thoroughly investigated. Good quality talc has yet to be discovered but the focus of interest would be on hydrothermally altered ultramafic rocks and on metamorphosed dolomites in the Lusaka and Copperbelt areas. Major targets for barite exploration would be vein and replacement deposits in the Luongo Fold and Thrust Belt of the Bangweulu Block. Any search for phosphate (apatite) would necessitate re-evaluation of the carbonatite-hosted deposits associated with the Karoo-age rifts of southern, central, and eastern Zambia. Medium- to high-grade graphite deposits are confined to the high-grade metamorphic terrains of eastern Zambia.

These include graphite, gypsum, kyanite and asbestos, with moderate resources of graphite having been identified at a number of occurrences in the high-grade metamorphic terrains of eastern Zambia. A major fluorite deposit has been defined at Sianyolo in the Mid-Zambezi Valley.

ENERGY RESOURCES

Uranium
Three important types of uranium occurrence have been recorded in Zambia: in Karoo sandstones; associated with the copper mineralization of the Copper belt; and structurally controlled mineralization in the Basement domes of north-western Zambia. The Karoo occurrences comprise presumed detrital concentrations, up to 1000ppm U, in the Escarpment Grit Formation, and fracture-controlled autunite-torbernite-pitchblende in the same arenitic units of the Mid-Zambezi Rift. Uranium occurrences associated with the Copperbelt mineralization variously consist of pitchblende, coffinite, and brannerite, or meta-torbernite and other secondary minerals concentrated near the base of the copper mineralization or within the footwall rocks immediately underlying the orebodies. A total of 120,000kg of U3O8 was produced from Nkana Mine in the period 1957-1959. Uranium mineralization in the Basement domes is variously accompanied by copper and gold and almost invariably occurs in kyanite-bearing schists which are now known to represent major thrust zones developed along the Basement-Katanga contact and propagated up-sequence northwards and eastwards. The Lumwana Malundwe deposit in the Mwombezhi Dome, as an example, contains some 4000t of U3O8, in addition to at least 19.5Mt copper ore at 1.4% Cu and minor gold.

Coal
Zambia possesses substantial coal resources and has been producing coal continuously since 1967. The bulk of the coal has come from the Maamba coal mine, an open-cast operation in the southern part of the country near Lake Kariba. The Maamba deposit and other known coal occurrences are confined exclusively to the lower-Karoo Gwembe Formation, within the series of fault-controlled basins that comprise the Mid-Zambezi Rift Valley. The Maamba deposit occurs within the Kazinze Basin but coal seams have also been discovered in the adjacent basins. Thin coal seams and carbonaceous shales have also been identified in the lower Karoo (Gwembe Formation) of the Luangwa and Luano-Lukusashi Valleys and in the eastern part of the Barotse Basin in western Zambia. Additional coal resources are most likely to be found in the fault-bounded Karoo basins of the Mid-Zambezi Rift, particularly in the Mulungwa Coalfield, the area between the Mulungwa and Siankondobo Coalfields, and in the Siambabala area. Some limited potential also exists in the Luangwa and Luano Valleys.

Hydrocarbon
Two exploration programmes by Mobil and Placid Oil between 1986 and 1991 failed to discover oil but, of two boreholes within the Luangwa Rift Valley, one was terminated before intersecting the most favourable reservoir horizons. Considerable thicknesses of littoral and continental sediments underlain by carbonaceous rocks with oil-generating potential are present within the Karoo-age graben of both the Luangwa and Mid-Zambezi Valleys.

Exploration
The mining legislation enacted in 1995 and favourable investment environment has created a high level of interest both in existing mining operations and in the exploration potential. Currently approximately 50% of the country is covered by existing Prospecting Licences and by applications for licences. Exploration in many cases is focused on areas where minor past production or prospects indicate some potential, but a significant level of activity is also being devoted to green fields’ exploration in areas with little or no history of discoveries. Companies active in the mid-1990 include Anglo American, AvMin, Billiton, Caledonia Mining, Cyprus Amax, Equinox Resources, Falconbridge, Phelps Dodge, RTZ Mining and Zamgold.

Development
Although still to be completed privatization of ZCCM has led to a flurry of interest in the mining sector and an encouraging level of physical investment. Important developments include:

• Purchase of the Luanshya/Baluba mining and metallurgical complex (now known as Roan Antelope Mining Corporation Group) by the Binani Group for US$35 million, with a commitment to further capital expenditure of US$69 million.
• Sale of Chambishi Mine to the Non-Ferrous Metal Industry of China for US$20 million.
• A feasibility study of Konkola Deep by Anglo American-controlled Zambian Copper Investments, a project which will ultimately require an investment of around US$750 million.
• Sale of Kansanshi to Cyprus Amax subject to the results of a phased exploration programme which would ultimately necessitate a total investment of US$48 million by Cyprus Amax prior to securing project financing.
• Commitment by Avmin (formerly Anglovaal) to US$12.5 million of exploration expenditure, mostly directed to evaluation of Konkola North.
• Construction of a US$30 million-plant at Bwana Mkubwa by First Quantum Minerals for re-treatment of copper oxide tailings.
• sale of Chibuluma Mine to Metorex Pty. for US$17.5 million and a commitment to US$34 million for the development of Chibuluma South.
• Purchase of ZCCMÕs Power Division by the Copperbelt Consortium Ð two UK-based power companies, National Grid and Midlands Power, and a team of ZCCM managers.

Another exciting development has been the opening up of the old Dunrobin goldmine by Reunion Mining as an open pit heap leach operation which poured its first gold late in 1997. Production of 50kg of gold per month for at least three years is anticipated and the potential for proving further ore in the area is reported to be high.

The complex geological evolution of Zambia, together with the abundance and diversity of mineral deposits and other natural resource deposits, are pointers towards the considerable potential for the discovery of new occurrences through exploration based on empirical models driven by known deposits and exploration formulated on conceptual models.

Gold
The great majority of gold deposits in Zambia are mesothermal lode deposits (veins and more dispersed occurrences in brittle and brittle-ductile shear zones). Most are localized within structures related to the Mwembeshi Shear Zone in central Zambia. This major inter-cratonic shear zone was undoubtedly trans-crustal in vertical extent and clearly acted as an important conduit for fluid flow and magma emplacement. It also exhibits a history of multiple reactivation throughout the Lomamian and Lufilian (Pan-African) Orogenies (c. 950-450 Ma) and was even reactivated during Karoo rifting. Consequently there was considerable potential for the genesis of substantial lode deposits, particularly where dilational zones (releasing bends, dilatational jogs, etc.) facilitated maximum fluid flow, and where the shear zone traversed the carbonate rocks, carbonaceous siltstones, and ironstones of the lower Katanga sequence which would have proved highly efficient chemical traps for hydrothermal gold.

Significant skarn and breccia deposits were probably developed adjacent to syntectonic granitoidal and even syenitic intrusions associated with the shear zone although to date only relatively small occurrences have been identified in the Mumbwa area around the Hook Granite Complex and satellitic intrusions. A similar prospectivity can be assigned to the poorly-known Kapiri Mposhi – Kipushi Shear Zone and adjacent NNE-trending zones of deformation. In eastern Zambia, key targets related to the Mwembeshi Shear Zone include areas where it traverses the restricted occurrences of volcanosedimentary rocks (eg. Sasare area) and also the offset zones related to the West Mvuye and Chindeni Dislocations, the former appearing to have been a focus for fluid flow (and wallrock alteration) and the latter as it also traverses mafic volcanic rocks.

Within the Zambezi Belt south of the Mwembeshi Shear Zone, thrusting and faulting of the complex Basement-Muva-Katanga terrain was accompanied by widespread de-watering, resulting in the genesis of a considerable number of gold prospects, screening of which could pinpoint optimum potential in terms of host structure and country rocks. Similar and probably more substantial fluid flow occurred within the early Lufilian thrust zones of the Domes Region of north-western Zambia to generate complex copper ± gold ± uranium lodes within the lower Katanga sequences and these represent important exploration targets.

In north-eastern Zambia a similar lode-gold potential, not yet investigated, exists within the Luongo Fold and Thrust Zone, the Chambeshi Fold and Thrust Zone, and the Shiva Ngandu Fold Zone, where leaching of Basement rocks and de-watering, quite possibly on a massive scale during the Irumide-age crustal shortening, could have created conditions favourable for gold metallogenesis. The minor occurrences of placer gold within the lower Mporokoso Group littoral sediments of the Bangweulu Block have some similarities to Witwatersrand-type mineralization and merit a basin-wide evaluation.

Copper
Combined reserves and resources of copper-cobalt ore in operating mines of the Copper belt exceed two billion tonnes and these have mostly been delineated for exploitation after privatization of the industry has been completed. Somewhat similar styles of copper mineralization, variously containing gold, uranium, and cobalt, are evident in the Domes Region to the west of the Copper belt and are attractive exploration targets. Recognition that a number of these deposits are hosted by thrust zones, however, offers greater opportunities for locating deposits at higher elevations within the Katanga sequence than normally anticipated. Precious-metal enrichment is also more probable in such zones, and manto-type copper-gold deposits may be developed in adjacent carbonate and shale units. Recognition of thrust-hosted copper mineralization also encourages critical evaluation of the established synsedimentary or syndiagenetic model for the Copper belt mineralization in the search for new deposits.

Widespread scapolitization of the Katanga sequence in the Domes Region attests to another phase of hydrothermal activity, involving NaCl-brines probably derived by dissolution of evaporites, and the occurrence of copper enrichment (0.8%) in scapolite-schists in the Mujimbeji prospects of the Kabompo Dome indicates yet another potential type of exploration target. Vein, breccia, and skarn deposits of copper are likely to be developed in any area where the copper-rich lower Katanga succession has been overprinted by faulting or intruded by felsic to mafic bodies, features particularly evident in central and western Zambia. The regional coincidence of evaporites (n the Lower Roan), granitic intrusions, widespread scapolitic alteration, and Cu (Fe)-Co-Au-U mineralization also offer the intriguing possibility for the occurrence of deposits belonging to the enigmatic Fe-oxide (REE-Cu-Au-U) spectrum of deposit-types which includes, amongst many other, Olympic Dam. The granitic association of copper in the Irumide Belt near Mkushi also merits a careful re-evaluation of the genesis and potential of this style of mineralization. Copper-bearing massive sulphide deposits of possible exhalative origin discovered in the Lusaka area and south-eastern Zambia point to additional targets for copper exploration.

Other Base Metals and Rare Metals

Zinc and lead deposits discovered to date are hosted entirely by carbonate rocks occurring stratigraphically at the Lower Roan – Upper Roan transition. Considerable potential remains in the Kabwe area, and the Katanga-age carbonate sequences northwest of Mumbwa offer a similar potential. The migration of NaCl-rich brines, indicated by the distribution of scapolite in north-western Zambia, could have led to extensive mobilization of Pb and Zn and the subsequent genesis of vein and replacement deposits in lower-Katanga carbonate rocks and even in overlying Kundelungu carbonate units. The common occurrence of vein and replacement deposits of barite within the early Proterozoic sequences of the Bangweulu Block, where caught up in the Luongo Fold and Thrust Zone, also suggest the activity of NaCl-enriched brines and thus imply that conditions heretoo may have been favourable for the transport and precipitation of Pb and Zn.

Substantial resources of iron have been identified, mostly in lower Katanga successions, and the requirement here is for thorough evaluation of known deposits within the context of potential demand from a burgeoning Zambian industrial and manufacturing sector and a wider demand throughout central Africa. Manganese occurrences also are known but there is potential for the discovery of further supergene-enriched deposits throughout the Muva terrains of northern Zambia.

No major layered intrusions have been identified in Zambia but the mostly likely hosts for orthomagmatic nickel deposits are gabbroic intrusions south and east of Lusaka and the possible faulted extensions of the Great Dyke near Mpala Gorge in the southern part of the country. Some of the sediment-hosted occurrences of metal associated with gabbroic bodies in north-western Zambia also have modest potential.

The tin (-tantalum) potential lies in a thorough re-evaluation of the Choma Tin Belt in southern Zambia and in detailed prospecting of the pegmatitic areas of eastern Zambia. The Hook Granite Complex and granitic bodies intruding the Irumide Belt merit some attention for tin and/or tungsten mineralization and the unusual scheelite-bismuth mineralization of the Unda Unda area, 80 km east of Lusaka, would be a priority for tungsten exploration. Syntectonic and post-tectonic granitic magmatism associated with the Irumide Orogeny in north-eastern Zambia may have led to tin and tungsten enrichment in the Chambeshi Fold and Thrust Zone and Shiwa Ngandu Fold Zone.

GEMSTONES

Diamonds
The abundance of diamonds and indicator minerals in Zambia highlight the considerable exploration potential. The most favourable terrains are the stable cratonic Bangweulu Block and possibly the Kabompo area of western Zambia where alluvial diamonds are particularly abundant. The rift-related kimberlites and associated rocks of eastern Zambia have limited potential as they were probably derived from younger, locally diamond-depleted, mantle.

Emeralds
Systematic exploration of the Ndola Rural area utilizing a combination of radiometric surveys and soil geochemistry, supported by detailed mapping, offers considerable potential for the discovery of additional deposits of the high-quality gemstones.

Uranium
The greatest potential for uranium appears to be vein and disseminated mineralization hosted by Lower Roan and Upper Roan sequences and most commonly occurring within the footwall rocks immediately underlying some of the copper orebodies of the Copperbelt and Domes Region. It also shows significant enrichment in the thrust-hosted copper (± gold) mineralization of the Domes Region. Calcrete deposits within the basal sandstones of the Kalahari sequence in western Zambia may be analogous to the calcrete deposits of Namibia and thus merit investigation.

Hydrocarbon
The petroleum potential of Zambia can be considered unexplored. The Luangwa and Mid-Zambezi graben have a favourable history of lower-Karoo hydrocarbon generation and upper-Karoo development of structural traps during rifting. Potential reservoir units occur in the lower-Karoo Luwumbu Formation and upper-Karoo Escarpment Grit in the luangwa graben and in the Siankondobo and Gwembe Formations of the lower Karoo in the Mid-Zambezi graben.

THE CHAMBER OF MINES

The Chamber of Mines of Zambia is registered as an association for mining employers, be they large mining companies or single employers. It was originally formed in September 1942 as the Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines. It operated until 1965 when the Copper Industry Service Bureau (CISB) replaced it. The Chamber of Mines was re-established in 2000 after the privatisation of the mining assets were completed[49].

Mission Statement

The institution aims to promote the interests of its members, and encouraging, protecting and fostering the Mining Industry of Zambia and doing everything necessary and advisable for the advancement /achievement of those objectives.

Operations

The Policy Making Body of the Chamber of Mines of Zambia is the Council whose composition is as below:

i. One representative from each Class A Member

ii. One representative elected by Class B Members jointly amongst their number. Other Class B Members may be elected if in the opinion of Council, their capacity and technical capability warrants individual representation

iii. One representative elected by Class C Members jointly from their number

iv. One representative elected by Associate Members jointly from amongst their number.

The Chamber of Mines in Zambia was originally formed in September 1942 as the Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines. It operated until 1965 when the Copper Industry Service Bureau (CISB) replaced it. However, with the nationalisation of the mining industry the necessity for the Chamber of Mines fell away.

The Chamber of Mines was re-established in 2000 after the privatisation of the mining assets were completed. The Objectives for which the Chamber of Mines of Zambia has been established are detailed in the Constitution. The Chamber is established for the purposes of promoting the interests of its members, and encouraging, protecting and fostering the Mining Industry of Zambia and doing everything necessary and advisable for the advancement /achievement of those objectives. The main role of the Chamber of Mines of Zambia (CMZ) is advocacy in creating synergies. CMZ aims to influence policy in the mining sector to reflect the vision and dreams of its members as well as to promote economic growth in Zambia. CMZ further seeks to create stakeholders linkages with various players in the country and abroad with a view to establishing productive partnership that will help realize its full potential as a central organ in the mining industry in Zambia.

THE ZAMBIA–CHINA COOPERATION ZONE (ZCCZ)

The Zambia–China Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) was the first Chinese economic and trade co-operation zone to be established in Africa. The project emerged from converging interests on both sides: China’s interest in Zambia’s copper reservoirs and Lusaka’s desire to develop a manufacturing base around its mining sector. The policy briefing analyses how the zone came into being, its achievements and the current challenges it faces. It highlights a number of shortcomings at the implementation level that need to be addressed urgently, by both Chinese investors and Zambian authorities, if the ZCCZ is to move beyond low-skilled labour employment and resources supply[50].

Lusaka is conceivably Beijing’s most paradigmatic example of an ‘all weather friendship’ in Africa. Diplomatic ties stretch back to Zambia’s independence in 1964 and encompass one of the richest historical records on China’s co-operation with the continent. For decades China has provided support in vital sectors such as agriculture, healthcare, education and infrastructure. The construction of the Tazara railway in the early 1970s, linking Zambia’s Copper belt Province with the port of Dar-es-Salam on the Indian Ocean, remains one of the most iconic illustrations of China–Africa co-operation to this day. However, it was only in the 2000s that the commercial dimension of the relationship finally gained momentum. Bilateral trade grew from $108 million in 2000 to $1.39 billion in 2009 and further to $2.85 billion in 2010,[51]greatly boosted by the dramatic swelling of China’s copper imports in recent years. By the end of 2010, China was the second-largest destination for Zambian copper exports.

Likewise Chinese investment flows to Zambia have intensified significantly over the past decade. Although Chinese investments (private enterprises and state- owned enterprises or SOEs) cover a wide range of sectors (such as manufacturing, agriculture, infrastructure, technology, energy supply and telecommunications), the lion’s share of these has gone to the mining sector mostly channelled through SOEs. China is presently the third- largest investor in the country.[52] In 2010 China’s investment stock in Zambia ($944 million – up from $148 million in 2004) was it’s third-largest on the continent, after South Africa and Nigeria[53]

The establishment of the ZCCZ

The idea of establishing a special economic zone (SEZ) ostensibly surfaced in 2004, initiated by Non-Ferrous Metals Corporation Africa (NFCA). The NFCA is the Zambian subsidiary of China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Group Company (CNMC, a mining SOE), which had been exploring Chambishi copper mine in Zambia’s Copper belt since 1998. The NFCA approached the Zambian government with a proposal to set up an industrial park for copper processing in Chambishi.

Lusaka responded to the idea with great enthusiasm. However, an on-going review of the legal framework in Zambia delayed the project’s commencement. [54]The new Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZ) regulations, envisaging the provision of a competitive environment for investors to process Zambia’s natural resources within its borders, was issued finally in 2006 (the Zambia Development Agency Act No 11 of 2006). That same year, China announced its intention to establish three to five economic and trade co-operation zones (ETCZs) in Africa as an instrument to promote economic development within the framework of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation. In this context, the ZCCZ became both Zambia’s first MFEZ and China’s first ETCZ in Africa. Demonstrating the high importance of the project for both parties, President Hu Jintao and late President Levy Mwanawasa officially inaugurated the ZCCZ in February 2007. In January 2009, President Rupiah Banda and the Chinese Minister of Commerce inaugurated a subsection of the ZCCZ (Lusaka East) near Lusaka International Airport.

The CNMC, the formal developer, administers the zone through ZCCZ Development Limited, a subsidiary created for that purpose and registered in Zambia. The ZCCZ has head offices in Kitwe and Lusaka, and is in charge of developing the zone (the Chambishi and Lusaka East subsections). Its responsibilities range from general planning and co-coordinating on-site construction to attracting investors. The ZCCZ is also responsible for liaising with and providing quarterly reports to the Zambia Development Agency, the government body responsible for co-coordinating all MFEZs. The Chambishi ZCCZ occupies an area of 11.58 square kilometres within the mining concession of the NFCA (41 square kilometres) in Kalulushi Municipality in the Copper belt Province. Set in a mining area, the zone aims to channel investment primarily into non-ferrous metals metallurgy (copper and cobalt) and to process by-products (including electrical wire and cable, mine equipment, construction equipment, chemical products, fertilizers, and pharmaceuticals) and provide supporting services such as storage, transportation and housing. Production is aimed at supplying the local and regional markets.[55]

The East Lusaka ZCCZ covers an area of 5.7 square kilometres adjacent to Lusaka’s international airport. Taking advantage of its proximity to the airport facilities, this subsection was designed to work as an international commercial hub. It aims to create a light industry cluster (manufacturing, assembly and packaging of goods) that is connected to non-ferrous metals (household appliances) as well as other sectors (garment and food-processing), wholesale facilities, logistics and real estate.

Agreement details and preferential policies

The ZCCZ agreement was negotiated between the CNMC (supported by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the Association of Chinese SEZ and the local embassy) on the Chinese side and the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA), the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Finance on the Zambian side, within the framework of the MFEZ Act. According to the ZCCZ management, the land lease is for 76 years in Chambishi and 80 years in Lusaka East.

Secrecy surrounding the negotiations has resulted in strong criticism of the agreement and a widespread belief that the land was given free of charge. Although both the ZDA and the ZCCA management have denied this,[56]the amount paid by the Chinese remains undisclosed and is believed to be very low. The preferential policies to be implemented inside the zone have been far less controversial, as they follow closely the incentives stated in the MFEZ Act. Investment incentives in the Chambishi and East Lusaka ZCCZs are the same.

These are exemption from tax on dividends for five years from the year of first declaration of dividends; 0% corporate tax for five years from the first year profits are made, with 50% of profit to be taxed in years six to eight, increasing to 75% in years nine to ten; 0% import duty rate on raw materials, capital goods and machinery for five years; and deferment of VAT on machinery and equipment imports. The developer is responsible for providing the on-site infrastructure, including roads; telecommunications; electricity and water supply; and facilities for administration, commerce, exhibitions and training. Although designed to attract primarily Chinese private capital, the zone is open to other foreign investors as well as local entrepreneurs. There is, however, an investment threshold of $500,000. All foreign investors are required to register in Zambia.

The current status

The Chambishi ZCCZ is currently China’s only ETCZ in operation in sub-Saharan Africa and, even then, only partially so. When driving inside the zone there is little more to see than the main gate, a smelter, the administration building, basic roads, a power supply station and a couple of buildings under construction. The on-site infrastructure (phase 1) is only now at the end of 2011, nearing completion. The master plan has been designed to accommodate 50 to 60 companies.

As of July 2011, 14 investors (the majority of which are Chinese) had settled inside the zone with accumulated investment nearing $1 billion. Most of these can be traced back to the CNMC, as a significant number of the investors are subsidiaries of or companies affiliated with the CNMC. Most of the remaining companies are Chinese construction companies carrying out infrastructure projects in the zone. They have registered inside the zone to enjoy the incentives it provides. According to ZCCZ Development Limited, negotiations are underway with a few more investors, including local entrepreneurs.

The biggest showpiece inside the zone is the copper smelter, recruiting nearly half of the 6 658 employees working inside the zone (934 of whom are Chinese). Almost three years after its launching, the Lusaka East ZCCZ, where 13 300 jobs are expected to be created, is still at an early stage of infrastructure construction (both on site and off site). Nonetheless, there are already interested entrepreneurs and the subsection is expected to start receiving investors by April 2012.

The challenges

Although five years have passed since its launching, the Chambishi ZCCZ is only partially operational and struggling to produce expected benefits for the domestic economy. Some sectors of civil society have criticized the slow pace of development of the Chambishi ZCCZ, which has been under construction for five years. They claim it has failed to stimulate Zambia’s manufacturing sector and job creation, and have accused the CNMC of being mostly interested in minerals extraction.[57]

Although it is far too early to write off the ZCCZ as a failed venture, major challenges should be identified and tackled. Currently the existing obstacles seem to be related more to implementation than to policy and design. The main implementation challenge seems to be the poor condition of infrastructure surrounding the ZCCZ, particularly in the remote area of the copper belt Province. Although there is a transportation network in place – in the form of a national road and railway – it needs to be rehabilitated and extended.

The current state of the network seriously compromises not only supply to the zone but also product distribution to national and regional markets, a key factor for the success of any SEZ. Another major obstacle is the lack of a cohesive absorbent regulating frame[1] to ensure the necessary domestic spill overs, such as transfer of expertise and technology and integration of the domestic private sector. Local entrepreneurs feel left out because the investment threshold has been set too high.

Local suppliers also fear this will be a missed opportunity. The loose regulations on local content enable investors to choose their supply sources. Owing to language and culture barriers and the much cheaper options back home, Chinese investors tend to rely on their own supply chains. Despite several pleas by the Miners Suppliers Association to establish a framework to ensure their participation in the process, Lusaka has made no progress in this regard so far.[58]

A further important challenge is to make the ZCCZ process less secretive and elitist (with the presidency and Chinese government being the sole interlocutors to date) to better inform and integrate local stakeholders. Local entrepreneurs, civil society and communities seem to know little about the ZCCZ and its goals. The zone is therefore largely regarded as a Chinese enclave, resulting in misapprehension among the general public. Although these challenges may apply to all Zambian MFEZs, there are also obstacles of a more abstract nature that are specific to the ZCCZ.

These include fundamental differences in work ethics, business culture and the language barrier. These differences have been particularly problematic when it comes to labour issues. The stipulation of Zambian law that most labour be hired locally has placed a large pool of local workers under Chinese management. This has created serious misunderstandings,[59] mostly owing to a large gap between Chinese labour practices (including longer hours, lower salaries and lower safety standards) and local work ethics,[1] being shaped primarily by western standards. Other challenges include the low returns for the host government in the early stages of the ZCCZ project and the difficulty being experienced in bringing new investors on board. Although the former may undermine Lusaka’s interest in the zone, particularly in a context of political alternation, the latter may endanger the overall success of the zone, as the ZCCZ remains sparingly populated – well below its expected capacity.

POLICY EFFECTIVENESS AND CHINA’S INVESTMENT IN THE MINING SECTOR

Post privatization expectations and disappointment[60]

Zambia’s mining sector was privatised roughly between 1997 and 2002. Shortly thereafter copper prices began rising, prompting rapid expansion by Western as well as emerging-economy investors and raising prospects for a revitalisation of the long-stagnant sector. Yet Zambia’s copper mines have failed to live up to their development potential for a number of reasons, including the government’s limited ability to capture fiscal benefits: incoming investors negotiated highly concessional tax and royalty rates at privatisation, when Zambia was a forced seller in a buyer’s market. Consequently, in 2007 the government collected just 3% of the $4.7 billion earned by copper and cobalt exports.

Popular pressure on government to secure a larger share of benefits from copper extraction grew throughout the boom, but attempts to revisit the provisions of state–firm contracts through a formal renegotiating process failed. In early 2008, the government announced a new tax regime that would raise taxes on mining companies. Their responses varied. Several Western mining companies, including First Quantum Minerals and Mopani Copper Mines, threatened to go to international arbitration and quietly scaled back their investment plans, while most emerging market firms, including China’s Non-Ferrous Metals Corporation Africa (NFCA), were silent on the issue.

Local regulatory capacity has not kept pace with the rapid acceleration in mining sector investment. High-profile examples of regulatory failure include a now-infamous incident in 2005 when the explosives manufacturing facility of BGRIMM (Beijing General Research Institute of Mining & Metallurgy, a subsidiary of NFCA) literally blew up, killing over 50 Zambian workers. When the Indian-owned Konkola Copper Mines polluted the Kafue River in 2007, it caused Zambia’s largest environmental disaster, but ministerial intervention prevented the Environmental Council (the regulator) from bringing charges against the company. These shortfalls in regulation have added impetus to the calls for reform. High on the agenda are proposals for new licensing procedures, increased resources, and limitations on government interference. However, progress has been stalled.

In 2008 foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing countries fell by 30% (to $385 billion)

– the first such drop since the East Asian crisis of 1997.5 The financial crisis limited the ability of many investors to raise the capital required to repay existing debt or finance new projects. The immediate impact on the Zambian mining sector was significant. Forecasts for the production of finished copper in 2009 halved, from 1 200 to 600 kilo tonnes, and about a third of directly employed mineworkers were made redundant. The impact of the crisis on Western firms operating in Zambia was exacerbated by the uncertainty caused by the governments’ U-turns on fiscal matters in 2008. Sudden policy reversals represent a significant risk for firms reliant on highly sophisticated but fickle institutional investors. Thus, when the crisis hit, many were already reconsidering their investments. The mood of mining companies was described as ‘very suspicious’, because there was ‘no guarantee of stability, the government can turn around again anytime’.

However, outward FDI from China continued to grow. Investment into non-financial sectors reached $41 billion in 2008, a year-on-year increase of 64%.7Chinese companies are far less vulnerable to a global ‘credit crunch’ because their government can instruct the state-owned banks to continue lending, even when pure market logic might dictate otherwise. Moreover, higher capital reserves and trading restrictions meant that Chinese banks were less exposed to exotic (and toxic) mortgage-backed securities.

Zambia benefited through various high-profile investments from China. In May 2009 NFCA, competing against Vedanta Resources and the Luanshya Mineral Resources consortium, acquired Luanshya Copper Mines, which was being sold as a direct result of the low copper prices. Similarly, the Jinchuan Group Company ‘saved’ Albidon’s Munali nickel mine through an injection of equity. In North-Western province Zhonghui Mining was awarded a prospecting licence in February 2010, having undertaken to invest up to $3 billion.8 The Minister of Commerce said the government was ‘grateful’ that, despite the global downturn, Zhonghui’s investment budget had increased.

The nature and implications of investor diversity

The entry of Chinese actors into the African mining industry represents a tremendous opportunity for the continent’s resource-rich countries, yet it poses certain problems for policymakers. Zambia’s influx of Eastern and Western companies from markedly different institutional and cultural backgrounds means that the regulatory framework will have to accommodate widely divergent ways of doing business. These variations cover involvement with home governments, embeddedness in international capital markets, and the business culture developed by each company over time.

For example, Chinese state-owned companies are often both influenced and protected by the state, so their exposure to markets is only partial. NFCA is a subsidiary of the state-owned China Nonferrous Metal Mining (Group) Company, which plays a very specific role in China’s foreign policy, operating all the large Chinese mines on the Copper belt, and pioneering the development of ‘special economic zones’ in Africa. Chinese investors often enter Zambia through ‘closed-shop’ negotiations between the presidency and Chinese officials. The government is rewarded by large loans from China. Chinese investors appear to look to cultivating close relationships with members of Zambia’s central government rather than fostering community relations and demonstrating corporate social responsibility to ensure the stability of their on-going operations.

Chinese companies also enjoy an advantage in raising capital. For most firms, raising debt capital on international markets is increasingly associated with regulatory pressures. International banks require compliance with the Equator Principles, which provide for regular audits, by independent consultants, of the applicant’s social and environmental management systems. Moreover, firms listed on stock markets must report audited financial accounts prepared to international accounting standards. Chinese state-owned companies that do not raise capital on international markets are not subject to these reporting requirements. NFCA was the only one of the five companies I studied in Zambia that did not produce auditor sign-off on the accounts lodged with the Zambia Revenue Authority, a significant omission given the evidence of transfer pricing in the sector.

Again, the informal norms and practices of Chinese companies are distinct in ways that affect regulatory compliance. For instance, the typical period that NFCA managers spend at the company is three years, an unusually high management turnover that may lead to short-term incentives: managers focus more on near-term production and profit to the detriment of investment in longer- term projects, like improving environmental and safety standards. Moreover, segregated managerial practices and language problems increase the propensity for dangerous mistakes. An NFCA employee reported that poor communication was the reason for his company’s having the highest number of fatalities underground.

How diversity undermines reform

Zambia’s regulatory framework for its mining sector relies on co-operation, consultation, self-reporting and mutual accountability. Regulators are viewed as partners who should support and enable, as well as control and constrain, private sector interests, with the aim of creating ‘a win–win situation, so that when we regulate, we regulate such that they are more than willing and glad to comply’. However, where investors follow different standards and practices, regulators cannot rely on consensus. Firms that already have adequate reporting and control systems, like most of the Western mining companies, need not fear that regulatory reform will impose higher compliance costs. However, companies that do not have such systems in place are unlikely to support stricter standards. A mining manager from Chambishi Metals said that his firm fully supported reforms that would sharpen the regulatory ‘teeth’ of the Mines Safety Department, but described NFCA’s mood as ‘apprehensive’.

Zambia’s ‘presidential’ political culture, in terms of which large foreign investors are expected to brief the president on their investment plans, also complicates reform efforts because it engenders an interventionist approach. What should be relatively straightforward bureaucratic regulatory policymaking and enforcement becomes politicised. For example, a mines safety department official divulged that the ministry of mines was resisting plans for a more independent regulatory agency because it does not wish to relinquish control.

SAII A POLICY BRIEFING

The recent crisis showed African governments just how sensitive private investment can be to the vagaries of international capital markets and a global downturn. In contrast, Chinese investors, who are often supported by the state through direct ownership or debt financing, have been able to offer long-term commitment, a matter of key importance to African governments that rely heavily on foreign investment to develop their resource sectors[61].

Differences between Chinese and Western companies in practice and standards can impede their agreement on regulatory reform. Moreover, the tendency among Chinese investors to cultivate relationships with executive-level members of government may entrench personalised and discretionary arrangements that undermine the drive towards regulatory reform. Under the new administration of President Rupiah Banda, Zambia’s commitment to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and greater transparency remains ambiguous. For example, the government rejected donor proposals to involve external consultants in assessing bids, and failed to disclose its reasons for awarding the Luanshya Copper Mines to NFCA.

If Zambian copper is to support economic and social development, the government must strengthen and clarify the mandates of the regulatory agencies involved in the mining sector. This can be done only if policymakers become less reliant on collaboration with the mining companies. Although self-regulation and consultation over policy formulation have merits, they can be counter-productive when there are wide divergences in the culture and interests of the companies requiring regulation.

BANK OF ZAMBIA-BEFORE CENTRAL BANK

A semblance of central banking started in Zambia through the establishment in 1938 of the Salisbury (Harare) based Southern Rhodesia Currency Board. Its jurisdiction extended to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland because of a monetary agreement that existed between Southern Rhodesia and these territories. In 1954, the Southern Rhodesia Currency Board was renamed the Currency Board of Rhodesia and Nyasaland when its ownership changed from the Southern Rhodesia government to the Federal government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Currency boards are not central banks and they do not offer banking services. Their sole function, in contrast to the multiple functions of central banks, is to issue currency. In the case of the Central African Currency Board, and its predecessor they issued the Central African pounds which were 100 percent backed by pound sterling reserves in London. In other words, if the territories’ foreign exchange reserves rose, the Board increased its issue of local currency. If they declined, the local currency issued also had to be reduced.

With time the Currency Boards existence was hotly debated with some people saying that it needed to be replaced by a central bank. At the time, one of the popular views held by economists was that monetary policy could play a direct role in promoting economic growth primarily through credit expansion. The strict rules on monetary creation under the currency board, which made it conditional on developments in the balance of payments, did not accommodate discretionary credit expansion. In general, it was also considered more preferable to have a central bank which could conduct monetary policy and counter unfavorable cyclical developments.

Another major criticism that was made on the currency board was that the system for issuing currency under it imposed a heavy opportunity cost on the economy. Since the domestic currency on issue required 100 percent pound sterling cover, the utilization of foreign reserves to import capital for development was restricted.

In one important aspect, there is an important lesson to be learnt from the currency board arrangement. Firstly, it was cheap to administer. This was because it was a tiny organization. Secondly and perhaps more important, monetary restraint was much easier to establish under the currency board arrangement because government borrowing, the usual source of monetary expansion in most countries, was not allowed. Maintaining low inflation rates is therefore much simpler compared to modern central banking which permits government to print money for spending. Many central banks in the world, including the Bank of Zambia, which was forced to rapidly expand credit to their governments during the 1970s and the 1980’s discovered they could do little to stop inflation. That is why in the recent years many governments are moving away from borrowing from their central banks.

Social Stratification

Since independence came to Zambia, there has been an obvious gap between the rich and the poor. The elite have adopted a Western standard of living and in essence have created their own class. In both rural and urban societies, there are definite lines of wealth and poverty[62]. In the village a man is considered wealthy by having a large, healthy family, as well as his material goods. In the cities, there is greater emphasis on material wealth. The white and Asian populations have traditionally owned businesses and have done well over the years.

With the loosening of trade restraints, the gap between rich and poor has only widened. At the same time, the government is working to increase foreign investment in the country, while national priorities such as education and health care declined in importance. Concrete blocks and tin roofs—once provided by the government for palace construction within the villages—became a symbol of wealth and prestige. If a family did well financially, they would attempt to copy this construction fashion.

In small cities where electricity is available, appliances such as refrigerators, stoves and especially televisions and video cassette recorders are an indication of wealth. In all communities, a vehicle is an obvious indicator of wealth and success. In the cities, foreign imports are frequent sights on the streets.

An individual’s house is also a symbol of wealth and success. In the cities, large houses with pools and manicured gardens enclosed in a large fence can be found. In the villages, a family’s homestead reflects wealth through the number of structures, particularly if those structures include granaries, which hold a family’s maize harvest.

The Establishment of Central Bank

As the view grew stronger that a currency board was inappropriate, the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established in March, 1956. It was equipped with the full powers of a conventional central Bank such as conducting monetary policy, banker to government and commercial banks, manager of foreign exchange reserves and so on. The bank was also empowered to lend to the territorial and the Federal governments up to a limit based on their expected revenues in that fiscal year[63].

The Bank of Zambia was established to take over from the Bank of Northern Rhodesia on the 7th of August, 1964 although its Act was only passed in June, 1965. The Bank of Northern Rhodesia was itself constituted from the Lusaka branch (established in September, 1961) of the Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland after it broke up together with the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on the 31st of December, 1963.

The Bank started operations with about 100 staff organized around only two departments, namely the Chief Cashier’s or General Manager’s department and the Secretary’s department. The former was responsible to the Governor for monetary policy implementation, currency issue, banking, government securities, exchange control and foreign exchange management. The Secretary was responsible for personnel, administration, internal auditing and the Board. With time, the number of departments at the Bank started to increase. One of the earliest to be established was the Research Department in 1967. The Operations Department was created in 1976, and later, especially in the 1980s, the pace accelerated when other departments such as Personnel and Administration (1977) Exchange Control. Import and Export Control, Estate and Properties (all in 1981) were created. They were followed in 1982 by Banking and Currency, Small Scale Industries, Inspection and in 1984 by National Debt, Transport, and Government Securities.

The increase in the number of departments at the Bank partly reflected the increased demand on the functions which it had to perform, most of which centered on administering government imposed regulations such as exchange controls and import and export controls. In turn there was higher demand by the Bank on support services for these core activities. In addition, however, it is also true that the Bank, like many other organizations both inside and outside Zambia then, did not make hard distinctions between core and peripheral responsibilities and, hence, utilize resources accordingly. To give a concrete example, it was an accepted practice in Zambia that employers should find accommodation for their employees and in some cases, even furnish that accommodation. Institutions therefore acquired substantial property which required manpower and organization to manage. In some cases there were economic arguments, which were considered sound then, which led to organizational expansion.

This was an acceptable position at the time in the developing world and one of its strongest proponents among practitioners was the Reserve Bank of India. Applied to Zambia, it included the establishment of a department for Small Scale Industries and, later, a credit guarantee scheme. The expansion of the functions of the Bank saw a rise in the number of staff from 400 by 1975, to 1 226 in 1988 and to 1 400 in 1994. The Bank premises therefore had to be extended to accommodate the numbers. The new building (currently corporate head office) opened in 1975 while the Regional office in Ndola opened in 1979. Annex buildings were subsequently added to Lusaka and Ndola.

This expansion resulting from this extension of functions was unfortunately, not underpinned by a strong organizational structure. The Structure of the Bank has evolved over time more in response to staffing factors than the real needs of the Bank. One major cause for this has been the extreme rapid turnover of Governors. Since 1964, there have been ten appointments to the post (excluding the current Governor) over a period of 28 years making an average tenure of 2.8 years for each. With instability at the top, continuity and strategic planning for the future were bound to suffer.

The Changing Roles of Central Bank

The Bank of Zambia Act of 1965 and its subsequent amendments charge the institution with the usual central bank responsibilities such as being banker to government, issuer of currency, manager of foreign exchange reserves, controller of commercial banks’ liquidity and with responsibilities for the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. Although maintaining price stability is referred to in the Act as one of the Bank’s objectives, it was not considered with any particular emphasis in practice. This was not unique to Zambia. Many other central banks followed the received wisdom of the times regarding the possibility of a tradeoff between inflation and employment – the Phillips Curve idea which stipulates that higher levels of employment could be attained if higher inflation rate could be tolerated. The thinking at the Bank of Zambia – and at many other central banks – was that putting special emphasis on the central bank’s objective of maintaining price stability was focusing the function of a central bank much too narrowly. Interpreting its position correctly the Bank of Zambia acquired an equity stake in the Development Bank of Zambia and in the Zambia National Commercial Bank. At one time, thought was even given to the possibility of establishing and running a commercial farm.

Meanwhile in the major central banks of the world, the idea that the main role of central banks should be the maintenance of price stability without which a stable macro-economic environment was not possible, was gaining ground. It was also increasingly being felt that there was little else that a central bank can do to promote economic prosperity and attempting to do so through easy money just led to higher inflation. As a result of this realization, Central Banks started to re-orientate their activities accordingly. This new view on the appropriate role for central banks is only now beginning to be accepted. In 1991, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) came to power, replacing the United National Independence Party (UNIP) which had ruled for 27 years.

The new government’s priorities were the restoration of economic future growth and employment to the Zambian economy. Liberalizing the economy and thereby allow market forces a greater role in the allocation of resources was to be the main means of achieving this. Price controls were abolished, as were subsidies on all consumer items.
Macroeconomic management in Zambia has not been the same since. Although the ultimate economic objective has remained the same, namely growth and employment, it is now generally accepted that investment and subsequently growth, is unlikely to take place if the economy remains characterized by macroeconomic instability such as high inflation, shortage of foreign exchange, scarcities of commodities and so on.

Consequently, from 1992 the emphasis has been on creating a stable macroeconomic environment as a prelude to sustainable economic growth. The government’s focus on price stability as a key contribution to future economic growth prospects has paused a new but welcome challenge for the Bank. Hence, for example, although it reluctantly got involved in things like providing credit to parastatal organizations; it has begun to re-orient its activities towards meeting the core objective of maintaining price stability and ensuring a sound financial system

Board of Directors

The Board of the Bank of Zambia is composed of the Governor, who is the Chairperson, and six other Directors appointed by the Minister of Finance and National Planning from among persons with professional or academic experience in business or financial matters and who are not officials or employees of the Bank. All Directors of the Board are non-executive directors. The Secretary to the Treasury is an ex-officio member of the Board and without power to vote. The Secretary to the Treasury also does not count for a quorum. The Vice Chairperson is elected by the Board from among the members of the Board. Directors of the Board are appointed for a period of three years and are eligible to be reappointed for another three years. The Board is the overall authority in which all the power of the bank are vested. It is responsible for formulation of the Bank of Zambia policy.

Since its inception the Bank of Zambia has gone through various changes in its organizational structure. Overtime, this has resulted into an organizational structure which has become more focused on the core activities of the central bank. Furthermore the Bank has shed off staff in areas where outsiders could easily be contracted to provide the same services more satisfactorily. The areas now being contracted to external bodies include: outside security, canteen services, club and maintenance. As a result of the restructuring exercise, the Bank has seen the total number of staff fall from 1,400 to well below 850. But while more such functions have been dropped, others more critical in the new liberalized environment have emerged. These new areas are mainly in the policy making arena.

Legal Tender

The Bank of Zambia is the authority by law mandated to issue Zambian Currency banknotes and coins as legal tender. This is according to section number 4[2] of the Bank of Zambia Act 1996[64]. Legal tender comprises of banknotes and coins issued by the Bank of Zambia for circulation in the Republic of Zambia. The Zambian currency is known as the Zambian Kwacha and Ngwee (where 100 Ngwee is equal to K1). Zambia currently has nine banknotes and five coins in circulation. These are: K50,000, K20,000, K10,000, K5,000, K1,000, K500, K100, K50, K20 banknotes K10, K5, K1, 50N and 25N coins.

Climate

The general height of the land gives Zambia a more pleasant climate than that experienced in most tropical countries. There are three seasons – cool and dry from May to August, hot and dry from September to November, warm and wet from December to April. Only in the Valleys of the Zambezi and Luangwa is there excessive heat, particularly in October and, in the wet season, a high humidity. In the warm wet season, frequent heavy showers and thunderstorms occur, followed by spells of bright sunshine. Plants grow profusely and rivers and streams fill up almost overnight.

During the cool dry season, night frosts may occur in places sheltered from the wind. The countryside dries up gradually and grass fires, fanned by high winds are a feature of this time of the year. In depressions, radiation occurs on cloudless nights. Temperatures rise high during the hot, dry season but new leaves appear on the trees before the start of the rains and new grass brightens the countryside. The main growing period of woody vegetation is between August and November.

Although Zambia lies within the tropics, much of it has a pleasant climate because of the altitude. Temperatures are highest in the valleys of the Zambezi, Luangwa, and Kafue and by the shores of Lakes Tanganyika, Mweru, and Bangweulu. There are wide seasonal variations in temperature and rainfall. October is the hottest month. The main rainy season starts in mid-November, with heavy tropical storms lasting well into April.

The northern and north-western provinces have an annual rainfall of about 125 cm (50 in), while areas in the far south have as little as 75 cm (30 in). May to mid-August is the cool season, after which temperatures rise rapidly. September is very dry. Daytime temperatures may range from 23° to 31° C (73–88° F ), dropping at night to as low as 5° C (41° F ) in June and July. Lusaka, at 1,250 m (4,100 ft), has an average minimum of 9° C (48° F ) and an average maximum of 23° C (73° F ) in July, with averages of 17° C (63° F ) and 26° C (79° F)

Rainfall

While the rainfall pattern over the whole country is similar – between November and March, the amount of rain varies considerably. The climate is affected most by the movement of the inter-tropical convergence zone, which is the meeting place of the sub-tropical high-pressure areas of the northern and southern hemispheres. Over the sea, this zone approximates to the equator, and when the sun is overhead at the equator, heavy rains may fall in the equatorial regions of Africa. The zone moves southward with the apparent movement of the sun in the southern summer and brings rain to the greater part of Zambia.

In the north of the country rainfall is 1250mm/ (50 inches) or more a year, decreasing southwards to Lusaka where it is about 750mm/ 30 inches annually. South of Lusaka rainfall is dictated more by the east and Southeast trade winds, which have lost much of their humidity by the time they have reached so far inland. Rainfall in this area is between 500 and 75omm / 20 and 30 inches. In exceptional years the influence of the inter-tropical zone is felt much farther to the south, resulting in excessive rain in the Southern Province and partial drought in the north. Except for very rare falls in August, rainfall is confined to the wet season, which sometimes starts as early as October and finishes as early as March. At the height of the wet season, it rains on seven or eight days out of ten.

Average temperatures are moderated by the height of the plateau. Maxima vary from 15oC to 27o C in the cool season with morning and evening temperatures as low as 6oC to 10oC and occasional frost on calm nights in valleys and hollows, which are sheltered from the wind. In the cool season the prevailing wind, dry south easterlies come from the southern hemisphere belt of high pressure. Invasions of cold air from the southeast bring cloudy to overcast conditions. During the hot season, maximum temperatures may range from 27o C to 35o C.

It can be seen that annual temperature variation is greatest at Livingstone, the most southerly town, and the smallest at Mbala, the town nearest the equator. Zambia’s vegetation is of the savanna type and over half the country is covered by trees, varying from the more open conditions in the drier south to tall dense woodlands in the north and north-west. These woodlands contain only hardwoods. The trees are bare for a brief period only and the spring leaves appear before the start of the rains. Grass fires spread rapidly in the dry season but new blades of grass soon push through the blackened earth. Zambia’s climate makes possible the cultivation of a wide range of crops; maize, tobacco, cotton, rice, wheat and groundnuts. All kinds of vegetables can be grown, together with citrus fruit, bananas, pineapples, mangoes, avocados and even grapes. Lichis are also a high potential export crop. Tea and coffee are also grown successfully in fact the coffee produced is of a very high quality. Sugar cane is grown both by villagers and commercially.

Energy

Electricity is relatively cheap due to the abundance of hydroelectric power sources as well as reasonably large coal reserves. Most of the electricity is supplied from major hydropower stations located in the Kafue Gorge, Lake Kariba north bank and the Victoria Falls as well as from the mini-hydro power stations in Lusiwashi, Musonda Falls, Chishimba Falls and Luzua. The domestic electricity supply is 240 volt, 50-hertz alternating current, with 415-volt single and three-phase supply available for industrial use.

Natural Resources

Apart from its abundant wildlife, rivers, and lakes, Zambia holds 6% of the world’s copper reserves and is the fourth largest copper producing nation in the world. Zambia is internationally recognised as a major producer of emeralds, aquamarines, amethyst and tourmalines and the quality of the gems are highly competitive with world markets. Water is provided principally by the civic authorities in all cities and towns. Many residential properties are served by borehole systems.

Education

Zambia’s education is generally regarded as a basic human right and is vital to the development of a nation. Education empowers people, enabling them to be proactive, to control their lives and broaden economic and social opportunities. A long-standing educational goal in Zambia has been that every child who enters Grade 1 should be able to complete Grade 9. This aspiration goes back to the time of the struggle for independence when the nationalist movement established the goal that every Zambian should be able to complete at least a junior secondary education. In later years, this crystallized as ten years of compulsory schooling for every child, but the 1977 Educational Reforms reduced this to nine years. The structure proposed in 1977 was that eventually every primary school would extend its offerings up to Grade 9, so that there would be a continuous programme from Grade 1 to Grade 9, with the curriculum organized on the basis of six years of primary and three years of junior secondary education. The education to be provided during these nine years was referred to in the 1977 and subsequent documents as “basic education”.

The rationale for proposing this extended period of education was twofold. Basic education was to provide general education in basic subjects, skills training and productive work. Thereby, it was seen as enabling pupils to achieve a standard of functional education, which would equip them to live productively in society, and to possess occupational competence in a skill or group of skills. In other words, its aim was to provide general education, including some practical skills and a sound preparation for further education (full-time or part-time). Secondly, it was seen that nine years of compulsory education would allow pupils to grow two years older before they would have to fend for themselves in the world of work, if they did not continue with full-time education or training. It was believed that on completion of nine years of schooling the learner would be more mature when facing career or educational choices, and would base these on a fuller realization and understanding of his or her abilities, talents and interests.

It was recognized in 1977 and subsequently that the achievement of nine years of full-time education for all would take a long time. Financial constraints did not allow the government to proceed vigorously with the provision of additional facilities to make this goal a reality. Ongoing efforts to expand secondary provision brought about some increase in the number proceeding from Grade 7 to Grade 8, but because of the rapid growth in Grade 7 enrollments, the numbers leaving the school system on completion of Grade 7 increased very rapidly.

This situation prompted communities to adapt or provide facilities in primary schools for the commencement of Grade 8 and Grade 9 classes. Thus began the “basic schools movement” which has gathered momentum over the years. The number of basic schools rose from 51 in 1986 to 399 in 1994, and their number continues to grow. Their contribution to educational provision can be gauged from the fact that they now account for more than half the Grade 8 entry. In two respects, this popular movement has set the stage for the future development of education in Zambia: it sets down a major parameter for the structure of the education system, and it points to the all-important role of the community in educational provision.

THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM[65]

Primary Education

The Zambian education system has a 7-5-4 structure, namely 7 years at primary school, 2 and 3 years at junior and higher secondary school respectively, and 4 years at university for undergraduate degrees. While the intention is that school education should be mandatory for all, sadly many poorer children drop out along the way. Important steps were taken to make the primary education available to all the children between three to ten years. At present, there are almost 4,000 government schools and basic schools opened up in Zambia, where large numbers of students are being enrolled. Today even the girl child is not lagging behind in education. Literacy rate among the girl students are also going up in Zambia. English along with the native languages are being taught in the schools. Even the rural schools have started teaching the students English and the native languages.

Middle Education

Those who elect to study on at higher secondary school must first write a transitional selection examination. Thereafter, they may spend 4 years in an academic environment, where they hope to reach the standard required for their further university education. The first 2 years of secondary school are spent at middle schools. Many students go off to work after this, because the prevailing culture is that they have completed a decent education. The valid age to get entry in secondary level is fourteen years. Sometimes students are enrolled on the basis of quota systems.

Higher Zambia Education

Educational opportunities beyond high school are rather limited in Zambia. There are few schools offering higher education and most Zambians cannot afford the fees. The University of Zambia is the primary institution of higher learning. Several teacher-training colleges offer two-year programmes beyond high school, and there are several Christian schools, which offer seminary-level training.

Higher education is also available to the people of Zambia, where the entrance age is twenty to twenty four years. Copper-belt University and Azzalia University are the two popular University college of Zambia. Over the years, important and meaningful expansion has taken place in the educational sector of Zambia. However, the majority of the Zambia population are very poor and cannot afford the education for their children. Thus, USAID is an US based financial agency that is working hard to improve the condition of Zambia education. Both government and private schools exist in Zambia. The private school system began largely as a result of Christian mission efforts during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. One of the most famous private schools is the Roman Catholic run St Mary’s Seminary located in Eastern Province. Private schools operate under either the British or American way of schooling. The education system in Zambia has suffered a decline over the past two decades as a result of a drop in national revenue, linked to the low copper prices and substantial increase in fuel costs.

Despite this set, back the Zambian government has made serious effort to recover and reform the education sector. The Zambian government is committed to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education for All (EFA) objectives. The Ministry of Education is supportive of free primary education that has resulted in a massive increase in enrolment. The Government has recognized in the newly created Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) the role of education in poverty reduction and the need for early childhood education. In addition, the Ministry of Education is fully aware of the needs of orphans and vulnerable children (OVC). Though a great deal needs to be done for orphaned children, there is a sound platform to work from.

The HIV/AIDS pandemic remains one of the most formidable challenges within the country. Unfortunately, there remains a lack of HIV/AIDS education and support services for students and teachers. Teachers are just beginning to come forward for HIV/AIDS counselling and testing. Decentralization of the education sector has slowly progressed since 1990. Education Boards for basic schools, high schools and teacher-training institutions have been established. These boards, however, do not yet have the full authority to be effective. Zambia despite its reforms in education is still not adequately investing in education. The National Development Plans targets a 4% of the GDP but depends on external sources to reach this target. USAID’s objective is to improve the quality of education by closely collaborating with the Ministry of Education to bring about positive reforms. USAID has been supporting the Ministry of Education for nine years. During this period, more USAID has provided more than 70 million dollars for the support of education. Currently, USAID is funding four (4) separate education initiatives in Zambia: Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP2); Quality Education Services through Technology (QUESTT); Community Health and Nutrition, Gender and Education support (CHANGES2); and the Textbook and Learning Materials Project (TLMP).

All USAID’s education programs are designed to complement and contribute to enhancing the quality of education. USAID supported EQUIP2 program is embedded in the MOE headquarters and is considered part of the MOE structure. This program assists the MOE with collecting information on the schools, supports implementation of the annual school census and preparation of the Education Statistical Bulletin, and contributes to national policy development, institutional management and organization of an information technology network. The EQUIP2 program also implements a unique HIV/AIDS workplace service for teachers and their families. The overall purpose of the workplace program is to encourage MOE personnel to join counseling and take advantage of HIV testing opportunities. In addition, the EQUIP2 program is assisting the MOE design and monitor regular classroom based student assessment techniques and is introducing a global learning portal that will allow teachers and administrators to access a wide range of new topics through the internet.

USAID also supports The Quality Education Services through Technology (QUESTT) Program. The core strategy of the QUESTT is to continue to expand basic education through Interactive Radio Instruction (IRI).The radio program learning at Taonga Market is created for children that are not in a conventional schools. The children sing and complete class lessons in consent with the teacher on the radio. The Learning at Taonga Market radio program reaches more than 80,000 children. The QUESTT program also assists the Department of Open and Distance Education (DODE) in the development of radio programs and materials for grades 1-9 ensuring a full cycle of basic education is available to the children. QUESTT also uses radio instruction and other technologies to support the pre-service and in-service teacher training in order to ensure the quality of teaching.

The CHANGES2 program designed to support schools directly is also funded by USAID and is an expansion and enhancement of the successful CHANGES program, implemented from 2001 – 2005. The current program is strengthening basic education teachers’ professional skills, with a special focus on HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation. In addition, CHANGES2 supports the Ministry of Education’s school health and nutrition activities, and empowers students, teachers and community members to improve education, gender equity and health in schools and communities. CHANGES2 works in four provinces and in 400 schools per year and trains at least 800 teachers annually. .In addition CHANGES2, provides small grants for schools to begin income-generating activities, produces learning materials on HIV/AIDS, school health and nutrition, to support effective teaching in schools and communities. The CHANGES2 program provides 4,000 scholarships a year to orphans and vulnerable children in secondary school to allow them to continue their studies. CHANGES2 also works in partnership with the Ministry of Education to improve curriculum and teaching methods in the Teacher Education colleges. Finally, USAID is supporting through Mississippi Consortium for International Development the production of 600,000 new maths books for students in grades four and five.

Vocational Education

The Zambian government regards the development of the nation’s skill base as fundamental to its economic growth. With this in mind, the technical education, vocational and entrepreneurship, training program is being redeveloped, to realize the full potential of the nation’s people.

Tertiary Education

There are just 5 universities in the whole of Zambia, namely the Copper belt University in Kitwe, the Zambia Adventist University in Monze, the Northwest University in Ndola, and the Cavendish University and the University of Zambia in Lusaka. The last-mentioned is the oldest having been established in 1964, and is illustrated here. It has schools of agricultural sciences, education, engineering, humanities & social sciences, law, mines, medicine, natural sciences, and veterinary medicine. English is the official language of instruction in schools from preschool to tertiary education.

Universal primary education

The Government of Zambia has established access and quality of education^[1], especially for girls, as a national priority, even in hard economic times. Efforts have ranged from far-reaching policy reform to expanded access to education[66]. Zambia is addressing poor access to education through MDG 2. In 2002, the Ministry of Education enacted the Free Basic Education policy, which has subsequently led Zambia to dedicate substantially more domestic resources to education. From 2006 to 2010, funding to the education sector steadily increased from 2.9% to 3.5% of GDP. Zambia improved school infrastructure, including water, and sanitation. Teacher training programs have increased the teacher supply to match the expansion of school enrollment. The number of teachers increased from 50,123 (27,559 males and 22,564 females) in 2002 to 77,362 (39,733 males and 37,629 females) in 2009.

Student enrolment has increased from 2.5 million students in 2005 to 3.3 million in 2009. Furthermore, the participation of girls increased from 1.4 million in 2005 to 1.65 million in 2009. The Gender Parity Index (GPI) improved from 0.95% to 0.99%. Over one third of the girls who became pregnant returned to school between 2002 and 2009. Over 200,000 students in basic schools were reached with improved water and sanitation. The policy offers diverse approaches to bring children to education. Women are particularly supported by the policy through bursaries or scholarships and by encouraging them to return to school after pregnancy. Radio campaigns are encouraging girls and children from low socio-economic status to go into schools.

The policy also created opportunities for communities to initiate and manage local schools for their children; the number of community schools grew from less than 200 in 1996 to over 3,000 in 2009. Monica Hangwinto is one happy 11-year-old because, since last year, she can attend school here in Shimballa village, just a 20-minute walk from home. Before the school was built in 2009, she could not get an education. The nearest classroom was a two hour walk away. Monica could not easily trek that far, and her parents were afraid something might happen to her on her way, as has been the case with other playmates who were harassed, assaulted, or killed in traffic accidents.

FREE BASIC EDUCATION POLICY

The Ministry of Education in 2002 enacted the free basic education policy (Grades 1-7). In 2007, the Ministry implemented the Every Child to School policy, which concentrated on infrastructure development and led to the building of 4,627 new classrooms. This initiative builds on the 1996 national education policy. In 2008, the Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (EFA FTI) endorsed Zambia’s national education strategy. FTI was an important factor in the prioritisation of education in national policies, supporting the Zambian Government with a US$60 million allocation to the sector budget. Partnerships with non-governmental organizations and local communities have also been key. Even at a time of economic difficulty, The Government of Zambia has maintained its focus on improving access, and investing in education. The focus now is moving to driving up quality standards.

Increasing access to quality basic education for all children

Education is not only a human right, but it is also an essential tool for individuals to break the poverty cycle and to building the human capital of nations. Zambia is one of the poorest countries in the world and is home to 6 million children under the age of 18 of which 4 million children are of the primary school age (7-14). Though Zambia made commendable progress in increasing access and gender parity, more than a quarter million children are out of school and 47% of those enrolled in school do not complete the primary cycle.

The current UNICEF country programme (2011-2015) focuses on capacity and systems strengthening for improvement of quality of education, equity in participation and progression from pre-primary to primary and lower secondary education, particularly for girls, rural children, and other excluded groups. HIV prevention and behavioural change are promoted through life skills programme for children who are in school and out of school. The programme has three results areas:

Early Childhood Care and Development Education (ECCDE)

UNICEF is providing support to help the GRZ promote Early Childhood Care and Development Education (ECCDE) for children aged six and below. Children who participate in early childhood education are more likely to enrol and remain in primary school (and achieve better results) than those who cannot access comprehensive early childhood care. UNICEF supports establishment of child-friendly early learning centres, developing national curriculum and learning and development standards, and training of teachers and care givers. More than 40 centres are providing school readiness instruction to 7,000 children in 5 districts. ECCDE centres are also entry points for monitoring child health and nutrition.

Quality Basic Education

Since the introduction of the free basic education policy in 2002, enrolment in basic education levels has steadily increased. However, children from poor households, rural children and girls are the last to enrol in school and the first to drop out, and are significantly underrepresented in the upper grades of basic education as well as the secondary level. UNICEF supports the Ministry of Education, civil society, and communities to ensure that children and adolescents are able to develop, learn and participate in a protective, inclusive and child-friendly enabling environments. At the national level, support include training of teachers and school administrators on inclusive education, interactive teaching and other classroom subjects; technical assistance for curriculum and student assessment reviews; and advocacy for policy and systemic reforms.

At sub-national level, community schools that serve rural and marginalized children are the priority for UNICEF support: 10,000 children are learning in newly constructed child-friendly 60 classrooms with clean water and gender sensitive sanitation facilities and more than 20,000 pupils have received adequate teaching learning materials. 306 community School teachers (146 male, 160 female) have benefited from professional training on teaching skills.

HIV/AIDS and Life Skills Education

As part of UNICEF’s strategy to fight HIV and AIDS among youth, the programme includes Life Skills Education as a methodology assisting learners to have comprehensive knowledge on HIV prevention and risk reduction skills. At national level, UNICEF assisted the Ministry of Education in the development of Life Skills materials for grades 1 to 9, development and implementation of HIV workplace policy and capacity development of teachers in life skills provision. As of 2009, 60% of the basic schools were providing life skills to learners.

Through NGOs UNICEF supports interventions that include life-skills through sports and peer to peer counselling which reaches over 500, 000 children in and out of school with Life skills and HIV prevention messages in 6 provinces[67].

$211 million for free education up to grade 12

Government through the ministry of education, science, technology, vocational training and early education has signed a mutual accountability framework with its cooperating partners for the third national implementation framework (NIF III) of the education sector under the sixth national development plan for 2011-2015. A total of 211.25 million United States dollars has been committed for the period of the third national implementation framework up to 2015. The committed resources will be critical in programmes such as the implementation of the free education policy up to grade 12, upgrading of community schools into fully fledged primary schools as well as promoting gender equality and equity.

Unless attention is paid towards improving literacy and numeracy levels particularly for the early graders, performance among children will forever remain at the tail end in the SADC region. Zambia is resolute in its quest to attain the education for all and millennium development goals by 2015 and the government has prioritized education as one of the key sectors for increased investment during the period of the sixth national development plan (SNDP) and beyond. No nation can aspire to substantive economic and social progress without investing in quality education. Strengthening and building capacity in the educational planning, use of accurate and timely data for evidence based decision and policy making is vital for effective implementation of the third national implementation framework^[1].

RIGHT TO EDUCATION

Education policy framework

Zambia has ratified most international treaties that protect the right to education. Although the 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Zambia does not protect the right to education, it is under review, and the right to education is expected to be included in the revised constitution. Because the current constitution does not include the right to education, however, there are currently few redress mechanisms for the right to education in Zambia. Zambia’s main legislation on education is the Education Act 2011, which identifies each person’s rights to early childhood education, basic education and high school education. Since 2006, government education policies have focused on access, but there is a recent shift towards improving quality of education in addition to addressing accessibility issues.

According to World Bank data, public expenditure on education in Zambia equalled 2.8% of GDP and 14.8% of total government expenditure in 2004, but had decreased to 1.3% of GDP by 2008. This figure is considerably lower than neighbouring countries. In Angola, public expenditure on education in 2008 equalled 6.4% of GDP and 22.4% of total government expenditure. In Tanzania, public expenditure on education in 2008 equalled 6.8% of GDP and 27.5% of total government expenditure. Moreover, the government is not upholding its policy commitments on education expenditure.

Advocacy opportunities

• The key immediate advocacy opportunity is to influence the national constitution revision process and to focus on the implementation of the right to education, following the adoption of the new constitution, including changes to laws, policies and redress mechanisms to support the right to education contained within the constitution.
• The 1996 Educating Our Future policy, which still orientates the education efforts of the governments should also be revised and updated. It should in particular clarify the commitments regarding early child care and development education, which are vague and limited.
• The budget allocated to education is below government commitments and international standards in comparable countries. As an immediate step, government should be pressured to maintain their budget commitments and prioritise education in budget decision-making processes, spending the maximum available resources towards education.
• Although education is theoretically free up to grade 7, indirect fees such as fees for PTA funds, are still used, and should be abolished. In addition, to address the high drop-out rates after grade 7, advocacy could be directed towards also eliminating fees at higher grades. The recently elected government has committed to abolish examination fees up to grade 9, and some other political parties even promised abolishing fees up to grade 12; these promises should be translated into laws and policies.
• Minimum ages legislation (for marriage, employment, and criminal responsibility) in Zambia is far from being coherent with the right to education (see generally RTE’s report on the topic). If there have been recent progress, in particular in the draft constitution which recognises 18 as a minimum age for marriage, this should be a priority area for reform^[1].

RIGHT TO EDUCATION PROJECT – AUGUST 2012

I. International Obligations

The major UN conventions (listed below) each have provisions relevant to education, non-discrimination or access to justice, and they can all be signed up to by states, thereby obliging these to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. When States ratify international treaties, they legally commit to respect its provisions, and the concrete situation in the country can therefore be measure against the standards set in the treaty. The ratification of treaties further indicates that the right to education does not come out of a vacuum, but corresponds to international standards that many States have committed to enforce. It is sometimes possible to bring complaints before national courts if these treaties are not respected by States. Some conventions, either in their core text or in optional protocols, also specify routes of individual complaints to the different committees of independent experts[68].

INSTRUMENT	RATIFIED
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)	10 Apr 1984
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR	Not signed
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)	6 Dec 1991
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure	Not signed
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	21 Jun 1985
Optional Protocol to the CEDAW	Not ratified
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)	10 Apr 1984
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR	10 Apr 1984
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial	4 Feb 1972
Discrimination (CERD)	4 Feb 1972
ILO C87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise	02 Sep 1996
Convention
ILO C98 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention	02 Sep 1996
ILO C111 Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation	23 Oct 1979
ILO C138 Minimum Age Convention	09 Feb 1976
ILO C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention	10 Dec 2001
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights	10 Jan 1984
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the	Not ratified
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child	02 Dec 2008
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights	10 Jan 1984
UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education	Not signed

II. NATIONAL POLICIES

National laws and policies are important because they define concretely the framework of rights and obligations for actors in the country. The Constitution is the highest legislative norm; it sets out general principles to which all other national laws and policies have to adhere. It is usually the text where human rights, including the right to education, are or should be defined. If a policy or law does not respect the Constitution, it can usually be challenged before courts.

The list of laws and policies presented below is not exhaustive; it gives an indication of the relevant existing policies and their relation with the right to education. It can constitute a basis for further research, and it should be considered critically together with the observations made by NGOs and international organisations.

iii. CONSTITUTION

The Constitution includes human rights guarantees, but not the right to education.

Key provisions

1.1 Part IX – Directive principles of state policy and the duties of a citizen

Art.112 – Directive principles of state policy

(e) The State shall endeavour to provide equal and adequate educational opportunities in all fields and at all levels for all.

1.2 Child Rights

Art.24 – Protection of young persons from exploitation

No young person shall be employed and shall in no case be caused or permitted to engage in any occupation or employment which would prejudice his health or education (…).

1.3 Religion

Part III – Protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual

Art.19 – Protection of freedom of conscience

(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of conscience, and for the purposes of this section the said freedom includes (…) freedom, either alone or in community with others, and both in public and in private, to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in (…) teaching, (…).

(2) Except with his own consent (…), no person attending any place of education (…) shall be required to receive religious instruction (…) if that instruction (…) relates to a religion other than his own.

(3) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for persons of that community or denomination or from establishing and maintaining institutions to provide social services for such persons.

Fee or for free education:

Zambia was one of the governments which formally acknowledged their inability to ensure free primary education when it ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights in 1984. It stated that “the financial implications are such that full application cannot be guaranteed at this stage”. In 1999 the government self-critically stated that ‘it cannot meet all the expectations in the area of education. Private and community schools provide basic education outside the formal system and it is encouraged as an alternative avenue”. It affirmed in 2002 that “there is no legislation that guarantees the right to education”.

In the early 1990s, families financed just under a half (44%) of the cost of primaryschooling but by the endof the decade, their financial contribution increased to twice as much as the government’s. Direct charges increased from k20 in 1991 to k1,000 in 1994 with the annual cost of keeping one child in primary schools estimated at $24. Widespread impoverishment reduced the parental ability to pay for the schooling of their children but, nevertheless, a child could be excluded from school for the failure to pay fees even if the parents are unable to pay then. The background was that too many parents were still unable to finance the education of their children.

A commitment to seven years of free basic education was announced in February 2002 by the president of Zambia. This included the abolition of school fees and obligatory school uniforms. This commitment was repeated in the PRSP one month later. The government recalled the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where by elementary education should be free and compulsory and highlighted the high cost as the principal obstacle to universalizing education.

The commitment to free education was made for primary school alone while secondary while secondary schools were to be funded 80% by user fees.

Although the government formally declared that primary education should be free as of 2002, this pledge has not been translated into reality. Human Rights watch found in 2005 that schools continue to charge fees.

Some of the fees were abolished but others were merely re-named as Venkatesh Seshamani. Although the government abolished user fees, this did not effectively reduce the financial burden of the parents since practically all schools simply raised the PTA charges to cover the lost fees. The conditions Zambia had to meet to reach the completion point and, thus, attain debt relief pitted the ministries of finance and education against each other. Reduced budgetary allocations to education were needed to qualify for debt relief and educational retrogression continued.

One of the first necessary steps is an increase in teachers’ salaries. In 1999, the

World Bank found that “at starting salary of about $660 annually teachers are paid almost 25% below the CSO (Central Statistical Office) estimate of poverty

line for a household with two adults and four children”. In 2004, the monthly cost of living on the basis of a minimal bread- basket was calculated at $160 while

average teachers’ salaries were $130[1].

Article 11 of the 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Zambia identifies that “every person in Zambia has been and shall continue to be entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual”. Part III of the Constitution expands on these fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, which include protection from discrimination (article 23) and the protection of young people from exploitation (article 24). While its preamble specifically “pledg[es] to every citizen the right to education”, no provision in the constitution specifically protects the right to education. Children’s rights (beyond the right of children of a Zambian citizen to citizenship, and protection from exploitation) are not specifically identified in the constitution.

A new constitution is currently under review, and early drafts show that human rights, including the right to education, are likely to be incorporated into the document.

1.4 FIRST DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA, 30 APRIL 2012

The First Draft Constitution of the Republic of Zambia incorporates a Bill of Rights. This includes

a) the right of persons to education (article 62),

b) the right of children to free basic education (article 55),

c) the right to non- discrimination (article 27),

d) the right of women and men to equal treatment (article 51),

e) youth access quality and relevant education and training (article 56),

f) and the right of persons with disabilities to education (article 58) .

However, the draft constitution has a number of shortcomings that should be addressed. In particular, it does not clearly spell out the State’s obligation under international law to fulfil human rights to the maximum of its available resources and its immediate obligation to fulfil certain elements of the right to education such as the immediate obligation to provide free basic education[69].

Key provisions of the draft constitution protecting children’s rights

Part IV: Bill of Rights

Article 55: Children

(1)It is the duty of parents and the State to nurture, protect and educate children.

(2)All children, whether born in or outside wedlock, are equal before the law and have equal rights. […]

(5)Every child has a right – […]

(c) to free basic education;

(d) to be protected from discrimination, neglect, abuse and harmful cultural rites and practices, including female genital mutilation and body mutilation, and to be protected from marriage before attaining the age of eighteen years;

(e) To be protected from any work that is exploitative or likely to be hazardous or adverse to the child’s welfare; […]

(g) not to be subjected to corporal punishment or any other form of violence, or cruel and inhuman treatment, in the home, school and any institution responsible for the care of children; […]

(k) To a standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development; […]

(q) to survival and development

(6)Children with special needs, orphans, a child whose parent is in prison, children with disability, refugee children and homeless children or children living or who spend time, on the streets, are entitled to the special protection of the State and society.

Article 62: Economic and social rights

(1)A person has the right to – […]

(f) Education

LEGISLATION AND POLICIES

The education system in Zambia is organised as follow: 9 years of basic education, 3 years of high school and 4 years of higher education (based on competitiveness).

4.1 BUDGET

i. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Report (PRSP) (2007) identifies that the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) 2006-2010 target in 2007 was to increase government funding to the education sector to 4.4% of GDP and to raise the education and skills development budget to at least 22.4% of the national budget by 2010.

ii. The Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) 2011-2015 identifies education and skills development is a strategic focus of the SNDP, and a focus of discretionary expenditure.

4.2 POLICY FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW

i. “Educating Our Future” (1996) is the third major education policy in Zambia. It guides the current action of the Ministry of Education. This policy focuses on equitable access to quality education at all levels. Actual implementation of the policy has, since 2003 been based on various education sector Strategic Plans.

ii. The Education Act 2011 identifies that every person has a right to early childhood education, basic education and high school education (s14), and that every child has the right to free basic education (s15). The act prohibits discrimination by education institutions (s19) and ensures equal access to all learners, including poor and vulnerable children (section 22).

iii. The Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) 2011-2015 (January 2011) is the sixth medium term plan that outline strategies for development, including education and skills development. The SNDP aims to improve the quality of education and skills development outlining the necessary policies and reforms, as well as objectives, strategies and programmes for education and skills development.

iv. The Education and Skills chapter of Zambia’s Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010 (2007)which was implemented though the Education Sector National Implementation Framework focuses on improving the quality of education and training within and outside the public education and training system. It also introduces measures that aim to improve access to education for vulnerable children, increase the retention and completion rates of girls, and address the adult literacy rate of 55.3%.

v. The National Child Policy (2006) constitutes core guidelines for improving the welfare and quality of life of children as well as for protecting their survival and developmental rights. It aims at reducing moderate to severe malnutrition in children, and expanding early childhood care^[1].

PATRIOTIC FRONT MANIFESTO: EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT

The PF policy proposals for education are set out under three main areas:

Early education

It intends to “provide and facilitate early childhood education centres and teachers in all local government wards in Zambia”. There are also promises to equip teachers with training at diploma and degree levels in early childhood education[70].

Primary and secondary

The PF will re-introduce “free and compulsory education for all (that is from grade one to grade twelve)”, accompanied by a new commitment to a twin track approach to education with students having the choice to pursue an “academic route” or “technical” path. This is new and seeks to respond to concerns that the current approach is too focused on getting a job rather than entrepreneurship or other innovative practices. Perhaps the most eye catching proposals relate to provisions to look after the teachers in rural areas. There are promises of increasing rural hardship allowance, providing new housing and government guaranteed mortgages or loans.

Tertiary education

PF are planning to increase the number of public universities by converting existing colleges into public universities. The focus is therefore on a public funded higher education system. There’s also a proposal to introduce a new bursary scheme for tertiary education for all pupils who qualify to higher learning institutions. The beneficiaries would either repay the money or “work off” the benefit they have received. Finally, PF will create a new independent regulatory body to register and enforce education standards in public and private universities. The last two proposals are similar to plans already being taken forward by the MMD administration and therefore some might contend that it is unclear what PF proposals add to the table^[1].

SOME MEASURES TAKEN BY ZAMBIA TO GUARANTEE THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION

In John Banda v The People HPA/6/1998, Zambia’s High Court ruled in 1999 that corporal punishment as a sentence for crime is unconstitutional as it contradicts article 15 of the constitution, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading punishment. The lessons of this ruling have been incorporated into the Education Act 2011 which prohibits corporal punishment or degrading or inhuman treatment (s28).

The recommendations and observations made by national or international bodies provide a critical view of the laws and policies in a country, and can constitute a useful tool to identify the gaps related to the right to education. They also give arguments for national advocacy, and can be useful forum to mobilise people and drive change on the right to education.

Recommendations are often made by NGOs in the context of the reporting to UN bodies. They give the point of view of civil society and affected people. At the national level, independent monitoring bodies, such as national human rights institutions, can also make recommendations on human rights, normally giving a neutral domestic perspective on the state of human rights in a country. The performance of States to respect their obligations is also reviewed by other States through Universal Periodic Review (UPR), which is a peer review mechanism taking place at the Human Rights Council. The recommendations made in this context, are often rather general, but carry a significant political weight. The analysis made by UN human rights bodies related to treaties which States have signed up to provide more specific recommendations, and constitute one of the most authoritative sources of critical analysis on human rights in a country. Other international mechanisms, such as UN Special Rapporteurs and UN Agencies (including UNICEF, the World Bank, etc.) can be another useful source of information.

NGOS AND NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

In their submission to the UN Human Rights Council for the UPR in 2008, NGOs working in Zambia reported that the government had mainstreamed human rights and children’s rights education into the high school civic education curriculum. The World Organisation Against Torture expressed concern that although it is unlawful, corporal punishment and other forms of humiliating and degrading punishment are still widely practiced against children in Zambia as a means of discipline in education, and indicated a need for raising public awareness for nonviolent forms of discipline. Franciscans International and Edmund Rice International (FI-ERI) highlighted that rapid privatisation of social services (including education) between 1997 and 2000 in the Copper belt region of northern Zambia has deepened poverty and has affected social services, including education.

FI-ERI indicated that while school enrolment has increased in Zambia, fewer children complete their primary education; in 2005, 93% of girls and 91% of boys were enrolled in primary school, but only 83% of children completed primary school. FI-ERI also stated that the government needs to contribute to the running costs of community schools, in line with its Educating Our Future document, as these schools currently rely on private donor funding. Other concerns expressed by NGOs elsewhere includes the fact that although the government has committed to early childhood education, its involvement remains limited it leaves it to private players, NGO’s and local councils to provide early childhood care and education[71].

Though government spells out the education system of 9, 3, 4, in the policy, this is almost an attainable considering that there hasn’t been steady improvement of resources. E.g. in Nakonde (and the picture is the same for many other rural parts of Zambia), there are only 3 institutions which go up to grade 12 against over 60 basic schools which becomes systematically limiting to learners completion of school.

UN HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES

UN universal periodic review recommendations

The UN agencies on the human rights situation in Zambia recommended as follows

i. Increase resources for education to help children to go to school, including secondary school

ii. Introduce human rights into the school curricula

iii. Provide children with a safe school environment by, inter alia, taking all necessary steps to prevent abuse and exploitation of children by school personnel, taking effective disciplinary measures against school personnel who have committed those offences and encouraging the reporting of these incidences to the competent authorities, notably through child-sensitive structures for complaints

Children with disabilities

i. Establish a comprehensive policy for children with disabilities

ii. Establish special education programmes to facilitate the inclusion of children with disabilities into the regular education system

iii. Seek technical cooperation to train professional staff to work with children with disabilities

iv. Increase resources for special education and vocational programmes for children with disabilities, and to support families of children with disabilities

OTHER RELEVANT UN BODIES

The analysis of the human rights situation in Zambia made by UN agencies, including the right to education, can be found in the Compilation of UN information prepared for the UPR. The OHCHR office in Zambia gathers information regarding human rights in Zambia and the UN field office gathers additional UN documents.

The 2011-2015 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) highlights that basic education completion is low (while completion rates for grades 1-7 are high at 94.7%, completion rates for grades 8-9 are low at 51.2%). Other factors that limit girls’ progression in education at secondary and tertiary levels include early marriage/early pregnancy, low appreciation for girls’ education, gender-based violence, inadequate sanitation facilities in schools and the burden of care caused by the HIV and AIDS epidemic. Quality of primary education also needs improvement.

The UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magdalena Sepulveda Carmona, identified the impact of discrimination on access to education in Zambia when on a mission to Zambia in August 2009 (A/HRC/14/31/Add.1). She noted that discrimination in Zambia is pervasive, and limits women’s opportunities to access education. As a result of discrimination, women are more likely to be unemployed, are less literate and are underrepresented in political and decision-making activities. Social discrimination impedes refugees’ and asylum seekers’ access to the education system, making them vulnerable to extreme poverty.

LANGUAGES

English is the official language as the country was once an English colony (1924–1964). While many people speak English, in rural areas tribal languages are spoken, in addition to a few other vernacular languages. Each of the seventy-five tribes living in the country has its own dialects and language. The main vernacular languages are Bemba, Lozi, Luanda, Luvale, Nyanja, Tonga, and Tumbuka.

The official language of Zambia is English, which is used to conduct official business and is the medium of instruction in schools. The main local language, especially in Lusaka, is Nyanja. However, Bemba and Nyanja are spoken in the urban areas in addition to other indigenous languages which are commonly spoken in Zambia. Others are Lozi, Kaonde, Tonga, Lunda and Luvale, which feature on the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC)’s local languages section. The total number of languages spoken in Zambia is 73.

The process of urbanisation has had a dramatic effect on some of the indigenous languages, including the assimilation of words from other indigenous languages and English. Urban dwellers sometimes differentiate between urban and rural dialects of the same language by prefixing the rural languages with ‘deep’. Most will thus speak Bemba and Nyanja on the Copper belt; Nyanja is dominantly spoken in Lusaka and Eastern Zambia. English is used in official communications and is the chosen language at home among – now common – intertribal families. If one does visit Zambia it becomes evident that language continuously evolves and has led to Zambian slang which can be heard in daily life throughout Lusaka and other major cities. Intentions of introducing other languages, like Portuguese, into the school curriculum have been discussed by the government.[1] French is commonly studied in private schools, while some secondary schools have it as an optional subject. A German course has been introduced at the University of Zambia (UNZA)[72].

Social protection in Zambia

Zambia officially has extensive social protection targeted at low-capacity households, including social assistance (protection) and social insurance programmes (prevention), and programmes to improve economic productivity (promotion). However, these programmes face immense challenges and the actual coverage is very low and, in some cases, actually declining.[52] Some analysts describe the programmes’ coverage as patchy and transitory and not especially coherent or logical[73].

Public works, such as PUSH, and cash transfers are the main instruments used to protect consumption among low-capacity households by providing

i. Seasonal safety nets to address cyclical poverty and vulnerability at times of need by offering employment and

ii. Community assets that is beneficial for productive activities. In practice, however, the programme prioritises food transfers to areas affected by natural disasters where vulnerability is acute and infrastructure development has remained a secondary objective.

NGOs also have implemented short-term public works programmes implemented by NGOs, such as CARE’s agricultural inputs-for-assets (AICA) programme. Social insurance initiatives, such as micro-insurance, health insurance and other contributory schemes exist, but these are very limited in their membership. Formal sector workers are protected by well-resourced pension, sickness and disability benefits, but most low-capacity households, especially in rural areas, work outside the formal sector.

The emphasis on protection of the expense of prevention and promotion means that households move out of poverty only very slowly because they are unable to invest in activities that have greater returns. They remain highly at risk of sliding back into poverty and applying negative coping strategies.[6] A balance between protection, prevention and promotion, however can only be achieved through more and consistent resources. Further improvements might also include

a) improved implementation of existing programmes; and

b) Better co-ordination between different implementers and programmes.

Social protection for LGBT is non-existent in Zambia and any expression thereof is illegal.

HEALTH

Zambia has recently articulated an ambitious national health program designed to meeting health-related MDGs. Public expectations are high and Zambia continues to receive significant resources from global and bilateral donors to support its health agenda[74]. Although the lack of adequate resources presents the most important constraint, the efficiency with which available resources are being utilised is another challenge that cannot be overlooked. Inefficiency in producing health care undermines the service coverage potential of the health system. This paper estimates the technical efficiency of a sample of hospitals in Zambia.

Zambia’s health system is poised for a major challenge of executing an ambitious health programme designed towards improving health service delivery and meeting its health-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In 2006, the Ministry of Health (MOH) announced an ambitious national plan to scale-up a range of interventions for fighting the Zambia’s leading health problems. Public expectations are high and Zambia continues to receive significant resources from various donors and development agencies to support its health programme. By 2006, the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) alone had given about US$120 million. More resources are likely to be available through the Highly-Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative[75]. These resources will continue to enhance Zambia’s capacity to extend coverage of a range of key interventions to its citizens. With total health expenditure currently estimated to be only around US$ 25–30 per capita, there is no doubt that Zambia will need external support in order to further its health agenda.

The Ministry aims to address and share ideas with the public on various topics in the health field and related services under the vision of providing the people of Zambia with equity of access to cost effective, quality healthcare as close to the family as possible. The public health sector has taken significant steps towards meeting the objectives of the health reforms, particularly in improving access to health care, afford-ability of health services and health systems strengthening. The country is also under significant pressure to reduce the disease burden, improve the health status of Zambians as well as accelerate the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Ministry of Health has health facilities that aim at delivering health care to the community classified as either hospitals, Health Centres or Health Posts.

Hospitals
In Zambia, hospitals are at the centre of implementing interventions and policies, which are crucial to the attainment of the recently articulated health targets. In particular, hospitals provide the largest share of services in antiretroviral therapy (ART), prevention of mother to child transmission of Human Immune-deficiency virus (PMTC), Tuberculosis treatment, safe deliveries and many other services. Besides their political clout, hospitals are consumers of a substantial proportion of health sector resources. When hospitals consume excess resources in producing their services this invariably results in misallocation and loss of potential care to other beneficiaries. This in turn raises important sustainability and equity implications. Thus, improving efficiency would increase the service potential of existing health infrastructure and provide opportunities for re-allocating resources to other areas.

The hospitals are divided into three categories namely; Level 1hospitals at District level also known as the primary level hospital, Level 2 hospitals at Provincial level also referred to as secondary hospitals and Level 3 hospitals also referred to tertiary hospitals at the central level. The intensity of care also differs as the hospital level changes. The referral system also comes in as soon as these levels of care are adhered to. Health Centres too are divided into either Urban Health Centres or Rural Health Centres. For Health Posts, the health sector aims at taking the most basic health care as close to the family as possible as stated in the Basic Health Care Package. The construction of these facilities targets a certain radius in given catchment population area.

Prevention, Care & Treatment Partnership program is managed by Family Health International. The Prevention, Care & Treatment Partnership (ZPCT) works in concert with the Ministry of Health to strengthen and expand comprehensive HIV/AIDS services in the central, copper belt, luapula, north-western, and Northern Provinces. This partnership focuses on services provided at health facilities, supports referral linkages between communities and the health system, and assists the Ministry of Health and National AIDS Council to develop strategies, guidelines, and standard operating procedures. It covers prevention of mother-to-child transmission, HIV counselling and testing, anti-retroviral therapy and other treatment and care, TB/HIV, health worker and counsellor training, and lab and pharmacy support. ZPCT partners are Management Sciences for Health, Churches Health Association of Zambia, Kara Counselling & Training Trust, and Expanded Church Response.

The Health Services & Systems Program (HSSP), led by Abt Associates, works in partnership with the Ministry of Health at all levels to support increased access to quality health services and to strengthen health systems. HSSP assists the Ministry of Health to strengthen antenatal, post-abortion, and emergency obstetric care; address childhood immunization and micronutrient needs; integrate management of childhood illnesses; and, expand long-term family planning methods. HSSP also provides significant assistance to the National Malaria Control Center in rolling out the national indoor residual spraying program and in strengthening case management of malaria in children and presumptive treatment for pregnant women. HSSP also supports the underlying systems that are required to make a public health service function. This includes the health management information system and health sector planning. Lastly, HSSP provides support for human resources: pre-service training, human resource planning and management, and the rural retention scheme. HSSP partners include Abt Associates, JHPIEGO, International Science & Technology Institute and Save the Children.

USAID’s health program supports Zambia’s National Health Strategic Plan to combat malaria and tuberculosis; improve maternal and child health; promote family planning and reproductive health; and, prevent HIV and provide care and treatment for those already infected with the virus. USAID supports capacity development to promote behaviour change, increase demand for and access to quality health services, strengthen the health system, and procure key commodities. USAID works through partners that provide direct assistance to the public and private sectors throughout Zambia.

With a national prevalence of 15.6 percent among Zambians aged 15-49 (women 18 percent; men 13 percent), according to the 2001/2 Demographic & Health Survey (DHS), the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Zambia overwhelms the health system. USAID, under the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), supports comprehensive activities under the Ministry of Health and National AIDS Council national plans. In five provinces, USAID partners work directly with the Ministry of Health to expand quality services for prevention of mother-to-child HIV transmission, HIV counselling and testing, anti-retroviral therapy, and other treatment and care. USAID also supports private sector HIV counselling and testing through the New Start network of clinics. At the national level, USAID invests in the supply chain system for HIV/AIDS-related commodities. USAID procures anti-retroviral drugs, HIV test kits, and HIV-related lab equipment and supplies for the public sector.

Malaria is the leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Zambia, with nearly 4.3 million cases and 50,000 deaths per year. It is responsible for one quarter of childhood deaths and accounts for almost 50 percent of hospitalizations nationwide. USAID support to the National Malaria Control Program focuses on the most vulnerable: pregnant women and children under age five. USAID helps expand availability and use of proven preventive measures, including long-lasting insecticide-treated bed nets (LLINs) and targeted indoor residual spraying. Activities also address the dangers of malaria in pregnancy by reaching pregnant women with preventive treatment, and strengthening diagnosis and treatment of malaria-especially for children. USAID procures LLINs, insecticides for indoor residual spraying, diagnostic equipment, and other commodities for the national malaria program.

The incidence of tuberculosis in Zambia is on the rise, with new infections fuelled by a 70 percent HIV co-infection rate. USAID helps the Ministry of Health strengthen Zambia’s capacity to deliver proven, cost-effective interventions. USAID’s partners work in three provinces to expand and enhance Directly Observed Treatment Short-course (DOTS) and improve the co-management of tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS.

Zambia’s maternal mortality ratio (729 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births) is one of the highest in the world, and only 43 percent of deliveries are attended by a medically trained provider. As for child health, although under-five mortality has been decreasing, it still remains at an unacceptably high level (168 deaths per 1000 live births), with malaria and HIV being the principal causes of death in this age group. USAID supports priority activities under Zambia’s National Health Strategic Plan via technical assistance and training that strengthen antenatal, post-abortion, and emergency obstetric care; address childhood immunization and micronutrient needs; expand an integrated approach to managing childhood illnesses; and, make clean drinking water more available.

Investing in family planning and other reproductive health services is vital in mitigating the economic and environmental impact of population growth, and in improving maternal and child health-especially with Zambia’s high HIV prevalence. Family planning and reproductive health services are not uniformly available around the country and are not always well linked to HIV/AIDS interventions. Only 25 percent of married women currently use a modern method of family planning, with total fertility at 5.9. USAID helps achieve Zambian family planning and reproductive health goals by providing technical assistance and training to expand access to family planning services in the public sector, and through social marketing and support of communication for behaviour change.

Health Communication Partnershipuses community mobilization and communication tools to promote better health-seeking behaviour. The program strengthens community organizations and leadership around key health issues in 22 districts. It also supports national health information, education and communication campaigns by developing job aids, radio programs, health talk lines and video- and poster-based media. Two HIV/AIDS-related videos produced by HCP, Tikambe and Road to Hope, have won international awards. HCP partners are the Johns Hopkins University Center for Communication Programs, Save the Children, and International HIV/AIDS Alliance.

HIV/AIDS

Zambia, in southern Africa, has one of the world’s most devastating HIV and AIDS epidemics. More than one in every seven adults in the country are living with HIV[76] and life expectancy at birth has fallen to just 49.4 years[77]. In 2011, nearly 42,000 adults and 9,500 children were newly infected with HIV that is about 115 new infections each day[78]. After four decades of independence, Zambia has found peace but not prosperity and today it is one of the poorest and least developed nations on earth.

Zambia’s first reported AIDS diagnosis in 1984 was followed by a rapid rise in the number of people living with HIV. Although Zambia has received hundreds of millions of dollars for HIV programmes from rich country governments, HIV prevalence has not dropped significantly, remaining more or less stable since the mid-nineties. As of 2011, overall HIV prevalence was 13 percent; however, it has been reported as considerably higher in some urban areas[79].

The impact of HIV/AIDS

Unlike in some countries, HIV in Zambia does not primarily affect the most underprivileged; infection rates are very high among wealthier people and the better educated. HIV is most prevalent in the two urban centres of Lusaka and the Central Province, rather than in poorer rural populations[80].

The collapse of copper prices in the 1970’s weakened Zambia’s economy and saw an increase in the number of men seeking work away from home. The movement of miners, seasonal agricultural workers and young men between rural areas and urban centres has been shown to spread HIV to new areas[81]. Zambia is now the most urbanised country in sub-Saharan Africa, with only a third of its population living in rural areas. Although the HIV epidemic has spread throughout Zambia and to all parts of its society, some groups are especially vulnerable – most notably young women and girls. Among young women aged 15-24, HIV prevalence is more than twice that of men in this age category.

A number of factors resulting from gender inequality contribute to the higher prevalence among women. Women are often taught never to refuse their husbands sex or to insist their partner uses a condom. In a Zambian behavioural survey, around 15 percent of women reported forced sex, although this may not reflect the true number as many women do not disclose this information[82]. In addition, young women in Zambia typically become sexually active earlier than men, with partners who will be on average five years their senior and who may already have had a number of sexual partners[83]. An estimated 15 percent of men and women aged 15-24 years, were younger than 15 years the first time they had sex.

In 2011, a long awaited law protecting women from gender violence was enacted. It is hoped the Anti-Gender Based Violence Act, outlawing gender-based violence, such as, physical, sexual, economic and psychological violence, will reduce the increased risk of HIV infection faced by women. The impact of AIDS has gone far beyond the household and community level. All areas of the public sector and the economy have been weakened, and national development has been stifled. As Zambia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper acknowledges, “the epidemic is as much likely to affect economic growth as it is affected by it”.

The loss of workers due to AIDS can lead to a large reduction in a nation’s economic productivity. Agriculture, from which the vast majority of Zambians make their living, is particularly affected by the impact of AIDS. A decline in the number of individuals able to work at the crucial periods of planting and harvesting can significantly reduce the size of the harvest. AIDS is believed to have made a major contribution to the food shortages that hit Zambia in 2002, which were declared a national emergency.

Children have been much affected by the AIDS epidemic in Zambia, where 170,000 children are estimated to be living with HIV. However, being HIV infected is not the only way that children are affected by HIV and AIDS. In 2009 there were 690,000 AIDS orphans in the country[84] and AIDS orphans made up half of all orphans in the country. Children may be abandoned due to stigma or a simple lack of resources, while others run away because they have been mistreated and abused by foster families.

In 2003, it was revealed that increasing numbers of child rape cases were being fuelled by the “virgin cure” myth (which wrongly claims that sex with a virgin can cure AIDS). A 2005 study by the Applied Mental Health Research Group (part of the John Hopkins School of Public Health) reported that child sexual abuse was “a major problem” among the HIV-affected population of mothers and children studied in Lusaka, Zambia.

HIV/AIDS Prevention in Zambia

HIV and AIDS prevention through awareness-raising began early in Zambia. An American journalist in 1988 reported, “Zambia is waging one of the world’s most aggressive educational campaigns against AIDS, surpassing anything being done in the United States”. Much of the early campaign involved pamphlets and posters that warned of the dangers of AIDS and promoted abstinence before marriage, for example: “Sex thrills, but AIDS kills”. Over the years, a wide range of media has been used to carry messages about AIDS, and children have been taught at least the biological facts in school.

CONDOMS AND ABSTINENCE

It has been conclusively proven that condoms are highly effective at preventing sexual HIV transmission, when used correctly and consistently. Nevertheless, the role of condoms in curbing the spread of Zambia’s epidemic has been a subject of prolonged controversy in this mainly Christian nation. In 2002 the three main churches in Zambia passed a resolution endorsing condom use for preventing HIV transmission between married couples. In all other cases the churches encourage abstinence only, which many AIDS experts consider to be an ineffective approach:

“We do appreciate the crucial role the Church has continued to play in building good moral values in our society and its active role in home-based care; however, the Church could do even more if it stops treating the condom as an instrument of immorality but a life saving device.” – Chris Zimba of Youth Change Impact.

Additionally, top government officials have publicly criticised condom use. Near the end of his presidency, Frederick Chiluba said, “I don’t believe in condoms myself because it is a sign of weak morals on the part of the user”. Although total condom sales more than doubled from 4.7 million in 1993 to 10.6 million in 2002, the use of condoms remains infrequent, especially in rural areas. One issue is availability and affordability: many villages are miles from the nearest outlet.

Issues of stigma, lack of knowledge, and gender inequality also present major obstacles to people using them. More recently, total condom distribution has been dropping in Zambia, particularly in non-health facilities where condom distribution dropped by 46 percent in 2007 and then a further 10 percent in 2008. Although condom distribution from health facilities went up by 13 percent in the same period, this general decline does not bode well for efforts to promote better sexual health in a country where condom use is not widespread. Only 1 in 10 men and women who engaged in higher risk sex (those had more than one sexual partner in the last 12 months) reported using a condom with their last partner[85].

HIV/AIDS education

There are still many misconceptions about HIV and AIDS in Zambia. In 2009 only around one third of young people aged 15-24 had comprehensive HIV/AIDS knowledge. If behaviour is to be changed, young people must be a priority target. It is often said that Zambia’s youth offer the nation a “window of hope” – the hope of an AIDS-free future. Nearly half of all Zambians are between 0 and 14 years old; relatively few of these young people have HIV, and they are all eager to learn. Effective education therefore has the power to change attitudes and behaviour for life. Unfortunately, the government has not always taken the lead:

“It must be acknowledged that the Ministry of Education has made a late start on interventions, mainly because HIV/AIDS was generally viewed as a Health issue.” – Ministry of Education, September 2000[86].

In recent years the Ministry has sought to better integrate AIDS education into more parts of the school curriculum. A government case study in 2009 showed that about two thirds of teachers had knowledge about HIV and AIDS education and could integrate them into their lessons but that many did not, and lacked sufficient resources or the skills to use them. In those schools where life based skills HIV and AIDS education was provided, the response has been very positive. However, 17 percent less 15-24 year olds were reached with HIV and AIDS education in 2008 compared to 2006, so there is obviously a need to step up these efforts if sustainable prevention efforts are to succeed.

Zambia’s prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) initiative was launched in 1999, beginning with a three-year pilot programme in Copper belt Province. In 2004 it had expanded so that 74 health facilities in four provinces offered antiretroviral drugs (primarily nevirapine) to expectant mothers and new-born infants, increasing to 939 by the end of 2008. In 2007 an estimated 47 percent of pregnant women living with HIV received ARVs for preventing mother-to-child transmission. By the end of 2011, 95 percent of pregnant women received the most effective antiretroviral regimens (i.e. not single-dose nevirapine, which is no longer recommended by WHO) to prevent transmission to their baby.

Zambia’s commitment to providing antiretroviral prophylaxis to HIV-positive pregnant women has been rewarded; a vast reduction in annual new HIV infections among children is evident between 2009, when 21,000 children were newly infected, and 2011, when 9,500 children were newly infected.

• In the late 1980s, one school in Zambia became perhaps the first in the world to set up an Anti-AIDS club, and by 1992 there were 1,150 registered clubs. Members are encouraged to spread messages about safer behaviour and compassion for those living with HIV. So long as their influence extends beyond their membership and reaches the most vulnerable children, Anti-AIDS clubs can be very effective.
• Television, radio and the press have also proved to be influential in raising awareness, even though not all people have direct access to them. Some 71 percent of urban and 37 percent of rural youth saw at least some of the HEART television campaigns in 2000, and it seems that their behaviour was influenced as a result.
• Music, drama, group discussions and role play exercises have been employed by the Copperbelt Health Education Project (CHEP) to raise AIDS awareness, particularly in rural areas. In 2003, through its in-school youth programme, the CHEP educated some 25,000 students using these methods. Peer-centred education also reaches sex workers, street children and soldiers, and the CHEP has established youth-friendly health services, in which trained peer educators work alongside clinic staff.
• Truck drivers have been identified as key players in the spread of HIV due to the high levels of mobility along main transport routes. Prevention programmes targeting this high-risk group seem to have had a positive effect on behaviour: reported condom use for truck drivers increased from around 50 percent in 2000 to almost 70 percent in 2006. ‘Corridors of Hope’ is a project funded by USAID and implemented by RTI International and Family Health International. It aims to reduce HIV transmission among transportation corridor communities in seven countries, including Zambia.

Just 15 percent of Zambian adults aged 15-49 received a test in the last 12 months and know their HIV status. Those who do not know they are infected with HIV can spread the virus to others before they become ill. Moreover, those who are not diagnosed early may not get the treatment and care they need. Because they fear stigma and social rejection many people are reluctant to come forward to be tested, waiting instead until they fall ill. People may also not go for testing because they cannot see the advantage of knowing their status – especially if they are unlikely to receive antiretroviral therapy. Even those who want to be tested may find that accessing services is difficult or costly. The extremely low level of HIV testing in Zambia has been highlighted as one of the main reasons people are failing to access HIV treatment.

In early 2001, Zambia’s largest mining company, Konkola, caused much controversy by forcing hundreds of its employees to undergo anonymous HIV tests. Many groups complained that the miners might suffer discrimination as a result. However, the company insisted that without this action it would be unable to plan its future operations and improve the health of its workers. Results from the testing programme found that 18 percent of the 8,532 employees were infected with HIV.

In 2004 Zambia’s National AIDS Council called for mandatory HIV/AIDS testing in all hospitals in an effort to control the epidemic. Their views provoked strong criticism from human rights activists and people living with HIV, who saw mandatory testing as a breach of human rights. In 2005, the Zambian government stated that it would not encourage anonymous (without consent) testing and it would discourage mandatory testing for employment and scholarships.48 It would, however, encourage (VCT) voluntary counselling and testing, and promote universal routine counselling and testing (i.e. routine opt-out testing) of all at-risk patients entering a health facility.

As of 2009, all 1,563 private and public health facilities in the country offered VCT services. In that year more than one and a half million people aged 15 and over were tested for HIV and received their results; double that of the previous year and quadruple that of 2006. In 2010, the number of HIV testing and counselling facilities expanded further to a total of 1,689. Unfortunately, this increase in facilities did not result in an overall increase in the uptake of HIV testing and counselling in 2010, with reports showing that the number of people who received HIV testing and counselling was 200,000 people less than in 2009.

HIV/AIDS treatment

State provision of antiretroviral therapy began in Zambia in late 2002, although initially very few people could afford the monthly payments towards the drugs. Provision of free treatment started in June 2004[87], made possible by an unprecedented amount of funding from the Global Fund (in 2004 it committed $254 million over 5 years), PEPFAR (Zambia is one of the programme’s most highly funded focus countries, receiving $149 million in 2006 alone) and other sources. The delivery of the programme relies on the involvement of many NGOs, churches and communities.

At the end of 2011, 82 percent of the 510,000 people in Zambia needing ARV treatment were receiving it[88]. This estimation of treatment coverage is based on the 2010 WHO guidelines. Although access to antiretroviral treatment is high and increasing among adults, coverage among children remains worryingly low, with only 1 in 3 children in need of treatment receiving it in 2011. However, the Ministry of Health has further increased access to treatment by creating 68 new antiretroviral therapy (ART) sites in addition to supplying drugs to all existing ART sites nationwide in 2013. As a result of this, and support from the Global Fund, approximately 400,000 people now have access to free treatment.

Ultimately, Zambia aspires to provide universal treatment access, so that ARV therapy is equally available to everyone who is clinically eligible. However, some current schemes try to make it easier for particular groups to gain access, including civil servants, teachers, university students and mothers and children (through “PMTCT Plus”). Additionally, some employers run private schemes – particularly the mining companies. In general, accessing treatment is a great deal easier for city-dwellers than for those living in rural areas.

The treatment programme’s greatest handicap is the inadequacy of the healthcare system, which suffers from high patient numbers, lack of physical space and infrastructure, and – most critically – too few staff. There is a critical shortage of doctors (in 2006 there were only 646 doctors in a country of almost 12 million people), nurses, lab technicians and other health professionals. Zambia currently has under a third of the doctor-patient ratio recommended by the WHO.

The crisis stems from a variety of factors, most notably a large-scale emigration of trained professionals to other countries in Africa and abroad, where salaries and conditions are more favourable. Zambia is now trying to recruit as many health workers as it possibly can, and has implemented a variety of initiatives to retain health staff, expand the workforce, and improve the wellbeing of doctors and nurses[89]. ‘Task-shifting’ is a strategy that has been introduced to delegate certain health-care duties to lay people or community workers to reduce the workload of doctors and nurses. Still, human resource challenges are continually cited as a major impediment to effective treatment programmes.

An analysis by USAID found that the gap in finances available to achieve Zambia’s country targets (increase the number of people on ART by 24 percent from 2010 to 2015) was likely to be $8.2 billion in 2011, increasing to $57 billion in 2015. According to 2006 data, Zambia’s funding for HIV treatment comes mainly from international sources, raising the concern that Zambia’s increasing level of treatment coverage may not be sustainable without consistent foreign donor support.

HIV/AIDS funding

In 2009, after it was revealed that donor aid to the Zambian Ministry of Health had been embezzled, Sweden and the Netherlands suspended $30 million in aid for health programmes[90]. The Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Malaria and TB also suspended more than $137 million later that year[91]. In 2010, it was revealed that around $7 million from the Health Ministry had been stolen in total. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) responded by suspending a $14.5 million aid program for the Health Ministry[92]. Although the Zambian government reimbursed the Swedish and Dutch governments for their stolen funds, and partly reimbursed Canada, these countries had not resumed their health aid as of August 2010. They insisted that funding would not resume until certain internal reforms and audits were carried out. The Global Fund on the other hand, resumed its funding but is instead channelling it through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)[93].

Almost three quarters of funding for HIV and AIDS Zambia is from foreign donors, and it has been reported that HIV programmes are amongst some of the worst affected by the corruption scandal and resulting disruptions in donor funding. The majority of Zambia’s donor funding comes from PEPFAR (50 percent), followed by the Global Fund and the World Bank.65 Concern about this reliance on donor funding has been voiced by the Southern African AIDS Trust which has urged the Zambian government to scale up its funding for HIV and AIDS programmes.

Conclusion

So far, Zambia has had notable success in scaling up ARV treatment. The government can take much of the credit for providing strong leadership while at the same time recognising that they cannot succeed alone. They have involved faith-based organisations, civil society and NGOs, and have also entered into a partnership with the private sector to administer some of the treatment. Zambia must continue to strive to make ARV therapy equally accessible to all those in need; the abolition of user charges was a crucial step towards this goal. However, the scale up of treatment faces serious challenges due to human resource and funding shortages.

Even if treatment scale up proceeds, it is vital that prevention programmes are also expanded. The ARV programme itself can help this process because it offers an incentive to be tested, and those who know they have HIV are less likely to infect others. The decline in HIV prevalence among some young women suggests that some prevention campaigns may be working. However, it is clear that stigma, gender inequality and opposition to condoms remain deeply entrenched. All sectors of society must fight their hardest to change attitudes.

First AIDS Case

Zambia’s first AIDS case was reported in 1984[94]. Within two years the National AIDS Surveillance Committee (NASC) and National AIDS Prevention and Control Programme (NAPCP) were established to coordinate HIV/AIDS-related activities. In the early stages of the epidemic much of what was known about HIV prevalence was kept secret by the authorities under President Kaunda. Senior politicians were reluctant to speak out about the growing epidemic (the President’s announcement in 1987 that his son had died of AIDS[95] was a notable exception), and the press did not mention AIDS.

By the early nineties it was estimated that as many as 1 in 5 adults had been infected with HIV, leading the World Health Organization to call for the establishment of a National AIDS Advisory Council in Zambia. According to Stephen Lewis, the former UN’s Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, throughout the 1990s the government was ‘disavowing the reality of AIDS’ and doing ‘nothing’ to combat the problem[96].

The new millennium signalled a marked change in political attitude and, according to Stephen Lewis, ‘an entirely new level of determination’70 to confront the epidemic. The National HIV/AIDS/STD/TB Council (NAC) became operational in 2002 when Parliament passed a national AIDS bill that made the NAC a legally-established body able to apply for funding (the prospect of a large World Bank grant provided much of the necessary motivation). At the passing of this bill, the NAC became the single, high-level institution responsible for coordinating the actions of all segments of government and society in the fight against HIV and AIDS and is in charge of guiding the implementation of the National HIV and AIDS Strategic Framework (2006-2010).

In 2004, President Mwanawasa declared HIV/AIDS a national emergency and promised to provide antiretroviral drugs to 10,000 people by the end of the year. Having exceeded this target, he set another to provide free treatment for 100,000 by the end of 2005. Government ministers and officials at all levels are now much more willing and able to talk about the epidemic. Even former president Kaunda has changed – he is now one of the most vocal and committed AIDS activists in the country. In 2008 UNAIDS reported a stabilising of Zambia’s epidemic and some evidence of favourable behaviour change[97].

Assessment of overall health sector response and capacity

The government has demonstrated a high level of political commitment to address HIV/AIDS. Several national support structures have been put in place. As early as 1986, Zambia created the National AIDS Surveillance Committee and the National AIDS Prevention and Control Programme[98]. In 1987, a short-term emergency plan was established to deal with the safety of blood supply. Two medium-term plans were subsequently implemented. In December 2002, the National HIV/AIDS/STI/TB Council (NAC) was established to coordinate the national multi-sectoral response, one component of which is the health sector response.

The NAC includes representation from government, nongovernmental organizations, religious and traditional leaders, mass media, youth and the private sector and integrates the participation of multilateral and bilateral agencies. The National HIV/AIDS/STI/TB Intervention Strategic Plan 2002–2005 was developed with the following priority interventions: promoting behaviour change, reducing mother-to-child transmission, ensuring safe blood transfusion, providing care, treatment and support to people living and affected by HIV/AIDS, improving care and support for orphans and vulnerable children and strengthening multi-sectoral coordination of interventions. A high-level Cabinet Committee on HIV/AIDS has also been established to provide policy direction and regularly report to the Cabinet on HIV/AIDS issues[99].

Zambia has developed various policies, planning frameworks, guidelines and protocols to guide the national response. A national implementation plan for scaling up antiretroviral therapy in Zambia in 2004–2005 was developed with the objective of expanding access to treatment in the country. The plan for 2006–2008 is being developed. In addition, Zambia has been scaling up the health sector response to HIV/AIDS through several initiatives, including the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme, the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative, the Zambia Social Investment Fund, the Zambia National Response to HIV/AIDS Project (funded through the World Bank Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program for Africa) and grants from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

This response includes expanding voluntary counselling and testing, providing antiretroviral therapy, developing home-based care, managing opportunistic infections, strengthening laboratory capacity, ensuring blood safety, managing sexually transmitted infections and encouraging behaviour change. The government is also addressing the human resources needed by introducing retention schemes based on incentives for doctors and rural health workers and conducting training of health workers using the WHO Integrated Management of Adult and Adolescent Illness (IMAI) approach. Communities of people living with HIV/AIDS, nongovernmental organizations, faith-based organizations and the private sector also contribute to the national response to HIV/AIDS and implement various activities around the country.

Critical issues and major challenges

The lack of trained human resources is one of the most significant challenges to scaling up the health sector response to HIV/AIDS in Zambia. The high prevalence of HIV-related illness in Zambia has seriously overburdened the health care system at all levels, accentuating the burden on a thinly stretched workforce whose numbers are also diminishing due to HIV/AIDS. The situation is further exacerbated by the emigration of skilled health workers to other countries. Health infrastructure needs to be strengthened, including laboratory services. Health infrastructure is particularly constrained in rural, remote areas. Systems for drug procurement and supply management need to be strengthened. In addition, the current restructuring of the Central Board of Health has adversely affected staff productivity[100]. There are also concerns regarding the continuing availability of adequate funding to sustain the government’s programme of providing antiretroviral therapy services free of user charges in the public sector. Information regarding transmission of HIV is limited in rural areas. Much stigma is still associated with HIV/AIDS, limiting the number of people who seek HIV testing and care.

Marriage, Family, and Kinship

Traditionally, people would marry within their tribe, rarely going outside that circle to find a mate, but marriage within a clan group is considered taboo. Tribal customs vary but there usually is a mediator who serves as a go-between for a man and his desired bride. The man and his negotiator will meet with a prospective bride’s family and in addition to getting to know each other, start negotiations for a lobola (dowry)[101]. This lobola traditionally involves cattle or other livestock, but in modern times, money settlements have been accepted. The lobola is considered compensation to the family for the lost services of the woman.

Christian weddings are very common even in villages, although traditional religious customs are still practiced in both cities and rural areas, with variations from tribe to tribe. A Bemba custom calls for the man to live with his bride’s parents for a period, to prove his ability to take care of his wife. The main domestic structure is the extended family, common throughout Africa. The system grew out of a need to help family members in times of trouble. For example, if a family had a year of bad crops, their relatives would be expected to provide assistance. If a mother and father died, their children would be cared for by relatives.

The issue of inheritance is handled differently throughout the country, reflecting the different customs of the numerous tribes. Traditional methods call for disputes to be settled within the clan or at the next level, which is the chief. In disputes involving men and women, the clans traditionally favour the male’s position. In urban areas, the courts resolve these disputes. The Goba tribe has what is called dihwe[102]. Many Zambians, especially in cities, now create a will and last testament.

Discriminatory family code

Marriage in Zambia is governed by a dual legal system of statutory and customary laws. The Marriage Act provides for the minimum age of 16 for either male or female. Parental consent is required if either part is below 21[103]. Under customary law it is legal to marry a girl child who has attained puberty[104]. The law required marriage to be entered into with the consent of both parties, however it is reported that some customary marriages take place without the consent of the woman or her parents[105]. The government reports that the payment of a bride price is still prevalent for statutory and customary marriages[106]. The United Nations reports, based on 2002 data that 27 % of girls between 15 and 19 years of age were married, divorced or widowed in Zambia, compared to 2 % of boys in the same age range. In 1969, 41 % of girls aged between 15 and 19 were married; divorced or widowed which indicates that societal acceptance of early marriage has declined in recent decades[107].

Polygamy is not permitted under statutory marriages entered into under the Marriage Act[108]. However, polygamy is permitted and accepted as normal under customary laws in Zambia, particularly in patrilineal societies[109]. A 2007 Demographic and Health Survey found that polygamy affected 15 % of married women in Zambia. The prevalence of the practice varies according to region and level of education: it is more common in rural areas, although the figures have recently risen in urban areas, and the incidence is very low among women who have received higher education. Data from previous Demographic and Health Surveys show that the incidence of polygamy has decreased from 18 % in 1992, indicating that the acceptance of the practice is slowly declining[110].

Husbands are traditionally the heads of families in Zambia. In 2010, the government reported that the payment of a bride price provides husbands with absolute rights over children and the reproductive rights of the wife[111]. In the event of divorce following a legal marriage, the courts grant child custody in the best interests of the children. However, in the case of separation after a customary marriage, the children typically stay with the father[112].

The Intestate Succession Act of 1989 recognises women’s rights to inheritance whether married under statutory or customary Laws.[1] According to the law, widows have the right to inherit 20 % of their husbands’ property. 50 % of the estate goes to the children of the deceased (irrespective of gender), 20 % to the parents of the deceased and 10 %%% to other dependents[113]. In polygamous marriages, half of the inheritance is divided between the children (irrespective of gender) and the remainder is split equally between the wives[114]. Further, under some customary laws, women and children are not allowed to inherit[115]. According to the Chronic Poverty Research Centre, 31.77 % of widows inherited majority of assets after their spouses in 2007.

Despite the 1989 law, property grabbing from widows is a common practice, particularly in rural areas. A 2006 survey by the Central Statistical Office of Zambia found that three out of four victims of property grabbing did not take any action to change their circumstances. Further, 22 % of children of widows were affected by inheritance issues, with female children being twice as likely to be affected as male children[116]. Widows are also discriminated against in the practice of being claims by their deceased spouses’ relatives. The 2006 survey found that 15 % of female widows were married off to a relation of the deceased, compared to 4 % of males. The practice is more common in rural areas[117]. Women’s position in the family can also be gleaned from their participation in house-hold decision making. Data from the 2007 Demographic Health Survey provides a snapshot of gender equality in house-hold decision making in Zambia. For large household purchases, 42 % of married women reported that decisions were made jointly with their husbands and 44 % reported that decisions were made solely by their husbands. Decisions about daily household needs are primarily made by women themselves (60 %)[118].

RESTRICTED PHYSICAL INTEGRITY

The Penal Code in Zambia prohibits rape with heavy penalties including life imprisonment

Marital rape is not prohibited under the Penal Code[119].There is no specific law against domestic violence; however the Penal Code’s assault provisions can apply to cases of spousal abuse. According to the US Department of State, sexual harassment in the workplace is prohibited in Zambia[120].

It should be noted that a number of non-governmental organisations have proposed a Sexual Offences and Gender Violence Bill. The proposed bill would make substantive amendments to criminal law with regard to violence against women and children. The draft bill defines gender-based violence, including explicit psychological and economic violence, marital rape, dowry violence, widow inheritance or property grabbing, female genital mutilation, female infanticide, child marriage, among other offences occurring in the family, as well as exploitation and trafficking. It also provides for aggravated sentences when rape results in HIV transmission and for the presumption of lack of consent when the victim is a child or unable to resist. It provides for the creation of a Sexual Offences and Gender Violence Court and the granting of protection orders to victims[121]. In 2010, the government reported that it intends to facilitate debate on the proposed bill through the Zambia Law Development Commission[122]

Survey data indicates that violence against women is common in Zambia. The 2007 Demographic Health Survey found that one in five women reported that they have experienced sexual violence at some point in their lives. The majority (64 %) of women reported that their current or former husband, partner, or boyfriend committed the act of sexual violence. For women who were younger than 15 years old when their first experience of sexual violence occurred, 19 % reported that the perpetrators were a relative[123].

With respect to domestic violence, the 2007 Demographic Health Survey found that almost half of all women had experienced physical violence since they were 15. Of those who experienced physical violence since the age of 15, 77 % reported that their current or former husband or partner. This indicates that the vast majority of physical violence experienced by women in Zambia is from their husbands and partners[124]. A factor contributing to the high prevalence of domestic violence is the acceptance of violence in the community. The 2007 Demographic Health Survey found that significant numbers of both women (62%) and men (48 %) believe that a husband is justified in hitting or beating his wife in certain circumstances[125].

Human Rights Watch reports that sexual violence and other severe forms of violence against women are common for women in detention, primarily perpetrated by police officials. They report that police officers try to coerce female detainees into sex in exchange for their release[126]. The US Department of State also reports that there have been recent reports that police officers raped women and young girls while they were in custody[127].

Key challenges in Zambia are the lack of enforcement of the law and culture of impunity for perpetrators of violence against women. The World Organisation against Torture reports that although the government has established specialist units with the police force to respond to violence against women, discriminatory attitudes amongst the police and judiciary prevent women from reporting violence. It is reported that women are often pressured by law enforcement officials into withdrawing complaints of violence or reconciling with abusive husbands[128].

The US Department of State reports that increased public awareness of violence against women has resulted in increased reports to police in recent years. Further, the government has established shelters, a toll-free phone line, provided training for police officers on gender-based violence and set up a number of comprehensive support services. Female genital mutilation reportedly is not practiced in Zambia[129].

Limitations on women’s reproductive rights also infringes upon women’s physical integrity in Zambia. The 1972 Termination of Pregnancy Act allows access to safe abortion on medical or social grounds. However, due to a lack of awareness of the legality of abortion amongst women and health care providers, many maternal deaths are the result of complications from unsafe abortions[130]. The 2007 Demographic and Health Survey found that overall 41 % of married women use contraception and 33 % use modern methods of contraception. Access to reproductive health services is a challenge with 26 % of married women reporting an unmet need with respect to family planning.

Son bias

Gender disaggregated data on rates of infant mortality and early childhood nutrition are not available for Zambia. With respect to access to education, the World Economic Forum reports that Zambia has reached gender parity in primary school enrolments which indicates that there is no preferential treatment of sons with respect to primary school education. However, a gender gap persists in secondary and tertiary education enrolments, suggesting that the education of sons continues to be more highly valued than the education of daughters[131]. The male/female sex ratio for the total population in 2012 is 1[132]. There is no evidence to suggest that Zambia is a country of concern in relation to missing women.

Restricted resources and entitlements

Zambia has a two tier system of land ownership which consists of state and customary land[133]. Although the government passed the Land Act in 1996 which guaranteed women the possibility of being land owners, the legislation allows for customary laws to dictate land ownership which mainly confers land ownership to men. Under customary law, men dominate the allocation, inheritance and use of land. Women generally lack control over land but may have access and user rights to the land[134]. To improve women’s access to land, the Ministry of Justice has issued a circular allocating 30 % of all advertised land to women; however there is no monitoring mechanism to guarantee women have access to this land[135]. In 2010, the government reported to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against women, that it was considering an amendment to the Lands Act to reserve 30 % of titled land for women. With respect to women’s access to property other than land, to a statutory marriage, women are entitled to enter into contracts and have access to property other than land, either individually or jointly with their husbands. Women who enter into customary marriages are not authorised to acquire possessions; after a divorce, they are entitled to keep only kitchen utensils and gifts received from their husbands. The difficulties Zambian women experience in obtaining access to bank loans is related to their lack of ownership rights and lack of economic empowerment. Most women are unable to provide the required guarantees and, although the practice is illegal, banks often demand that women provide proof of their husbands’ consent when applying for loans. It is reported however, that sue to advocacy and lobbying efforts, there has recently been a significant increase in the number of women with access to credit, particularly in urban areas.

Restricted civil liberties

There are no reported legal restrictions on women’s freedom of movement in Zambia. However, in practice men continue to control women’s movement. For example, the 2007 Demographic Health Survey shows the extent to which men in Zambia support women’s right to make decisions about their movement. When asked who should make decisions about visits to a wife’s family or relatives, only 7% of married men said the wife should make the decision, and 54% said the husband should make the decision[136]. The US Department of State reports that the government in Zambia generally respects the right to freedom of association. There is evidence to suggest that Zambia has an active women’s movement with the civil society organisations leading major reforms such as the proposed bill on gender-based violence. With respect to women’s participation in political life, the World Economic Forum reports that women make up only 14 % of Zambia’s parliamentarians and 17% of Ministerial positions. In addition to the non-discrimination provisions in the constitution, Industrial and Labour Relations Act specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in employment. Further, the Employment Act provides for paid maternity leave of 12 weeks at full pay[137].

Religion

The influence of Christian missionaries is evident. An estimated 53 percent of the population considers themselves Catholic. The country’s official religion has been Catholicism since 1993 when then President Chiluba officially declared it so. There are other religions, including a large Muslim population primarily in Eastern Province. This is a result of the immigration of Arabs from Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, largely due to the slave trade[138]. There are Hindus, Jews, and Pentecostals, who, combined, comprise only 1 percent of the population. Animism is practiced by a large amount of the population, even if they are Catholic, Seventh Day Adventists, or practitioners of another religion. Animism beliefs vary from tribe to tribe, but most are based on beliefs in the power of ancestors and in nature. Some people call this witchcraft and indeed such terms as “wizards” and “witches” are used. Many areas believe that crocodiles have strong powers.

Missionaries have a long history in the country although for many years there have been Zambian priests, especially in cities. A mission will periodically send a priest into the bush country for services and other religious duties. There is recognition of witch doctors, which use traditional medicines made from roots or plants. The major holy places are the many waterfalls, where people believe certain spirits live. Traditional healers will often go into the woods or bush to contact spirits. The various tribes have many rituals. For example, the Litunga tribe performs a ceremony that is called Kuomboka. This signifies the tribe’s movement in the rainy season from the floodplains to higher ground. Hundreds of canoes travel down the river with the chief leading the way. Umutomboko is performed once a year by the Kazembe Bemba and is a ceremonial re-enactment of a migration that took place in the early 1800s. Much dancing culminates with the chief’s dance.

Christianity

A 1996 amendment to the constitution declared the country a Christian nation while providing for freedom of religion in practice, ^[1] but a wide variety of religious traditions exists. The government requires registration of all religious groups; however, all applications reportedly are approved without discrimination. An estimated 85% of the population professes some form of Christianity. Another 5% are Muslim; 5% subscribe to other faiths, including Hinduism, Baha’ism, and traditional indigenous religions; and 5% are atheist.

The majority of Christians are either Roman Catholics or Protestants. Currently, there is also a surge in new Pentecostal churches, which have attracted many young followers. Muslims tend to be concentrated in parts of the country where Asians have settled—along the railroad line from Lusaka to Livingstone, in Chipata, and in the eastern province. Some members of the Muslim community have complained of discrimination since the country was declared a Christian nation. They claim they cannot freely teach and practice Islam; however, other Muslim organizations state they have not experienced any restrictions on their activities.

Zambia is officially a Christian nation according to the 1996 constitution, Traditional religious thought blends easily with Christian beliefs in many of the country’s syncretic churches. Christian denominations include:

i. Presbyterianism

ii. Roman Catholic

iii. Anglican

iv. Pentecostal

v. New Apostolic Church

vi. Lutheran

vii. Seventh-day Adventist

viii. Jehovah’s Witnesses

ix. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints

x. Branhamism

xi. and a variety of Evangelical denominations

These grew, adjusted and prospered from the original missionary settlements (Portuguese and Catholicism in the east from Mozambique) and Anglicanism (English and Scottish influences) from the south. Except for some technical positions (e.g. physicians), western missionary roles have been assumed by native believers. After Frederick Chiluba (a Pentecostal Christian) became President in 1991, Pentecostal congregations expanded considerably around the country.

Zambian-born Archbishop Emmanuel Milingo was a high-ranking Bishop at the Vatican until he left to marry Maria Sung, a 43-year-old Korean acupuncturist, at a ceremony officiated by the Rev.Sun Myung Moon in New York (May, 2001). He was ex-communicated by the Roman Catholic Church in September, 2006 for conducting a consecration of 4 married men as bishops.

Approximately 1% of the population is Muslims with most living in urban areas.^[3] There is also a small Jewish community, composed mostly of Ashkenazis. Notable Jewish Zambians have included Simon Zukas, retired Minister, MP and a member of Forum for Democracy and Development and earlier on the MMD and United National Independence Party. Additionally, the economistStanley Fischer, currently the governor of the Bank of Israel and formerly head of the IMF also was born and partially raised in Zambia’s Jewish community. Ismaili Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communities exist owing to the Indian and Pakistani diasporic community in Zambia. The Bahá’í population of Zambia is over 160,000, or 1.5% of the population. The William Mmutle Masetlha Foundation run by the Baha’i community is particularly active in areas such as literacy and primary health care.

International religious freedom report

The constitution and other laws and policies protect religious freedom and, in practice, the government generally respected religious freedom. The trend in the government’s respect for religious freedom did not change significantly during the year. There were reports of societal discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice. Prominent societal leaders, however, took positive steps to promote religious freedom. U.S. embassy representatives discussed religious freedom with the leaders of all major religious groups, the diplomatic community, and government officials.

Religious Demography

According to the 2010 census, the population is 13.1 million. Approximately 87 percent of the population is Christian, 1 percent is Muslim or Hindu, and 12 percent adhere to other belief systems, including indigenous religions. Many people combine Christianity and indigenous beliefs. Muslims are primarily concentrated in Lusaka and in the Eastern and Copper belt provinces; many are immigrants from South Asia, Somalia, and the Middle East who have acquired Zambian citizenship. A small minority of indigenous persons are also Muslim. Most Hindus are of South Asian descent.

STATUS OF GOVERNMENT RESPECT FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Legal/Policy Framework

The constitution and other laws and policies protect religious freedom

The constitution declares Christianity the official religion of the country, while upholding the right of all persons to enjoy freedom of conscience or religion. The constitution provides for freedom of thought and religion for all citizens; freedom to change religion or belief; and freedom to manifest and propagate religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance. Other laws address religious freedom violations[139].

Religious groups must register with the registrar of societies in the Ministry of Home Affairs and pay regular statutory fees. To apply, a group must have a unique name, possess a constitution consistent with the country’s laws, and display general compatibility with the peace, welfare, and good order of the country. The government may subject unregistered religious groups to fines and imprison group members for up to seven years. The government requires religious instruction in all schools from grades one through nine. Religious education after grade nine is optional, although not all schools offer it. The government observes the following religious holidays as national holidays: Good Friday, Holy Saturday, Easter Monday, and Christmas.

Government Practices

There were no reports of abuses of religious freedom; however, the government imposed restrictions that affected members of religious groups. In July the government deported a Catholic priest to his native Rwanda on the grounds that a sermon he delivered, in which he criticized government agricultural policies, might incite anti-government uprisings. The government revoked the deportation order in November due to pressure from civil society groups and the Catholic Church.

In October the chief registrar of societies announced that he would revoke the registration of all religious groups and communities taking an active role in politics, although he had not done so by year’s end. The law does not allow revocation of registration on that basis. In June the registrar threatened to revoke the registration of religious groups, churches, mosques, community organizations, and other similar societies for failing to pay their fees. On October 11, the chief registrar revoked the registration of the Independent Church of Zambia (ICOZ) for non-payment of fees.

In August the registrar revoked the registration of the Mount Zion Spiritual Church in Zambia because police arrested its bishop in connection with the killing of a college student. By law, the registrar may revoke the registration of a group for a number of reasons, but criminal involvement of one member is not among them. Although all religious leaders were relatively comfortable with religious freedom provisions in the existing constitution, some expressed concern that on-going constitutional reform discussions retained emphasis on Zambia as a Christian nation.

Status of Societal Respect for Religious Freedom

There were reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or practice. Prominent societal leaders, however, took positive steps to promote religious freedom. In September residents of Chambishi in Copper belt province burned to death four persons suspected of Satanism. Subsequent clashes between residents and police attempting to restore order resulted in several injuries. Police arrested several people whose trials continued at year’s end. Government and religious leaders condemned the killings, called for calm, and called on police to arrest culprits. The government also criticized the police for neglecting warning signs before the murders. The government did not make public its investigation of police conduct.

Leaders of ecumenical movements, including the Zambia Episcopal Conference, the Christian Council of Zambia, and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia, held regular meetings to promote mutual understanding and to discuss national concerns.

U.S. Government Policy

The U.S. ambassador and embassy representatives discussed religious freedom with religious leaders, the diplomatic corps, and government officials. Embassy officials met with religious leaders to discuss how on-going constitutional reform would affect religious freedom. On August 9, the ambassador hosted an after for representatives of the Islamic Supreme Council, the diplomatic corps, and members of the Muslim community within the U.S. mission.

Death and the after-life

Funerals are a major event, with family members coming from great distances to attend. A funeral may last for many days, with the men outside drinking and talking, and women inside, wailing. The delay gives people travelling from long distances time to arrive. After a period, the group will proceed to a graveyard where services, usually Christian, will be held. Unfortunately, funerals have become an everyday occurrence due to the high death rate associated with AIDS and other illnesses.

There are separate ceremonies for the burial of village chiefs, along with their ancestors. A Bemba tradition is that if a paramount chief dies, his body will not be buried for a week but is protected because a clipping of his hair or a fingernail could be a very powerful item in traditional religions. Traditional religions also have their specific beliefs on death and afterlife.

TRANSPORT AND POVERTY REDUCTION

Transport is critical to poverty reduction but if inappropriately designed, transport strategies and programs result in networks and services that heighten the conditions of the poor, harm the environment, ignore the changing needs of users, and exceed the capacity of public finances. Transport is capable of generating growth by facilitating trade both nationally and internationally, and by increasing access to social services like health and education[140].

At the macroeconomic level, investment in transport raises growth by increasing the social return to private investment. Similarly, at the microeconomic level, improvements in transport often lower agricultural input prices and hence the costs of 56oduction. In addition access to markets generally improves and hence facilitates the development of the non-agricultural rural economy and tourism. In urban areas, the quality of transport service influences the location of firms and individuals. The cost of labour and the efficiency of the labour market are also determined by transport.

Without an efficient transport system, it is harder and costly to move goods, resulting in loss of market competitiveness and lower economic growth. Further, Zambia can benefit from her central location by serving as a hub of economic development in the region as a transit route. In the rural areas where poverty is more extensive, a cause of poverty is inadequate transport, which leads to restricted access to markets.

The Transport Situation

The main modes of transport in Zambia are rail, road, air and maritime. The rail network work comprises the Zambia Railways, running from the Zimbabwean border in the south to the Congolese border in the north. The Tanzania Zambia Railways (TAZARA), jointly owned by Zambia and Tanzania, links the former to the port of Dar es Salaam. A smaller rail line links Livingstone with Mulobezi and was previously used for ferrying timber. It is now dysfunctional.

Both Zambia Railways and TAZARA were constructed primarily to serve the mining industry. As farming took root along the line of rail, especially along the Zambia Railways, haulage of agricultural produce created extra business. The decline of mining and agriculture has reduced the volume of business available to the railway lines. This has been compounded by lack of maintenance, resulting in inefficient operations and the road sub-sector taking a larger share of business.

The road network is the backbone of the Zambian transport system reaching to remoter areas where other modes cannot. Zambia has a gazetted road network of approximately 37,000 km of which 6,476 km are bituminous and surfaced to Class 1 standard. The gravel and earth roads account for 8,478 km and 21,967 km respectively. In addition there are about 30,000 km of ungazetted community road network comprising tracks, trails and footpaths. A large part of the main road network was constructed between 1965 and 1975. Over the years the country’s road Infrastructure has been eroded through lack of maintenance. The main problems have been institutional and financial which relate to:

a) Inadequate and erratic flow of funding;

b) The inadequacy of the institutional framework within which roads were managed;

c) Poor terms and conditions of employment;

d) Lack of clearly defined responsibilities among road management actors;

e) Lack of managerial accountability.

The inadequate institutional framework as well as lack of clearly defined responsibilities is manifested in the present arrangement. The responsibilities for planning, preparing design standards, construction and maintenance of roads are fragmented among the various government institutions. These are the Ministry of Communications and Transport; the Roads Department in the Ministry of Works and Supply; Department of Infrastructure and Support Services in the Ministry of Local Government and Housing; Zambia wildlife Authority (ZAWA) in the Ministry of Tourism and to some extent the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries; and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development for the Social Recovery Project dealing with rehabilitation of community roads.

With respect to air transport, there is need to improve air services to complement other transport modes and to make Zambia a regional Air transport hub.

Water transport in Zambia is presently not significant although it is critical to some places in the Western, Northern and Luapula provinces where it is the only reliable form of transport. The country has abundant navigable lakes and rivers but the development of the sector has been inhibited by lack of technical know-how in the management of inland waterways. The situation has been exacerbated by lack of handling equipment at harbours and inadequate dredging facilities particularly for canals and rivers. There is need to develop Zambia‘s lakes, rivers, ports, and harbours to increase alternate use of transport modes and improve trade with neighboring countries. Development of Mpulungu habour in Northern Province will lead to increased volume of exports through east sea routes.

PRSP Interventions in Transport

The primary goal for the PRSP interventions on transport are first and foremost to support the economy to grow, thereby enabling more resources to be generated for more public interventions in all areas, including transport. For sustainable national development there is need for a national transport policy that requires the development of a comprehensive transport programme which is divided into three priority categories.

a) Preserving investment already made in Infrastructure roads through maintenance.

b) Establishing infrastructure, which aid economic recovery and poverty reduction.

c) Establishing infrastructure which bring environmental and social benefits, and

d) Instituting effective management systems.

Railways

As the mining industry slowly recovers followed by the related sectors the volume of business for railway will also recover, provided they can match the competition from road transport. A well-functioning railway system is important for enhancing export competitiveness, economic growth and poverty reduction since railway haulage tends to be cheaper than other modes where speed is not a major consideration.

Government shall therefore focus on the following issues:

a) Ensuring the rehabilitation and preservation of investment and the continuous improvement of the rail infrastructure

b) Improving railway efficiency through concessioning to the private sector.

c) Make arrangements for new railway connection to areas that will come into new economic production especially large-scale mining.

d) Level the playing field between roads and rail so that it is not economic for very heavy cargo to be transported by roads in order to reduce pressure on roads.

e) Expand and strengthen government capacity to develop supportive regulatory and investor-friendly legislation, monitor compliance with policies and legislation;

f) Standardising practices and procedures in line with SADC member states to provide seamless and predictable service throughout the region;

g) Provide a competitive, cost- effective, commercial, efficient and market-driven railway transport system.

h) Foster inter-modal co-operation between road and rail, especially for the movement of international freight and passengers;

i) Promote co-operation with regional railways to ensure undisrupted movement of cargo at interchange points.

j) Promote collabouration between Zambia Railways Limited and TAZARA.

k) Evaluate and implement extension of the railway network like Chipata-Mchinji rail link and the Kasama-Mpulungu rail link as part of railway network development strategy;

Although all the above objectives are important, the first five take priority.

Road Transport-Road Infrastructure

Being a large but poor country, Zambia will continue to depend on road transport. There are two major challenges associated with this, however. Firstly, her extensive road infrastructure is in need of rehabilitation and maintenance. A stagnant economy, heavy debt burden and wrong priorities have all contributed to road deterioration. The second challenge is linking this important transport mode with increased overall productivity for the economy.

Over the next three years, Zambia intends to continue putting greatest priority on rehabilitating and maintaining all her road network from feeder to trunk roads. This is important for the following reasons:

a) Delay in maintenance and rehabilitation increases costs eventually.

b) Economic growth and poverty reduction require that the roads and other transport systems are efficient and cost effective and this is not possible with poor roads.

c) Efficient delivery of services including emergency relief requires good roads.

d) Road rehabilitation creates jobs and business opportunities, often at the lower end of the labour market and this has direct impact on reducing income poverty.

Zambia has been undertaking road repair under Road Sector Investment Program (ROADSIP), which is a partnership between road users, the government and donors to promote development through roads. The first phase was launched in 1998. ROADSIP’s objective has been to bring a core network of the road to maintainable condition and already positive impact has been registered with the percentage of paved roads in good condition having risen from 20 in 1995 to 44 in 1999 and the paved roads in poor conditions falling from 51 percent in 1995 to 29 percent in 1999. Over the first PRSP period, ROADSIP II will be launched and it will continue with the objectives set out in phase I.

For the size of her economy and the population parameters, Zambia’s paved road network is quite extensive, exceeding that of the average for Sub Saharan Africa and even that for Zimbabwe and South Africa. This partly explains the difficulty in keeping abreast with maintenance and rehabilitation. The implication is that Zambia will minimize construction of new paved roads and pay more attention to looking after what she already has including rural feeder roads. Further, economic and social rates of return will be applied for trunk, main and urban roads in the selection of roads for improvements.

Many of Zambia’s paved and other roads were not necessarily constructed as part of an organised package to enhance national productivity or capitalize on her central location for trade. With the emphasis now being placed on growth, the roads must be integrated into the overall plan to make this happen. This will be done as follows:

a) Rehabilitation and maintenance of all roads to enhance efficiency.

b) Where new mining areas are to be opened up as anticipated in the Lumwana area in the North-Western Province, appropriate road connections will be done to complement the railway connection

c) In agriculture new farming blocks will be established in rural Zambia to take advantage of the land and water resources to produce high value products. Farm blocks must be near existing roads but where this is not feasible new roads, not necessarily paved, will be constructed.

d) A similar approach will be taken for tourism. In all tourist zones, the minimum intervention will be to ensure continued accessibility through good roads.

Rural Travel and Transport

Poverty is said to be highest in most of the Zambian rural areas because of the lack of access to market for agricultural produce as well as productive inputs. This has been worsened by the poor transport systems that exist in rural areas. Therefore, if the poverty situation in rural areas has to be addressed the issue of transport has to be of paramount importance .In order to improve the rural travel and transport; the following measures have been proposed:

a) Establish an institutional framework for the development and management of rural transport and travel in the country;

b) Improve the planning, management and financing of rural road transport as well as upgrading the road infrastructure such as community roads, paths, tracks, trails and footbridges through community participation;

c) Facilitate the rural communities with establishment of sustainable approaches to the construction and maintenance of rural transport infrastructure;

d) Facilitate the introduction and promotion of appropriate motorized and non- motorized means of transport aimed at improved mobility in rural areas;

e) Encourage the development of industries for the design, manufacture, repair and maintenance of intermediate motorized and non-motorized means of transport for rural areas, and

f) Ensure that gender issues are considered in rural travel and transport.

Institutional and Management Issues in Roads

For the goals outlined above to be realized, the government is aware that a number of institutional and management issues will need to be dealt with. The key issues are as follows:

1. The multiplicity of authorities in the management of roads causes difficulties.

2. Within a rationalized authority for roads, Government’s role will primarily be to plan, facilitate, co-ordinate, implement, regulate and monitor developments in the infrastructure and industry. The private sector will do the rest.

3. Create a more credible and sustainable domestic system for financing and managing the road network to gradually reduce dependence on external financing.

4. Institutional reform and human resources development will be undertaken; 5. Promote the road transport growth in the region, by levelling the playing field with other countries and improved traffic handling at border points.

Road Safety

Zambia loses an average of 1,000 lives through road accidents and it is estimated that road accidents in Zambia cost the country about 2.3% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually. Costs include direct costs such as damage to vehicles, policing and administration costs, medical expenses and insurance costs. In order to reverse this trend, Government will focus on the development of appropriate legislation to ensure satisfactory safety levels, and the Implementation of efficient and effective law enforcement procedures in line with regional norms.

These issues would be tackled through pursuance of the goal of protecting the lives of road users and property through the introduction of appropriate road safety measures and enforcement of regulations. In achieving this goal government will put in place the following policy objectives

a) Make road safety engineering aspects compulsory in the construction, rehabilitation and maintenance of roads;

b) Improve the awareness of the need for better road safety behaviour among the road users through publicity and training; and

c) Improve the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.

d) Based on the policy objectives Government shall: –

(i) Institute safety engineering within the present and future institutional arrangements in the road sector;

(ii) Collabourate with relevant agencies in a national road transport authority for motor vehicle examination and testing in accordance with regionally accepted standards;

(iii) Integrate the National Road Safety Council into a national road transport authority for efficient management of the road safety;

(iv) Improve the reporting and analysis of road accident data in order to better target actions towards priority road safety measures;

(v) Ensure that the lives of all road users are protected through the introduction of appropriate road safety measures with strict enforcement of road traffic laws and regulations;

(vi) Improve the co-ordination between institutions involved in road safety activities at national and regional level.

(vii) Institute arrangements for a more efficient and effective enforcement of traffic regulations.

(viii) Introduce an insurance safety levy to finance road safety programmes.

Civil Aviation

Liberalizing of air transport since 1991 has resulted in the formation of private local airlines. The reasons behind a slow growth in the industry can be attributed to factors such as unattractiveness of the Zambian market caused by small passenger loads, and lack of properly managed tourist destinations.

Currently, there are 144 airports/aerodromes in the country of which National Airports Corporation manages the four major airports. Government or private individuals and organizations manage the rest. National Airports Corporation is providing air Navigation Services throughout the country. Expansion in the mining and tourism industries will revive air transport demand. Government shall ensure safe and efficient air navigation services in accordance with international civil aviation standards. She will also create a competitive environment so that private companies continue to provide transport services. Further, Zambia will ensure those airports that are critical for commerce and tourism; i.e. the Lusaka, Ndola, Livingstone and Mfuwe are always in good serviceable condition.

In the effort of achieving this, the government shall ensure that the following issues are addressed

a) Pursuing legal and institutional reforms aimed at revamping the industry to meet the challenges of a liberalized environment;

b) Promoting civil aviation in accordance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation;

c) Ensuring compliance with regional and international agreements;

d) Educating, training and professional development of human resources in the aviation industry, and

e) Attracting international carriers to stimulate tourism and trade.

Maritime and Inland Waterways

Inland waterways are needed especially in areas that are inaccessible by other modes of transport and are accessible by water transport. It has inherent advantage that the services can be operated wherever navigable waters are available without requiring huge investments. Sustainable investments would be required for the improvement and maintenance of navigable rivers, canals and channels and development of terminal facilities at harbours. The Government shall also ensure that water transport operators adhere to communications regulations on lakes and rivers.

In order to achieve the above stated goal, Government shall:

a) Improve the safety and efficiency of inland water transport system and shipping including promotion of regional co-operation;

b) Promote a safe and clean marine and inland waterways environment.

c) Prepare a comprehensive plan for ensuring proper navigability on all designated waterways in the country including canals;

d) Encourage private sector participation in the operation of water transport services;

e) Develop and improve the infrastructure at the existing ports to the standards of regional ports

POPULATION

The Central Statistical Office (CSO)

The Social Statistics Division forms the core of the central statistical office for it houses the census of population and housing which is the largest undertaking carried out by the office. The division has three branches; population and demography branch, geographic information branch and the labour statistics branch[141].

The population and demography branch is responsible for conducting the census of population and housing that provides socio-economic and demographic information up to the lowest administrative levels. The branch also undertakes ad hoc surveys such as the Zambia Demographic and Health Survey (ZDHS), and the Zambia Sexual Behaviour (ZSBS). The ZDHS provides information on HIV and syphilis prevalence as well as other behavioural information required for programs monitoring and evaluation. The sexual behaviour survey provides information on knowledge, attitudes and behavioural practices that is also important in monitoring and evaluation programs. The branch also conducts other routine programs; Migration Statistics, the Sample Vital Registration with Verbal Autopsy (SAVVY) and the Maternal Mortality Survey. Under Migration Statistics information on numbers of people entering and leaving the country by various characteristics is provided. The Sample Vital Registration with Verbal Autopsy (SAVVY) provides information on numbers and causes of death as well as capturing information on births occurring in communities while the Maternal Mortality survey provides information on the maternal deaths occurring in the communities

The Geographic Information branch was created for the purpose of designing and producing census maps to use during census and survey data collection. It also provides the frame for all the other surveys conducted by the office, ministries, researchers and other organizations. The maps are meant to guide enumerators during data collection to ensure that they completely cover their areas of assignment. The maps are also meant to ensure that there are no overlaps or omissions during data collection. The branch comprises HQ and provincial staff whose duties include field mapping, a process through which geographic data is collected across the country using appropriate tools and equipment. This data is then compiled and used, in addition to other available map data to produce the census maps. The branch is also involved in the production and dissemination of census and survey data in form of maps and atlases.

The Labour Statistics Branch produces Labour force size, growth, composition and distribution. It also produces employment and underemployment statistics through the Labour Force Survey. The branch also compiles and maintains the Central Register of Business Establishments which forms the main sampling frame for establishment based surveys such as the Quarterly Employment and Earnings Inquiry. The Quarterly Employment and Earnings Inquiry is a survey used mainly to compile formal sector employment statistics. It focuses on the private sector, Non-government organization, the local government and the Central Government. Other statistics from the employment and earnings inquiry are the income statistics in the formal sector[1].

The Central Statistical Office (CSO) is a department under the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Zambia. The department is headed by a Director. According to the Census and Statistics Act, Chapter 127 of the Laws of Zambia, CSO’s mandate is to collect and analyse official data on economic and social indicators that are disseminated on a timely basis. CSO’s mission statement is to coordinate and provide timely, quality and credible official statistics for use by stakeholders and clients for sustainable development.

There are various statistical branches under the Economic and Financial Statistics division. These are Prices statistics, External Trades statistics, Living Conditions statistics, Public Finance statistics, National accounts statistics and Industrial Production statistics. Under the Agriculture and Environment Statistics division, there is agriculture branch and environment branch. Social Statistics division has also got various branches under it. These are Labour statistics, Demography and population statistics, Geographical Information System (GIS) statistics and Migration statistics branches.

Branches found under Information, Research and Dissemination division are Gender statistics, Library, Field Coordination, Operations, Sales office and Dissemination Branches. Data users are able to get information on various statistics such as GDP, Inflation rates, Production of major crops, Food balance sheet and Index of industrial production from our branches that are in charge of such statistics. CSO is also able to provide statistics tailored to our clients requirements.

CSO’s Mission

To coordinate and provide timely, quality and credible official statistics for use by Stakeholders and clients for sustainable Development”

Goal Statement

“To achieve an effective, efficient and coordinated National Statistical System (NSS) that will ensure sustainable production and disseminating of demand driven official statistics for national development”[142].

The population of Zambia goes up to 14,075,099 people

Zambia ended 2012 with a population of 14,075,099 people, which represents an increase of 441,303 people compared to 2011. Zambia is no. 70 among the 182. From 1960 until 2012, Zambia Population averaged 7.4 million reaching an all-time high of 14.1 million in December of 2012 and a record low of 3.1 million in December of 1960. The population of Zambia represents 0.20 percent of the world´s total population which arguably means that one person in every 518 people on the planet is a resident of Zambia.

Annual Rate of Population Growth

The Zambian population grew at a rate of 2.8 percent per annum during the intercensal period 2000-2010. This is an increase over the annual rate of population growth of 2.4 percent per annum recorded during the period 1990-2000. The urban population grew at a rate of 4.2 percent per annum in the period 2000 – 2010, compared to 1.5 percent per annum during the period 1990 – 2000. The rural population grew at a rate of 2.1 percent per annum during the same period 2000 –2010, a drop from the annual rate of 3.0 percent during the period 1990-2000. Lusaka Province was the fastest growing province with an annual rate of population growth of 4.6 percent, followed by Northern Province at 3.2 percent per annum and the newly created Muchinga Province at 3.1 percent per annum.

The female population is greater, with 7,052,869 women, representing 50.10% of the total, compared to 7,022,230 or 49.89% men. Zambia is a country with a very low population density, with 19 people per square km and it was in position 36th in our ranking of density population in 2012.

Population Composition and Distribution

Zambia’s total population is broken down into 49.3 percent (6,454,647) males and 50.7 percent (6,638,019) females. Zambia’s total population is distributed as follows: 60.5 percent (7,923,289) were in rural areas and 39.5 percent (5,169,377) were in urban areas. The percentage of the urban population increased from 34.7 percent in 2000 to 39.5 percent in 2010, consolidating Zambia’s position as one of the highly urbanized countries in Sub Saharan Africa. At Provincial level, Lusaka Province has the largest percent share of the population at 16.7 percent (2,191,225) of the total population. Copper belt Province is second with 15.1 percent (1,972,317), while Eastern Province is third with 12.2 percent (1,592,661) of the total population. Muchinga Province has the least percent share of the total population at 5.4 percent (711,657).

Population Density

Population density is defined as the total number of persons per square kilometre. Zambia has a land area of 752,612 square kilometres. Therefore, the country had a population density of 17.4 persons per square kilometre in 2010. The population density increased from 13.1 persons per square kilometre in 2000 to 17.4 persons per square kilometre in 2010, representing an increase of 4.3 persons per square kilometre. The most densely populated province in Zambia was Lusaka Province with a population density of 100.1 persons per square kilometre. Copper belt Province was second with a population density of 63.0 persons per square kilometre. North Western Province was the least densely populated province with a population density of 5.8 persons per square kilometre.

Household Size and Composition

Zambia had a total of 2,513,768 households as captured during the 2010 Census of Population and Housing. Male headed households made up 77.5 percent (1,947,501) of all households, while 22.5 percent (566,267) were female headed households

Green National Registration Card (NRC) Holders

All Zambian citizens qualify to obtain a green National Registration Card (NRC) upon attaining the age of 16 years. At the time of the 2010 Census, 6,412,290 Zambian citizens were aged 16 years and above, making them eligible to have NRCs. Copperbelt Province had the highest proportion of NRC holders with 87.7 percent followed by Luapula Province with 86.5 percent. Central Province had the least proportion of NRC holders with 80.6 percent.

Electoral Information

At the time of the 2010 Census, 5,857,806 Zambian citizens were aged 18 years or older, making them eligible to vote. Of these, 3,677,092 were registered voters. Of the total number of registered voters, 49.5 percent (1,818,517) were males and 50.5 percent (1,858,575) were females[1].

FLAG

The background of the national flag is green, symbolic of the country’s natural beauty, with three vertical stripes in the lower right corner. The three stripes are: red, symbolic of the country’s struggle for freedom; black, representing the racial makeup of the majority population; and orange, symbolic of the country’s copper riches and other mineral wealth. A copper-coloured eagle in the upper right corner symbolizes the country’s ability to rise above its problems.

Sources of law

Zambia does not have a single code containing its laws. These are drawn from a variety of sources. The following are sources of law in Zambia:

i. Constitution

ii. Legislation

iii. Common Law

iv. Judicial precedent

v. Customary Law

vi. Authoritative texts

Constitution of Zambia

The constitution was adopted in 1991 and was amended in 1996. It abrogates the 1973 constitution, which allowed, as stated above, only one political party. More political parties were allowed to participate as enshrined by the new constitution.

Legislation

Legislation in Zambia is contained in statute books that are available in most libraries. The Ministry of Justice Law library offer legislation. The government website is also helpful in as far as legislation is concerned. Constitutionally, legislation refers to laws that have been passed by parliament and have been assented to by the President. Subsidiary legislation refers to laws passed by other bodies to which parliament have validly delegated such legislative powers. These include government gazettes and municipal byelaws, inter alia.

In Zambia the legislative vests in the National assembly and is assented to by the President. Parliament can confer power on any authority to create binding laws. Currently parliament consists of one House; the National assembly. In terms of the constitution, legislation brought through parliament has to be scrutinized by the National assembly before it goes for assent to the President (article 78(2)). A bill shall not become law unless the President has assented to it and signed it in token of that assent (article 78). By virtue of Article 54(2) (a), the Attorney General is charged with drafting and signing all bills presented before parliament. The Attorney General may delegate functions to the Solicitor General (article 55(5) (b)). Laws made by the National Assembly and assented to by the president shall be styled “Acts” and the words of enactment shall be “Enacted by the Parliament of Zambia” (article 78(8)).

Precedent

Precedent forms part of the law of Zambia. Decisions of superior courts of record are therefore binding to lower courts. Decisions from South African courts are only persuasive, and courts refer to them in formulating their decisions. Decisions from similar jurisdiction can also be cited for their persuasive value. Magistrates’ courts decisions do not become precedent since these are lower courts. They are however bound by decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. Precedent assists in consistency in legal interpretation and application of the law. It has also been justified for bringing certainty and uniformity to the law. However, precedent has been blamed for causing rigidity of legal systems, preventing development of the law.

Authoritative texts

Written works of eminent authors have persuasive value in the courts of Zambia. These include writings of the old authorities as well as contemporary writers from similar jurisdictions.

International Law

Zambia is signatory to many international instruments. Although the country is quick to ratify, implementation is often slow or never materialises. Zambia belongs to the dualist tradition, thus views international law and domestic law as two separate legal systems. Hence, domestication of international law by an Act of Parliament is necessary before international law can be applied. This of course excludes customary international law, which is binding on all states. The Attorney General is mandated by article 54(2) (b) to draft and peruse treaties and agreements the government of Zambia is party to.

The Justice System of Zambia

Introduction

The Judiciary of Zambia is an independent arm of the government. Under Article 91(2) of the Constitution, Judges, Magistrates and Justices shall be independent, impartial and subject only to the Constitution and the law. They shall also conduct themselves in accordance with the code of conduct promulgated by parliament.

Article 91(1) of the Constitution defines the composition of the Judicature of the Republic as consisting of:

i. The Supreme Court of Zambia;

ii. The High Court of Zambia;

iii. The Industrial Relations Court;

iv. The Subordinate Court;

v. The Local Court; and

Such lower Courts as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament. For example, the Small Claims Courts established by the Small Claims Courts Act Chapter 47 of the Laws of Zambia.

Article 98 (2) provides for the tenure of offices of the Judges that they shall vacate office on attaining the age of sixty-five and they may only be removed from office for inability to perform the functions of office, whether arising from infirmity of body or mind, incompetence or misbehaviour.

The Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court are appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, subject to ratification by the National Assembly as stated by Article 95 of the Constitution.

The Magistrates who preside over Subordinate Courts are appointed by the Judicial Service Commission, acting in the name of the President.

Under Article 91(3) of the Constitution the Judicature shall be autonomous and it is administered in accordance with the Judicature Administration Act Chapter 24 of the Laws of Zambia.

Judiciary Objectives

The roles or core functions of the Judiciary include the following:

i. Administer justice through resolving disputes between individual and individual, and between state and individual

ii. Interpret the constitution and the laws of Zambia

iii. Promote the rule of law and contribute to the maintenance of order in society

iv. Safeguard the constitution and uphold democratic principles

v. Protect human rights of individuals and groups

The Administration of Judicature

According to Section 3(1) of the Judicature Administration Act Chapter 24 of the Laws of Zambia, The President, on recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, appoints a Chief Administrator who is responsible for the day to day running of the Judicature and the implementation of resolutions of the Judicial Service Commission.

The Chief Administrator

i. is the Controlling Officer regarding the expenditure of the Judicature within the meaning of the Finance (Control and Management) Act Chapter 347 0f the Laws of Zambia.

ii. Keeps books of accounts and other records in relation to the accounts of the Judicature.

iii. Prepares and submits financial reports concerning the activities of the Judicature to the President.

Method of Judicial Appointment

i. The Judicial Service Commission is responsible for identifying and recommending candidates to the President for appointment to judicial offices.

ii. Article 93(1) of the Constitution states that the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice shall subject to ratification by the National Assembly be appointed by the President.

iii. Article 95(1) of the Constitution states that the Puisne Judges shall, subject to ratification by the National Assembly, is appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.

iv. The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Industrial Relations court are also appointed by the President on advise by the Judicial Service commission as stipulated by Article 95(2) of the Constitution.

v. The other members of the Judicature and its staff are appointed under section 4 of the Judicature Administration Act, Chapter 24 of the Laws of Zambia.

These include the High Court Registrar, Magistrates, Justices of the Local Courts, Sheriff and other members of staff who are appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.

The Judicial Service Commission

The Judicial Service Commission is chaired by the Chief Justice. Other members of the Commission include:

i. A Supreme Court Judge

ii. The Attorney General

iii. The Solicitor General

iv. A Member of Parliament

v. The Secretary to the Cabinet

vi. A Legal Practitioner

vii. President of the Law Association of Zambia

viii. Dean of the School of Law

ix. The Chairman of the Public Service Commission

At the apex of the Zambian justice, system is the Supreme Court, which is the final court of appeal on all matters. It has a supervisory and review jurisdiction over all courts of Zambia. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction for all legal and constitutional disputes. The High Court, which holds regular sessions in all nine provincial capitals, has authority to hear criminal and civil cases and appeals from lower courts. The Industrial Relations court deals exclusively with industrial and labour matters. There is also a Land Tribunal and Revenues Appeals Tribunal. Magistrate courts have original jurisdiction in some criminal and civil cases; local, or customary, courts handle most civil and petty criminal cases in rural areas.

Local courts employ the principles of customary law, which vary widely throughout the country. Lawyers are barred from participating in proceedings in such courts, and there are few formal rules of procedure. Presiding judges, who usually are prominent local citizens, have substantial power to invoke customary law, render judgments regarding marriages, divorces, inheritances, other civil proceedings, and rule on minor criminal matters. Judgments often are not in accordance with the Penal Code. For example, they tend to discriminate against women in matters of inheritance.

The Constitution and the Judiciary

Judicial power exclusively vests in the judiciary in terms of Article 91(2) of the Constitution. Article 91 (3) of the Constitution further provides that justice shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of an Act of Parliament which shall be independent and subject on. Article 91(1) provides that the judiciary shall consist of the Supreme Court of Judicature comprising:

(a) The Supreme Court, and

(b) The High Court

(c) Such other courts as may be prescribed by an Act of Parliament.

Chapter outline of the constitution

Zambia was the first British territory to become a republic immediately upon attaining independence. The constitution promulgated on August 25, 1973, abrogated the original 1964 constitution. The new constitution and the national elections that followed in December 1973 were the final steps in achieving what was called a “one-party participatory democracy.” The 1973 constitution provided for a strong president and a unicameral National Assembly. National policy was formulated by the Central Committee of the United National Independence Party (UNIP), the sole legal party in Zambia. The cabinet executed the central committee’s policy. In accordance with the intention to formalize UNIP supremacy in the new system, the constitution stipulated that the sole candidate in elections for the office of president was the person selected to be the president of UNIP by the party’s general conference. The second-ranking person in the Zambian hierarchy was UNIP’s secretary general.

In December 1990, at the end of a tumultuous year that included riots in the capital and a coup attempt, President Kaunda signed legislation ending UNIP’s monopoly on power. In response to growing popular demand for multi-party democracy, and after lengthy, difficult negotiations between the Kaunda government and opposition groups, Zambia enacted a new constitution in August 1991. The constitution enlarged the National Assembly from 136 members to a maximum of 158 members, establishing an electoral commission, and allowed for more than one presidential candidate who no longer had to be members of UNIP. The constitution was amended again in 1996 to set new limits on the presidency (including a retroactive two term limit, and a requirement that both parents of a candidate be Zambian-born.) The National Assembly is comprised of 150 directly elected members, up to 8 presidentially appointed members and a speaker. Zambia is divided into nine provinces, each administered by an appointed governor.

The constitution of Zambia is the supreme law and if any other law inconsistent with the constitution that other law shall, to the extent of its inconsistency, be void ( article1(3)). Therefore, Zambia has a constitutional supremacy. The constitution was adopted in 1991 after consultations with the citizens of Zambia. It was amended in 1996. It repealed the constitution of Zambia Act, 1973. It purports to be an autochthonous document. The constitution set out clearly the state structure, bill of rights, the separate arms of government as well as other administrative organs such as the public service commission.

Constitutional clauses analysis:

Fundamental rights and freedoms Article11

Protection of right to life Article 11(a), Article 12

Protection of right to personal liberty Article13

Protection from slavery Article 14

Protection from inhuman or degrading treatment Article 15

Protection from deprivation of property Article16

Right to a fair hearing Article 18(1)

Protection against arbitrary search or entry Article 17(1)

Protection of freedom of conscience and religion Article 19

Protection of freedom of expression Article 20

Protection of freedom of assembly and association Article 21

Rights of child Article 24

Enforcement of protective provisions Article 28

National Sovereignty and the state

Zambia is defined as a unitary sovereign, multiparty and democratic state. (This part sets out that all power resides in the people who shall exercise their sovereignty through the democratic institutions of the state). This part also establishes the Public Seal. The supremacy of the constitution is set out in this part. The constitution also sets out the anthem and the National Emblem.

Citizenship

Citizenship is the state of belonging. Citizenship guarantees rights of nationality and all other rights from being a national of a particular country. Amongst other inherent rights is the ability to pass on to natural and adopted children since they cannot obtain their independent citizens at that stage. This part talks about acquisition and loss of acquisition. Citizenship in Zambia can be by way of descent, operation of the law or birth, marriage or by registration.

Most notable is the fact that either the mother or the father or both can confer citizenship on children (Article 5). Article 9 provides for the establishment of the Citizenship Board, which deals with any matters pertaining registration as citizens and powers of parliament in making provisions for acquisition of citizenship of Zambia by persons who are not eligible to become citizens of Zambia.

Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedom of the Individual

Part three is concerned with the promotion and protection of fundamental human rights and freedom of the individual.

Protection of the right to life

Zambia still retains the death penalty, whilst Article 12(1) states that no person shall be deprived of life, it permits the use of death penalty in the execution of the sentence of a curt in respect of criminal offence which that person has been convicted. This is not enough to ensure the full guarantee of the right to life. The right to life, as guaranteed by the second protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and political Rights aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. Imposition of the death penalty itself is not only a violation of the right to life, but also the ultimate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.

Protection of the right to personal liberty

The protection guaranteed in the international standards is missing or not fully recognized and entrenched in this constitution. For example, International standards of fair trial provide that anyone arrested or detained must be notified at the time of the arrest of the reasons of their arrest or detention and their right, including their right to counsel. This information is essential to allow detained persons to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention and, if they are charged, to start the preparation of their defense. It is essential against arbitrary arrest and detention, to ensure that no detainee is held incommunicado detention, or in a place other than an official detention centre or prison or held in any manner intended to frustrate proper and prompt access to the detainee by legal representatives, doctors or next of kin. Finally, it is not clear why this part on the protection of the right to personal liberty should include exceptions allowing for orders requiring a person to remain within a specific area or prohibiting that person from being within such an area as envisaged by article 16(1)(i).

Protection of Women’s rights

The Zambian Constitution is silent on the issue of women’s equal participation in electoral politics. Moreover, no provision of the Zambian Constitution ensures substantive equality between women and men, though Article 11 does include a blanket non-discrimination clause that guarantees everyone the enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms regardless of “race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed, sex or marital status” (emphasis added). Article 23 of the Constitution further guarantees that, except for certain limitations, “A law shall not make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.”

Article 23(4) of the Zambian Constitution allows discrimination in the area of customary Law, family law and other areas such as adoption, marriage, divorce and inheritance. Article 11(1) recognizes and declares every person in Zambia to be entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, whatever “his sex”. However, the same article states that the entitlement of these rights and freedoms are subject to limitations contained in this related to Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Linked to Article 23(4), this means that discrimination against women in areas related to property and inheritance rights is allowed. Article 16 provides for protection against deprivation of property, which may only be carried out under an Act of Parliament providing for payment of adequate compensation.

The right of persons of with disabilities

There is no specific provision in the Zambian constitution that stipulates the rights of persons with disabilities. Article 23 proscribes discrimination in any form against any person and could be used to govern the rights of the disabled. Persons with disabilities should have their rights protected and guaranteed. However, Zambia has a specific legislation on the rights of disabled persons. It is contained in the Handicapped Persons Act of 1968 as amended. The Zambian statute establishes a Council of the disabled, which provides for voluntary registration of disabled persons and of associations that maintain their welfare. A commissioner of the disabled is responsible for the administration of the Act.

The Executive

Article 33(1) states that there shall be a president of the Republic of Zambia who shall be the head of state and of the government and the Commander-in-chief of the defense force. Article 33(2) clearly states that the executive power of the Republic of Zambia shall vest in the president and, subject to the other provisions of this constitution; shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinates to him. In line with the doctrine of separation of powers Article 33(2) emphasizes that exercise of executive power by the president shall be in accordance with the constitution. This serves to curtail any excess on the use of such power. The constitution further provides for the appointment of the Vice-President, ministers and their deputies.

The Attorney general

The attorney General (AG) plays the role of the legal advisor to the government, hence the relationship between the office of the AG and the ministry of justice. The AG is not part of the cabinet per se but works closely with the executive. Article 54(1) of the constitution which is the provision creating this office provides that the AG shall be appointed by the president. It further spells out the qualifications of the persons to be appointed. The AG is the Principal legal advisor to the government and an ex-officio member of cabinet. The AG represents the government in courts or any other legal proceedings to which government is a party.

Government also makes use of the office of the Solicitor General (SL) who shall be appointed by the president as per Article 55(1). The SL may exercise any power or duty imposed on the AG when the AG is unable to act owing to illness or absence and in any case where the AG has authorized the AG.

Apart from the AG’s office and the SL’s office government also makes use of the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), mainly in criminal matters. Article 56(1) set up this office and provides for the appointment of the DPP. The DPP is appointed by the President subject to ratification by the National Assembly, and qualification for appointment to this office is the same as that for a judge of the High Court with experience biased on criminal law, (Article 56(2)).

Article 56(3) provides that the DPP shall have power in any case which he considers it proper to do so, to;

(a) Institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person in any court, other than a court martial, in respect of any offence alleged to have been committed by that person;

(b) Take over and continue any such criminal proceedings as have been instituted or undertaken by any other person or authority;

(c) To discontinue, at any stage before judgment is delivered, any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by himself or any other person or authority.

The DPP in person or by delegation to subordinate officers has the power to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any court. This office can take over and continue or discontinue any criminal proceedings instituted by any person or authority, at any stage before judgment is delivered. Although individuals can prosecute (that is institute criminal proceedings) at the private instance. The drawback of provisions allowing for prosecution at the private instance is that the DPP’s office never really gets to totally relinquish its powers to prosecute. Article 56(3) (b) of the constitution acts as a drawback clause that can easily be open to abuse, to frustrate any attempts at private prosecutions. Notwithstanding the issue of a nolle prosequi, the DPP’s office can still intercept private prosecution proceedings and take over in its capacity as a public prosecutor: thus effectively excluding the person or authority that initiated the proceedings. The DPP’s office need not give reasons for such move, save that it is proper to do so.

Further, after re-joining the fray, the DPP’s office may then exercise its powers under paragraph (c) to terminate any criminal proceedings, whether started by the office at the public instance or any person at private instance. It is submitted that this vicious cycle is open to abuse. In effect, it means that prosecution can only be undertaken by the DPP and no other individual or authority.

The Legislature

The constitution portrays the government in Zambia as a multi-party and democratic Sovereign State. The constitution further provides that parliament shall consist of the President and the National Assembly. In terms of Article 63(2), membership to the National Assembly is through ordinary elections and being voted into parliament. The elected members shall not exceed one hundred and fifty members (150), not more than eight (8) nominated members and the speaker of the national assembly. Since Zambia is a multi-party democracy members of parliament represent their respective political parties. The constitution is silent on the issue of Women’s equal participation in electoral politics.

The Judicature

Administration of the Judiciary

According to Section 3(1) of the Judicature Administration Act Chapter 24 of the Laws of Zambia, The President, on recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, appoints a Chief administrator who is responsible for the day to day running of the Judicature and the implementation of resolutions of the Judicial Service Commission.

The constitution provides that the judicature shall be autonomous and shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of an Act of parliament. The judicature shall be independent and subject to only the constitution. The judiciary shall consist of superior court of judicature comprising of;

i. Supreme Court

ii. High Court

iii. Industrial Court

iv. Subordinate Courts

v. The Local Courts

vi. Such other courts as may be prescribed by act of parliament.

The judiciary has jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, including matters relating to the constitution, and such other jurisdiction as by law conferred on it. The superior courts are courts of record and have power to commit for contempt to themselves and all such powers as were vested in a superior court of record immediately before the commencement of the constitution.

Infringement on judicial independence

The constitution gives very wide powers to the head of state to appoint judicial officers. The president appoints the chief justice and the deputy chief justice. According to article 93(1) the chief justice and deputy chief justice shall subject to ratification by the national assembly, be appointed by the president. Article 93(2) gives the president the power to appoint judges of the Supreme Court. Article 95(1) states that puisne judges shall subject to ratification by national assembly be appointed by the president on the advice of judicial services commission. Furthermore, the president with the advice of the JSC appoints the chairman and deputy chairman of the industrial court. Section 96(1) states that any position appointed under article 93 to act as a judge of the Supreme Court shall continue to act for the period of that person’s appointment is marked by the president.

Judges and other judicial officers ought to be hired on full time basis to ensure that they enjoy security of the tenure to enable them to carry out their duties in a competence fashion without fear or favour. Judges on contract are under pressure particularly when their contracts are about to end. This is contrary article 91(2) which promotes judicial independence and frowns upon infringement on this independence by other organs of government. Appointment of judges on acting or contract basis is detrimental to judicial independence since such judges are put in a state of suspense regarding whether they would be confirmed or not. In such a situation, the judge may find himself/herself trying to please those with power to confirm him/her by deciding cases in their favour. The involvement of the head of state in the process of appointing judges intimidates against an independent judiciary. Due to this fact, such appointment cannot be free of political considerations. The constitution still rests arguably judicial powers on the president. In a situation where the appointing body is politically, influenced one cannot hope for independent judiciary. People seeking judicial appointments might be lobby appointed. Thus, such people would feel a sense of obligation to the executive and be inclined to favour the executive in the adjudicatory process.

Judicial tenure and remuneration

Article 98(1) provides a position holding the offices of a judge of the Supreme Court or the office of a judge of the high court shall vacate that office on attaining the age of 65 years. Provided that the president –(a) may appoint a judge of the supreme court, who has attained that age to continue in office for such further period, not exceeding seven years as the president may determine. Judges along with other specified officers such as attorney general, investigators- general solicitor- general director of public prosecutions are paid from the general revenues of the republic. Such salaries and or allowances may be presented by or under an act of parliament. Article 119(3) provides that the salary payable to the holder of any holder of office shall not be uttered to his disadvantage after his appointment. Note article 96.

Removal of judges from office

According to Article 98(2) a judge of the Supreme Court, high court chairman of deputy chairman of the industrial relations court may be removed from office only for inability to perform the functions of his office whether arising from infirmity of body or mind, incompetence or misbehaviour and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of this article. Article 98(3) provides for the establishment of a tribunal which will investigate the case of a judge before removal in which the tribunal consists of a chairman and not less than the other members who hold or have held high judicial office. This tribunal can be biased in the sense that the judge whose perpetual removal has been influenced by the political motives can collude to remove him from offices in order to gain favour from the executive. The tribunal after a proper inquiry represents the matter to the president and advices the president whether the judge ought to be removed from office for inability or incompetence or for misbehaviour for which the president has an obligation to remove such judge from office. Article 98 gives so much power on the president to remove and suspend judge and this compromises the independence of judiciary as narrated by article 91(2).

The Supreme Court

Article 92 establishes the supreme court of Zambia, which shall consist of: the chief justice, the deputy chief justice, seven Supreme Court judges or such greater number as may be prescribed by an act of parliament. The Supreme Court is a superior court of record.

The High Court

Article 97 establishes the high court of Zambia which shall have, except as to the proceedings in which the industrial relations court has exclusive jurisdiction under the industrial relations (act no.27 of 1993), unlimited or original jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil or criminal proceedings under any law and such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred on it by this constitution or any other law. The high court shall be divided into such divisions as may be determined by an act of parliament 94(2). The chief justice shall be such an ex-offices judge of the high court (3). The other judges of the high court shall be such number of puisne judges as maybe prescribed by parliament.

Article 94(6) provides that the high court shall be a superior court of record. The high court has jurisdiction to supervise any civil or criminal proceedings before any subordinate court or any court martial and may such order issues such as writs and give such direction as it may consider appropriate for the purposes of ensuring that question as is duly administered by such court.

Specialist courts in Zambia

Apart from the Supreme Court and the High Court which are ordinary courts, Zambia also has specialist courts set up to deal with particular matters. These are creatures of statute, with limited jurisdiction as set out in the legislation establishing them. The Industrial Court and Local courts are examples of specialist courts in Zambia.

The Local Courts

The local courts play an important part in the settlement of disputes of the majority of the majority of the population the customary law itself is in a state of flux. The main thrust of the law governing the operation of the Local Courts, contained in Chapter 29 o the Laws of Zambia, is the administration of customary law. In reality, the Local Courts are the focal point of varied societal claims. Customary law is the ambiguous expression in which are hidden many legal claims. It can be safely asserted that Local Courts are the clearing grounds for simple torts, contracts, and petty crimes. However, the main workload of the courts is the law relating to non-statutory marriages. Divorce, reconciliation, custody of children, payment of mabolo or lobola, persons who die without a will-these are areas which affect the legal rights of the majority of the population. The effective handling of these disputes and their fair and just resolution assure stability in the community.

There is no uniform formal educational qualification for adjudicators of local courts. They bring important innovation in the administration of community justice derived in part from their practical understanding of the workings of a post-traditional society. These justices are often fluent in more than four local languages.

Small Claims Courts

There is on the Zambian statute books the Small Claims Court Act. The objective of the Act is to provide for the establishment, of Small Claims Courts to be situated in areas to be designated by the Chief Justice. The Small Claims Courts adopt arbitration as a mode of resolving disputes. The choice of this mode of dispute resolution is questionable because arbitration is typically adjudicative and is quite formal. Mediation would probably have been a more apt mode of resolving disputes in the Small Claims Courts. The tragedy of the Small Claims Court legislation is that although the legislation has been on the statute books for over a decade, the Small Claims Courts have not yet been operationalized. However, the idea of Small Claim Courts is a very good one. It depends on involvement of legal practitioners of 5 year standing with more personnel allocated to them. The Small Claims Court could utilize existing infrastructure such as school buildings, community halls and several others. If the existing mechanisms of resolving disputes in both rural and urban areas are adopted but also adapted to suit the needs of the poor the small claims court could work most effectively. Rules that normally apply to formalized courts should be more flexible to enable the poor.

The Legal Aid Board

The Legal Aid Act 70 was enacted on 20th November 1967. The objective of the Act is to provide for legal aid in civil and criminal matters and causes to persons whose means are inadequate to enable them to engage practitioners to represent them. The Directorate of Legal Aid Board operated as a department within the Ministry of Legal Affairs and consequently enjoyed limited autonomy. However, by the Legal Aid (Amendment) Act the Legal Aid department was transformed into a Legal Aid Board. The Legal Aid Board comprised the following part-time members appointed by the Minister:

a) A person qualified to be a Judge of the High Court who shall be the Chairperson;

b) A representative of the Law Association of Zambia;

c) The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry responsible for legal affairs;

d) A representative of the Ministry responsible for Home Affairs;

e) The Director who shall be an ex officio member;

f) A representative of a non-governmental organization active in the promotion of human rights; and

g) One other person

Furthermore, the Legal Aid (Amendment) Act defined the functions of the Board as being to:

a) Manage and administer the Legal Aid Fund; and

b) To carry out any other activities relating to the provision for legal aid which are necessary or conducive to the performance of its functions under the Act

There was however, a proviso placed on this function, namely, that the Board would not be responsible for the supervision and administration of the Directorate. It is difficult to fathom the intention of the legislature in this respect because it is usual for boards of corporate bodies to superintend secretariats or directorates. A further amendment was made to Legal Aid legislation in 2005. By the Legal Aid (Amendment) Act, the Legal Aid Board was re-constituted as a body corporate, with perpetual succession and legal capacity to sue and to be sued. The composition of the Board was enlarged to include representatives from the Ministries responsible for finance and national planning; community development and social welfare; labour and sport and child development.

Furthermore, the functions of the board were reformulated and enlarged. The functions of the Board are to

a) Administer and manage the Legal Aid Fund;

b) Facilitate the representation of persons granted legal aid under the Act;

c) Assign practitioners to persons granted legal aid under the Act;

d) Advise the Minister on policies relating to the provision of legal aid and implement Government policies relating to the same; and

e) Undertake such other activities relating to the provision of legal aid and which are conducive or incidental to the performance of its functions under the Act.

Although the Legal Aid Board has been established as a body corporate, it has not been delinked from the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry still recruits, disciplines and determines the conditions of service for legal aid personnel. The Ministry is also still responsible for mobilizing and disbursing resources to the Board. The de-linkage is important in order to establish an independent body that can effectively plan for expansion, hiring and retention of staff as well as mobilize resources from either Government or cooperating partners. The formality surrounding the Legal Aid Board still makes it difficult for the ordinary person to easily approach the Board.

The Legal Aid Board has offices in Lusaka, Kitwe, Ndola, Kabwe and Livingstone. It has on its establishment a total of twenty-one lawyers, out of an establishment of thirty four. 79 the lawyers for the Board are faced with crashing case loads. Apart from facing a critical shortage of staff, the Board has inadequate transport and operational tend to suffer. In view of the preceding constraints, the Board tends to limit the grant of legal aid to accused persons facing serious criminal cases mostly in the High Court. The Board therefore handles a very limited number of civil cases. The woes of the Board are also worsened by the fact that the Board is unable to attract and retain lawyers due to the poor conditions of service. The failure to decentralize the Board and its myriad of administrative and logistical problems has resulted in denying many indigent persons especially in rural areas legal aid.

Law reports

Zambia has a law report series known as the Zambia Law Reports (ZLR). These Law reports are available online and they are obtainable at the high court. The statutes of Zambia are available online and are listed by name. Supreme Court, High Court, Industrial Relations Court, Land Tribunal, Revenue Tribunal rulings are also found online. The ‘Zambian Law Journal’ is found at the school of Law in the University of Zambia. The ‘Laws of Zambia’ is a 1996 compilation of 26 Volumes containing all the laws and the entire respective various Republican Constitutions since independence. Volume 1 Contains the Index of the Laws of Zambia. The Laws are in read only PDF format. Zambia law Reports can also be obtained at the University of Pretoria. There is also ‘Zambia Law Reports Consolidated Index’ containing the cumulative indexes of cases reported, cases referred to, legislation referred to, and subject matter from 1963 to 1978 Published in 1984, Council of Law Reporting, and High Court for Zambia (Lusaka, Zambia).

The Zambia Legal Information Institute (ZamLII) was established by the Law School of the University of Zambia in 1996, in partnership with Zamnet. It has received important start-up assistance from the Legal Information Institute of Cornell Law School. The Institute’s aim is to improve access to judgments, statutes and other legal materials of the Republic of Zambia within both Zambia and elsewhere and to connect lawyers, judges, academics, students and others within Zambia with the growing collection of legal information available around the globe via the Internet. ZamLII provides on-line research of Zambian and foreign legal information and general information about Zambia. Our collection of legal information in Zambia includes The Constitution of the Greater Republic of Zambia, rules and selected decisions of the courts, selected acts, legal commentary, a legal directory, and finally, information about the University of Zambia School of Law. ZamLII also provides links to foreign legal information in and outside of Africa. You can also find general information about Zambia through our link with Zamnet.

 

Government Gazettes

The government of Zambia publishes a gazette that contains all relevant announcements and enactment or amendments of laws and regulations. It incorporates various government decisions, and once they feature in the Gazette, government decisions are deemed and laws and regulations are deemed to have been published and validly promulgated.

Gazettes are used by both the government and ordinary citizens to convey information to the public. The following are some of the normal uses of gazettes:

i. Notices to creditors and debtors in administration of estates.

ii. Publication of amendments to existing laws, regulations and rules.

iii. Publications of newly enacted laws, regulations and rules.

iv. Invitation for tenders from government departments.

v. Insurance of trading licenses for companies.

vi. Publication of title deeds and deed of transfer in respect of property.

Law schools in Zambia

There is a school of law in the University of Zambia. It has a law department within the faculty of law that offers Bachelor of Laws degree. The law school in collabourations with Zamnet established The Zambia Legal Information Institute (ZamLII). It has received important start-up assistance from the Legal Information Institute of Cornell Law School.

Access to information

Access to information is impeded by a number of factors such as limited and uneven distribution of libraries and information materials, restrictive library regulations and lack of awareness among members of the general public of their rights of access to information. These limitations inhibit citizens from effectively participating in national affairs.Having said that legal information is available at the School of law and the internet as discussed above.

The Law Association of Zambia

The Law Association of Zambia is a professional organization bringing together more than 600 legal practitioners. The Association was founded in 1973 and brings together all practicing members of the legal profession. Prior to this, the Association was called the Law Society of Zambia. As in most other jurisdiction, the Law Association of Zambia regulates the legal profession. The Law Association of Zambia is a professional organization bringing together more than 600 legal practitioners. The Association was founded in 1973 and brings together all practicing members of the legal profession. Prior to this, the Association was called the Law Society of Zambia. Members of the association are Individual advocates practicing in Zambia and students enrolled in the University of Zambia Law School. Amongst others, the law association seeks to further the development of law as an instrument of social order and justice and as an essential element in the growth of society, To provide a means by which lawyers, whatever their particular field of activity, can participate together fully and effectively in the development of society and its institutions and To encourage lawyers as individuals to join actively in the life of, and identify themselves with people and to utilize their skills and training in their service.

The Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) is a body corporate established by the Law Association of Zambia Act, Chapter 31 of the Laws of Zambia. Being a body corporate, the Association can sue and be sued and is competent to enter into any contractual obligation of its choice. The Association’s main policy-making body is the Annual General Meeting, comprising all registered members of the Association, which membership presently stands at five hundred. In between the Annual General Meetings, the Association elects an Executive, comprising the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, Hon. Secretary, Hon. Treasurer and eleven Council Members to run the day-to-day affairs of the Association. The Association has various committees of duly appointed Advocates responsible for various activities of the Association. Membership is open to individual advocates practicing in Zambia and students enrolled in the University of Zambia Law School.

Political Parties

Significant political developments have occurred in Zambia since the 2001 tripartite elections. After having had two previous elections in 1991 and 1996, the 2001 elections produced a multiparty Parliament for the first time since Zambia’s independence in 1964. These elections seem to signal that the country has moved from a dominant one party political system to a competitive multi-party system. Despite these positive political developments, political parties and the party system in Zambia still remain relatively undeveloped. This trend in Zambian political culture may be partly due to the short time period in which political parties have had to organize, a lack of organizational funds, and a host of legal and political obstacles that have exacerbated political party fragmentation. Political parties play a vital and indispensable role in modern political systems and are the raison d’être of a multiparty system.

To its credit, Zambia has been deemed an “oasis of peace” in Africa since its independence. Although the country experienced one-party rule for 27 years, there was not the degree of repression and social anarchy that characterized many other African countries. Because of this unique attribute, Zambia’s political transition in 1991 was peaceful; Zambia successfully held presidential and parliamentary elections in 1996 and 2001. Despite disputes over the election results in 1996 and 2001, the country has been able to utilize constitutional provisions to resolve political differences.

The MMD government was elected in 1991 and within six months of assuming office; fragmentation began to surface within the ruling party. Several MPs resigned in the fracas. In 1993, several former cabinet ministers and notable MPs left MMD to form the National Party. Although several MPs successfully won their seats on the NP ticket, the party atrophied and failed to offer a serious challenge to the MMD government. Due to continued dissatisfaction with MMD, two other parties, the Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC) and the Agenda for Zambia (AZ) were formed in 1995 and 1996 respectively.

Faced by a perceived threat from the political opposition, by 1996 the MMD government orchestrated a constitutional amendment to preclude the strongest challenger, UNIP’s Kenneth Kaunda, from competing in the 1996 elections. Traditional tribal chiefs were also barred from standing as candidates. In a backlash attempt by supporters of UNIP, the 1996 elections were widely boycotted by civil society representatives, and supporters of UNIP, resulting in a consolidation of MMD’s dominance in Parliament. That year, the MMD increased its parliamentary seats from 125 to 131, while the political opposition remained largely fragmented. Both parties were led by individuals who held senior positions in the first MMD National Executive Committee and were ministers in Chiluba’s first cabinet.

With the combined opposition parties winning only nine seats and the independent candidates having won ten seats, this parliamentary result followed serious irregularities in the electoral process. The alleged irregularities included poor management of the voter registration process, resulting in a massive reduction in voters eligible to participate in the elections. The overwhelming evidence of widespread vote rigging and other forms of electoral fraud in the 1996 elections led to the elections result being challenged in the Courts.

Amid popular contestation, Chiluba announced in May 2001 that he would not seek a third presidential term on the MMD ticket. In late August 2001, Levy Mwanawasa emerged as the party’s choice for its presidential candidate. The election date was announced at the end of November, in the middle of the rainy season and well after the MMD had commenced its election campaign. At the dissolution of Parliament, prior to the election, MMD held 89 seats as compared to 131 when elected in 1991. The opposition UPND, NP and UNIP held twenty seats in sum. Forty seats in Parliament were vacant. After a split within the MMD, forty seats that were occupied by that party were left vacant, as several MP’s who left the government either joined the opposition or formed other parties.

The 2001 tripartite elections were also widely regarded as flawed by both domestic and international observers. There were serious doubts as to whether the results reflected the will of the people. The final results released by the Electoral Commission of Zambia indicated that about 70% of the registered electorate cast their votes for president. Of these votes, the MMD party received 28.69%, while the UPND receiving 26.76%, a difference of 30,000 votes. Expressed as a percentage of registered voters, the MMD received less than 20% of the vote, which makes it the only party to win the government with such a narrow margin of victory since independence, in spite of allegations against the party over vote rigging and other alleged abuses of electoral fraud.

The 2001 elections seem to highlight the risks associated with transitioning from a dominant single party system to a non-authoritarian competitive party system. Of the seven political parties in Parliament, no party had an absolute majority. The MMD won less than 50 % of the seats (46%), while the UPND had just about a third (33%). Combined, MMD and UPND shared about 80% of seats in Parliament. Together, UNIP and FDD accounted for 17% of the seats while the remaining three opposition parties shared 5% of the seats. At the local government level, opposition parties controlled key city and municipal councils in about six provinces.

Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)

The MMD originally formed during a planned referendum in July 1991 as a pressure group to campaign for the restoration of a multiparty system to contest the ruling party UNIP. In January 1991, MMD transformed itself into a political party with diverse representation, including trade unions, commercial farmers, the clergy, students, academics, businesspersons and former UNIP politicians. Under the leadership of the former Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) chairman-general, Frederick Chiluba, the party united around a cohesive platform to remove UNIP from power. As MMD consolidated power in 1991 and 1996 elections, with the party leadership garnering the majority vote, there were fears that the country was regressing back to a one-party state. As Although legislation severed the formal links between the party and government, MMD’s priority position in government allowed it to use the incumbency to access state resources, especially during election campaigns. As a result of discord within the party over governance issues, between 1993 and 1996 the party experienced several defections and resignations leading to the formation of rival political parties.

In 2001, the MMD had an organizational presence in every province within the country. Consequently, the party could boast of national structures and coverage and it held regular elections for its national leaders. However, as the 2001 elections drew nearer, the party was faced with the prospect of defeat, triggered by the desire of
President Chiluba to run for a third term in office. As public pressure against the third term mounted and senior party leaders began denouncing the action, the party began to lose its popularity. Eventually, the president declared he would not seek a third term and the MMD went on to win its third mandate. However, MMD’s electoral performance was very poor -having gained less than 30% of the national vote and winning less than three seats in four provinces. This was perhaps the lowest mandate won by any ruling party in Zambia since independence and posed serious challenges to the new leadership.

The MMD manifesto is based on the promotion of a free market economy and good governance. Since 1991, the party has implemented a very ambitious economic reform program. It has liberalized the economy and removed most of the controls that characterized the Zambian economy in the Second Republic. These policies have
produced a serious social impact, which has contributed to deterioration in living standards and a high incidence of poverty. The party faces a number of challenges, as has been reflected in the party’s declining representation in Parliament, considering that since the 2001 elections the MMD no longer commands an absolute majority.

The United Party for National Development

United Party for National Development (UPND) was formed the UPND in 1998. The party was established on a social democratic platform of providing free health and educational services to the Zambian people. It also articulated a commitment to providing agricultural subsidies to rural farmers to increase agricultural production. The UPND’s performance in local government and parliamentary elections between 1998 and 2000 made it the main opposition party to the MMD. The party won more than 60 local council seats in the 1998 local government elections and six parliamentary by-elections in Southern, Western and Central provinces. It also controlled one council in north-western province. Although the party claimed an organizational presence in almost all of Zambia’s nine provinces, it was better
organized in Central, north-western, Southern and Western provinces.

UPND finished second to the MMD presidential candidate in the 2001 elections. The party won the majority of local government seats in Western, Central, north-western, Southern and Lusaka provinces. With these 49 seats, UPND was the second largest party in Parliament. Historically, UPND has strong ties to other opposition parties, with which it contested the results of the 2001 election in the Supreme Court. The party has encountered serious leadership and organizational challenges, including its level of dependency on the patronage of its party president.

Although the party’s national leadership is representative of all the ethnic groups, the electorate perceives it as a regional or ethnic party. Additionally, the party has had difficulty asserting itself as the main opposition party in the country. Without recognition as the official opposition, on account of falling short of the threshold of 53 seats, the party has been unable to systematically challenge government policy in Parliament and to initiate legislation. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, UPND has been internally cohesive and self-confident, as evidenced by very few defections among the senior leadership. Additionally, it is the only political party that successfully expelled its MP for accepting a ministerial appointment in the MMD government.

United National Independence Party (UNIP)

UNIP is the oldest African political party in Zambia. It was established in 1959. It was briefly involved governmentwiththeANCbetween1962-1964and it was the governing party in Zambia from 1964-1991.The leader of the party until 1992 was former President Kenneth Kaunda, who was the first president of the independent country of Zambia. He voluntarily stepped down in favour of Kebby Musokotwane, but returned to the party in 1995 to increase the party’s chances of defeating the MMD in 1996. Kaunda was excluded from running on the party’s ticket in 1996 due to a controversial constitutional amendment passed by the ruling MMD, which barred persons whose parents were not born in Zambia from contesting the presidency.

Between 1992 and 1998, UNIP suffered harassment under the government’s rule, including arrests and detentions over allegations that the party conspired to overthrow the Government. The most controversial of these alleged conspiracy acts were the “Zero Option” and “Black Mamba” “plots” that resulted in a number of UNIP leaders being detained, including the party’s vice president Chief Inyambo Yeta. Additionally, UNIP president Kenneth Kaunda was detained in connection with an alleged coup attempt to overthrow the MMD government in December 1997.

Although the party can legitimately claim to have countrywide organizational structures, the party has experienced serious organizational problems since leaving office in 1991. During the one-party era prior to 1991, UNIP benefited from the use of public funds because there was no distinction between the ruling party’s purse and the government as evidenced by the fact that party officials were paid from the public treasury, the party used government vehicles and the State financed party offices. Since leaving office, UNIP has had to rely upon its own resources and properties, which has translated into a diminution of the party’s organizational capacity. The Central Committee that was formerly full-time is now part-time and a number of staff have been laid off or have not been paid for a significant period of time. Due to financial problems, the party has not been able to hold important party meetings.

In addition to organizational problems, the party has also experienced serious leadership problems since 1992. Internal bickering and factionalism has led to frequent leadership turnover, suspensions and sometimes expulsions. The influence of the party’s founder and former president Kenneth Kaunda may have had a negative
impact on party organization and membership morale, as the party seems to be divided between two camps between supporters of the former president, and those who want fresh leadership without formal ties to Kaunda.

A leadership crisis in 2000 led to the ouster of party president Francis Nkhoma and his replacement by Kaunda’s son and UNIP’s secretary general, Tilyenji Kaunda, who later contested the 2001 presidential elections. There are concerns within the party over Tilyenji Kaunda’s leadership ability, as he is perceived to be directing the affairs of the party from outside the country and lacking necessary organizational experience. UNIP espouses a distinct social-democratic ideology that calls for more state- involvement in the economy and the provision of state resources for social services. However, the perceived failure of its past policies, coupled with its serious leadership problems have contributed to the party’s failure to offer a formidable opposition to the ruling MMD.

Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD)

This party was formed in July 2001 by senior party and government officials who were expelled from the MMD for opposing a third term of the country’s president. The original founders included the former Vice President of Zambia, Christon Tembo, cabinet ministers, deputy ministers and MPs. In September 2001, Tembo was elected as the party’s first president, with a similar manifesto as the MMD. In the 2001 elections, the FDD won 12 MP seats in Lusaka and Eastern provinces. It also gained control of the Lusaka City Council. Additionally, its candidate in presidential elections finished third, managing to win 13% of the national vote. Additionally, the party fielded the largest number of councilors and MPs and won the mayoral ticket. Unsatisfied with the results, however, the FDD have joined in collabouration with other parties to contest the 2001 elections results in the Supreme Court. The party has an organizational presence in all nine provinces of the country. Although relatively well organized, lately a significant number of FDD party members have defected to the MMD government. Recently three of its MPs were appointed to governmental ministerial positions without party consultation. While the party supports a Government of National Unity (GNU), as it has sought to negotiate its involvement in the MMD government with the President to date it has been unable to reach a workable partnership.

Heritage Party (HP)

Godfrey Miyanda, former Zambian Vice President from 1994 to 1997 founded the HP. Like other opposition parties, the HP was formed in protest of the government’s bid for a third presidential term. HP is committed to promoting integrity in public office, transparency and greater public accountability. The party’s leader is a central force in the party’s operation.
Although the party contested the 2001 elections and finished fifth with about 8% of the national vote, it obtained only four MPs in the most recent elections. Since those elections, two of these MPs have defected to the ruling party, while the remaining two HP MPs have both been appointed to Deputy Ministerial positions in the MMD government party approval. The party views this action as “poaching” and because there is no expulsion clause in the HP constitution, it has not challenged with the “erring” MPs. Currently HP is one of the parties challenging the election of the country’s president in the Supreme Court

Zambia Republican Party (ZRP)

Many former MMD members claim that their only quarrel with the MMD was Chiluba’s desire to run for a third term. This explains why a number of FDD members and officials have gravitated back to the MMD after Levy Mwanasa was elected President. The ZRP was formed in early 2001 through an alliance of four parties including the Republican Party. The ZRP presidential candidate in the 2001 elections did not perform well finishing sixth with less than five percent (4.8%) of the national vote. Although the party did win one Parliamentary seat in Lusaka Province, the MP has since been appointed by the government as Cabinet Minister. The party’s policy direction does not differ fundamentally from the MMD. ZRP supports a free-market economy based on private entrepreneurship, good incentives to the private sector and a Government that is responsive and responsible to the citizens.

Patriotic Front (PF)

In September 2001 Michael Sata, a former Cabinet Minister and the MMD National Secretary, formed the PF. It was the last of the parties to be formed as a result of MMD succession problems. The party was organized quickly to contest the 2001 elections and consequently it did not perform well. The PF secured under 4% (3.3%) of the national vote and won only one MP seat. The party’s main policy platform is the reduction in taxes and prudence in the management of public resources. The party’s leader is a central force in the party’s operation. However, the main problem the party faces is a public perception that its leader supported Chiluba’s third term bid and was at the forefront of prosecuting those opposed to it through suspensions and expulsions. The are other political parties which have contested parliamentary seats and they include National Citizens Coalition (NCC), Social Democratic Party (SDP), Zambia Alliance for Progress (ZAP), National Leadership for Development (NLD) and the NCC (National Citizens Coalition).

Civil society

Zambia has a variety of non-governmental organizations working on issues of human rights and related fields. Despite the euphoria over the defeat of President-since-independence, Kenneth Kaunda’s, United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Zambia’s first ever multi-party elections, it has become clear that elections did not herald an end to the prominence of human rights issues in the political life of the country. The then ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD has been beset by political scandal, defection, corruption and allegations of involvement in the traffic of illegal drugs. The new government has also demonstrated a certain degree of intolerance by declaring a state of emergency and detaining several opponents, following claims of a coup plot hatched by members of UNIP. At the same time, law enforcement agencies for the most part remain fixated on their erstwhile methods of operation, which were, to say the least, not human rights-sensitive. The press is often targeted for harassment.

Human rights organizations (HROs) in Zambia are, in the main, faced with extending the experience they gained in the monitoring of elections and civic education to other areas of human rights work. While the elections were an issue around which it was fairly easy to galvanize interest and attention, there is a need to aggressively promote knowledge of human rights among the general populace–broadly described as “apathetic”. Some prominent cases from the past regime, such as the detention-without-trial of Katiza Cebekhulu (the key witness in the trial of Winnie Mandela, who was spirited away from South Africa in order not to give testimony expected to be potentially damaging), have been passed over to the new government, but the government has done little to address the concerns expressed by human rights groups about them. Torture is reported to take place on a regular basis. In addition, there have been reports of a number of incidents where police have detained the relatives of their intended victims, in order to flush them out of hiding–the case of opposition UNIP member, William Banda, being the most prominent. The new HROs that have come into existence are largely believed to be “elitist”, and need to cooperate more effectively with the press and others involved in the human rights struggle.

Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (CHRD)

The Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (CHRD) has yet to make a significant impact on the human rights scene in Zambia, although it runs an office for pro bono counseling on legal and human rights matters. The Centre faced initial problems with registration, as the authorities suspected their motives. Although the registration matters were overcome, it continues to encounter problems with government obstruction of receipt of external funding granted to the organization. The Centre is nevertheless looking around for alternatives, and intends to organize a paralegal training course to be conducted in June 1994.

Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ)

The Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ) was part of the group that was active in the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), but it has, in general, adopted a low profile with respect to advocacy on human rights issues in Zambia. Instead, it deals with questions such as refugees and relief, some gender questions, ethics, development and unemployment. This activity is all conducted under the auspices of the Social Justice Committee of the CCZ.

Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP)

Initially begun as a monitoring group prior to the 1991 general elections, FODEP is an umbrella organization comprised of several church groups, women’s organizations, the Law Association and the Press Association. Today, FODEP has broadened its mandate to cover civic education for the purposes of enhancing the general awareness of the population. Drawing on its experience in the elections, FODEP intends to focus on civil and political rights at the local level, and to involve parliamentary and other elected representatives in the dissemination of knowledge and information about these rights.

Human Rights Committee of the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ)

The Law Association of Zambia (LAZ), a statutory body recognized by law in 1973, established a Human Rights Committee to function under its auspices. The Committee was heavily involved in civic education around the elections and produced a number of programs for the broadcast media on elections and civic rights. The Committee transcribed the notes from these seminars and circulated them as a further mechanism of sensitization. In conjunction with the Catholic Secretariat, it has also designed a program for the conduct of simultaneous seminars on human rights in all the provincial centres of the country, as a starting-point for the sensitization of the broad populace on general human rights issues. A series of seminars for the police force have also been designed, the first to commence in Lusaka. As a major human rights actor, the Committee has received several reports on police violence and prison conditions, and attempts to ensure that these issues are expeditiously addressed.

Inter-African Network for Human Rights (AFRONET)

AFRONET is billed as an organization designed to promote coordination and networking among African HROs. As yet, it has only begun to meet with various organizations within Zambia and to publicize its operations outside the country. Although it has observer status at the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, it still has a long way to go, both in the conceptualization of its precise goals and programs, and in raising the consciousness of HROs throughout the continent on the need for coordination and networking. Its programs focus on communication, the promotion of good governance and sustainable development, human rights, and the interaction of law and society.

Legal Resources Foundation (LRF)

The Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) was established as a company limited by guarantee, in order to obviate the possibility of the authorities’ exercising their powers to ban a society under the provisions of the Societies Act. The idea of the LRF was conceived in 1991 prior to the meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGUM) in Harare. LRF has several objectives, including the promotion of an interest in human rights; the development of law (through the publication of cases, law reports and a monthly newsletter); and reform of the law. So far, however, LRF has not commenced operations and has yet to formulate specific programs to actualize its objectives.

National Women’s Lobby Group

Established on July 20, 1991, the National Women’s Lobby Group (WLG) is a pressure group established to pursue the rights of women, children and minorities, especially in relation to the policy-making bodies in the country. It is headed by a Secretary General, who is presently assisted only by a secretary. WLG is composed of a number of women’s NGOs and its approach is broad in ambit. It is involved in networking and is a resource base for information and policies about women. It also lobbies the President and informs the electorate about issues of women’s rights. WLG has developed a three-year plan by which it will work towards a core budget to cover training in human rights and, especially, in lobbying and outreach.

Office of Social Education of the Zambian Episcopal Conference (ZEC)

Often working in collabouration with the other church groups in Zambia (the Christian Council and the Evangelical Fellowship); the Zambian Episcopal Conference (ZEC) has been more public and active in the arena of human rights, especially in the issuance of public statements or pastoral letters, than have its counterparts. ZEC statements have covered issues such as structural adjustment and its impact on human rights, a review of the Constitution, and problems with the transition to the third (present) republic. The ZEC has embarked on an active program of encouraging the formation of Justice and Peace Committees at the local level, building on the model of the Zimbabwean experience. To this end, it has conducted a total of five seminars over the past two years in order to sensitize its members on the spirituality of justice and peace, and the need for respect for human rights. The attendees at these seminars have then proceeded out into the countryside, and sought to disseminate the information they have culled to the broader populace. The results have varied, but are a significant beginning for a process that will invariably take some time to gel. Individual Justice and Peace Committees also identify areas of specific concern to their local communities. Among the issues that have been addressed are: the treatment of prisoners on remand, the payment and condition of domestic workers at large and within church institutions, the issue of allocation of places in schools, and the effect of the structural adjustment program. A national Justice and Peace Committee/Commission is yet to be established.

Women’s Rights Committee of the Law Association of Zambia (WRC)

Established in 1988 as part of the LAZ, the Women’s Rights Committee (WRC) gained impetus after the passing of the Intestate Succession Act. Following this, WRC established a National Legal Aid Clinic for Women in November 1990, which has been run in the main by volunteer lawyers. A full-time Coordinator for the Clinic was appointed in 1991, and continues to be assisted by volunteers. The clinic still has problems of recognition and has not been formally registered, but utilizes the framework of the Citizen’s Advice Bureau of the LAZ in order to appear in court. The WRC functions like a private law firm and the majority of its cases are on inheritance, divorce, and custody and maintenance matters. The clientele are mainly the unemployed who are charged only a nominal fee.

Zambia Civic Education Association (ZCEA)

The Zambia Civic Education Association (ZCEA) initially commenced as a program of UNIP–the former ruling political party–as a mechanism in its “revival campaign” to meet the challenges following the general election, but the party was not extremely responsive to its overtures. Consequently, the group has attempted to distance itself from any direct political affiliation and claims to be wholly independent. The ZCEA is under the organizational control of a Chair, who is the only full-time worker, while all its programs are implemented by volunteers. One of its first actions was to inaugurate what it calls “clinics”, which are held every Saturday and Sunday, where ZCEA holds public information sessions, discussing the role of public officers, human rights education and issues such as health, hygiene and the environment, as the most “basic needs” of the community. The group has also targeted the police and attempted to implement a community-policing scheme in at least one area of peri-urban Lusaka. This has been approached as a pilot project, and an attempt has been made to deal with common problems in the relationship between police and the community. The scheme has also addressed conditions at the stations, related to the cells, women prisoners, and so on. The ZCEA has also designed a “right to shelter” project in Mapoloto Township.

PARLIAMENT

The President’s Office

The Office of the President of the Republic of Zambia is the highest executive position in Government. The President is the Head of Government and the National Assembly, and also serves as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces of Zambia. The Office is attended to by the Chief of State House Staff, Principal Private Secretary, Three Senior Private Secretaries and Five Special Assistants (Press, Economics, Politics, Legal, Projects Monitoring and Implementation). Two Chief Personal Secretaries serve directly in the Office where the President works, supported by his Aide De Camp.

National Assembly

The National Assembly is comprised of 150 directly elected members, up to eight presidentially-appointed members, and a speaker. Zambia is divided into nine provinces, each administered by an appointed deputy minister who essentially performs the duties of a governor. The Supreme Court is the highest court and the court of appeal; below it are the high court, magistrate’s court, and local courts.

Voting in Parliament

Voting is done through simple majority. There are no reserved seats or quotas for women, ethnic minorities or other categories. Vacancies arising between general elections are filled through by-elections. Voting is not compulsory.

Voting is open to all people above 18 years and eligibility to stand for parliamentary is 21 years, of Zambian citizenship (including naturalized citizens), and resident in the country at the time of election. Also eligible are people who are able to speak and read in the official language of Zambia, as well as citizens overseas, who are not civil servants.

Disqualified are people who pay allegiance to a foreign State, insanity, sentence of death or imprisonment, conviction of a corrupt or illegal practice within five years preceding the elections, persons found guilty of such practice upon the trial of an election petition, lawful custody, persons who are not in possession of a national registration card, insanity, undischarged bankrupts, sentence of death or imprisonment, restriction in movement or detention pursuant to certain laws, etc.

The office of the Speaker

The Office of the Speaker in the Parliament of Zambia is established under Article 69(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia. The election of the Speaker is the first business that a new Assembly transacts at its first meeting. This is so because Article 69(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia states. No business shall be transacted in the National Assembly (other than the election to the Office of Speaker) – at any time when the Office of the Speaker is vacant (The Constitution of Zambia, 1996).

The Functions of the Speaker

The Speaker is the Presiding Officer of the National Assembly and his authority is recognised and respected by all Hon. Members of Parliament. He regulates debates and enforces strict observance of rules which govern orderly conduct in the House. He calls upon Members who wish to speak to do so. He preserves the order and dignity of proceedings in the Assembly. He is the spokesman and the representative in its powers, proceedings and dignity of the institution’s external relations with other authorities and persons outside Parliament.

The Speaker is the custodian of parliamentary procedure, bills and all parliamentary papers and publications. All Members of Parliament look to him for guidance in matters of procedure, and he decides on points of order. He may give his rulings immediately or defer his decision to a later date or time. His rulings constitute precedents by which the subsequent Speakers of the Assembly will be guided. The Speaker’s ruling or, indeed, that of the Deputy Speaker and the Deputy Chairman of Committees of the whole House may not be criticised or questioned except by a substantive motion of which notice has been given. An affront to the Speaker or the Chair is an affront to the entire House.

The Speaker is the guardian of the dignity and privileges of the House; and it is only through him that Members of the National Assembly claim and enjoy their rights of access to the Head of State, the President. The Speaker has wide powers in the House. He can call Members to order for the use of non-parliamentary language; for any unbecoming behaviour; for irrelevance; and for tedious repetition. He can order Members to resume their seats or to withdraw a word or a phrase or order a Member to apologise in accordance with the Standing Orders; and he can order a Member to leave the Chamber. If a Member disregards the authority of the Chair or contravenes the rules of the Assembly by persistent and wilful obstruction or otherwise, the Speaker or the Chairman of Committees has the authority to ‘name’ that Member, after which the Leader of Government Business in the House (the Vice-President) or any Cabinet Minister present would move a motion for the appropriate punishment to be meted out, which may include a suspension from the House. If the Member does not leave the House, the Speaker orders the Sergeant-at-Arms to remove him by force.

In addition to presiding over the debates of the House, the Speaker is the Chairman of all Sessional and Select Committees, but physically chairs the Standing Orders Committee. The Speaker is also the President of both the Zambia Branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) and the Zambia National Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). In this capacity, he presides at their Annual General Meetings. Together with the Executive Committees of both organisations, he appoints Hon. Members of Parliament to attend Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and Inter-Parliamentary Union seminars, regional and parliamentary conferences as delegates. He also appoints members of staff of the National Assembly to serve as Secretaries to such delegations.

Deputy Speaker

The Office of the Deputy Speaker in the National Assembly of Zambia is an honourable office established under Article 70(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia. The election of the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly is the second business after the election of the Speaker that the new Assembly transacts at its first meeting in accordance with Article 70(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Zambia which states that the members of the National Assembly elect a person to the Office of the Deputy Speaker when the Assembly first sits after any dissolution of the National Assembly and, if the Office becomes vacant otherwise than by reason of the dissolution of the National Assembly, at the first sitting of the Assembly after the office becomes vacant (The Constitution of Zambia, 1996).

Duties of the Deputy Speaker

The duties of the Deputy Speaker are those enumerated for the Speaker, in the absence of the latter. The Deputy Speaker is also the Chairman of Committees of the whole House. As Chairman of Committee of the whole House, the Deputy Speaker has the following responsibilities when the House resolves into Committee; that is, to guide the House in its deliberations of:

i. The committee stages of all bills under consideration in the House;

ii. The estimates of expenditure, in the Committee of Supply, after the budget address by the Minister of Finance and Economic Development and when the House considers Supplementary Estimates; and

iii. The revenue measures, in the Committee of Ways and Means. This Committee considers taxation measures and bills dealing with taxation or raising of funds, which only comes before the House after the Committee of Ways and Means has agreed to the measures.

The Sergeant-At-Arms

The Sergeant-At-Arms is an officer of the House whose duty is to assist the Speaker in maintaining law and order in the Chamber. The Sergeant-At-Arms also provides security to the Hon. Mr. Speaker and the Chamber when the House is in Session. The officer is the custodian of the Mace. The Mace of the Parliament of Zambia is made of copper with an ivory shaft and natural amethyst set in the head and end. The cone of the Mace bears three copper eagles and engraved on the collars of the shaft are the words; ‘Republic of Zambia’ and ‘One Zambia, One Nation’. The Mace is the symbol of authority of the Speaker. It is brought into and taken out of the Chamber by the Sergeant-At-Arms, who leads the Speaker’s procession and also announces the procession’s entry into the Chamber. When the Speaker is presiding over business of the House, the Mace is laid on the Table of the House. During the Committees of the Whole House, which are presided over by the Deputy Speaker, the Mace is placed in the lower brackets at the front of the Table. During the Ceremonial Opening of Parliament by the President, the Mace is placed on the Table of the House and covered with a green cloth. Under the Sergeant-At-Arms fall the House Messengers. The House Messengers service the House and the Committees when these are sitting.

The Deputy Chairman of the Committee

The Deputy Speaker, who is the Chairman of Committee of the whole House is deputised by the Deputy Chairman of Committee of the whole House. His functions are those of the Chairman of Committee of the whole House. He sits in for the Deputy Speaker whenever circumstances necessitate this.

The Electoral Commission

Electoral Commission Act 24 of 1996 provides for the formation and composition of Electoral Commission and its operations. The Commission consist of a Chairperson and not more than four other members appointed by the President, subject to ratification by the National Assembly (Section 4 (1) (b)), for a term not exceeding Seven years. In addition, it sets out the circumstances under which the President may remove a member of the Commission. The Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) is the autonomous electoral management body for the Republic of Zambia. The ECZ was established in 1996 under article 76 of the Constitution of Zambia.

Composition

The Chairperson of the Commission shall be a person who has held, or qualified to hold high judicial office or any other suitably qualified person. Whereas the Chairman and members of the Commission constitute the policy making body, the Electoral Commission Act 24 provides for the Commission to appoint a Director who is the Chief Executive Officer of the commission and is responsible for management and Administration of the Commission, and

implementation of the decisions of the Commission. The Director is assisted by such staff as the Commission appoints by statutory instrument on such terms and conditions as the Commission determines.

Legislation governing the electoral commission

The Electoral Commission of Zambia is an independent and autonomous Electoral Management Body (EMB) that is governed and regulated by the following pieces of legislation:

i. The Constitution of Zambia, 1991;

ii. The Electoral Commission Act No.24 of 1996;

iii. The Electoral Act No.12 of 2006;

iv. The Local Government Elections Act, Cap 282 of the laws of Zambia;

v. The Local Government Elections (Amendment) Act, 1997; and

vi. Various statutory instruments made to regulate the electoral process, such as the Electoral (code of conduct) regulations, the Electoral (General) regulations and the Electoral (registration of Voters) regulations.

The Electoral Commission of Zambia is responsible for the delimitation of constituency, ward and polling district boundaries; (see Article 76 of the Constitution, Section 9 of the Local Government Elections Act and Section 37 of the Electoral Act, 2006 , respectively); the registration of eligible citizens as voters and the update and maintenance of a register of voters (Article 76 and Section 4 of the Electoral Act); the conduct and the supervision of the Zambia’s presidential, National Assembly(parliamentary) and Local Government elections (see Article 76 of the Constitution and Section 2 the Local Government Elections (Amendment) Act No 17, 1997).

The Electoral Commission is also responsible to provide electoral information and voter education to members of the public and the electorate on the various phases/stages of the electoral process and elections, in particular. (See Section 77 of the electoral Act, 2006); It also has powers to facilitate the establishment of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for the management of electoral disputes (Section 111 of the Electoral Act, 2006); and powers to make regulations deemed pertinent to the electoral process (see Section 129 of the Electoral Act, 2006).

The Electoral Commission as established under Article 76 of the Constitution consists of a chairperson and four other members appointed by the President, subject to ratification by the National Assembly for a term not exceeding seven years (See section 4 of the Electoral Commission Act). The Act also provides the provisions for the removal of Commission members and all matters incidental to the internal operation of the Electoral Commission.

SOME OF THE KEY LEGISLATIONS PASSED SINCE 2011 TO DATE

Water Resources Management Act-2011

An Act to establish the Water Resources Management Authority and define its functions and powers; provide for the management, development, conservation, protection and preservation of the water resource and its ecosystems; provide for the equitable, reasonable and sustainable utilisation of the water resource; ensure the right to draw or take water for domestic and non-commercial purposes, and that the poor and vulnerable members of the society have an adequate and sustainable source of water free from any charges; create an enabling environment for adaptation to climate change; provide for the constitution, functions and composition of catchment councils, sub-catchment councils and water users associations; provide for international and regional cooperation in, and equitable and sustainable utilisation of, shared water resources; provide for the domestication and implementation of the basic principles and rules of international law relating to the environment and shared water resources as specified in the treaties, conventions and agreements to which Zambia is a State Party; repeal and replace the Water Act, 1949; and provide for matters connected with, or incidental to, the foregoing.

The Zambia Institute of Advanced Legal Education-2011

An Act to amend the Zambia Institute of Advanced Legal Education Act, 1996

The Urban and Regional Planners Act-2011

An Act to establish the Zambia Institute of Planners and provide for its functions; provide for the registration of planners and planning firms and regulate their professional conduct; and provide for matters connected with, or incidental to, the foregoing.

The Zambia Qualifications Authority Act-2011

An Act to provide for the development and implementation of a national qualifications framework; establish the Zambia Qualifications Authority; provide for the registration and
accreditation of qualifications; provide measures to ensure that standards and registered qualifications are internationally comparable; and provide for matters connected with, or incidental to, the foregoing.

The Supreme Court (Amendment), Act-2011

An Act to amend the Supreme Court Act

The Appropriation Act 2011

An Act to authorise expenditure from the general revenues of the Republic of moneys required for the services of the Republic during the financial year ending on the 31st December, 2012, not exceeding in the aggregate twenty-seven trillion, six hundred and ninety-eight billion, two hundred and eighty-one million, nine hundred and twenty-nine thousand, eight hundred and thirty-four kwacha.

The Day Nurseries Act, 2011

An Act to repeal the Day Nurseries Act

The Environmental Management Act, 2011- 2nd Part

An Act to continue the existence of the Environmental Council and re-name it as the Zambia Environmental Management Agency; provide for integrated environmental management and the protection and conservation of the environment and the sustainable management and use of natural resources; provide for the preparation of the State of the Environment Report, environmental management strategies and other plans for environmental management and sustainable development; provide for the conduct of strategic environmental assessments of proposed policies, plans and programmes likely to have an impact on environmental management; provide for the prevention and control of pollution and environmental degradation; provide for public participation in environmental decision-making and access to environmental information; establish the Environment Fund; provide for environmental audit and monitoring; facilitate the implementation of international environmental agreements and conventions to which Zambia is a party; repeal and replace the Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act, 1990; and provide for matters connected with, or incidental to, the foregoing.

The Environmental Management Act, 2011- 1st Part

An Act to continue the existence of the Environmental Council and re-name it as the Zambia Environmental Management Agency; provide for integrated environmental management and the protection and conservation of the environment and the sustainable management and use of natural resources; provide for the preparation of the State of the Environment Report, environmental management strategies and other plans for environmental management and sustainable development; provide for the conduct of strategic environmental assessments of proposed policies, plans and programmes likely to have an impact on environmental management; provide for the prevention and control of pollution and environmental degradation; provide for public participation in environmental decision-making and access to environmental information; establish the Environment Fund; provide for environmental audit and monitoring; facilitate the implementation of international environmental agreements and conventions to which Zambia is a party; repeal and replace the Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act, 1990; and provide for matters connected with, or incidental to, the foregoing.

The Traditional Beer (Repeal), Act 2011

An Act to repeal the Traditional Beer Act, 1930

Water Resources Management Act 2011

An Act to establish the Water Resources Management Authority and define its functions and powers; provide for the management, development, conservation, protection and preservation of the water resource and its ecosystems; provide for the equitable, reasonable and sustainable utilisation of the water resource; ensure the right to draw or take water for domestic and non-commercial purposes, and that the poor and vulnerable members of the society have an adequate and sustainable source of water free from any charges; create an enabling environment for adaptation to climate change; provide for the constitution, functions and composition of catchment councils, sub-catchment councils and water users associations; provide for international and regional cooperation in, and equitable and sustainable utilisation of, shared water resources; provide for the domestication and implementation of the basic principles and rules of international law relating to the environment and shared water resources as specified in the treaties, conventions and agreements to which Zambia is a State Party; repeal and replace the Water Act, 1949; and provide for matters connected with, or incidental to, the foregoing.

The Zambia Institute of Advanced Legal Education 2011

An Act to amend the Zambia Institute of Advanced Legal Education Act, 1996

The Urban and Regional Planners Act 2011

An Act to establish the Zambia Institute of Planners and provide for its functions; provide for the registration of planners and planning firms and regulate their professional conduct; and provide for matters connected with, or incidental to, the foregoing.

The Zambia Qualifications Authority Act 2011

An Act to provide for the development and implementation of a national qualifications framework; establish the Zambia Qualifications Authority; provide for the registration and
accreditation of qualifications; provide measures to ensure that standards and registered qualifications are internationally comparable; and provide for matters connected with, or incidental to, the foregoing.

The Supreme Court (Amendment), Act 2011

An Act to amend the Supreme Court Act

The English Law (Extent of Application)(Amendment)Act 2011

An Act to amend the English Law (Extent of Application) Act

The Anti-Gender – Based – Violence Act 2011

An Act to provide for the protection of victims of gender based violence; constitute the Anti-Gender-Based Violence Committee; establish the Anti-Gender-Based Violence Fund; and provide for matters connected with, or incidental to, the foregoing.

The Penal Code Act 2011

An Act to amend the Penal Code

The Juveniles Act-2011

An Act to amend the Juveniles Act

The Education Act, 2011

An Act to regulate the provision of accessible, equitable and qualitative education; provide for the establishment, regulation, organisation, governance, management and funding of educational institutions; provide for the establishment of education boards and for their functions; domesticate the Convention on the Rights of the Child in relation to education; repeal and replace the Education Act, 1966, and the African Education Act, 1951; and provide for matters connected with, or incidental to, the foregoing.

The Trades Licencing, Act 2011

An Act to repeal the Trades Licensing Act, 1968

The Tolls Act, 2011

An Act to establish and provide for the operation of toll roads; provide for the charging and collection of tolls; provide for private sector participation in the tolling of roads; repeal and replace the Tolls Act, 1983; and provide for matters connected with, or incidental to, the foregoing.

The High Court (Amendment) , Act 2011

An Act to amend the High Court Act

The Fisheries Act 2011

An Act to provide for the appointment of the Director of Fisheries and fisheries officers and provide for their powers and functions; promote the sustainable development of fisheries and a precautionary approach in fisheries management, conservation, utilisation and development; establish fisheries management areas and fisheries management committees; provide for the regulation of commercial fishing and aquaculture; establish the Fisheries and Aquaculture Development Fund; repeal and replace the Fisheries Act, 1974; and provide for matters connected with, or incidental to, the foregoing

Registration of Business Names, Act 2011

An Act to provide for the registration of business names; repeal and replace the Registration of Business Names Act, 1931; and provide for matters connected with, or incidental to, the foregoing.

1991 – 2001 – MMD and Frederick Chiluba

By the end of Chiluba’s first term as president (1996), the MMD’s commitment to political reform had faded in the face of re-election demands. A number of prominent supporters founded opposing parties. Relying on the MMD’s overwhelming majority in parliament, President Chiluba in May 1996 pushed through constitutional amendments that eliminated former President Kaunda and other prominent opposition leaders from the 1996 presidential elections.

In the presidential and parliamentary elections held in November 1996, Chiluba was re-elected, and the MMD won 131 of the 150 seats in the National Assembly. Kaunda’s UNIP party boycotted the parliamentary polls to protest the exclusion of its leader from the presidential race, alleging in addition that the outcome of the election had been predetermined due to a faulty voter registration exercise. Despite the UNIP boycott, the elections took place peacefully, and five presidential and more than 600 parliamentary candidates from 11 parties participated. Afterward, however, several opposition parties and non-governmental organizations declared the elections neither free nor fair. As President Chiluba began his second term in 1997, the opposition continued to reject the results of the election amid international efforts to encourage the MMD and the opposition to resolve their differences through dialogue.

Early in 2001, supporters of President Chiluba mounted a campaign to amend the constitution to enable Chiluba to seek a third term of office. Civil society, opposition parties, and many members of the ruling party complimented widespread popular opposition to exert sufficient pressure on Chiluba to force him to back away from any attempt at a third term. Presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections were held on December 27, 2001. Eleven parties contested the elections. The elections encountered numerous administrative problems. Opposition parties alleged that serious irregularities occurred. Nevertheless, MMD presidential candidate Levy Mwanawasa was declared the victor by a narrow margin, and he was sworn into office on January 2, 2002. Three parties submitted petitions to the High Court, challenging the presidential election results. The courts decided that there had been irregularities but that they were not serious enough to have affected the overall result, thus the election result was upheld. Opposition parties won a majority of parliamentary seats in the December, 2001 election, but subsequent by-elections gave the ruling MMD a slim majority in Parliament.

2001-2008 ELECTIONS

2001 election

In August 2000, the National Executive Committee of MMD elected Mwanawasa as its presidential candidate for the 2001 election. He won the election, held on 27 December 2001, with 29% due to Zambia’s first past the post system, beating 10 other candidates including two other former vice presidents (Godfrey Miyanda and Gen. Christon Tembo); Anderson Mazoka came in a close second with 27%, according to official results. Mwanawasa took office on 2 January 2002. However, the results of the elections were disputed by main opposition parties, including Mazoka’s United Party for National Development, which many observers claim had actually won the elections.[2] Both domestic and international election monitors cited serious irregularities with the campaign and election, including vote rigging, flawed voter registration, unequal and biased media coverage, and the MMD’s improper use of state resources. In January 2002, three opposition candidates petitioned the Supreme Court to overturn Mwanawasa’s victory. While the court agreed that the poll was flawed, it ruled in February 2005 that the irregularities did not affect the results and declined the petition.[3]

The 2006 presidential election was hotly contested. Mwanawasa ran for a second term in the presidential election held on 28 September 2006. His re-election was confirmed on 2 October; according to official results, he received 42.98% of the vote. Mwanawasa was re-elected by a clear margin over principle challengers Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front and Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development. The parliamentary election that same year awarded MMD with 72 seats, the remaining 84 seats split among other parties with the majority of those seats going to the Patriotic Front. He was sworn in for another term on 3 October [7] and a few days later, he named a new cabinet and appointed Rupiah Banda as Vice-President.[8]

The presidency of Levy Mwanawasa until his death in office in mid-2008 was different than the flamboyant expenditure and increasingly apparent corruption of the later years of Frederick Chiluba’s terms in office. Indeed, the former president was arrested and charged with several counts of embezzlement and corruption, firmly quashing initial fears that President Mwanawasa would turn a blind eye to the allegations of his predecessor’s improprieties. Mwanawasa was accused by some observers of demonstrating an authoritarian streak in early 2004 when his Minister of Home Affairs issued a deportation order to a British citizen and long-time Zambian resident Roy Clarke, who had published a series of satirical attacks on the President in the independent Post newspaper. However, when Clarke appealed to the High Court against the order, the judge ruled that the order was arbitrary and unjustified and quashed the order. President Mwanawasa, true to his mantra of heading a government of laws, respected the court decision and Clarke was allowed to resume his column of satirical critique. Mwanawasa’s early zeal to root out corruption also waned somewhat, with key witnesses in the Chiluba trial leaving the country. The Constitutional Review Commission set up by Mwanawasa also hit some turbulence, with arguments as to where its findings should be submitted leading to suspicions that he has been trying to manipulate the outcome. Generally, the Zambian electorate viewed Mwanawasa’s rule as a great improvement over Chiluba’s.

The 2008 presidential by-election

In August 2008, President Mwanawasa tragically died of a stroke and a presidential by-election was constitutionally required to establish his successor. Then Zambian vice president Rupiah Banda succeeded him to the office of president, to be held as a temporary position until the emergency election on October 30, 2008. In this election, Sata trailed the MMD candidate Rupiah Banda by only two percentage points, raising public suspicions of a last-minute “rig” by the powers that be. Banda won by a narrow margin over opposition leader Michael Sata, to complete the remainder of Mwanawasa’s term. Unrest was averted however by Sata going on radio and television to order his followers to abstain from violence.

2011 Elections

The Electoral Commission of Zambia

The ECZ conducted the 2011 Presidential, National Assembly and Local Government Elections on Tuesday 20th September 2011. The 2011 tripartite elections were the fifth general elections in Zambia after the reintroduction of the multiparty system in 1991. During the 2011 elections, the Commission acted independently and this was reflected in the Commission’s determination to remain neutral and proactive in its approach to dialogue and engagement with stakeholders throughout the entire process. Local monitors and International Observers commended the Commission for conducting the elections in a transparent manner. They found the elections to have been generally free and fair.

Several key factors contributed to the successful management of the elections. These include the independence of the Commission, the inclusion of various technological innovations such as the creation of a fully computerized biometric database of voters, , computerized results management system, nomination and accreditation process coupled with the deliberate establishment and maintenance of partnership with key stakeholders in the elections process like political parties, civil society, security forces and the media. Additionally the changes in the comprehensive strategies for communication, training and voter education simplified and enhanced the processes.

Legal Framework

The Electoral Commission of Zambia is an independent and autonomous Electoral Management Body (EMB) that is governed and regulated by the following pieces of legislation[1]:

i. The Constitution of Zambia, 1991;

ii. The Electoral Commission Act No.24 of 1996;

iii. The Electoral Act No.12 of 2006;

iv. The Local Government Elections Act, Cap 282 of the laws of Zambia;

v. The Local Government Elections (Amendment) Act, 1997; and

vi. Various statutory instruments made to regulate the electoral process, such as the Electoral (code of conduct) regulations, the Electoral (General) regulations and the Electoral (registration of Voters) regulations.

The Electoral Commission of Zambia is responsible for the delimitation of constituency, ward and polling district boundaries; (see Article 76 of the Constitution, Section 9 of the Local Government Elections Act and Section 37 of the Electoral Act, 2006 , respectively); the registration of eligible citizens as voters and the update and maintenance of a register of voters (Article 76 and Section 4 of the Electoral Act); the conduct and the supervision of the Zambia’s presidential, National Assembly(parliamentary) and Local Government elections (see Article 76 of the Constitution and Section 2 the Local Government Elections (Amendment) Act No 17, 1997). The Electoral Commission is also responsible to provide electoral information and voter education to members of the public and the electorate on the various phases/stages of the electoral process and elections, in particular. (See Section 77 of the electoral Act, 2006); It also has powers to facilitate the establishment of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for the management of electoral disputes (Section 111 of the Electoral Act, 2006); and powers to make regulations deemed pertinent to the electoral process (see Section 129 of the Electoral Act, 2006).

The Electoral Commission as established under Article 76 of the Constitution consists of a chairperson and four other members appointed by the President, subject to ratification by the National Assembly for a term not exceeding seven years (See section 4 of the Electoral Commission Act). The Act also provides the provisions for the removal of Commission members and all matters incidental to the internal operation of the Electoral Commission.

Conflict Management

One of the mandates of the Electoral Commission of Zambia (the Commission) is to manage electoral conflicts and resolve disputes. This mandate is set out in section 111 of the Electoral Act. In pursuance of this mandate the Commission has established Conflict Management Committees at national and district levels. These committees are composed of a Chairperson appointed by the Commission; a Vice Chairperson; One representative from each registered political party; representatives of civil society organizations and representatives of such Government ministries and institutions as determined by the Commission, such as the Zambia Police, Anti-Corruption Commission and the Drug Enforcement Commission; and the secretariat.

The Committees are mandated to manage and resolve electoral conflicts in a prudent and timely manner, with a view of achieving peaceful elections and mutual resolutions through mediation of conflicts that arise in the electoral process. This is done through the publication and enforcement of the Electoral Code of Conduct which regulates the conduct of the media, polling agents, political parties, monitors, observers and candidates during elections. Apart from receiving complaints from electoral stakeholders on alleged breaches of the Electoral Code of Conduct, the Committees also attend to complaints based on alleged bias by electoral officers appointed by the Commission. This is cardinal for the holding of free, fair and peaceful elections.

The National and District Conflict Management Committees have powers to:

i. Mediate electoral conflicts

ii. Advise the conflicting party in an election conflict

iii. Report the matter to the police for further action where a crime is committed during elections, for example, assault

iv. Recommend the revocation of accreditation of any monitor or observer to the Commission.

While the Committees have overriding powers and responsibilities to mediate electoral conflicts, they cannot make certain decisions which are reserved for the Commission and the Judiciary. The Committees hence;

i. Do not have judicial powers

ii. Do not have powers to disqualify the candidature of any person participating in the elections

iii. Cannot declare or announce the election results

iv. Cannot order the recount of votes in case of a dispute over election results

v. Cannot usurp the role of election officers during elections

vi. Cannot fine or imprison an offender.

Complaints to be resolved by the Committees should be in writing and addressed to the area Town Clerk/Council Secretary or to the Electoral Commission of Zambia. The Committee Chairperson shall inform the Committee members about the complaint received and a meeting shall be held within 24 hours of receipt of the complaint to assess whether the complaint should be handled by the Committee or referred to Law Enforcement Agencies. The Electoral Code of Conduct directs that Conflict Management Committees shall resolve or encourage amicable settlement of disputes within twenty four (24) hours from date of receipt of the complaint.

Elections

A general election was held in Zambia in September 2011[1] to elect a President and representatives to the National Assembly.[2] The 20 September 2011 elections in Zambia were the country’s 5th multi-party elections and despite some shortcomings represent further progress for the country in strengthening its democratic processes. Up to this point, and with some aspects of the process continuing, many of the benchmarks for democratic elections have been met, even though some shortcomings do remain to be addressed for the future.

The elections were highly competitive, in terms of the number of parties as well as the number of candidates. There were 10 presidential candidates and 769 candidates from 20 political parties for the National Assembly elections. The democratic principles of participation and representation as well as the basic freedoms of association, assembly and movement were largely met. However, there was a noted decrease in the number of women candidates for the National Assembly elections even though women account for more than 50 per cent of the electorate and the population.

It was a rare example in Africa of an opposition candidate’s cruising to victory and, perhaps more important, the incumbent’s graciously admitting defeat. Rupiah Banda, who was elected president in 2008, tearfully acknowledged that he had lost and called for his supporters to recognize Mr Sata as president, paving the way for a smooth transition of power. Zambia, a sparsely populated, copper-rich country in southern Africa, had been ruled by the same party for 20 years. A smooth transition of power is nothing to be taken for granted in this part of the world. Former Ivory Coast president Laurent Gbagbo’s refusal to acknowledge that he had been roundly defeated by opposition leader Alassane Ouattara plunged the country into months of suspense, turmoil and ultimately violence before he was finally captured. Kenya exploded in violence in 2007 after a deeply flawed election kept the president in power, and Robert Mugabe’s refusal to give up the reins in Zimbabwe in 2008 set off nationwide bloodshed. In Ethiopia in 2005, government forces gunned down hundreds of opposition supporters after a contested election.

2011 ELECTIONS REPORT

After competing for the second time against his old foe, Rupiah Banda, Michael Sata was finally able to defeat Zambia’s long-serving president at the polls to become the country’s newest president. Sata, founding member of the Patriotic Front (PF) garnered a majority 43.33% of the vote through promises of a better life, which appealed to the 60% of Zambians who live under $2 a day. Banda trailed with 36.23% of the vote. Sata was sworn in as Zambia’s fourth President on September 23, 2011, by the country’s Chief Justice Ernest Sakala.

Candidate (party)	No. of votes	% of votes
Michael Sata (PF)	1 150 045	43.33%
Rupiah Banda (MMD)	961 796	36.23%
Hakainde Hichilema (UPND)	489 944	18.46%
Charles Milupi (ADD)	13 382	0.5%
Elias Chipimo (NAREP)	10 190	0.38%
Tilyeni Kaunda (UNIP)	9 713	0.37%
Edith Nawaki (FDD)	6 627	0.25%
Ng’andu Magande (NMP)	6 097	0.23%
Godfrey Miyanda (HP)	4 358	0.16%
Frederick Mutesa (ZED)	2 191	0.08%

Women’s participation in the political process and the commitment to address the imbalances

Women’s participation in political life has significantly declined especially at parliamentary and local government levels as attested from the 2011 September elections. This is against a background of many interventions to reduce this gender imbalance. A trend analysis by the Ministry of Gender & Child Development indicates that from 1991 women representation in politics was on the increase from 4.8% to 10.6% in 1996, and further increased to 15.19% in 2006. In contrast, there was a sharp decline in 2011to 11.3%[1]. Similarly the Zambia National Women’s Lobby (ZNWL) Gender Analysis of the 2011 Zambian Tripartite Elections provides context to these statistics. In practical terms, the 2011 Elections saw the participation of only one female presidential candidate, Edith Nawakwi who received 0.3% of the total presidential votes and came out 7th out of the 10 presidential candidates. Similarly, at parliamentary level, only 17 women were elected out of the 150 parliamentary candidates elected. This represents 11% out of the total number of elected to the legislative body. The report further goes to state that none of the female candidates who stood as independents managed to get a seat. At local government level, only 85 women were elected out of the 1,382 councillors that emerged winners. This represents 6.1% of women representation and shows a decline from the 7% female councillors in 2006. The Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF) report also confirms that the 2011 elections failed to address the gender gap in terms of women’s participation in elections (NFD 2011). Cabinet level representation is also very low with only four[1] full cabinet members appointed by President Sata[1]. Out of 10 provincial ministers only one is female[1].

A lot needs to be done for Zambia to meet the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, which calls for State parties to ensure 50% of women and men in all decision-making positions. Neither the Constitution nor electoral legislation has affirmative action provisions like quotas to further the representation of women in public elected bodies or for appointed positions. There is a need for a broad policy shift that would help Zambia dismantle the cultural prejudices that disadvantage women in the process of selection of candidates at presidential, parliamentary and local government levels. There is need for gender sensitive legislation to be developed. Proportional representation as an electoral system would also improve women’s representation in elective bodies like Parliament and Councils as opposed to the first-past-the-post system, which is currently being used.

A 2005 study by Jotham Momba in Africa as well as another study by Muna Ndulo (2000) on political parties, posited that selection of candidates by political parties in certain instances such as selection of candidates at the lower, middle echelons of authority within the party do not follow party democratic procedures, and tend to disadvantage prospective female candidates. In addition, the pre-dominant patriarchal structures and perceptions are at the centre of disadvantaging the adoption of women as candidates within the political parties. There is need for political parties to encourage a high participation of women in National Executive Committees and recognize that women are equally capable of being in leadership positions and taking decisive actions.

Moreover, political parties have failed to address significant inequalities among men and women in their ranks. The absence of voluntary quotas in political party manifestos and constitutions[1] to guarantee the inclusion of women exposes a lack of political and affirmative action. Studies conducted on political parties in Zambia show that none of the political parties provide any quotas for women or youth candidates for parliamentary or local government elections.

To date, the PF government has made up for the poor representation of women in parliament through the appointment of more women in decision-making positions[1]. For instance, the current Inspector General of Police is female; many of the provincial police commanders are also female. Women are also heading the office of the Auditor General, Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC), Anti-Corruption Commission(ACC) and as part of initiating Judicial reforms, females have been appointed to hold the position of Acting Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice. There appears to be a deliberate policy to fill most strategic decision making positions with women.

Unfavourable political developments resulting in political intolerance and polarization

Post 2011 Elections, the country has experienced unprecedented high levels of political intolerance. The levels of antagonism amongst the political players, civil society organizations and sections of the media are evident. The intolerance has resulted much from perceived government manoeuvres to close up space for participation especially for opposition parties[1], civil society[1] and media[1].

Through this study, however, many reasons are given that have led to this development suffice to say that no one reason is presented leading to this or indeed weighted out as the most prominent. Some respondents suggest that despite the PF government ascending to office through a populist vote, the high tensed pre-election experiences that they faced at the hands of the former government still have effect on them after they took over the reins of power. For instance, some suggest that some sections of the current civil service still remains sympathetic to the MMD and have not accepted or adapted to the fact that a new government, and in particular that President Sata is at the Presidency of this nation. In contrast, some are of the view that the civil service continues to be ‘choked out’ by a continuous reminder to implement not only government programs but the current ruling party’s manifesto – which has also brought in some inherent resistance from technocrats.

There is also a wider view all parties, are still in an electioneering mode. The contestations that have characterised the PF with its former foe, the MMD, on one hand, and the tiffs that the PF had with its once political ally, in the defunct PACT, the UPND are still evident. Immediately after the elections it was easy for the two parties to quickly form the UPND-MMD alliance, of which one of the positions was to make the work of the new government difficult, especially in parliament. Others contend that the two major political parties did not, and have not accepted that there is a new government in place, and to this effect their strategies remain to detract any progress that the PF government intends to implement. To the contrary, there is also an argument that the PF, recognizing the weakness it has in running a government with a reduced number of parliamentarians, its thrust has been to exert its influence by appointing opposition MPs to the Executive, as will be further elabourated below.

The President of the Republic is mandated to appoint members of parliament, even from the opposition, to ministerial positions. President Sata has exercised such powers, and this has seen the appointment of deputies to his cabinet, from the opposition MMD, and most recently, UPND. This move, though legal, has caused a lot of anxiety, and some political parties have accused the president of wilfully appointing such members of parliament to destabilize and weaken the opposition. The MMD for instance, has in effect experienced a dwindling number of its opposition influence, including now the loss of two parliamentary seats arising from either expulsion or resignation from the party of its parliamentarians, while at the same time faces internal turbulence with some MPs who view their president, Dr. Nevers Mumba as an illegitimate leader through a High Court ruling[1] of January 28, 2013, which recognizes him as the bona fide leader of the party after the now expelled National Secretary had attempted to expel his own president.

Most recently, two UPND members of parliament have been appointed by the Head of State, and already, the opposition party has proceeded to expel one of its MP and the fate of the other is yet to be decided. While it is within the president’s powers, many commentators question the morality of the appointments and have called on the Head of State to exercise restraints. In similar vein, opposition parties whose members have been appointed to ministerial positions have been advised or indeed called upon not to expel their members as this is resulting into unnecessary and costly by-elections, draining national coffers at a time when people’s aspirations is for development.

The levels of political intolerance has also manifested in violent campaigns during all the by-elections so far held. The most notable was a local government election in Rufunsa, Mufumbwe, Mpongwe and Livingstone. In the case of Livingstone[1], the by-election which was scheduled for 28th February, 2013 had to be postponed following the killing of a political cadre and riots that ensued following arrests of the opposition leaders.

The violent nature of politics has a significant impact on how citizens will ultimately participate in the political process. The incremental trend of incidences of violence correlates well with the resulting low levels of participation. Most by-elections have had a paltry 28% turnout while many people shun political gatherings for fear of being caught up in skirmishes between and among parties.

At the time of conducting this study, various segments of society[1] have heightened calls for political dialogue amongst the political stakeholders, and are impressing on State House to provide leadership and take a bold step in addressing glaring scenarios that are denting the repute of Zambia as a democratic country.

Electoral system

Zambia’s presidential electoral system is decided by means of a first-past-the-post system, where an absolute majority is not required. The President is elected by direct popular vote for a five-year term.

Unrest

Although the election was considered free, fair and transparent by electoral observers, there were isolated incidents of unrest that resulted in the death of two people. The violent flare-ups occurred in some of Lusaka’s slums and some towns within the country’s Copper belt, which are traditional PF strongholds, owing to the slow pace of results being released. PF supporters protested over the postponement of results, which they interpreted as a ploy by the ruling Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) to rig the outcome of the vote. It was later revealed by electoral authorities that the postponement was due to their systems being hacked, which led to the delay in the release of provisional results. Despite the deaths, the Zambian police have been lauded for containing the situation and preventing any further loss of life or damage to property.

The King Cobra

Sata, who has dedicated most of his political career to toppling his counterpart, Banda, has coined the nickname King Cobra, owing to his sharp tongue and criticism of corruption in the Zambian government. He is regarded as a fierce critic of foreign mining firms, mostly from China[1], who benefit from the country’s copper industry. He is reportedly also a fierce critic of the labour conditions, which workers are subjected to in these mines. Despite this criticism, Sata toned down his anti-Chinese rhetoric during the elections race, so as not to scare off investors. Once sworn in, one of Sata’s first moves as President was to reassure investors that they were welcome to invest in the country’s copper sector, but only if they obeyed the law, specifically by employing more Zambian workers. He pointed out that Chinese investment was welcome, but it would not receive preferential treatment, even though Chinese companies had ploughed more than $2-billion into the developing mining sector. Sata did not go into the foreign labour issue; however, Zambian workers are disgruntled over the fact that Chinese building projects predominantly employ Chinese labourers.

Future challenges

After 20 years in power, the ruling MMD was unable to convince the Zambian electorate to give its leader another term. The growing poverty levels and the need for change tilted the political power in favour of Sata. In the electoral race, Sata provided promises for a better life to all Zambians, which resonated with the country’s poor and working class[143].

The promises of creating jobs, improving education and stopping foreign exploitation essentially convinced the voting majority that Sata should be President. The real challenge for the new President lies in translating these promises into real change for the Zambian people, something he says will occur in 90 days. This will involve balancing his political ambitions with economic realities.

BY-ELECTIONS GALORE IN ZAMBIA: PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY UNDER THREAT

Complaints about the number and cost of parliamentary by-elections held since the Patriotic Front (PF) came into power continue unabated in 2013, along with controversy about the viability and future of Zambia’s multiparty democracy[144]. In total, 31 by-elections have been called since the PF won elections in September 2011. Eleven of the 31 were as a result of defections to the ruling party, three due to the death of sitting members of parliament (MPs), and seven because of court nullifications petitioned by losing PF candidates. In July there were eight vacant parliamentary seats awaiting by-elections, all due to court nullifications and the defection of sitting MPs from the main opposition Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) to the ruling PF. Another two seats awaited court determination following the expulsion of MPs from the United Party for National Development (UPND) for accepting ministerial positions in the PF government. The overall result is a fundamental alteration in the political power configuration of Zambia’s 158-member parliament formed after general elections in 2011.

Importantly, the 2011 elections produced a hung parliament, with the parliamentary configuration tilting in favour of the opposition. The PF won 60 seats, the opposition MMD 55 seats, the UPND 28 seats; independent candidates’ three seats; and the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) and the Alliance for Democracy and Development (ADD) one seat each. The total number of opposition parliamentarians came to 88. However, soon after the elections, some MMD parliamentarians resigned to join the ruling PF. As of June 2013, PF numbers have swelled to 69 thanks to defections from the MMD, whose numbers have dropped to 40. The numbers of the other opposition parties remain largely unchanged, with only the independents dropping to two. In the current parliamentary configuration, ruling party MPs far outnumber those of each of the opposition parties. President Michael Sata and his PF need only two seats to secure an absolute majority in parliament and 29 to reach a two-thirds majority.

While by-elections are in accordance with Zambia’s electoral laws, there are anxieties that the PF is in the process of engineering a de facto one-party state. Zambia was a de facto one-party state until 2001, when the combined opposition parties garnered more MPs than the then ruling MMD. This scenario was short-lived as MPs from UPND, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the Heritage Party were ‘bought’ with ministerial positions and other government appointments. An interesting development at the time was that the ruling party experienced problems in electing the Speaker of the National Assembly because it had fewer MPs than the opposition. However, two opposition MPs were subsequently ‘bought’ to vote with the ruling party to produce the Speaker.

The stand-off between government and the opposition in passing bills and other government-sponsored motions led to underhanded methods aimed at weakening the opposition by targeting ‘weakling’ MPs. At the time of the 2006 elections, the number of opposition MPs had significantly dwindled. However, like the 2011 elections, the 2006 elections produced a majority opposition with the PF’s 49 members serving as the largest opposition party in the House. Although the PF tried to maintain cohesion in its rank and file, the party crumbled in 2007 when late President Levy Mwanawasa appointed the National Constitutional Conference (NCC) and 22 of its MPs defied the party by participating in the process. The party later expelled these MPs, but they held on to their seats until the 2011 elections because of a court injunction. The expelled 22 shifted their loyalty to the ruling MMD, which created a de facto one-party parliament.

Although attributing the by-elections and defections exclusively to the PF would be inaccurate, the PF does have a notorious ‘three-pronged’ approach to reducing the number of opposition MPs. The first is inciting ‘weaklings’ to resign from their parties with automatic membership in the PF and employment in the diplomatic service. The second is the lure of appointments to deputy ministerial positions – 15 opposition MPs have thus far defected to the PF in this way. The third strategy is court nullification of constituency seats. The PF has petitioned 50 seats since the last election and have won over five. This strategy has been made possible by weaknesses in the country’s political party system and a PF-created reality that the political wilderness is best averted by joining the PF.

Another caveat in the PF pursuit of a parliamentary majority is the on-going constitution-making process. Repeated delays in releasing the final revised document to the Presidency and the public have raised speculation that the PF is seeking a two-thirds majority in parliament to eventually enable it to reject aspects of the draft. These include contentious provisions around the 50%-plus-one majority vote for presidential candidates to be declared the outright winner; the appointment of ministers outside parliament; and the presidential age limit of 75, among others. The above is supported by an emerging trend in parliament where the Executive no longer presents bills that ordinarily would be debated, but issues statutory instruments instead.

The forgoing dynamics have arguably established the PF’s ‘track record’ in inducing defections, and this will progressively become harder to alter. Factional politics and single-party-dominant political systems are known to lead to the downfall of parliamentary democracy and even the temporary suspension of democratic institutions through the imposition of presidential rule, for example. If events since the last elections are any indication, the opposition will be left with a paper-thin majority in parliament by the end of the year.

Three general consequences can be expected to flow from the above patterns. The first is financial. One by-election costs approximately KR5 million or US$1,4 million. The budget for by-elections is exhausted and with many still to be conducted, questions about the PF’s governance style and budget management in particular have increased. Government’s unilateral move to remove subsidies for fuel and agricultural goods in May 2013 has been widely interpreted as an attempt to raise funds for the unremitting by-elections. The money could have been used to protect the 68% of the country’s population living below the poverty line against the impact of rising food and fuel prices.

Second, the issue of limited opposition space in parliament will be reinforced by the existing constrained space for their activities outside parliament. For instance, the provisions of the Public Order Act have often been used by the PF to prevent the opposition from holding public rallies or visiting their constituencies, even in the markets. This will significantly dampen opposition parties’ ability to mobilise.

Third, and with the above in mind, civil society will increasingly be required to reclaim its space in the governance of the country and act in the capacity of the opposition. Cowardice and quiet diplomacy have characterised civil society and the church since the PF assumed power, and an awakening is urgently needed. While a ban on MPs defecting is very unlikely under the PF rule, it is clear that without any immediate interventions, Zambia’s democratic deficit will continue to grow.

Independent since 1964, Zambia has experienced five successful multiparty elections since 1991. The peaceful general election held in September 2011 further strengthened the country’s democratic credentials and underscored the country’s enormous economic potential grounded in its rich endowment of natural resources that include abundant land and water. The country has defined its own development agenda through its Vision 2030 and the Sixth National Development Plan (FNDP). The Plan is organized around the theme of “broad based wealth and job creation through citizenry participation and technological advancement.” Specific development goals include fostering a competitive and outward-oriented economy, significantly reducing hunger and poverty, and reaching middle income status. The first step came in July 2011 when Zambia was classified a lower middle income country by the World Bank.

Zambia has had a decade of rapid economic growth. A combination of prudent macroeconomic management, market liberalization and privatization efforts, investments in the copper industry and related infrastructure, and steep increase in copper prices helped achieve an average annual growth of about 5.7% during the last decade. Foreign direct investment rose from approximately US$164.9 million in 2003 to US$1.73 billion in 2010 with most investments going to mining, manufacturing wholesale and retail trade. The Zambian government consolidated macroeconomic stability under International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs (latest concluded in 2011) and successfully navigated the shocks connected with the 2008 global economic and financial crises. Annual inflation declined from about 30% in 2000 to 7.2% in 2011. Debt relief improved Zambia’s external position and helped build foreign-exchange reserves to a comfortable level.

However, Zambia’s economic growth has not translated into significant poverty reduction. Sixty percent of the population lives below the poverty line and 42% are considered to be in extreme poverty. Moreover, the absolute number of poor has increased from about six million in 1991 to 7.9 million in 2010, primarily due to population growth. The urban picture is far better than the rural: in the Copper belt and Lusaka provinces, for example, poverty incidence is fairly low (22% and 34% respectively), whereas in the rest of the country, which is dominated by agriculture, poverty rates are greater than 70%. Almost 90% of Zambians who live below the extreme poverty line are concentrated in rural areas, and the poverty gap ratio (a measure of how far average incomes fall below the poverty line) is far higher for the rural population than their urban counterparts (20% and 3.7%, respectively). Accelerating growth and reducing poverty will necessitate increasing the competitiveness of the Zambian economy by reducing the cost of doing business and ensuring that the rural economy, upon which much of the population depends for its livelihood, contributes meaningfully to overall growth. Despite vast potential and stated commitments to diversification, the mining sector continues to dominate the economy.

DEFECTIONS/FLOOR CROSSING-PRESIDENT SATA’S PREDATORY POLITICS

Zambia’s ruling Patriotic Front (PF) party came to power in 2011 with 60 members of parliament, just five more than the losing Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) – and well short of an overall majority in the 150 seat National Assembly[145]. Since then, President Michael Sata has sought to fashion the parliamentary majority his party did not secure in the general election by engineering a host of by-elections, which his party – enjoying all the benefits of incumbency – is most likely to win.

The first part of the campaign involved the PF petitioning the results of the 2011 polls in 50 constituencies where it narrowly lost, claiming fraud and vote buying by the ruling MMD. These cases are still being contested in the courts, but it is likely that some of the results will be nullified and by-elections ordered – and when that happens, the PF will be ready. Indeed, it has already won 5 of the 6 by-elections that have been held following defections from the opposition benches to the PF. These defections and ensuing by-elections are the second part of the PF’s seize-complete-control-of-parliament strategy. Working with his closest advisor and Minister of Justice, Wynter Kabimba – who, ironically, has twice failed to win a parliamentary seat – Sata has engaged in deliberately predatory politics – luring 13 opposition MPs to join his government by giving them deputy ministerial positions.

These defections have crippled the opposition and forced a series of by-elections that have seen the PF increase its representation to 71, including the 8 MPs that the president is constitutionally entitled to nominate. And with four more by-elections pending, the PF seems set to move closer towards its ultimate goal – 100 seats and a two-thirds majority in parliament. Complete control of parliament is important for Sata because he clearly wants to preside over a de facto one party state with nominal opposition and a complaint media. This will allow him to dilute or stall the current constitution, which calls for a reduction in the powers of the executive, and provides more autonomy for the judiciary and media. There is also the contentious ‘50-plus-one’ clause, which the PF would like removed – as it is unlikely to amass sufficient votes at the next election in 2016 given that its support is largely confined to three of Zambia’s nine provinces. A united opposition could win the presidential poll.

Needless to say Sata has been encouraged by the number of PF ‘victories’ and its increasing control of the legislature. And the PF has already used its growing strength to ride roughshod over parliament in appointing Mutembo Nchito, a Sata ally, as Director of Public Prosecution, despite overwhelming evidence of his unsuitability for the post. Even more controversially, the PF also succeeded – narrowly – in stripping former President Rupiah Banda of his immunity, despite much spirited opposition in the house. However, the tricks that Sata and the PF are using are not new. After Levy Mwanawasa won the presidency in the contested 2001 elections, he faced the threat of an opposition-dominated parliament – so he introduced the concept of co-opting members of the opposition into his government. As an opposition leader at the time, Sata railed against this manipulation of the system.

But there is nothing illegal about the practice. The Zambian constitution allows a president to appoint an MP to a position in government irrespective of the political party the MP belongs to. In addition, MPs are allowed to cross the floor. But what has infuriated many Zambians is that there has never been so much floor-crossing before, nor so many by-elections – most of which have been orchestrated by Sata.

The situation has been condemned by – among many others – the Zambia Episcopal Conference and the Evangelic Fellowship of Zambia, which issued a strongly worded pastoral letter recently saying that they seriously questioned the ‘justification’ and ‘authenticity’ of the many parliamentary by-elections and wondered why the government was ready to waste ‘colossal’ sums of money on the election campaigns when the country’s hospitals were facing a critical shortage of medical staff and equipment due to inadequate funding. The Catholic NGO, Caritas, added its voice to the criticism, claiming that it was ‘irresponsible’ for the PF government to continue diverting money that was meant for development to organise by-elections while the majority of Zambians were going hungry.

And many people are definitely struggling. The government has removed subsidies on fuel and other essential commodities, which have led to a huge rise in the cost of food. There have also been over 1,000 job losses in the mining industry in recent months. As opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema says, the PF should be focusing on these issues and not on ‘unwarranted by-elections’.

But Sata has deflected these criticisms, saying his government was committed to the concept of an ‘all-inclusive governance approach’ – meaning he will work with whomever he chooses – and describing all the complaints about the by-elections as ‘trivial’. He argues that it is not his fault that people want to defect and that it is a politician’s constitutional right to belong to a political party of his or her choice. Sports minister and PF spokesperson, Chishimba Kambwili, has also weighed in – claiming that resources have not been diverted because the by-elections were budgeted for. But this is hard to believe given that the Election Commission of Zambia was only allocated K4 million to conduct by-elections – since it was assumed that only one or two would be necessary and those they would take place following the death of an incumbent. With 6 by-elections already held and four more (at least) on the cards, it seems certain that money must have been diverted from other spheres of government. In addition, government officials, including the president, vice-president and ministers, routinely use state resources during the campaigns – increasing the cost to the public purse.

While most of the criticism has been directed at the president and the PF, defecting MPs have not been spared from attack. Most of those who have crossed the floor are new MPs, who have been easily persuaded by the ‘carrot’ of a deputy ministerial post – and by the fact that they do will no longer have to contribute part of their salary to their party. However, these are neither Cabinet positions nor all that influential. Indeed, Sata has appointed as many as three deputy ministers in some ministries – to accommodate the defectors. In his election campaign, Sata had actually promised the opposite – vowing to run a leaner government. It is just one of the many campaign pledges that he has failed to fulfil. Or indeed performed a complete U-turn. There are calls now to make amendments to the constitution in order to regulate by-elections and minimise the incentives for crossing over. But as long as the PF is in power and benefiting from the right to defect, it is highly unlikely that the new constitution will incorporate any such clauses. Instead, the PF will continue to target extra seats in parliament and Zambia will continue to sink towards another de facto one party state.

European Union Election Observation Mission Report

The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) was present in Zambia between 12 August and 8 October 2011 following an invitation from the President of the Republic of Zambia. The EU EOM was led by Ms. Maria Muñiz de Urquiza, Member of the European Parliament (MEP). It was also joined by a delegation from the European Parliament headed by David Martin, MEP. The mission deployed 120 observers from 27 European Union member states, Canada and Norway across the country to assess the electoral process against international and regional obligations and commitments related to holding genuine and periodic elections as well as the laws of Zambia. The EU EOM is independent in its findings and conclusions and adheres to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation commemorated at the United Nations in October 2005. On Election Day, observers visited 540 polling streams in 77 of the 150 constituencies throughout Zambia to observe voting and counting.

The elections held on 20 September 2011 for presidential office, parliamentary seats in 150 constituencies and local government were the fifth general elections in Zambia following the reintroduction of a multiparty system in 1991. The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) was present in Zambia between 12 August and 8 October 2011 following an invitation from the President of the Republic of Zambia. The EU EOM was led by Ms. Maria Muñiz de Urquiza, Member of the European Parliament (MEP). It was also joined by a delegation from the European Parliament headed by David Martin, MEP. The mission deployed 120 observers from 27 European Union member states, Canada and Norway across the country to assess the electoral process against international and regional obligations and commitments related to holding genuine and periodic elections as well as the laws of Zambia. The EU EOM is independent in its findings and conclusions and adheres to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation commemorated at the United Nations in October 2005.

These presidential and parliamentary elections were organized in a transparent and credible manner. Regional principles and international commitments to hold periodic and genuine elections have been mostly respected, but reform of key aspects of the electoral framework is required for future elections. Election day was generally calm and well managed. The election campaign has taken place in a highly competitive environment with key freedoms including those of assembly, expression and speech respected throughout the country during the campaign period. However, unequal access to resources has meant there has not been a level playing field for candidates or political parties to campaign. Despite this the change of president and government resulting from these elections represents an opportunity to further advance civil and political rights and strengthen the foundations of multiparty democracy.

The legal framework governing the presidential and parliamentary elections in Zambia provides an adequate basis for the holding of genuine elections in accordance with international and regional commitments and obligations adopted by Zambia. The constitution guarantees, and the courts are open to protect, fundamental rights and freedoms including the freedoms of assembly, association, conscience, expression and movement. Other fundamental rights related to genuine and periodic elections are protected including the right to be elected to public office by secret ballot and the right to vote according to the principles of equality and universal suffrage.

The Electoral Commission has acted with impartiality organizing these elections in a transparent and professional manner in accordance with its mandate. It has demonstrated competence in planning for key stages of the electoral process and this has been reflected in its delivery and organizational preparations. Although there were some glitches in the delivery of material on Election Day, nationwide the process went well. The lack of permanent and decentralized structures at provincial or district level did however limit the Electoral Commission’s capacity to directly manage events. Reliance on seconded administrative structures, both fuelled mistrust questioning the Electoral Commission’s independence, as well as reduced its ability to control all aspects of the process.

Large discrepancies between the sizes of constituencies are inconsistent with the constitution and with the principle of equality in representation. The population census of 2010 indicates that some urban constituencies have more than 15 times the population of sparsely populated rural ones. For example Zambezi West constituency in North Western province has a population of 21,896 while Kanyama constituency in Lusaka has 366,170.

There are no openly discriminatory or unreasonable criteria to register as a voter. In advance of these elections the Electoral Commission conducted an update of the 2005 voter register. The final register was certified on 31 July 2011 and has 5,167,174 registrants (50.1 per cent women and 49.9 per cent men), or 85 per cent, of the eligible population. The number of first time voters is significant, up to 24.5 per cent of all registered voters. The majority of registered voters (53.8 per cent) are between 18 and 35 years old. The mobile voter registration exercise was well prepared and managed although there were some early delays regarding the issuance of national identity cards and a lack of timely public information available on the registration process itself. There remain anomalies in the register including details of a significant number of deceased persons and errors that have been generated by clerical mistakes.

Criteria for qualification as a candidate for the presidential and parliamentary elections set out in the constitution and Electoral Act are generally in line with Zambia’s international commitments except in respect of the presidential election and the requirements of Zambian parentage and an absence of provisions for independent candidates to stand in these elections. A total of 10 individuals registered their presidential candidacies with the Chief Justice who acts as the returning officer for the presidential election, providing real choice for voters to elect the president. The parliamentary election was equally competitive with a total of 768 candidates registering from 20 parties across the 150 parliamentary constituencies.

Candidates and political parties enjoyed the rights of freedom of assembly, expression and movement during the campaign period with candidates and parties at liberty to move around the country without any major restrictions on their activities. Although the election campaign environment was highly competitive, unequal access to funding was clearly evident and there was not a level playing field. The president and officials attending inaugurations of large-scale public works, roads or hospitals, widely reported in the mass media, blurred the boundaries between official functions of the presidential office and campaigning. The use of state resources for campaign purposes has also at times been overt in support of the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD).

Freedom of expression in the media was respected during the campaign period. However, a highly polarised media environment led to highly selective campaign coverage. The state- owned television and radio stations failed to meet even their minimal obligations as public broadcasters and did not provide balance in key programmes such as news coverage that was dominated by the MMD. Newspapers’ content demonstrated similar trends with entrenched editorial lines and highly selective news coverage. In contrast, the commercial television and radio stations provided balanced and impartial coverage of the campaign.

Barriers within the political parties, lack of access to resources and opportunities, and an absence of positive measures to encourage the participation of women in public life were reflected in the low percentage of women candidates in these elections. There was one female candidate running for presidential election. A total of 111 (14 per cent) of the 768 candidates standing for the 150 parliamentary seats were women. Reflecting these low ratios only 17 women won parliamentary seats, or 11.5 per cent of the 148 seats that were contested, well below regional and international targets.

Civil society organizations played an important role in providing increased transparency during Election Day and then during counting and aggregation processes. The Civil Society Election Coalition 2011 deployed over 9,000 monitors to all the 6,456 polling stations to observe the polling and results management process. There are clear channels for complaints and appeals related to electoral matters. The conflict management committees have been very active in places where the electoral contests were particularly hard fought, and they served a valuable role in resolving matters such as disputes about posters, insults traded between candidates, and threats of violence. There has been a considerable number of electoral related cases in the High Court during the campaign period.

Counting of ballots was undertaken at polling stations. It was conducted in a transparent manner, albeit slowly, in the spirit, if not according to the exact rules, laid out by procedures in the polling stations observed. It went on across the country throughout most of the night. Aggregation of results was undertaken immediately following counting and the arrival of polling data at constituency level aggregation centres. The quality of this part of the process deteriorated considerably compared to voting day ones.

On the announcement of the final results there was general acceptance of the integrity of key parts of the election process. A comprehensive set of detailed recommendations is included at the end of this report for consideration by the relevant authorities in order to further improve certain areas in the election process. Central recommendations include:

i. Reducing the reliance of the Electoral Commission on seconded administrative structures to prepare for elections by introducing more permanent structures at either provincial or district levels. Furthermore, an independent review process should be introduced for appointments in the Electoral Commission based on best practice models for public appointment processes.

ii. The introduction of statutory provisions establishing clear rules for regulating campaign finance as well as political party registration. These should introduce greater public transparency measures in the financing and expenditure of political parties. Appropriate regulatory oversight should be introduced to ensure a separation between the resources attached to public office and campaign activities as well as to provide accountability in campaign finance.

iii. An adequate and proportionate and tiered regulatory framework for the media sector to ensure independent and appropriate regulatory mechanisms that operate in the public interest are in place.

iv. A more active and fully representative position for women in parliament, public positions and political parties should be encouraged through affirmative policymaking action including the introduction of quotas where necessary. This should include improving access to high level positions in the cabinet, parliament, civil service and political parties.

v. Continued improvements in developing a reliable results system to guarantee the integrity and reliability in the collection, aggregation and publication of results. Procedures should be reviewed and suitable measures put in place to ensure the accuracy and security of results as they are collected from polling stations.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

POLITICAL CONTEXT

The elections held on 20 September 2011 for presidential office, parliamentary seats in 150 constituencies and local government were the fifth general elections in Zambia following the reintroduction of a multiparty system in 1991. The incumbent party, the Movement for Multi- party Democracy (MMD), have dominated politics in Zambia since the 1990s. These elections were competitive with 10 candidates contesting for presidential office and a total of 768 candidates competing for 150 parliamentary seats in the National Assembly. Parliamentary elections in two constituencies were postponed following the deaths of candidates. In respect of the presidential election the leading candidates included the incumbent president, Rupiah Banda of the MMD and Michael Sata, of the Patriotic Front (PF). Another significant challenge to the incumbent came from Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND). Michael Sata has contested presidential elections in 2001, 2006 and 2008 and Hakainde Hichilema in 2006 and 2008.

All three leading presidential candidates’ parties fielded parliamentary candidates across the country and a total of 20 parties’ candidates contested seats in parliamentary constituencies. Whilst the MMD represented the single largest party in the outgoing parliament there had been gradual erosion and a loss of its parliamentary majority as opposition parties increased their seats in by-elections in the period since the 2006 parliamentary elections. In October 2010 the PF and UPND forged a coalition alliance to contest these elections, but this dissolved in the run up to the campaign due to disagreements between the two parties.

Key Political Actors

i. The incumbent party in government, MMD has won all presidential elections and has held a majority of seats in the National Assembly for the past 20 years. This party is ideologically committed to liberal economic policies and human development. Whilst the dominant party in Zambian politics for two decades it has suffered a series of setbacks following internal disputes and a number of prominent MMD members defected to the PF ahead of the 2011 general elections. MMD’s heartlands are considered to be the Eastern, North Western and Central provinces. President Mwanawasa appointed Rupiah Banda as his vice-president following his re-election in 2006. On the death of President Mwanawasa half way through his presidential term, Rupiah Banda was elected president in a mid-term election.

ii. Since 2006 the largest opposition party has been PF which has managed to increase its number of seats in parliament significantly. It was formed by its presidential candidate, Michael Sata, as a breakaway party of MMD ahead of the 2001 elections. PF’s strongholds are Lusaka and Copper belt as well as urban constituencies in Northern and Luapula provinces. It has strong support within the Bemba speaking parts of the population. In 2006 and 2008 presidential elections Michael Sata was runner up to the MMD candidates. According to its constitution PF is a socialist party.

iii. The final significant political party that competed in these elections is UPND which is a liberal party founded in 1998, again as is the case of the PF, as a splinter group from MMD. It performed very strongly in the 2001 elections, but its popularity has dropped since this highpoint. In 2006, Hakainde Hichilema was a presidential candidate of the United Democratic Alliance (UDA), an alliance of opposition political parties formed by UPND. Hakainde Hichilema is from Southern province and belongs to the Tonga ethnic group. UPND has a regional character and has a strong base of supporters predominantly in the Southern and Western provinces.

LEGAL ISSUES

Legal Framework

The legal framework governing the presidential and parliamentary elections in Zambia provides an adequate basis for the holding of genuine elections in accordance with international and regional commitments and obligations adopted by Zambia. The constitution guarantees, and the courts are open to protect, fundamental rights and freedoms including the freedoms of assembly, association, conscience, expression and movement. Other fundamental rights related to genuine and periodic elections are protected including the right to be elected to public office by secret ballot and the right to vote according to the principles of equality and universal suffrage.

Universal and Regional Obligations and Commitments

Zambia has signed the relevant international agreements on the protection of human rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (CPRW). As a member of the African Union and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Zambia also has ratified the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) with its Protocol on the Rights of Women (ACHPR-PW), African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa as well as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance that was adopted in 2007 but yet to enter into force. Zambia also has commitments outlined in the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections and the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development. These international and regional instruments are not directly enforceable in the courts of Zambia unless incorporated into national law by statute of the National Assembly.

Election Legislation

Presidential and parliamentary elections were governed by the same laws which applied for the 2006 and 2008 elections that includes the Constitution of Zambia as amended in 1996, the Electoral Commission Act 1996, the Electoral Act 2006, the Electoral (General) Regulations 2006 (with minor 2011 amendments), and the Electoral (Presidential Election) Regulations 1991. The Code of Conduct which contains important rules relating to the campaign and dispute resolution process was reissued in 2011, with amendments including the introduction of new electoral offences. Many criminal offences applicable to the campaign are contained in the Penal Code Act.

The Electoral System

The 1996 constitution establishes that Zambia is a unitary, indivisible, multiparty and democratic sovereign state. All powers reside in the people who shall exercise their sovereignty through the democratic institutions of the state in accordance with the law. Executive power rests with the president who is elected for a maximum of two consecutive five year terms as the head of state, head of government, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Legislative powers are vested in the National Assembly. Both the president and parliamentary members are elected using a first past the post electoral system. The president is elected in a single national constituency and the National Assembly is composed of single member seats in 150 constituencies across the country and the president also has the powers to appoint a further eight members. The president appoints the vice president, ministers, deputy ministers and provincial ministers from members of the National Assembly.

Delineation of Constituency Boundaries

Responsibility for establishing and reviewing the constituency boundaries for parliamentary seats rests with the Electoral Commission. There must be at least 10 constituencies in each of the nine provinces. Under Article 77 (4) of the constitution the population of the constituencies must be as nearly equal to one another as is reasonably practicable. However, variation is allowed to take into account means of communication, geographical features and density of population. The last review of the boundaries was prior to the 1991 elections. In October 2010 the Electoral Commission initiated a programme for the review of these to bring them in line with the planned changes that would have been introduced had the draft constitution been adopted. As the draft constitution failed to win parliamentary approval the plans to review the boundaries were also put on hold and the 2011 elections went ahead with the existing constituency boundaries in place. In August 2011 the Electoral Commission introduced minor changes to five constituencies in Northern and North Western provinces as a result of the creation of two new administrative districts.

There are large discrepancies between the size of constituencies, even considering geographical, communications and population density factors. The population census of 2010 indicates that some urban constituencies have more than 15 times the population of sparsely populated rural ones. For example Zambezi West constituency in North Western province has a population of 21,896 while Kanyama constituency in Lusaka has 366,170. The present boundary demarcations and constituencies are as a result inconsistent with the constitution and with the principle of equality in representation.

ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

Structure and Composition of the Election Administration

In accordance with Article 76 (1) and (2) of the Constitution of Zambia and the Electoral Commission Act of 1996 the Electoral Commission of Zambia is established as an autonomous body with the mandate to organize and conduct presidential, National Assembly and local elections as well as referenda. To this end it is responsible for the supervision and maintenance of the voter register, reviewing the boundaries of the electoral constituencies and polling districts, voter education and undertaking all technical preparations for holding elections. It is composed of a chairperson and four commissioners who are directly appointed by the president, subject to parliamentary vetting and approval. The Commission appoints a Director, three Deputy Directors and a Commission Secretary to manage the directorate of the Electoral Commission and its role is to support the Commissioners in their work and implement their policies and decisions. The Electoral Commission has powers to make regulations pertinent to the electoral process.

Designed as a centralized body the Electoral Commission does not have a permanent presence either at provincial or district level. For the purpose of organizing elections, provincial local government officers and town clerks or district council secretaries are temporarily appointed as provincial electoral officers and district electoral officers responsible for the coordination and preparation of elections in each province and district. The Electoral Commission appointed 150 returning officers and 300 assistant returning officers to oversee candidate nominations for the parliamentary election as well as aggregation and results processes. They are also responsible for announcing the final results of the parliamentary and presidential elections in their respective constituency. A total of 6,456 polling districts/stations divided into 9,022 polling streams were established for Election Day and some 54,050 presiding officers and polling assistants were recruited and trained to deliver the elections at this level.

The Administration of the Elections

The Electoral Commission has acted with impartiality organizing these elections in a transparent and professional manner in accordance with its mandate. It has demonstrated competence in planning for key stages of the electoral process and this has been reflected in its delivery and organizational preparations. A well designed electoral calendar ensured that logistic and technical deployment of material to district centres was carried out in advance of Election Day without major incident. Although there were some glitches in the delivery of material on election day, nationwide the process went well. The lack of permanent and decentralized structures at provincial or district level did however limit the Electoral Commission’s capacity to directly manage events. Reliance on seconded administrative structures, both fuelled mistrust questioning the Electoral Commission’s independence, as well as reduced its ability to control all aspects of the process.

With a background of disputes relating to the independence of the Electoral Commission and appointments for the Electoral Commissioners there was already an element of mistrust in the electoral process of key stakeholders prior to these elections. This continued throughout the organisation of these elections. Claims from opposition parties of bias in the electoral administration and allegations in the media at times questioning the integrity of the whole electoral process all created a climate of suspicion. In an attempt to reduce this the Electoral Commission introduced key confidence building measures such as stakeholder meetings and an open media and public relations policy that promoted a more inclusive environment for the administration of elections. These measures, however, did not reach all parts of the country and there was a lack of confidence amongst stakeholders in remote areas which were not fully included by these initiatives. The Electoral Commission also failed to adequately deal with speculation in newspapers regarding allegations of impropriety in the tendering process for ballot papers related to past elections that further promoted mistrust.

Selection committees headed by the district electoral officers for the recruitment of polling staff, the general instructions and the detailed criteria for their recruitment as well as tailored training solutions have also enhanced the electoral process. The merit based recruitment process was impartial and throughout the country the Electoral Commission’s supervisory and polling staff acted professionally. They acted with transparency and prepared for and conducted the elections in a competent manner. Furthermore, by decentralizing the accreditation process for domestic monitors, party agents and media improved arrangements were put in place for enhanced access for stakeholders, despite some inconsistencies in respect to implementation at district level.

VOTER REGISTRATION

The Right to Vote

There are no openly discriminatory or unreasonable criteria to register as a voter. To vote a person must be a Zambian citizen, at least 18 years old and in possession of both a national registration card and a voter card, and have their details included in the voter register. There are categories of disqualified persons that includes those of unsound mind, people detained under the Criminal Procedure Code or any other law in force in Zambia, those under a sentence of death or imprisonment or persons convicted of corrupt or illegal practices under the Electoral Act within the past five years, and those found guilty of such practices on an electoral petition within five years. These disqualifications are broadly in line with international standards. The major exception to this is the exclusion of persons held in custody who have not been convicted of an offence.

Voter Registration Procedures

In advance of these elections the Electoral Commission conducted an update of the 2005 voter register with a particular emphasis on increasing the number of new registrants, updating the information of those already registered and cleansing the database of any anomalies including entries of deceased persons. To these ends a new mobile system of voter registration was introduced that employed digital registration kits with a capability of capturing thumbprints for biometric and facial portrait data storage. The mobile voter registration update was conducted in three phases from June 2010 until March 2011 (183 days in total). The final register was certified on 31 July 2011 and has 5,167,174 registrants (50.1 per cent women and 49.9 per cent men), or 85 per cent, of the eligible population. The number of first time voters is significant, up to 24.5 per cent of all registered voters. The majority of registered voters (53.8 per cent) are between 18 and 35 years old. The mobile voter registration exercise was well prepared and managed although there were some early delays regarding the issuance of national identity cards and a lack of timely public information available on the registration process itself.

There appears to be broad confidence in the integrity of the voter register. However, there remain some anomalies. There are estimated to be details of approximately 250,000 deceased persons on the register that have been carried over from the 2005 database which the new register has been built upon. Clerical mistakes in data recording and entries, such as name spellings and minor errors have also been identified. To militate against these being a problem at polling station level the Electoral Commission issued clear and concise instructions on how to handle these matters to ensure voters who produced the required documents could vote. These responses to all these issues were appropriate and in line with best practice and the security measures put in place to ensure the integrity of the voter register were adequate. Due to technical errors during the data processing, the details of approximately 9,000 (0.17 per cent) voters were missing from the provisional voter register and these voters were unable to vote. According to the Electoral Commission, the majority of this data (99 per cent) has been now retrieved.

REGISTRATION OF CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTIES

Registration of Political Parties

Although the right to freedom of association is recognized by Article 21 (1) of the constitution and an individual is at liberty to form or be a member of a political party, there is no specific law on their registration or structures[1]. This leads to an absence of clear obligations on the parties to maintain internal democracy and a lack of transparency in their activities. Political parties register under the Societies Act, which involves a minimal annual return to the Registrar of Societies. Any financial information included in such returns is not made public. Political parties are often in default of their obligations under this law but attempt to update these prior to an election.

Registration of Candidates

Criteria for qualification as a candidate for the presidential and parliamentary elections set out in the constitution and Electoral Act are mostly in line with international commitments with a couple of exceptions. To qualify as a presidential candidate a person should be a citizen with Zambian parentage and be over 35 years of age, domiciled in Zambia for at least 20 years and sponsored by a political party. They should also meet all requirements to qualify to be elected as a member of the National Assembly. Nomination papers should be submitted with supporting documentation, a non-refundable deposit and a minimum of 200 supporters must be in attendance. Parliamentary candidates should be over 21 years of age and literate and they are required to demonstrate the support of nine voters in their constituency and submit a non- refundable deposit. There are categories of excluded persons including those that are bankrupt, of unsound mind and those who have been sentenced to imprisonment within the five years prior to an election.

Whilst these provisions above are in line with international obligations there are a number of restrictions that are not. There is an overly broad provision that all civil servants including teachers as well as security personnel are not permitted to stand for elections and are required to resign, rather than take a leave of absence, from their posts to qualify as candidates. This represents an excessive restriction. In respect of the presidential election and the requirements of Zambian parentage this is also overly prescriptive in breach of international obligations. A further issue was although presidential candidates submitted nominations during the week of 7- 12 August 2011 at the Supreme Court in Lusaka nominations for candidacy for the parliamentary election had to be registered in the respective constituency on 12 August 2011 with the returning officers during a one day nomination period. There have been no formal complaints from political parties on candidate registration, however, with the short time window, challenges in the case of errors or against any rejected nominations were without remedy short of an election petition after the poll.

A total of 10 individuals registered their presidential candidacies with the Chief Justice who acts as the returning officer for the presidential election, providing real choice for voters to elect the president. The parliamentary election was equally competitive with a total of 768 candidates registering from 20 parties across the 150 parliamentary constituencies. The MMD fielded candidates in all 150 constituency seats; PF had 148 candidates contesting seats and UPND 136 candidates. A range of other political parties fielded candidates and a large number of 140 independent candidates also contested parliamentary seats. The modal average was four candidates contesting each seat.

ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND PRE-ELECTION ENVIRONMENT

Background to the Election Campaign

The Electoral Commission set the campaign period from 29 July to 18 September 2011 at which time a 48 hour campaign moratorium came into force. During that moratorium period, campaigning, election rallies and the publication of campaign advertisements or statements were prohibited, but opinion polls and any election news stories, including ones critical of candidates, could still be published. The extent of the ban was only set out in a press release and not clarified in advance in any legal instrument. The Code of Conduct lists out broad freedoms to campaign, and outlaws violent or inflammatory language or conduct, and false statements about opponents during the campaign. Arms and weapons are forbidden at rallies. Public meetings must comply with the Public Order Act. Previously rallies required police permits to go ahead but this was amended in 1996 after a Supreme Court judgment to require notice rather than permission.

Overview of the Election Campaign

Candidates and political parties enjoyed the rights of freedom of assembly, expression and movement during the campaign period, with candidates and parties at liberty to move around the country without any major restrictions on their activities[1]. The election campaign environment was highly competitive with the candidates of the two major parties, MMD and PF, and a lesser extent UPND, travelling to the provinces to attend organized rallies. The parties also conducted large scale door-to-door canvassing of voters and lobbied traditional leaders such as chiefs in an attempt to increase votes. Rallies have been peaceful with a festival-like atmosphere and a large range of party paraphernalia including clothing and food handed out as an inducement for people to attend. Whilst the campaign environment has been generally calm, some inflammatory and negative campaigning, at times some vitriolic rhetoric and personalized insults have been observed at a number of MMD and PF rallies. There have also been a number of sporadic, localized and small-scale clashes between supporters of political parties in Lusaka and Namwala in Southern province.

The police’s response to these incidents was professional and balanced. Criminal investigations into statements allegedly inciting violence at rallies of the General Secretary of PF and the provincial Chairperson of the MMD, each proceeded to the stage of seeking a cautioned statement but no charges were issued before the elections. Overall, the campaign environment was not adversely affected by such incidents or clashes. This generally calm environment was in sharp contrast to the tension on election day and immediately following polling day when supporters of opposition parties clashed with security agencies and disrupted the process in some parts of the country (see election day section).

Campaign Finance and Use of State Resources

There are no provisions regulating campaign finance. The resources available to political parties and candidates varied considerably and there was a complete lack of transparency and accountability in both the sources of funding and how this was spent[1]. Furthermore, in respect to state resources, whilst Section 27 of the Electoral Act, obliges state authorities and the public media to give equal treatment to all candidates the only other specific ban on the use of public property or revenues for campaigning is in the Code of Conduct, which made it an offence to use governmental or parastatal transport or facilities for campaign purposes. This prohibition does not apply to the president and vice-president. Section 16 (2) of the Finance (Control and Management) Act prohibits the spending of public money for purposes not sanctioned by law, and compliance is with the Auditor General that is a constitutional office. In the past officials who diverted funds to political campaigns were convicted of abuse of office, but that offence was repealed by the Anti-Corruption Act 2010.

In the absence of appropriate provisions, and a lack of mechanisms to ensure that rules in place such as those in the Code of Conduct were enforced, there was no transparency in campaign funding or use of state resources and there was not a level playing field for the campaign. Advantages of incumbency were widely exploited by the MMD. The president also frequently attended ceremonial openings or inaugurations of large-scale public works, roads or hospitals that were widely reported in the mass media and blurred the boundaries between official functions of the presidential office and campaigning. The use of state resources for campaign purposes was at times overt, particularly in the use of public television, radio and newspapers. Use of government vehicles by the MMD to deliver campaign material was widely reported from the field. The lack of clearly defined parameters between private and public resources further dissolved boundaries between legitimate use of state resources used in an official capacity and use of them to campaign. In addition civil servants including provincial permanent secretaries and district commissioners were at times active in the election campaign for the MMD. Finally, the publicly funded relief maize programme was also frequently observed being used by the MMD in support of its campaign.

Voter Education

Pursuant to its mandate the Electoral Commission is responsible for providing voter education and in line with this it established the National Voter Education Committee that included civil society organizations and public institutions, and 74 District Voter Education Committees. A total of 1,422 voter education facilitators were trained to deliver these programmes in every ward. Specially tailored, and at times highly innovative, voter education programmes for each phase of the electoral process were delivered to increase the public’s awareness of their rights, knowledge of voting procedures and to encourage them to vote. This included producing material in the seven main local languages, door-to-door campaigns, and local drama groups targeting different social groups such as women and new voters, and highly visible radio and television campaigns.

MEDIA AND ELECTIONS

Media Environment

Freedom of speech in the media was respected throughout the campaign period with few reported incidents involving infringements to journalists to report on the campaigns of the political parties and candidates[1]. Whilst the entrenched positions of certain media outlets mean the media environment is highly polarized, there are also a range of commercial and religious radio and television broadcasters that are increasingly developing stronger ethical professional values in the sector. Radio is the most important source of information in Zambia, especially in rural areas and the emergence of new commercial radio and television broadcasters in 1991 together with newspapers means there is now an established history of competition to the state owned media and a relatively plural media sector in general that opens up a space for critical discussion and debate. A long standing dispute between the media and government about the nature of appropriate regulatory structures for the media sector has led to a regulatory vacuum, and little or no development, in respect to media industry regulation.

Legal Framework for the Media and Elections

Articles 11 and 20 of the constitution guarantee freedom of expression including freedom to hold opinions communicate and receive ideas and information without interference. The Electoral Act, Section 27 (2) establishes that all candidates and parties have the right to have their campaigns and manifestos reported by all of the public media in a balanced manner. The key regulations for media coverage of the elections is, however, outlined in the Code of Conduct 2011, which has an extensive list of obligations for media for their coverage of the campaign established in Regulations 13, 14 and 15. Regulation 13 (1) et seq. obliges all print and electronic media to provide fair and balanced coverage of the campaigns, policies, meetings, rallies and press conferences of all registered political parties and candidates during the campaign period. There is also a requirement for media organizations to report election news in an accurate manner and make a clear distinction between news and opinion.

A specific obligation is placed on public radio and television channels of the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) to allocate airtime to all political parties for party political broadcasts and there is also a provision for parties to purchase no more than a maximum of 30 minutes airtime in any one language per week on one of the public radio or television outlets (Regulation 14). ZNBC is under an additional obligation from Section 7 of the ZNBC Act to broadcast news and current affairs programmes which shall be comprehensive, unbiased and independent. Commentary should also be clearly distinguished from news.

Monitoring of Media Coverage of the Elections

A highly polarized media environment led to very selective campaign coverage of the parties and their campaigns in some of the mass media monitored by the EU. The right of voters to have access to a broad range of impartial news was not always respected. At times irresponsible and partial media reporting of events openly sought to mislead viewers, listeners and readers and this contributed to increasing suspicions of the electoral process. There was a blurring of the lines between editorial opinion and news items across state and some privately owned media.

The candidate debate style programmes, many of which were sponsored by non- state actors, granted access to contestants across broadcasters. Despite this access, key programming such as news bulletins, of the state-owned radio and television channels of the ZNBC was dominated by the MMD at the expense of the main opposition parties. These stations failed to meet even their minimal obligations as public broadcasters[1]. Although PF boycotted these radio and television stations and subsequently did not participate in any of the election related programming produced by these channels for much of the campaign period the absence of balanced programming policies was pronounced.

This particularly affected the diversity of ZNBC candidate debate style programmes. As a consequence overall coverage of political actors on ZNBC TV and Radio 2 that carried the debates meant MMD received a total of 37 per cent share of coverage compared to the major opposition party PF receiving 4-8 per cent share of coverage on the two channels. Other parties that did attend these debates included UPND who received 21 per cent share of coverage, Alliance for Democracy and Development (ADD) seven per cent and the National Restoration Party (NAREP) six per cent. A range of other parties received a share of five per cent each. The impact of these debates were also undermined by the fact that ZNBC’s news bulletins were highly imbalanced and dominated by MMD. As a result debate style programmes provided viewers and listeners with access to candidates, but at the same time highly imbalanced news coverage excluded candidates and parties and openly promoted MMD. In all the radio and television stations managed by ZNBC there was a lack of diversity and balance in news bulletins and between 70-76 per cent of coverage of political actors was afforded to MMD. In contrast PF received between 9-15 per cent with all other parties receiving negligible coverage in these stations’ news coverage. The tone of coverage towards MMD was also positive.

Commercial radio and television broadcasters had wider and more balanced coverage of the candidates and political parties with key commercial broadcasters’ programming demonstrating an equitable balance between key candidates and their political parties. Although in respect to volumes of coverage there was a tendency to grant more airtime to either PF or MMD, the tone of coverage was neutral. MUVI TV allocated 34 per cent of airtime to PF, 20 per cent to MMD, 16 per cent to UPND, nine per cent to NAREP with the remaining coverage divided between a range of smaller parties. Most coverage of political actors on commercial radio was in news bulletins. Radio Phoenix afforded PF 29 per cent, 26 per cent share to both MMD and UPND and NAREP 10 per cent with the remaining coverage shared between smaller parties. Radio Hot FM afforded MMD a total share of coverage of political actors of 24 per cent, PF 18 per cent, UPND 16 per cent, ADD 10 per cent, NAREP eight per cent, to Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD), seven per cent, Heritage Party and Zambians for Empowerment and Development (ZED) six per cent, National Movement for Progress (NMP) five per cent and less than one per cent of the other parties. Radio QFM afforded PF 36 per cent, MMD 33 per cent and UPND nine per cent. Radio Christian Voice afforded PF 35 per cent, MMD 18 per cent and UPND 17 per cent.

State-owned and private newspapers’ content demonstrated similar trends with the state-owned broadcasters with entrenched editorial lines and highly selective news coverage favouring either MMD in the case of the state-owned titles The Daily Mail and The Times or PF in respect to the private title, The Post.

PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES

Participation of Women

The principles of equality and non-discrimination are constitutionally protected. Although Zambia has signed key international and regional instruments for equality between women and men, women remain under represented in public life. The national legal framework does not provide for affirmative action for the representation of women. Despite women constituting half of the voting population they account for less than 15 per cent of those participating in the legislative and decision making processes.

Barriers within the political parties, lack of access to resources and opportunities, and an absence of positive measures to encourage the participation of women in public life were reflected in the low percentage of women candidates in these elections. There was one female candidate running for presidential election. A total of 111 (14 per cent) of the 768 candidates standing for the 150 parliamentary seats were women. Only eight out of 20 parties contesting parliamentary elections nominated female candidates: UPND 22, MMD and PF nominated 20 each, ZED 10, ADD and United National Independence Party (UNIP) six, FDD, four and NAREP two. A total of 21 female candidates stood as independents. Reflecting these low ratios only 17 women won parliamentary seats, or 11.5 per cent of the 148 seats that were contested, well below regional and international targets[146].

Participation of Minorities and Special Needs Voting

The constitution provides general guarantees of equal rights and freedoms and prohibits discrimination on grounds of race or religion. There are no legal obstacles to participation of any specific minority group as either candidates or voters. The constitution obliges the Electoral Commission to ensure access to voting for all eligible persons on the basis of non- discrimination including voters with disabilities. There were some provisions for assisted voting and 6,500 tactile ballot templates for the presidential election for the visually impaired were distributed to polling stations. However, special voting provisions provided for in law to allow housebound and the hospitalized to vote were not implemented largely due to disagreements amongst stakeholders on the procedures to be adopted. Polling stations were also mostly located in schools and were not always adequate to accommodate the physically disabled. The Zambia Federation of Disability Organizations played an important role in enhancing access for persons with disabilities to all stages of the electoral process and the legal proceedings it pursued sets an important precedent for the future (see complaints and appeals section).

Participation of Civil Society

Civil society organizations played an important role in providing increased transparency during Election Day and then during counting and aggregation processes. The coalition of eight civil society and faith based organizations that worked within the umbrella group, the Civil Society Election Coalition 2011, deployed over 9,000 monitors to all the 6,456 polling stations to observe the polling and results management process. This was despite some internal challenges experienced by the groups that were part of this consortium. After some initial controversy surrounding the plans of these groups to conduct parallel vote tabulation, compromise was reached to accommodate such an exercise. This further enhanced transparency measures in the results process and its results were in line with the official results supporting their integrity. Civil society also contributed in delivering voter and civic education prior to the elections to increase public understanding of the electoral process as well as voter turnout. Constant calls by non-state actors including the churches to ensure peaceful elections were also important voices in the maintenance of a climate conducive to guaranteeing that key freedoms were respected.

A large number of regional and international observer missions were also deployed from the African Union (AU), the Commonwealth, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI).

COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS

There is provision in the constitution and Electoral Act for dispute resolution of electoral matters, by mediation through Conflict Management Committees (CMCs) and by action or petition through the High and Supreme Courts. The constitution provides that all judges shall be independent and impartial and subject only to the constitution and law. Supreme and High Court judges are appointed by the president on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission after a parliamentary vetting process with the exception of some senior judges whose tenure has been extended by a decision of the president and in such an event the vetting process does not apply.

Electoral Offences

Offences are categorized in Part VII of the Electoral Act into illegal practices and electoral offences. The first category of illegal practices includes corruption offences of bribery, impersonation, undue influence, publishing false statements about candidates, inciting disorderly conduct at an election meeting and misuse of a ballot paper. These carry a maximum sentence of up to five years imprisonment, or a fine not exceeding €5,166. The second category of electoral offences includes more minor misdemeanours at polling stations. These carry a maximum sentence of up to two years imprisonment or a maximum fine of €2,583.

The Code of Conduct also created a series of new criminal offences. All political parties and candidates must sign up to the commitments in the code and if they refuse it is an offence. There is also in the code an offence for members or supporters of parties or candidates to use hatred or violence, or to deface the material of other parties, or disrupt rallies. A further list of general offences includes producing weapons at an election rally, scheduling rallies in the same location as one that is already planned and using government facilities for campaign purposes. Offences in the Code of Conduct carry a maximum sentence of two years imprisonment. The police, who are the responsible body for investigating and initiating a prosecution for any breaches to these provisions, reported a total of 102 arrests relating to the election mostly in Lusaka and Copper belt. The majority of these were minor offences of violence under the Penal Code Act.

Complaints and Appeals

In accordance with the Electoral Act and Code of Conduct, 75 conflict management committees (CMCs), one for each district and one at national level, were established in August 2011. These committees were comprised of members of political parties, civil society organizations and state law enforcement agencies. They were very active in the constituencies that were closely contested and served a valuable role in resolving issues such as disputes over posters, incidents of any insults traded between candidates, and threats of violence. Some disputes such as aggravated violence went to a CMC but later resulted in criminal prosecution. On 12 September 2011 the Electoral Commission sent an evaluation team from the national CMC to visit district CMCs around the country over a five day period to report on their effectiveness, and following the election this CMC dealt with complaints from political parties about delays in the transmission of results to the Electoral Commission at Lusaka.

During the campaign period there were many election related cases in the High Court including a challenge to President Banda’s candidacy on the grounds that his parents were not Zambian. The case was dismissed on a procedural issue that meant the matter was not addressed. The Zambia Revenue Authority was sued for allegedly failing to charge import duty on campaign material imported by the MMD leading to an abuse of state resources. This case was dismissed on 13 September 2011 on an issue of due notice, but the allegation itself was not addressed. Both these cases were taken by PF. In addition, during the campaign, the PF or its candidates obtained six court injunctions against media outlets to stop the continued publication of stories claimed to be defamatory. The court decided that the protection of reputation during the election period outweighed the freedom of expression. A case was taken by the Zambia Federation of Disability organizations against the Electoral Commission to force it to make special facilities available for visually impaired, deaf or wheelchair bound voters on Election Day. The court declared that the Electoral Commission was in breach of its constitutional obligation to provide access to voters, but deferred mandatory orders to comply until later elections.

Petitions

Post-election challenges to results can be submitted to a full bench of the Supreme Court in the case of the presidential election within 14 days of the swearing-in of the declared winner. There is no time limit for dealing with those cases and some in the past have taken years to reach judgment after the declared winner has been sworn in. No such petition was brought in respect to this presidential election. Petitions relating to the parliamentary elections must be taken to the High Court within 30 days of the particular declaration, or if there is an allegation of corruption up to 30 extra days are available. The High Court has 180 days to deal with the petition and could cancel the election of a declared winner. A person bringing an election petition in the High Court must pay €22 to court as security for costs. For Supreme Court petitions no sum is set but the fee set by the court for a 2008 petition was very substantial at €7,472.

The test on such an election petition is as to whether the majority of voters may have been prevented from electing their preferred candidate. The procedures for election petitions are in line with international standards save that there should be shorter time limits for dealing with the cases. In electoral petitions and political cases the courts are widely perceived by stakeholders to display extreme deference to the expectations of government. Electoral cases are often deferred or dismissed on narrow procedural grounds.

ELECTION DAY

Overview of Voting

Material required for polling was transported prior to Election Day to district level without major incident. The local delivery of this material down to polling station level was generally efficient allowing for the timely opening of the poll nationwide. There were some isolated incidents of polling material arriving late, but the large majority of polling stations either opened on time or within an hour of the scheduled time. Material and polling staff arrived several hours later in some polling stations in Kanyama, Matero and Munali constituencies in Lusaka. Polling in these polling stations started later and was extended until the evening according to procedures. There were other minor incidents of delay that were attended to by the Electoral Commission.

The most extreme case was in Lukulu West constituency when supporters of political parties disrupted the transfer of polling material. Elections were conducted a day late as a consequence. Nationwide voting proceeded throughout the day in a calm and orderly manner with a few reports of disruptions in Lusaka and a few other areas of the country. Polling procedures in 94 per cent of polling stations observed by European Union observers were assessed as good or very good. In some of these polling stations procedures were not followed strictly or some material, mainly seals and official stamps were missing, but this did not adversely affect the overall integrity of the polling. There were also some minor problems in regards to the voter register with people not being able to vote because their names were not included on it. The majority of these were resolved with presiding officers following the instructions issued. Polling staff were professional and overall acted with impartiality in the polling stations observed. Effective use of procedures provided adequate security measures and the secrecy of voting was largely maintained, although the layout and the position of the ballot booths in polling stations did not guarantee the secrecy of vote. In all polling stations observed there were a large number of party agents mostly from MMD, PF and UPND and domestic monitors. European Union observers assessed the overall environment for polling positively.

On Election Day sporadic incidents of violence erupted in small pockets of the country. These were all largely related to the increase in suspicions of the electoral process of PF supporters and rumours of electoral fraud. In Kanyama, Matero and Munali constituencies in Lusaka, rioting broke out as voters protested at delays in the opening of polling stations. Police fired tear gas and warning shots to disperse the rioters. These kinds of incidents continued in the days immediately following the elections and there was unrest in Ndola and Solwezi.

RESULTS -Counting, Aggregation and the Announcement of Results

Closing was assessed as fair to good in most polling stations observed. Counting of ballots commenced at all polling stations in clear sight of party agents and election monitors immediately following closing of the poll. It was conducted in a transparent manner, albeit slowly, in the spirit, if not according to the exact rules, laid out by procedures in the polling stations observed. It went on across the country throughout most of the night. Aggregation of results was undertaken immediately following counting and the arrival of polling data at constituency level aggregation centres. Whilst in general the process remained transparent it was not carried out at optimal speed, and in some aggregation centres, European Union observers reported problems. The quality of this part of the process deteriorated considerably compared to voting itself, and both counting and aggregation were transparent, albeit undertaken with widely different understandings of the paperwork process.

Delays in aggregation were mainly attributable to 1) the late opening of polling stations meant these stations also closed late 2) the difficult infrastructure for the transportation of results from polling stations to the aggregation centres 3) overly complex paperwork fir counting and forms that often led to staff confusion and misunderstanding of procedures; and 4) very low tolerance thresholds in the systems software that meant there were a number of incidents of rejection of data entry sets, even when data had very low margin errors or mistakes were minor, further complicating the process. European Union observers also reported a lack of adequate staff training and knowledge in these later stages of the electoral process. As a consequence verification was longer than anticipated and complex. However, despite this the Electoral Commission staff still managed to guarantee a transparent process that assisted in maintaining confidence in it, in many parts of the country. In other areas of the country heightened suspicions led to incidents of obstruction and an increasingly aggressive environment involving PF supporters acting in a threatening and menacing manner towards Electoral Commission staff during these final stages of the process.

The Chairperson of the Electoral Commission announced the certified results of the presidential election at 00:30 hours on 23 September 2011. Based on results obtained from 143 of the 150 constituencies Michael Sata of the PF was declared winner with a total of 1,150,045, or 43 per cent of valid votes. The incumbent president, Rupiah Banda of the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) received 961,796 votes (36.1 per cent) and Hakainde Hichilema of the UPND 489,944, or 18.5 per cent of valid votes cast. Based on these results the Chief Justice as the returning officer for the presidential election declared Michael Sata president elect. All political parties accepted results of the presidential election and there is a general acceptance across society that the elections were credible and transparent. A swearing in ceremony was held on 23 September 2011 in accordance with the law and the new president assumed office.

Compared to the 2006 elections voter turnout was significantly lower. It has reduced from 70.77 per cent in 2006 to 53.98 per cent in 2011. Central and Western provinces had the lowest turnout with 47.24 per cent and 48.21 per cent respectively. The highest turnout was in Copper belt, 59.67 per cent, followed by Southern 58.37 per cent and Northern Province 57.73 per cent. The turnout in Lusaka province was 52.26 per cent, slightly lower than the national average. A total of 56,678 ballots were invalidated, representing 2.03 per cent, of ballots cast. This level of invalid votes is in line with regional and international trends. However, it is an increase compared to the 2006 elections (1.75 per cent) and 2008 (1.32 per cent) presidential mid-term election.

Political Overview of the Election Results

On 28 September 2011 the Electoral Commission published final presidential election results based on 150 constituencies. Micheal Sata of the PF received 1,170,966, or 41.98 per cent of valid votes. Rupiah Banda of the MMD was second and received 987,866, or 35.42 per cent and Hakainde Hichilema of the UPND 506,763, or 18.17 per cent of valid votes cast. The remaining seven candidates received a combined total of 4.43 per cent of valid votes.

Results of the parliamentary election were released in conjunction with the presidential results. From the 148 parliamentarian seats contested on Election Day (elections in two constituencies were postponed due to the death of candidates) the PF has won 60 seats, MMD 55 seats and UPND 28 seats. Three independent candidates won seats and one seat each was won by ADD and FDD. The president also appointed another eight members of parliament that the position is permitted to under constitutional provisions. In respect to parliamentary seats the PF managed to maintain its popularity with voters in urban centres and Bemba speaking areas and it has retained seats in Copper belt. It has also increased the number of parliamentary seats it has in the rural areas of its traditional strongholds: Northern, Luapula and Lusaka provinces by winning 12 additional seats. This party also won seats in MMD heartlands: three seats in central, two in Western and one in Eastern province. Voting patterns also changed in the former traditional MMD stronghold of Western province, where MMD lost seats that were won by the opposition, mainly UPND. The UPND maintained its core regional support in the south and won all but one seat in Southern province.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations to improve the electoral process and related areas are offered for consideration and action by the Government of Zambia, Electoral Commission, political parties, civil society and the international community.

Legal Framework

i. The legal basis of the Code of Conduct requires strengthening. A number of the provisions in this code should be established in statutory law to reflect their gravity.

ii. Statutory provisions are required to provide for a suitable set of obligations, governed by principles of accountability and transparency for the registration of political parties. Furthermore, a statutory instrument providing for the regulation of campaign finances should also be considered.

iii. There should be a review of the Penal Code Act, Electoral Act and the Code of Conduct to ensure that any sanctions for offences are proportionate and consistent. Clarification of provisions such as those regarding the campaign moratorium should be made.

iv. Consideration should be given to introducing a fixed calendar for general elections and a longer time period should be introduced between the announcement of presidential results and the inauguration ceremony to ensure that any petitions can be dealt with before the president assumes office.

Electoral System

i. A review of constituency boundaries under the provisions of Article 77 of the constitution is required as a matter of priority to ensure boundary demarcations reflect population patterns and their weighting in parliamentary representation.

Election Administration

i. The appointments process for key positions in the Electoral Commission needs to be revised and to ensure it retains full independence an independent appointments process established based on best practice principles for public appointments.

ii. The current provision of the Chief Justice acting as the returning officer for the presidential election should be reviewed so that the Chairperson of the Electoral Commission takes on this role.

iii. Reducing the reliance of the Electoral Commission on seconded administrative structures to prepare for elections by introducing more permanent structures at either provincial or district levels should be considered.

iv. Broader provisions for special voting are required and existing procedures in place simplified, to ensure all groups that are eligible to vote are able to do so. This includes a number of categories of voters ranging from election monitors, party agents, and security personnel on duty on the days around election, the housebound and hospitalised.

v. The size and number of the larger polling stations needs to be reviewed to allow efficient processing of voters within the time limits set by law and to guarantee a more regulated environment that can be sufficiently managed by presiding officers.

Voter Registration

i. A review of the voter registers undertaken as soon as practicable. Efforts to expunge anomalies from the database such as the details of deceased persons or corrections of clerical errors are required. In line with legal provisions the Electoral Commission should put in place a system to enable those eligible to register, or those that want to change their details, to do so on a continuing basis.

Candidate Registration

i. In respect to candidate nominations the provision of Zambian parentage to qualify, as a presidential candidate needs to be removed, as should the requirement for a candidate to be sponsored by a political party.

ii. To ensure nominees for parliamentary elections have adequate access to appeals and complaints mechanisms the time period for parliamentary candidate registration should be extended to an appropriate time window.

iii. A review of the current provisions that civil servants are not permitted to stand for election is necessary. An appropriate alternative would seek to provide for a voluntary suspension period whilst registered as a candidate with an option to return to the workplace following the election if unelected.

Political Parties and Candidates

i. Positive measures need to be introduced by political parties to ensure that women are encouraged to hold key positions within the decision-making structures at all levels.

ii. Party agents require more training on their role during elections and a suitable code of conduct for them needs to be introduced. Visibility material identifying them as agents in polling stations and other levels of the process would also be beneficial.

Campaign Environment

i. State resources such as vehicles or the publicly funded maize programme need to be more clearly regulated and catalogued during an election period to ensure they are not used for campaign purposes. There should also be a moratorium on ceremonial openings of public works by the presidential office and public officials for the period of the official campaign. These measures require oversight to ensure a separation between the resources attached to public office and campaign activities.

ii. Campaign finance accounting mechanisms need to be put in place to provide clear monitoring and transparency in both campaigns funding and spending. Consideration should be given to placing a ceiling on spending. The political parties could be required to submit accounts of their donations and spending on a regular basis to a relevant authority for the duration of the campaign period guaranteeing maximum transparency.

iii. The complete separation of civil servants from election campaigns of political parties would be strengthened by a statutory provision clearly stipulating that no civil servant including Permanent Secretaries and District Commissioners are allowed to participate in campaign activities. The establishment of a special committee within the Public Service Management Division of the Cabinet Office should issue guidelines for civil servants during election periods.

iv. The Electoral Commission should have more scope to set out guidelines for the conduct of stakeholders during the pre-election period.

Voter Education

i. More extensive and permanent voter and civic education could be introduced throughout the year to inform and educate voters of both their rights as voters as well as registration and voting procedures. The Electoral Commission should build on its library of innovative material produced for these elections and ensure, in partnership with civil society organizations that this reaches all levels of the community.

The Media Sector

i. An adequate and proportionate and tiered regulatory framework should be established for the media sector to ensure independent and appropriate regulatory mechanisms that operate in the public interest are in place.

ii. A radio and television act needs to be developed in public consultation to provide a satisfactory regulatory environment for the broadcast media. Whilst respecting the principle of freedom of speech it should set out programme standards and broadcaster obligations as well as provisions relating to media coverage of elections.

iii. Effective regulatory structures are required for the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation to ensure it fulfils its legal obligations as a public service broadcaster. Internal reform of this broadcaster should be based on principles of independence and public accountability and led by public purposes in broadcasting. To this end clear monitoring mechanisms need to be introduced to guarantee impartiality and balance is maintained.

iv. Consideration should be given to privatizing elements of the state-owned media. This should include divesting all state interests in the two newspaper titles as well as interests in the news agency ZANIS.

Promote the Participation of Women and Minorities

i. A more active and fully representative position for women in parliament, public positions and political parties needs to be encouraged through affirmative policymaking action including the introduction of quotas where necessary. This should cover improving access to key positions in the cabinet, parliament, civil service and political parties.

ii. Provisions for disabled voters and polling staff should be enhanced and implemented. In the design and layout of polling stations and polling material full consideration should be given to the needs of this part of the community to ensure access to all stages of the electoral process.

Civil Society and Domestic Observation

i. The active position of civil society and other non-state actors should continue to be supported in respect to their election related work. Civil society organizations should continue to work together in observing elections to ensure coordination between organizations.

Complaints and Appeals

i. Consideration should be given to establishing a special electoral court during election periods that deals with electoral petitions in an expeditious manner. Assigned courts could also assist in accelerating any legal proceedings related to elections prior to Election Day and during the campaign period.

Polling, Counting and Publication of the Results

i. To protect the secrecy of the vote the process of recording the voter card number of the voter on the counterfoil of the ballot papers should cease. Positioning and layout of ballot booths needs to be more sensitive to protecting the secrecy of the vote.

ii. An increase in planning, inventory design and recording of delivery and arrival of electoral material systems is required that includes transport and logistics and human resource management. Checklists could be introduced at all levels to create adequate inventory systems as well as assist polling station level staff manage processes.

iii. The management of the counting process requires improvements both to the design of material such as forms and procedures and subsequent training of staff to ensure full comprehension of these processes.

iv. Sites for aggregation centre needs to be reviewed to guarantee they offer the appropriate facilities and space to enable accurate aggregation. Transportation and retrieval of polling material should also be reviewed to ensure efficient systems are in place and delivery and arrival is well documented.

v. The arrival of results and their aggregation at the centres would be made more transparent if they were projected in real time on localized screens. A greater number of operators with specialized training on this part of the process would also increase the efficacy of the collection of results. A review should be made of the procedures used during this stage of the electoral process with a view to improving the delivery times and transparency of aggregation.

vi. Greater use of communications tools such as the Electoral Commission’s website should be encouraged, particularly during the results process, where consideration should be given to posting polling station level results as a further transparency measure.

POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF PRESIDENT MICHAEL SATA

Michael Chilufya Sata (born 1937[147] is a Zambian politician who has been the fifth President of Zambia since 23 September 2011. A social democrat[148], he leads the Patriotic Front (PF), a major political party in Zambia. Under President Frederick Chiluba, Sata was a minister during the 1990s as part of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government; he went into opposition in 2001, forming the PF. As an opposition leader, Sata—popularly known as “King Cobra”—emerged as the leading opposition presidential contender and rival to President Levy Mwanawasa in the 2006 presidential election, but was defeated. Following Mwanawasa’s death, Sata ran again and lost to President Rupiah Banda in 2008.

After ten years in opposition, Sata defeated Banda, the incumbent, to win the September 2011 presidential election with a plurality of the vote. Banda’s party — of which Sata had been a member until a 2001 leadership dispute — had been in power for two decades. But this is not the first hand-over of power from one party to another in this southern African country. Sata, a former provincial governor and Cabinet minister known for his populist, anti-China rhetoric, left Banda’s Movement for Multi-Party Democracy to form his own Patriotic Front party in 2001. Sata lost elections that year and in 2006 to the MMD’s Levy Mwanawasa. In 2008, after Mwanawasa died of a stroke, Sata narrowly lost a special election to Banda, who had been Mwanawasa’s vice president.

Michael Chilufya Sata was born and brought up in Mpika, Northern Province. He worked as a police officer, railway man and trade unionist during colonial rule. He spent time in London working on the railway sweeping the platforms. Among other things, he was a porter at Victoria railway station3. Sata began actively participating in the politics of Northern Rhodesia in 1963. Following independence, he worked his way up through the rough-and-tumble rank-and-file of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) to the governorship of Lusaka in 1985. As Governor, he made his mark as a man of action with hands on approach. He cleaned up the streets, patched roadways and built bridges in the city. Afterward he became a Member of Parliament for Kabwata constituency in Lusaka. Though once close with President Kenneth Kaunda, he became disillusioned by Kaunda’s dictatorial style and he left the UNIP to join the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) during the campaign for multi-party politics in 1991.

After Frederick Chiluba defeated Kaunda in 1991, Sata became one of Zambia’s most instantly recognizable faces. Under the MMD, he served as minister for local government, labour and, briefly, health where, he boasts, his “reforms brought sanity to the health system”. In 1995, he was appointed as minister without portfolio, the party’s national organizing secretary during which his political style was described as “increasingly abrasive”.

Formation of the Patriotic Front

In 2001, President Chiluba nominated Levy Mwanawasa as the MMD’s presidential candidate for the 2001 election. In frustration, Sata left the MMD and set up a new party, the Patriotic Front (PF). He contested the 2001 election but did not do well—his party only won one seat in parliament. Sata conceded defeat and continued campaigning.

2006 election and afterwards

Sata contested the September 2006 presidential election as a populist championing the causes of the poor in the face of Mwanawasa’s economic reform policies. While the slate of candidates contesting the election frequently resorted to personal attacks and insults, Sata’s remarks were at times quite equally scathing. At one campaign event in particular, Sata was reported to have ripped apart a cabbage in front of his supporters. The cabbage was a reference to Mwanawasa’s speech impediment, which was the result of an injury sustained in a 1992 car crash. He has also accused Mwanawasa of “selling out” Zambia to international interests, and at one event, he referred to Hong Kong as a country and Taiwan as a sovereign state. In response, China, which is interested in Zambia’s copper reserves, threatened to cut off relations with Zambia if he was elected[149]. Sata’s right hand man in the campaign was Dr. Guy Scott, the Patriotic Front secretary general. Scott is a white Zambian politician. He served a number of ministerial positions during the Chiluba government[150]. Sata also received the public backing of Chiluba.

Initial results from the election gave Sata the lead, but further results put Mwanawasa in first place and pushed Sata into third place[151]. Interim results released after votes from 120 of 150 constituencies were counted put Mwanawasa on just over 42% of the vote; Hakainde Hichilema had 28%; and the Michael Sata had slipped to 27%. When opposition supporters heard that Sata had slipped from first to third place, riots erupted in Lusaka[152]. On 2 October, the Zambian Electoral Commission announced that Mwanawasa had officially won the election; final results put Sata in second place with about 29% of the vote[153]. Sata was arrested in early December 2006, accused of making a false declaration of his assets when applying to run for president in August, along with other charges. He was questioned by police and released on bail. If convicted, he could have received a prison sentence of least two years[154]. As a convict, he would also be unable to hold public office. Sata said the charges were politically motivated, and in court he pleaded not guilty to them[155]. On 14 December, the charges were dropped on the grounds that the declaration of assets was not made under oath[156].

On 15 March 2007, Sata was deported from Malawi shortly after arrival. Sata said that he was only there to meet with the business community, and alleged that the Zambian government had effected the deportation by falsely claiming that Sata was in Malawi to assist that country’s former president, Bakili Muluzi. The Zambian government denied this, while the Malawian government gave no explanation for Sata’s deportation. On 6 April, Sata’s lawyer said that he had initiated a lawsuit against the Malawian government for violating his rights[157]. After losing his passport in London in late 2007, Sata was issued another; however, on 10 November 2007, Minister of Home Affairs Ronnie Shikapwasha announced that Sata’s passport was withdrawn temporarily because he had obtained the new passport without following the necessary procedures and proving that he needed a new passport. Shikapwasha said that an investigation would follow, that Sata had been interrogated, and that he could face arrest[158]. Sata suffered a heart attack on 25 April 2008 and was evacuated to Milpark Hospital in Johannesburg, South Africa, where he was said to be in stable condition on 26 April[159]. He reconciled with President Mwanawasa in May 2008.

LEVY MWANAWASA’S DEATH AND THE 2008 ELECTION

After Mwanawasa suffered a stroke and was hospitalized in France, Sata questioned the official claims about Mwanawasa’s health on 15 July 2008, and he called for a team of doctors to be sent by the Cabinet to examine Mwanawasa; this team would then disclose Mwanawasa’s actual condition[160]. Mwanawasa died in office in August 2008. On 25 August, Sata attempted to attend funeral proceedings for Mwanawasa at Chipata in Eastern Province; however, Maureen Mwanawasa, Mwanawasa’s widow, ordered Sata to leave, saying that he was politicizing the event and that he had never reconciled with Mwanawasa’s family. Sata, who was removed from the scene by security, said that he was only there to mourn Mwanawasa and that he had hoped to escort the body while it was taken to provincial capitals across Zambia; he maintained that his reconciliation with Mwanawasa himself was sufficient to justify his presence.22 He also said that Maureen Mwanawasa had acted inappropriately[161].

Sata was unanimously chosen as the PF’s candidate for the presidential by-election at a meeting of its Central Committee on 30 August 2008. Accepting the nomination, he expressed the need “to scrub this country and wash it”; he also said that he would refrain from campaigning until after Mwanawasa’s funeral[162]. Despite his April 2008 heart attack, Sata said that he was healthy and in good condition.24 Sata said that he would not accept a victory for Banda because there was “no way MMD can win”, and he alleged that the Electoral Commission and the police were working together to rig the election[163]. Although he held the lead in early vote counting, which reflected his strong support in urban areas, his lead grew smaller as votes from rural areas were counted. In the end, Banda overtook Sata, and final results on 2 November showed Banda with 40% of the vote against 38% for Sata[164]. Sata subsequently stated that he had not been defeated and accused Banda of fraud[165].

The Presidency

Sata ran for President for a fourth time in the election held on 20 September 2011. In the early stages of the campaign he was more vitriolic in his anti-Chinese rhetoric, but he later toned down his rhetoric. Results showed him receiving about 43% of the vote against 36% for Banda, and Chief Justice Ernest Sakala accordingly declared that he had won the election in the early hours of 23 September. He was sworn in later in the day[166]. He was said to have won because of the urban vote. Despite the toning down of his rhetoric, the investment climate in Zambia was considered uncertain in the wake of his victory.

Policies

On 8 September 2008, Sata claimed that he would protect Chinese investments if he was elected, abandoning the hostility towards Chinese investment that he had expressed during the 2006 presidential election campaign[167]. During the 2006 election campaign he was reported to have said of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe that “Mugabe hasn’t done anything wrong. It is the imperialists, the capitalist-roaders, who say he is a villain[168].” In 2008, he said that he would revoke licenses for foreign investors if they resisted his orders to give at least a 25% stake in their companies to Zambians[169]. At his inauguration as President of Zambia, Sata assured foreign investors that they are welcome in his country, Africa’s biggest copper producer, but said they must improve conditions for their Zambian employees.

Changes since he assumed office

President Michael Sata has with dissolved boards of three parastatal institutions which include the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO), National Pensions Scheme Authority (NAPSA) and Bank of Zambia board (BoZ). Further, the President has reversed the sale of Finance Bank-Zambia and directed the Ministry of Finance to give it back to the owners. The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) has also welcomed the directive by President Michael Sata that the Ministry of Labour, Sport, Youth and Gender to revise the minimum wage from the current K419,000.

Road contracts

On-going road construction projects will be reviewed as part of the new Government’s roadmap to track the levels of corruption and promote transparency in the governance of the country. Contractors working on the roads should not be jittery if they did not engage in questionable contracts. Earlier it had been reported that there were reports that some contractors were given jobs worth K2 billion per kilometre, which is irregular. The government would not cancel any contract if there was no corruption involved in the process of awarding tenders.

Food Reserve Agency

The Food Reserve Agency (FRA) is also on the list of institutions to be audited to determine the levels of transparency in paying farmers. The FRA would be audited to determine the levels of transparency in paying farmers.

Central Bank Governor

Zambia’s central bank Governor who helped curb inflation to below 10 percent for the first time in 30 years, was fired by President Michael Sata in a sign the government may seek looser monetary policy. The central bank governor was head of the Bank of Zambia since 2002, winning awards for his fight against inflation. His removal may signal the government wants lower interest rates and a weaker currency in Africa’s biggest copper producer.

Army Generals

The government has ordered thirteen (13) Security and Defence Brigadier-Generals and sixteen (16) Colonels who have reached retirement age but were still occupying public offices following the illegal amendment of section 38 of the Defence and Security Act Cap 106 which allowed them to continue serving in the army to vacate their offices by December this year. The President said the previous Government contravened the law when it amended the section of the Defence law outside Parliament allowing retired senior defence personnel to continue occupying public offices contrary to what is outlined in the Defence Act.

The president made the order when he swore in eleven police commissioners, and one Permanent Secretary in the new Ministry of Chiefs and Traditional Affairs at State House in Lusaka. He said the previous Government had no mandate to amend the statutory Instrument section 38 without the approval of Parliament. He said the decision was done arbitrary and as such, needed to go back to Parliament for a final decision over the matter.

Zambian Defence Force

The Zambian Defence Force (ZDF) consists of the army, the air force, and Zambian National Service (ZNS). The ZNS, while operating under the Ministry of Defence, is responsible primarily for public works projects. The ZDF is designed primarily for internal defence in Zambia. Being a landlocked country, Zambia has no navy.

Air Force

The Zambian Air Force is a small air force equipped with Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21MFs and Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-19S in addition to a range of transport aircraft and helicopters. The Zambian Air Force (ZAF) is the air force of Zambia. Following the creation of the Republic of Zambia in 1964, Zambian military aviation was organized as the Zambia Air Wing which lasted until 1968. The Zambian Air Force was then established.

The primary missions of the Air Force are to defend Zambia’s borders and protect its airspace. In addition, it provides various forms of air support to other government departments. Thus, it also flies reconnaissance, trooping and transport missions for the police and airlifts medical supplies and personnel to inaccessible areas. Finally, the organisation provides emergency transport whenever needed. One of the more recent relief operations mounted by the Air Arm occurred in early 2007, when it came to the aid of flood victims in the North-Western Province. Few details are available on force deployment, but combat elements are understood to be located at Lusaka (K-8), Mbala (MB-326) and Mumbwa (MiG-21), with the small fleet of transport aircraft and utility helicopters also reportedly stationed at Lusaka.

The military—trials, tribulations and hope[1]

The military is an important part of a country’s history, reflecting the challenges it has gone through, the problems it has encountered—and survived[170]. In the case of Zambia, the military reflects its trials, tribulations and hopes. This chapter[1] is a ‘snap shot’ of the Zambian defence and security forces. It cannot be a full history of the defence force, which spans the entire history of the country itself; neither can it contain all the details of the past 40 years, which reflect Zambia’s modern history. Rather, this is an attempt at recording some of the many issues in the birth of a country; its survival through the traumatic era of independence struggles when the Southern African region faced formidable enemies; and finally the political growth of a state whose government, people and their military have focused on a brighter, more peaceful and secure environment for both themselves and the region at large.

The chapter[1] begins by tracking the formation of the Zambia Army and Air Force in the new state of Zambia, and follows the trauma of its political growth which was characterised by the transition from a plural political system to a single party system and, finally, a return to multi-partism. The focus here will be on the establishment of the new army and air force; the ‘false’ sharing of the military arsenal held during the previous federal government system; and the robust changes taken to meet the challenges at hand. The next epoch of Zambia’s military history traces some of the major issues that the military had to go through during the liberation wars and insurgencies that were waged in Southern Africa for the ‘heart and soul’ of the region. The issue of the military in a democracy is then addressed, followed by an assessment of some intra-state and regional challenges that the military is set to face.

Birth of a military

The first Zambian government at independence on 24 October 1964 was formed by the United National Independence Party (UNIP), which ruled Zambia from independence until 1991. Certain that it was poised to form the first government of an independent state, UNIP had in its manifesto thought through some issues about the defence and security of an independent Zambia. UNIP’s 1962 manifesto states as follows:

When a UNIP government is formed, the armed forces of Zambia will be strengthened and made more efficient in order to ensure internal security and to provide effective Defence against external aggression. However, a self-governing Zambia will be entitled to the benefits of the Commonwealth Defence schemes. A UNIP government will pursue a policy of non-alignment. A free Zambia will not align itself with either the West or the East.

Establishment of the army and air force

During the colonial period, the colonial authorities established a police force to look after their security needs, known as the Northern Rhodesia Police (Military). On 28 April 1933, this title was changed to Northern Rhodesia Regiment, and at independence the Northern Rhodesia Regiment became the Zambia Army. In the case of the air force, however, Northern Rhodesian needs were covered by the air force of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, known as the Royal Rhodesia Air Force (RRAF), and which was under the Central African Command.

Following the dissolution of the federation in 1963, the Northern Rhodesian government changed the title of the air force to ‘air wing’ and that of the territorial force of the air force to the ‘auxiliary air wing’[171]. At independence, the Northern Rhodesia Air Wing became the Zambia Air Force in accordance with the Zambia Independence Order, 1964, the Republic of Zambia (modifications and adaptations) (General) Order, 1964, para 3(l), which states:

Any reference in the existing laws to the ‘military forces of the territory’ shall be read and construed in respect of any time, or any period commencing on or after the appointed day as if it were a reference to the Defence Force.

The nature and character of the pre-1964 history of the Zambian military is critical to understanding subsequent developments in the post-colonial era.

The false sharing of the military arsenal

Zambia’s treatment at independence in the case of the two Rhodesians may probably go down as one of the greatest injustices ever to occur in the sharing of goods and services between states previously in a federal system of government. This was particularly evident in the sharing of the military arsenal between the two Rhodesians.

Northern Rhodesia was the richest territory in the federation, despite the federation’s capital being in Southern Rhodesia. One would therefore have expected the sharing to have been in favour of the highest contributor to the purchase of that equipment—or, at the least, an equitable distribution. This was not to be.

Southern Rhodesia received the lion’s share, leaving the new state of Zambia with some old and out-of-service aircraft (four DC-3 Dakotas and two Pembrokes) and little of anything else. In addition, the new state of Zambia did not have its own indigenous officer corps—all officers were from the British Army and the British Royal Air Force, or from the ‘white’ settler communities from both Southern and Northern Rhodesians (now Zimbabwe and Zambia respectively) who had decided to cast their lot with Salisbury—another distinction for Southern Rhodesia. The dishonest nature of the British colonial power on this matter is best illustrated by Martin Rupiya who in his doctoral dissertation writes:

When dissolution faced Central Africa, Britain’s arbitration at the Victoria Conference was uneven. She allowed all the weapons to be retained by S. Rhodesia and when she was challenged in the international United Nations (UN) Security Council chambers, used her veto power, for the first time since Suez in 1956. In the middle and late 1950s, the motive to have a powerful air force changed from Dominion status to becoming the corner stone and pillar supporting white minority rule.

Some of the aircraft ought to have been shared following the massive contribution by the Northern Rhodesian treasury of £300,000 over three years towards the purchasing of the aircraft and the costs for aircrew, engineers and technicians.6 Table 1 provides an indication of the size of the air force that the Northern Rhodesian government contributed towards. This imbalance continued to exist right through the tumultuous history of the Southern African region, characterised by the liberation wars fought by the Zimbabwean nationalists organised as the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) representing the Shona in the central, eastern and northern parts of the country, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), identified with the Ndebele in the south, in what had now become Rhodesia. It is, of course, a matter of conjecture (and dealt with later) what effect this military imbalance had on both Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle as well as on Zambia’s ability to ensure its own peace and security[172].

The independence order of battle

The Zambia Defence Force was established at independence in 1964 under CAP 131 of the Laws of Zambia, section 4(1), which on the maintenance of the defence force stipulates that the new republican defence force shall consist of an army and an air force as follows:

An army comprising:

i. The regular force of the army

ii. The home guard

iii. The army reserve

iv. The territorial Army reserve

An air force comprising:

i. the regular force of air force

ii. the auxiliary air force;

iii. the air force reserve; and

iv. The auxiliary air force reserve.

CAP 131 under section 5 also indicates the employment of the defence force and that it shall be charged with the defence of Zambia and with such other duties as may from time to time be determined by the republican president. Section 6 covers the employment of the defence force outside the republic in whole or in part, while section 7 provides for the establishment of a Defence Council which shall advise the president on such matters of policy and matters affecting the command, discipline and administration of the defence force. The Defence Council was also designed to perform such other functions and duties as the president may refer to it from time to time.

Another important provision in CAP 131 is section 165, which relates to the command of the defence force. Under this provision the president shall appoint an officer to be the commander of the army and another officer to be the commander of the air force. On Independence Day, 24 October 1964, the defence force inherited the army headquarters from the colonial forces, as well as a brigade group comprising:

i. Brigade headquarters in Ndola

ii. two infantry battalions;

iii. one armour squadron

iv. one artillery battery;

v. one squadron of engineers

vi. one signals squadron;

vii. one transport squadron;

viii. one ordinance supply company;

ix. one medical unit; and

x. One training school

The defence force also inherited the British Joint Services Training Team (BJSTT), established to train Zambians on the various army and air force jobs. The circumstances prevailing meant that the defence force had to be run and commanded by British officers and men. However, the hostile political environment with Zambia’s southern neighbours who had yet to achieve political independence required that the new defence force seek an urgent solution to its dilemma whereby it was commanded by officers whose loyalty could not be guaranteed.

The presence in Zambia of liberation movements from Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and South Africa made Zambia a military target, especially since it did not have an adequately manned and equipped defence force. It was therefore important that the country should consider accelerated training of its indigenous peoples as a solution to the threat it was facing.

ZAMBIANISATION

The process of indigenisation referred to as ‘Zambianisation’, started in 1963 just before the first Zambian Army officers graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. The Royal Air Force (RAF) at RAF South Cerney, RAF Church Fenton, RAF Bikin Hill and RAF Granwell trained air force officers[173]. Professional training for pilots was introduced in Zambia at ZAF Livingstone, and some aircraft technicians were trained at RAF institutions in the United Kingdom. Soldiers were trained in Zambia.

With an exclusive focus on male candidates, the defence force recruited volunteers from all parts of Zambia regardless of colour, religion or tribe. The recruits and officer cadets were not allowed to be active in politics and were required to sign a declaration stating such. British defence personnel were replaced by Zambians, as well as by some contracted personnel from ‘friendly’ countries such as India and Ghana. The first Zambian army and air force commanders were appointed in 1971. In 1973 the first female officers and other ranks were recruited into the military. The air force took longer to indigenise due to its technical nature and since indigenous people had in the past not been given opportunities to join.

Growth and expansion

As indicated earlier, the Zambia Defence Force inherited at independence could not match the magnitude of the threat facing the country from the 1970s onwards. Consequently, Zambia had to redesign and expand its defence force. New and more equipment was purchased and new air force bases and army barracks were built, coupled with unprecedented levels of personnel recruitment and training from 1963 to 1980.

In line with its pre-independence declared policy of non-alignment, Zambia procured military equipment from various countries including Britain, Italy, Yugoslavia, India, China and the Soviet Union. Some countries which were sympathetic to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, such as China, even donated equipment to Zambia. Officers and men were sent abroad for training in such countries as Britain, Canada, Italy, Yugoslavia, India, the Soviet Union, China and Pakistan. Likewise, training teams from some of these countries were contracted to train Zambians locally. Several training institutions were established, which then meant that training abroad was minimised.

All these developments were taking place in a very hostile environment; Zambia was being attacked by the colonial and racist regimes under the pretext of their ‘hot pursuit’ of freedom fighters. Against all odds, the Zambia Defence Force expanded rapidly and was able to face the threat squarely by the time the liberation wars reached their peak from the late 1970s to 1980. Young, inexperienced and relatively out-resourced, the Zambian military nevertheless had to withstand many challenges—this meant that it had to mature within a very short period of time. The wars of liberation and internal instability played a significant role in maturing the military; however, the administrative development of the country’s military posed some serious challenges.

At independence the defence force inherited a non-unified command structure in which the commanders of the army and air force reported individually and directly to the commander-in-chief through the minister of defence—the arrangement that is presently followed. However, during the mid-1970s there was a desire to seek better co-ordination between the two services—especially since the country was at that time experiencing some serious threats by the settler regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa. The Zambia National Service (ZNS) was yet to be formed.

In 1976 the President announced that the defence force would now employ a unified command system. The defence force—comprising the army, air force and the ZNS—was to be known as the Zambia National Defence Force (ZNDF)[174]. The Commander of the Army, Maj Gen Kingsley Chinkuli (presently Zambia’s ambassador to Germany) was made commander of the new ZNDF and was promoted to the rank of full general, while the Commander of the Air Force, Air Commodore Peter Zuze, was made Deputy Commander of the ZNDF and promoted to lieutenant general. The air force rank nomenclature that was identical to that of the British Royal Air Force was changed to that used by the army. The ‘symbolic’ change in uniform was, however, not well received by Zambia Air Force personnel, judging by the ultimate switch back to the traditional ‘blue’.

Nonetheless, there was seemingly a firm political decision to achieve a strongly unified military force. A general staff was created to oversee and co-ordinate operations of the ZNDF, and the army, air force and ZNS were each headed by a chief of staff co-located in Arrakan, an army barracks in Lusaka. Regional commands were established in each province of Zambia— including where there were no military units. Members of the different services were cross-posted to units not necessarily of their original service. Some army officers were therefore posted to command air force units and vice versa. Even staff cars were cross-posted—including relatively new air force staff cars that were ‘posted’ to the army and old ones from the army to the air force.

Most senior appointments in the ZNDF were filled by army officers; a move that created resentment and rejection of the ZNDF by the air force and ZNS, which felt dominated by the army. The general feeling was that their identity was obscured and their professionalism interfered with. The extent to which the latter could be regarded as a reality is debatable. Nevertheless, the system created discomfort for the chiefs of staff, who felt overshadowed and over supervised. Consequently, the ZNDF was disbanded in 1980 and the defence force reverted to the command system inherited at independence. However, some value of the system appeared to have been identified clearly enough; in 1990 Lt Gen Hanania Lungu, then Air Commander, was appointed Minister of Defence in a unified command structure, re-introduced with some modifications. This time, the army, air force and ZNS headquarters were at different locations. The services maintained their structures and autonomy but the commanders reported to the chief of general staff. In essence, a Department of Defence had been created; however, Lt Gen Lungu—the new Minister of Defence—was also appointed chief of general staff to oversee the transition up to the eventual appointment of a chief of the defence force.

With the re-introduction of a multiparty system of government in 1991 under a new political party—the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)—the unified command structure was abolished and the defence force structure reverted to that inherited at independence. Zambia has continued with this system, making the Zambia Defence

The era of trials and tribulations

The challenges that faced the Zambian military took a number of forms. The most serious was as a result of the Zambian government’s commitment to support liberation movements in the Southern African region. This undertaking brought immense suffering to the people of Zambia, and the related insurgency operations by neighbouring states challenged the military. Another set of challenges involved the attempts at unconstitutional changes of government.

Liberation wars and insurgencies

The young republic—and consequently the equally young military—had to deal with aggression by the numerically larger and better equipped militaries of the ‘white’ settler regimes of Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa. Faced with the decision of providing refuge and a staging point for the liberation movements from these countries and collaborating with them, the Zambian government chose the former. The decision unleashed repeated intrusions by the enemy forces into Zambia, leaving destruction, injury and death in their wake. The Zambian military was kept on continuous operational duties until 1994 when South Africa finally became a democratic state.

The aggressive attacks by South Africa’s infamous race units, Rhodesia’s ‘D’ Squadron, Special Air Services and Selous Scouts complemented by their regular army and air force units, only served to mature and harden the Zambian military. Insurgents trained and equipped by apartheid South Africa also subjected the Zambian military to attacks. In what was code-named ‘Operation Plathond’, the Bureau for State Security and the South African Defence Force joint operation unleashed the Mushala insurgency on the Zambian government, designed to destabilise it and that way reduce or indeed stop it from providing support to the African National Congress.

The 200-strong insurgency led by Adamson Mushala (a former wildlife game ranger) under the command of Col Jannie Breytenbach of South Africa’s first Special Forces unit operated in the jungles of north-western Zambia from 1976 to 1982. The group killed and destroyed property until it was defeated by the Zambia Army. Adamson Mushala was himself shot dead by the Zambia Army in 1982, putting an end to the eight-year scourge of abductions, looting and burning of villages, destruction of state infrastructure and general attacks on selected targets in the province. The insurgency was destroyed before it could spread to other parts of the country.

The experience gained by the military during its counter-insurgency operations in Zambia’s North-Western province came in handy when it was confronted by yet another insurgency in the country’s Eastern province. The Mozambique National Resistance (sometimes referred to by its Portuguese acronym RENAMO) carried out incursions into Zambia in the 1990s, burning villages and killing and abducting villagers. The Zambian military counter-insurgency operations in the area finally ended the incursions.

Attempts at unconstitutional changes of government

A dimension of instability that is often difficult to write about is that of the military itself, or part of it, being the cause of instability. It is true, however, that the military has also been known to be the institution that reverses the problem; in the case of Zambia, the latter has indeed been the case. The military in Zambia—unlike its counterparts elsewhere in Africa— has been able to defeat efforts by disaffected members of the military and population, as well as the designs by other forces external to the country, to change the government through illegal means. The military coup attempts in 1980, 1989, 1990 and 1997 failed due to the commitment of the Zambian defence and security forces to democratic ideals.

The military in a democracy

Discussion of the military in a democracy presupposes a variety of notions, including the extent to which the defence and security forces have been able to exist in an era of high political activity. In the case of a democratic space—generally interpreted to suggest a multiparty environment in which the government usually adopts liberal economic policies—of interest would be to see how the defence forces adapted to the changes taking place at the political level.

In the case of Zambia, three distinct eras may be identified: 1994–1973 when the country was under a multiparty political system; 1973–1991 when the country was under a single-party system; and 1991 to the present period, with the country once again governed by a multiparty system. We turn now to the military’s response to these different political experiences.

The contemporary defence force

The Zambia Defence Force is unique in two ways: first, the defence force does not employ a joint or unified command system of administration where there is a single commander of the force[175]. Instead, the commanders of the army and the air force report independently and directly to the commander-in-chief (the republican president) through the Ministry of Defence.

Second, the ZNS is part of the defence force in the sense that it is a strategic reserve for the army and the air force and therefore provides resources when required. This service, which in many respects is different from the traditional military structures exhibited by the army and air force, was established and is maintained under CAP 121, Part 2 of the Laws of Zambia. A similar message is repeated in Part 7, sections 24(2) and 25, which state that “the functions of the service shall include the training of citizens to serve the Republic and the employment of its members in tasks of national importance of which the defence of the Republic is a part”.az The ZNS was designed to be largely developmentally oriented, with arming, bricklaying and carpentry as some of the service’s major activities.

The army, air force and ZNS are nevertheless organically interlinked and complementary in their functions. Although the defence services operate as distinct entities, their operational functions are co-ordinated by the Ministry of Defence. At the apex of the command-and-control hierarchy is the Defence and Security Committee, which comprises Cabinet ministers and is chaired by the president. Below this is the Defence and Security Advisory Committee, which is chaired by the minister of defence. This Committee is responsible for the military and other security institutions such as the Intelligence Branch, Police Service, the Immigration Department and the Anti-Drug Commission.

Critical to the operation of the defence sector is the amount of resources available to it. With an economy not yet performing as well as it used to in the 1960s and 1970s when the country’s resource base (copper) was at its highest, coupled with myriad social and political demands, the needs of the Zambia military are not always met.

Professionalism and democracy

The level of stockholding has not affected the performance of Zambia’s military. During the difficult period from the 1970s to the early 1990s, the good military performance was largely the result of the highly professional way in which the defence force carried out its tasks, despite it being severely under resourced. Possibly the most trying factor on Zambia’s military was the country’s fluctuating political landscape. Zambia was initially governed by a multiparty democracy from 1964–1973, then by a one-party system of government from 1973–1991, and is now once again using a multiparty system.

One would expect differing professional standards among the defence and security forces during these periods. Furthermore, the fact that the defence and security services were highly interwoven in the political structure of the one-party state would imply their intense politicisation, and consequently an expectation by ‘conventional wisdom’ that the level of professionalism would correspondingly drop. Indeed, the defence and security services were extremely close to the party political and governmental structures, to the extent that service chiefs were members of the party Central Committee, and some were even appointed to political and governmental positions, such as district governors, cabinet ministers and diplomats. Additionally, this period coincided with the time of Zambia’s highest security risk, and the successful way in which the defence and security forces responded to the challenge reflects their high professional standards.

Furthermore, the military’s easy adaptation to the reintroduction of multi-partism highlights the extent to which it has remained focused on its primary role of providing peace and security to Zambia, regardless of the political system that obtains at the time. The presumed inverse relationship between professionalism and democracy has, at least in the Zambian case, not been apparent.

The military and tenets of good governance

Just as much as the military in Zambia has maintained its professionalism over time, so has it also responded positively to the challenges of good governance, which demand a defence and security force that is both transparent and accountable. In this respect, the military in Zambia has during the post-1991 era been subjected to stringent parliamentary oversight. This has been conducted by a number of parliamentary committees (mainly the Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs and the Public Accounts Committee) as well as by the Office of the Auditor-General.

The auditor-general, who is an officer of the National Assembly, releases an annual report on the financial activities of government—and the defence sector is one such government department that is studied. The auditor-general’s report usually identifies any cases of unconstitutional expenditure, and the report is considered by the various parliamentary committees. Since the report is available to all, the executive, and indeed the Zambia Army, Air Force, ZNS, Police and Security Intelligence Service can note the findings and explain these to the relevant parliamentary committees as well as to the executive, while also undertaking corrective measures where possible and appropriate.

The auditor-general has often observed cases of both excess and under expenditure, as well as inappropriate procurement and acquisition of goods and services, some of which border on corruption and corrupt practices. Since the resumption of open debates in Parliament, the executive has tended to act decisively on some of these cases. There are currently parallel investigations13 on what is popularly referred to as the ‘plundering of state resources’. The auditor-general’s report on the accounts for the financial year ended 31 December 2002 has revealed some severe cases of unconstitutional expenditure.

Intra-state and regional challenges

In as much as Zambia’s defence and security forces have responded positively to the various challenges they have encountered, their contribution to the overall goal of human security may be seen in their operation in non-traditional areas, such as food production and disaster relief, both within the country and the region. In addition, the military has been actively involved in the maintenance of peace and security under the UN. The Zambia Defence Force and other security wings have participated in peacekeeping operations in Chad, Angola, Yugoslavia, Mozambique, Burundi and most recently in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Zambia remains an active member of the Southern African Development Community and of its Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, which is attempting to harmonise the region’s defence and security needs. Towards this end, Zambia has been an active participant in a number of regional exercises that, among others, are required in order to achieve the interoperability needed for collaborative missions.

HIV/AIDS is another challenge, the exact magnitude of which has yet to be determined beyond the mere acceptance of its seriousness as a global, continental, regional and national challenge. Any significant statistical evidence showing the magnitude of the pandemic in the military has been described as ‘speculative’[176]. The need for intensive research in this area is one of the major tasks facing Zambia as it tackles the pandemic at national level.

Civil society expertise in Zambia

NGOs in Zambia assist the government in providing services and fulfilling its part of the social contract. Their involvement ranges from the most basic of activities, the sourcing and provision of water to rural communities (the international NGO, Water-Aid) to the more complex, legal aid to the vulnerable provided for by organisations such as the Legal Resources Foundation[177].

Some of Zambia’s international NGOs include CARE International and the United States African Development Foundation (USADF) which supports grassroots development focusing on HIV/AIDS, improved maternal, child and reproductive health, and the prevention and treatment of malaria. Zambia’s 25 unions are divided into two primary unions: the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the Federation of Free Trade Unions in Zambia (FFTUZ)[1]. The founding legislation was the Zambia Societies Act of 1958 until it was replaced in 2009. There were no set guideline as to the registration and operation of NGOs

The Non-Governmental Organisations Act 2009

Until recently, non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) in Zambia were largely unregulated and could operate freely as long as they had some form of registration, normally under the Societies Act. This has however changed with enactment into law of the Non-Governmental Organisation Act, 2009 (the “Act”). The Act was assented to on 26th August 2009 but has not yet come into force[178].

The purpose of the Act is to co-ordinate and register and to enhance the transparency, accountability and performance of NGOs. “NGO” is defined to mean a private voluntary grouping of individuals or associations, whether corporate or unincorporated, not established or operated for profit, partisan politics or any commercial purposes, and who have organized themselves for the promotion of civic education, advocacy, human rights, social welfare, development, charity, research or other activity for the benefit or interest of the public, through resources mobilised from sources within or outside Zambia.

The Act requires all NGOs as well as international NGOs operating in Zambia to be registered in accordance with the Act. An NGO is required to apply to the Registrar of NGOs for registration within 30 days of its formation. The Minister has powers to exempt any NGO from registration. The Act requires any NGO registered under the Societies Act or any other written law to within 90 days or such extended period as the Minister may allow for the registration of the NGO apply for a certificate. An NGO shall not be deemed unlawful until the period or extended period for registration has lapsed.

The Act establishes the NGO Board (the “Board”) which shall consist of 15 part time members appointed by the Minister. The Board is charged with among others the following functions:

i. Registering NGOs;

ii. Approving the area of work of NGOs operating in Zambia;

iii. Maintaining a register of national and international NGOs operating in Zambia;

iv. Recommending the rules and procedures for the audit of the accounts of NGOs;

v. Prescribing rules for the declaration of assets and liabilities by officers of NGOs;

vi. Receiving the annual reports of NGOs submitted by the NGOs;

vii. Advising the Government on the activities of the NGOs and their role in development (h) providing policy guidelines to NGOs for harmonizing their activities to the national development plan for Zambia

viii. Receiving discussing and approving the code of conduct prepared by the Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (the “Council”) for the self-regulation of NGOS.

The Act establishes the Zambia Congress of Non-Governmental Organisations (the “Congress”) which shall be the collective forum of all organizations registered under the Act. The Congress shall be managed and controlled by the Council which shall have 12 members who are representatives of NGOs registered under the Act. The functions of the Council are to develop, adopt and administer the Code of Conduct for NGOs, to facilitate and coordinate the work of NGOs operating in Zambia and to perform any other functions relevant for purposes of the Act as the Congress may determine.

The Council is required to facilitate self-regulation by NGOs on matters of activities, funding, programmes, foreign affiliations, training, the development of national human resource, institution building, scientific and technological development and any other matters taking into account national security and the public interest. This shall be the Code and Conduct and the Board shall ensure that it is consistent with the national development plan and the laws of Zambia. Once an application is submitted, an NGO is permitted to operate until a decision is made by the Board on its application. The Registrar shall issue the NGO with a certificate of registration which is valid for a period of five years and shall be conclusive evidence of authority of the holder to operate throughout Zambia or such parts of the country as are specified therein.

An application for registration of an NGO may be rejected by the Board if the proposed activities of the NGO are not in the public interest, the certificate previously held by the NGO has been revoked by the Board, an applicant submits false information the Board is satisfied on recommendation of the council that the application should not be approved, the constitution of the NGO is repugnant to the law, the application does not comply with provisions of the Act, the Board is satisfied that the NGO does not exist or if the name under which the NGO is to be registered is identical to another existing NGO or is otherwise undesirable. The Board has the power to suspend or cancel a certificate of an NGO in cases where the NGO violates the terms or conditions attached to the certificate, the NGO fails to submit the annual reports or accounts or returns, the officers or members of the NGO misappropriate or misapply the funds of the organization, the NGO contravenes any provision of the Act or the Code of Conduct, the Council recommends the suspension or cancellation of the certificate, the NGO alters its objects or pursues objects other than the declared objects or the NGO ceases to exist.

The Registrar is required to publish annually in the gazette, every registration, every suspension or cancellation of registration and every refusal to register an NGO. The duties of an NGO include notification of the Registrar in writing upon change of name, constitution, objects or when an NGO becomes a branch of or affiliated to or connected with any organization or group of whatever nature established within or outside Zambia. An NGO is also required to furnish the Registrar with information relating to its constitution, source of funding, office bearers, annual reports and such accounts, returns and other information as the Minister may by statutory instrument prescribe. Further, An NGO is required to provide to the Registrar notice of the situation of the registered office and postal address.

Controversial NGO Bill Now Law

President Rupiah Banda assented to 13 Bills among them the controversial Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) Bill effectively making them into law. A number of NGOs were, during the year, apprehensive as the Bill went through the legislative process that the government was targeting vocal civil society groups that were always criticising government[179].

Recently MS-Zambia, which funds over 20 organisations ranging from national advocacy based NGOs to community-based organizations (CBOs) at district level, said the implementation of the NGO Bill could taint Zambia’s image abroad and have repercussions on the donor communities’ willingness to commit their resources to the country. MS-Zambia country director Finn Peterson recently told the Post that the NGO Bill was unnecessary because all of his organisation’s partners were fulfilling the requirements and obligations to handle funds and carry out developmental activities according to their partnership agreements, following principles of transparency and accountability.

According to the report of the Committee on Health, Community Development and Social Welfare on the NGO Bill 2009 for the Third Session of the Tenth National Assembly which was appointed in January, the objectives of the Bill, among other things, were to provide for the registration and co-ordination of NGOs, establish the NGO Registration Board and the Zambia Congress of NGOs, constitute the Council of NGOs and enhance the transparency, accountability and performance of NGOs. The Bill defines an NGO as a private voluntary grouping of individuals or associations, whether corporate or incorporated, not established or incorporated for profit, partisan politics or any commercial purposes, and which have organised themselves for the promotion of civil education, advocacy, human rights, social welfare, development, charity, research or other activity or programme for the benefit or interest of the public, through resources mobilised from sources within or outside Zambia.

The Bill also provides for an NGO Registration Board which, according to the Committee, was in line with international best practice, which requires the regulation of non-governmental organisations to prevent money laundering, terrorism and other undesirable activities that are against public order and morality. In addition, the establishment of the Board is intended to enhance good governance and promote greater accountability among nongovernmental organisations. The registrar of NGOs may request, among other things, the source of funding for the non-governmental organization, a list of office bearers of the NGO or any committee or governing body of the NGO, and such accounts, returns and other information as the Minister may, by Statutory Instrument, prescribe. The bill also provides for a code of conduct which provides that a Council of NGOs shall facilitate-self regulation by NGOs on matters of activities, funding, programmes, foreign affiliations, training, the development of national human resources, institution building, scientific and technological development and any other matters taking into account national security and the public interest.

The parliamentary committee observed that the Bill was not only a welcome development but also long overdue and observed that the proposed legislation was intended to promote a spirit of cooperation and shared responsibility within the Government, donors and amongst other interested persons in their dealings with NGOs. The committee also noted that after the advent of the liberalised economy, the number of NGOs had increased tremendously to an extent that, in many circumstances, their efforts were being duplicated, resulting in the irrational use of resources. “The Bill will, therefore, ensure equitable sectoral geographical distribution of the NGO activities through regular consultation with the Government,” the committee noted.

Transparency International Zambia president Reuben Lifuka, commenting on the removal of Task Force executive chairman Max Nkole by President Banda, said: “We want to warn the Zambian people that this heavy-handed approach will become fashionable within the establishment especially now when the NGO Bill has been assented to – we will see government clamping down dissenting views in the NGO sector, the media and everywhere. We are drifting back to the days when only praise-singers could make it in life.” The government’s concern has been that most NGOs have been run as one-man organisations with little or no accountability to anybody. A number of fly-by-night NGOs are known to spring up during election periods which fold up soon afterwards. It will be interesting to see how these will operate with this law in place[180].

Status of the NGO Act, and government’s commitment to its amendment

In the run up to the 2011 elections, one of the controversial laws to be enacted was the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Act which seeks to regulate[1] the operations of civil society organizations in the country[1]. Enacted by the MMD government in 2009 the NGO Act is perceived to be an instrument to close up the space for participation of civil society. For NGOs working to protect human rights, the NGO Act of 2009, if fully implemented in its current form will give the government enough powers to aggressively harass and intimidate CSO groups[1]. The NGO Act also greatly narrows the definitions of CSOs[181].

It must also be noted that on page 48 of the Patriotic Front (PF) manifesto, the PF government, elected in 2011 presidential elections, vowed to amend or repeal the NGO Act which they stated was detrimental to the creation of an enabling environment for civil society. One and a half years have passed since the PF came into office, and Civil society organizations, late last year raised concerns around the inertia exhibited by the government in making the appropriate changes to a piece of legislation considered prohibitive to the operations of NGOs in the country. PF Secretary General, Wynter Kabimba, also in his capacity as Minister of Justice said Government will ensure that it modifies matters which NGOs are not comfortable with in the NGO Act.

Observers and civil society actors say that the PF government won the support of NGOs during the campaign due in large part to these promises; however, since coming into office they have reneged on their promise and have moved towards implementation of the law as it stands. The NGOs have complained over the rigidity of government in opening up to address the matter during the first NGO Congress which has exposed government’s lack of interest in laws meant to improve people’s well-being. Government’s slowness in addressing this issue has since brought anxiety amongst NGOs who felt that the NGO Act is likely to reduce their space. All genuine and well-meaning NGOs are all united on the fact that the NGO Act is a bad law.

Current perception about CSOs by the public, notwithstanding, is that they have changed, and not for the better good of the constituents they serve but there seems to be this unclear agenda that they are trying to champion. Most CSOs are either perceived or have failed to disengage from the likeminded positions they shared with the PF while in opposition. Similarly, with a number of CSO representatives appointed into government, it appears that CSO leaders have had a ‘carrot’ dangled to them, and many have taken unequivocal stands on matters were the public expected them to be strong and censor the government of the day. This could be giving government impetus to keep the NGO Act and use it effectively on CSOs in the long-run.

On March 1, 2013 – following months of speculation and uncertainty, Government launched the NGO Regulation Board – an eight person Board. The NGO Registration Board[1] will be responsible for monitoring the operations of NGOs. It is also expected to perform, among other functions, register, maintain and approve the area of work of NGOs operating in Zambia as well as recommend rules and procedures for the audit of NGOs accounts. An opportunity for the PF to stick to its commitment exists, especially if it can take the Act back to Parliament for amendment following recommendations from the just ended NGO Congress. NGOs were requesting for a law that would work for the betterment of the Zambian people and not promote hostility between the law makers and the NGO sector. Parliament has a responsibility to ensure that this law is repealed so that it works for the good of NGOs, because as it is in its state, the law will frustrate the efforts of the NGOs.

Before the passing of the NGO Act Zambian civil society raised fears that the new intended legislation designed to regulate non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would compromise their independence and even result in a clampdown on their operations. The NGO Act calls for “the registration and co-ordination of NGOs, to regulate the work, and the area of work, of NGOs operating in Zambia.” Under the NGO Act NGOs will be compelled to re-register every five years and submit annual information on their activities, funders, accounts, and the personal wealth of their officials; failure to comply could result in the suspension or cancellation of registration. Civil society leaders and human rights activists feared the new law could be used by government to silence critics and erode civil society, Times of Zambia reports. Apart from the NGOCC, the other two umbrella bodies are the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction and Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD)[182].

NGOs take swipe at PF’s inertia over NGO Act

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have expressed concern over the Patriotic Front (PF) government’s failure to address the controversial NGO Act No 6 of 2009 which they had promised to address during the election campaigns[183]. And Anti Voter Apathy (AVAP) executive director Richwell Mulwani said the PF should commit itself to the amendment process as indicated in their party manifesto and ensure that the Act is taken back to Parliament for amendment following recommendations from the just ended NGO Congress. The NGOs complained over the rigidity of government in opening up to address the matter during the first NGO Congress which has exposed government’s lack of interest in laws meant to improve people’s well-being.

Government’s lack of interest in addressing this issue has since brought confusion among the organisations who now accuse each other of being compromised over the contentious issues outlined in the Act. Forum for Democratic Process (FODEP) Chairperson McDonald Chipenzi said the current NGO Act was detrimental to progression the country has made in the attainment of true democracy adding that the interim board comprising NGO Coordinating Council (NGOCC), Zambia Civic Education Association (ZCEA) and Transparency International Zambia (TIZ) has failed to point out matters that needed urgent attention. Others on the board included Action Aid, Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) and the Zambia Social Council for Development (ZSCD). According to Part 3 of the NGO Act, registration of an NGO should be facilitated by section 10 (1) which states that ‘subject to section eleven, a person shall not operate an NGO that is not registered in accordance with this Act.’ He argued that since there was no organisation that had so far registered under the Act, the interim board should have argued against that fact, which by law did not recognize the existence of all NGO’S as at now.

There are definite flaws in this law and it’s surprising that our colleagues in the interim board failed to speak out on the criminality of this law directed against the major stakeholders- in this case, the NGOs themselves. The organisations argued that the board could not have failed to identify themselves as the victims of the 2009 Act as it was designed against the people it was meant for. When a piece of legislature defines what you do, it simply means that anything it doesn’t say would be contradicting the law, tentatively, this board should have attacked the very existence of such a law and an immediate review should have been proposed to identify a road today. And AVAP director Mr Mulwani said that the NGOs were requesting for a law that would work for the betterment of the Zambian people and not promote hostility between the law makers and the NGO sector. Parliament has a responsibility to ensure that this law is repealed so that it works for the good of NGOs, because as it is in its state we know this law was made to frustrate the efforts of the NGOs[184].

ZAMBIA’S NEW BILL HIJACKS NGOS

On 16 July, Zambia joined a growing list of countries seeking to restrict civil society through controversial legislation. Since the beginning of the year, numerous governments have sought to introduce restrictive laws to curb the ability of civil society organisations and NGOs to critically examine their policies and question their record on good governance. Earlier this month, Ethiopia introduced an anti-terrorism law with provisions ambiguous enough to label peaceful blockade of public services or incidental damage to public property during protest demonstrations as terrorist acts[185].

In June, after much protest from civic groups, Azerbaijan’s parliament deferred its decision to pass restrictive amendments to a law limiting the ability of NGOs to access much-needed funds from international donors to sustain and support their activities. Nicaragua also has a pending draft manual on international cooperation that seeks to impede rather than promote cooperation through provisions that restrict international civil organisations’ involvement in or financing of activities deemed to be of “partisan political nature”.

In February, a restrictive NGO bill was introduced in the Kyrgyz parliament to prevent civil society organisations from “participating in political activities and processes of the popular vote” with wide implications for election monitoring activities. While in some instances NGOs have been able to build enough pressure to prevent restrictive pieces of legislation from becoming law, it remains a matter of deep concern that these initiatives are being undertaken in the first place.

Although absolute dictatorships are gradually giving way to elected governments, use of public resources and government powers to marginalise political opponents remains rife in many parts of the world. With opposition parties effectively silenced or marginalised through coercive means in transitional democracies, NGOs have often had to single-handedly perform the task of exposing official malpractices and hold governments accountable for non-fulfilment of electoral promises. This often leads to accusations in government circles about NGOs meddling in politics and abandoning their non-partisan principles. Government/civil society relations in transitional democracies are further strained by the competition for development aid that many foreign donors seek to channel through NGOs. Often, the result is the introduction of a restrictive NGO bill, as in Zambia’s case.

Although one of the stated objectives of the Zambian bill is to enhance the transparency, accountability and performance of NGOs, questions regarding the motives behind this push by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government, which has held power in the country since 1991, are being raised. Key provisions of the bill restrict the independence of NGOs and subject them to excessive and unwarranted controls. Despite existing international best practices that the decision to register should be the prerogative of an individual NGO, the bill requires all NGOs to subject themselves to compulsory registration within 30 days of their formation or adoption of a constitution. No time limit is prescribed for the processing of a registration application, which could keep some NGOs in a prolonged state of uncertainty regarding their legal status. NGOs can be denied registration in the “public interest”, a term not defined by the bill. This allows decision-makers to make an assessment of an NGO’s merit at their discretion. The bill also ignores the principle of perpetual succession for legal entities, by requiring NGOs to re-register every three years, creating additional bureaucratic hurdles and an opportunity to harass organisations that are critical of official policies.

Furthermore, the bill vests the government-dominated NGO registration board with far-reaching powers that could have serious negative implications for the independence of the NGO sector. Three functions of the NGO board are particularly problematic:

i. The power to approve the area of work of NGOs, which allows the government to determine their thematic and geographic areas of functioning and exercise control over their affairs;

ii. The power to provide policy guidelines to harmonise the activities of NGOs with the national development plan, which co-opts NGOs into assisting in the fulfilment of the political priorities of the government reflected in the plan;

iii. The power to advise on strategies for efficient planning and coordination of activities of NGOs, which treats NGOs as government subsidiaries as opposed to independent entities free to formulate and execute their action plans in line with identified priorities.

Government domination of NGOs is further reinforced through provisions that empower the office of the registrar to demand information from NGOs about their accounts and office-bearers at will and within an unspecified time frame. Registration of an NGO can be suspended or even cancelled for a minor infraction of the bill’s provisions, with no distinction made between first-time and repeat offenders. The bill also imposes forced regulation and peer monitoring on NGOs by forcing them to draw up a code of conduct requiring approval by the government-dominated NGO board, and monitored by a 12-member NGO council. Although members of the council are to be elected by NGOs themselves, its overreaching mandate could have serious repercussions on the autonomy and independence of individual NGOs, who may not subscribe to the majoritarian position adopted by the council. The council is legally obligated to influence the activities of its peers by playing a monitoring and coordinating role over the NGO sector.

A number of civil society organisations in Zambia and abroad have made submissions to the government and parliamentary bodies in regard to the bill but have not received substantive assurances that it will be dropped or at least that its more restrictive aspects will be amended. Passage of the bill in its present form will constitute not only a serious setback for good governance and democratic initiatives in Zambia but is also likely to spawn a spate of restrictive legislation in the region, as attested by recent experiences from Latin America and central Asia, where governments have introduced mirror legislation to roll back civil society space.

FREEDOM HOUSE: Zambia’s government should halt enforcement of NGO law

Freedom House urges the government of Zambia to postpone enforcement of its draconian NGO Act, which required non-governmental organizations to register with the government before February 5 2014, in apparent violation of the country’s constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of association. Freedom House calls on the government to consult with civil society to resolve issues about the legality and enforcement of the law.

The law requires NGOs to register with the Ministry of Community Development, regardless of their legal standing, and also creates a NGO Board, whose membership is dominated by government appointees. The board has authority to deny registration to organizations not complying with provisions of the law. In recent months, nearly 500 NGOs declared their intention not to register under law until the government addressed their concerns. Implementation of the NGO Act is part a broader regressive trend in Zambia, where the government is increasing its harassment of civil society, independent journalists, and political opposition.

The NGO Act was passed in 2009 by a Movement for Multi-party Democracy government. In its 2011 campaign during national elections, the then-opposition Patriotic Front (PF) promised not to implement the law until the issues raised by civil society had been addressed. Since coming to power, however, the PF-led government has moved forward with enforcement[186].

The ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION

The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is the Agency that is mandated to spearhead the fight against Corruption in Zambia. It was established in 1980 under an Act of Parliament, the Corrupt Practices Act No. 14. This Act has over the years been reviewed in a bid to strengthen the anti-corruption legislation. In 2012, the Anti-Corruption Act No 3 was enacted following the repealing of the Anti-Corruption Act, No. 38 of 2010. As the lead institution in the fight against corruption in Zambia, the Commission is geared to professionally execute its mandate through investigations and prosecutions of suspected offenders; establish corruption prevention mechanisms; mobilise support and enlighten the citizenry of Zambia through community education programs. Join the fight against corruption for a better Zambia.

MISSION, GOAL AND VISION

The mission of the ACC is to effectively prevent and combat corruption in order to promote integrity, transparency and accountability for sustainable development in Zambia

GOAL STATEMENT

The ACC’s goal is to achieve a significant reduction in the levels of corruption in Zambia

VISION STATEMENT

The vision of the ACC is to be a lead institution of a broad sector alliance for combating corruption”. Officers of the Commission are also guided by eight fundamental core ethical values in their performance of duty. These include: Integrity, Excellence, Accountability, Respect, Confidentiality, Collaboration, Impartiality, Loyalty, Responsibility and Citizenship as contained in the ACC Code of Ethic

Structure

Act No.3 of 2012 the Commission is established as a two tier body in the sense that there is a Board of Commissioners and the Directorate. The Board of five Commissioners is appointed by the President as follows:

a) Chairperson;

b) Vice Chairperson; and

c) Three other Commissioners as members.

d) There are also Standing Committees of the Board as follows:

i. Strategy Committee

ii. Corruption Prevention Committee

iii. Community Education Committee

iv. Audit and Risk Management Committee

v. Corporate Affairs Committee

The Directorateis established as follows:

a) Director-General

b) Deputy Director General

c) Secretary to the Commission who is also responsible for Finance and Administration

Directors who include:

i. Director of Investigations

ii. Director Corruption Prevention

iii. Director Community Education

iv. Director Legal and Prosecution

ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES

Legal Framework:

The Government has since 2001 maintained a strong legal framework to fight corruption in Zambia. This is evident from the several cases of suspected corruption that the Commission has handled and brought before the courts of law. In furthering the fight against corruption and strengthening the current legal framework the Commission initiated the process of reviewing the law on corruption in order to bring it in line with international best practices. The ACC also lobbied for the enactment of other legislation to support the fight against corruption. As a result, a new law on corruption called the Anti-Corruption Act No. 3 of 2012 was enacted. This is the law under which the ACC currently operates. Further, the Government also enacted a Whistle Blower protection law called the Public Interest Disclosure Act No 4 of 2010 as well as the Forfeiture of Proceeds of Crime Act No. 19 of 2010.

Community Education and Corruption Prevention Exercises

The Commission has continued to successfully conduct several community education and corruption prevention exercises throughout the country as part of the execution of its mandate.

Introduction of Civic Education in Schools

In 2002, The Anti-Corruption Commission, in conjunction with the Curriculum Development Centre embarked on the development of a Civic Education Syllabus for schools in Zambia. The syllabus aims at inculcating correct civic attitudes, develop appropriate value and morals among the youths and covers topics on corruption, human rights, democracy and drug abuse. In 2006, the syllabus was introduced as a pilot in a number of schools. Further, the Commission has worked with the youths through youth festivals and school anti- corruption clubs and has raised the levels of awareness on the evils of corruption among the youths.

Investigations

Investigations of suspected cases of corruption and related crimes are conducted by the Investigations Department of the Commission. The Department thus houses one of the Commission’s core functions. It is responsible for the investigation of corruption and other related crimes. The Department’s principal functions are:

i. To receive and investigate complaints of alleged or suspected corrupt practices

ii. Intelligence gathering and data analysis

Once the ACC receives reports of alleged or suspected corrupt practices the Director General then authorises inquiries to be conducted. Those found with cases to answer under the ACC Act are taken to court for trial and the Commission is represented by the Legal and Prosecutions Department. It is however important to note that an investigation can lead to the following outcomes:

i. Prosecution of the accused once sufficient evidence of the commission of an offence is adduced and the Director of Public Prosecutions gives consent to prosecute the suspected offender.

ii. Exonerating an accused person if there is no evidence that point to wrong doing.

iii. Administrative Action where evidence is insufficient to sustain a case in court or prove the commission of an offence beyond reasonable doubt. In such a situation where evidence is not sufficient but the Commission believes that there is a loophole for corruption or an accused could have engaged in bad behaviour which cannot be proved to be corruption, an investigation can end up in a recommendation for administrative action.

iv. The Commission can refer any case to any relevant agency that is deemed to have adequate authority to deal with cases that do not fall under the Commission’s jurisdiction. Some cases of outright fraud, theft, drug abuse and the like have been referred to the Zambia Police or the Drug Enforcement Commission for them to competently handle.

The Anti-Corruption Act No 3 of 2012 spells out what constitutes and offence of corruption for which the Commission will investigate and prosecute. According to the Act these offences include

i. Promising, giving, receiving and obtaining of gratification in return for a favour. The Act defines gratification as any corrupt payment, whether in cash or in kind.

ii. Misuse or abuse of public office for private or personal gain.

iii. A public officer who lives beyond one’s past and present official emoluments. This offence suggests that a public officer must prove that the wealth they have acquired is within their past and present official emoluments. If they fail to provide an explanation of how they acquired such wealth or property, this may be deemed to have been corruptly or ill-gotten.

The Commission has since inception investigated a lot of cases of corruption falling within the Act as the Commission Annual Reports indicate. Below is a summary of statistics for cases handled by the Commission in 2011

Total Reports Received	Complaints Received	Information Received	Authorized Complaints
1401	345	1056	126
Unauthorized Complaints	Dockets Closed	Dockets Brought Forward From 2010	Total Number Of Active Dockets
219	172	438	564

Legal and Prosecutions

The Legal and Prosecutions Directorate is charged with the responsibility of prosecuting offences under the Anti-Corruption Act No 3 of 2012. Section 6 (1) (b) (ii) of the Act also empowers the Commission to prosecute such other offences under any written law that may come to the attention of the Commission in the course of an investigation for corruption[187].

As such the Legal and Prosecutions Directorate carries out the prosecutorial functions of the Commission which includes:

i. Rendering legal advice on the on-going inquiries and giving legal opinion on dockets upon conclusion of any inquiry.

ii. The Department also drafts all charges and consents for DPP’s consideration and prosecutes all cases of corruption and such other offences that may come to the attention of the commission in the course of any investigation of corruption.

iii. The Department also represents the commission, in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, in all civil matters.

iv. It also undertakes legal research in order to enhance the capacity of the ACC to implement its mandate.

The Directorate is also primarily charged with the responsibility of executing three strategic objectives is contained in the ACC 2009-2013 Strategic Plan. These include;

i. Increase efficiency and effectiveness in investigations and prosecutions in order to improve the clearance rate of cases

ii. Review and strengthen the legal framework in order to enhance the effectiveness of the ACC, included in this is the lobbying of government to ratify and domesticate regional and international conventions and protocols on corruption

iii. Introduce effective prosecutions management and monitoring systems in order to improve the clearance rate of the cases and introduce a higher rate of convictions.

By the close of 2011, the Commission had recorded a total of 15 convictions from January 2011, and 10 acquittals were also recorded during the same period. In 2010 the Directorate recorded 16 convictions and 6 acquittals; this represented a conviction rate of 72%. By and large the Directorate is making huge strides in achieving its long term objectives and annual targets.

Below is a status summary of cases as at December 31^st 2011:

No of Ordinary cases	54
No. of opinions rendered	14
No. of cases before DPP	00
No. of convictions	14
No. of Acquittals	10
No of High Profile Cases	11
No. of Cases pending Judgement	5

National Anti-Corruption Policy-Institutional Level

At the Institutional level, the objectives include, among others, to provide a mechanism for the coordination of anti-Corruption programmes in Government Ministries, Departments, Agencies (MDA) and the Private Sector[188]. In this regard the Public Private Partners Policy launched by GRZ recently will have reference. Another objective at Institutional level is to enhance transparency and accountability in the exercise of Public authority, and streamline cumbersome bureaucratic and complex procedures in public service delivery.

This will be achieved by institutionalization of corruption prevention through formation of Integrity Committees (ICs) in MDAs, and these have already been established in 20 institutions including the Ministry of Lands, the Immigration Department and Zambia Police Service. Among the Local Authorities, ICs have been established in the Lusaka, Livingstone, Ndola and Kitwe City as well as the Kalulushi and Luanshya Municipal Councils. Private Institutions have also requested the ACC to help them set up ICs and Konkola Copper Mines has established ICs at each of its four (4) Integrated Business Units. The benefits of the ICs have begun bearing fruit as witnessed in the establishment of service charters and customer service centre where the IC initiative have been put in place.

Strengthening human, financial and material resource capacity in anti-corruption institution, building capacity and motivating public service workers are other objectives at institutional level. The legal framework has elevated corruption prevention by giving the Commission powers to instruct a public body on practices and procedures that are necessary to prevent, reduce or eliminate corruption. Further, the law has provided for the establishment of IC in all public institutions.

Legal Level

The National Anti-Corruption Policy aims at, among other things, harmonizing and strengthening laws and regulations. This entails reviewing and enacting relevant legislation in the fight against Corruption. This process calls for domestication of international protocols and conventions to adopt best practice

Social Level

At social level, the objectives are to develop, review, coordinate and implement social mechanisms for the fight against Corruption. Another objective is to develop programmes that will counter cultural aspects and traditional customs that promote Corruption. In this light, the Commission will soon be approaching the newly established Ministry of Traditional Affairs, among other stakeholders, with a view to developing such programmes together in future.

Integrity Committees

The Integrity Committees started off as an initiative in 2006 after the publication of the National Governance Survey Report of 2004. The findings of the survey indicated that corruption was rife at the points of public service delivery and the Anti-Corruption Commission was convinced that to address the problem, Integrity Committee needed to be formed in public institutions. The first cohort of Integrity Committees was therefore appointed and trained in 2006. An initial number of eight institutions were selected to pilot the initiative. Since then more Institutions from both the public and private sectors have requested the Anti-corruption Commission to assist them in forming Integrity Committees. With the amendment of the Anti-Corruption Act, the formation of integrity Committees has since become law. Further, the National Anti-Corruption Policy also advocates for the creation of these committee as a measure for institutionalizing the fight against corruption.

Integrity Committee are internal institutional committees established in line with the Government programme which is contained in the National Anti-Corruption Policy (NACP) and provisions of section 6(1) (a) subsection (iv) of the Anti-Corruption Act No. 3 of 2012. These committees are charged with the mandate to spearhead the prevention of corruption within their sphere of control and hence the institutionalization of corruption prevention. The rationale for this institutionalization of corruption prevention is that public institution exists to serve the public. It is in their interest therefore to ensure that they deliver on their respective mandates in an efficient and effective manner free of corruption.

Appointment and Composition

Integrity Committee members are appointed on a three year term by the Chief Executive Officers on behalf of Secretary to the Cabinet. Currently there are thirty two Institutions with Integrity Committees[1].

Guiding Principles

In recognition of the aspirations of the Government and the people of Zambia to achieve ‘zero tolerance’ to corruption, this policy is founded on the following principles:

a) Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law

This requires compliance with the provision of the Constitution, and other laws of the Republic of Zambia, in a manner safeguarding basic human rights and freedoms.

b) Leadership

A committed leadership of unquestionable integrity is a precondition for good governance and for achieving zero tolerance to corruption.

c) Ethics and ethical conduct

Ethics and ethical conduct is a moral and social norm that requires doing more than complying with laws and regulations, to doing what is right with emphasis on good or goodness in conduct. This is in line with what an organized group determines for itself and expects its members to comply with and uphold.

d) Fight against corruption is universal

This is the duty and responsibility of every person of any gender, age, creed or orientation, and institution – private and public, as the effects of corruption are not discriminatory.

e) Fight against corruption is a partnership

This demands development and involvement of strategic partnerships and alliances forming integrity networks that facilitate co-ordination of the activities of all the bodies and stakeholders; exchange of relevant information among major stakeholders; and, provision of assistance to one another.

f) Fight against corruption demands consistency

This entails ensuring effectiveness in implementation of measures against corruption through continuous oversight; review of the performance of the corruption prevention measures; and, making regular proposals on enhancing the effectiveness of the measures to the institution that has the authority to carry out the measures.

Parliament

The African Parliamentarians Network against Corruption (APNAC Zambia) is the major avenue for interface with parliamentarians. Through this the ACC liaises on key legislative and governance issues with parliamentarians.

Media

Media organisations and practitioners play a critical role in keeping the fight against corruption topical. As such, the ACC from time to time conducts media capacity building workshops in order to enhance anti-corruption reporting.

Civil Society Organisations

Civil Society Organisations form another key partner of the ACC given their advocacy, lobbying, mobilisation and related strengths. Training of Trainers is the usual beginning point wherein the ACC takes members of CSOs through corruption and anti-corruption issues. Depending on availability of funds, the ACC may fund some CSOs to undertake sensitization, lobbying and advocacy activities on its behalf.

Currently the Commission has established a Civil Society Fund for Anti-Corruption Campaign (FACC) aimed at creating partnership with CSOs in the fight against corruption. The Fund is a facility established and administered by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) with the support of the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom. The fund is meant to support civil society engagement in monitoring and oversight of delivery of services in sectors with anti-corruption initiatives and contracting out arrangements for community education. Under the fund, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) will be expected to spearhead initiatives aimed at enhancing anti-corruption knowledge among communities; monitoring delivery of public services; and conduct research intended to determine corruption trends and recommend appropriate interventions.

The CSOs engaged will be encouraged to undertake activities with specific targets. The target may be identified by the Commission or the Civil Society engaged to carry out a project. A precise justification for the selection of the target has to be available. In some cases, CSOs will be encouraged to partner with other CSOs in undertaking activities with one CSO taking the lead. The Commission has since embarked on training CSOs with the aim of equipping them with knowledge on corruption and project management. Thereafter CSOs are invited to submit project proposals for them to undertake anti-corruption activities. The guidelines for the fund can be accessed at FACC Guidelines. So far the first phase of processing applications for undertaking anti-corruption activities has commenced.

Milestones Recorded in Graft Fight in 2013 – ACC

The Anti-Corruption Commission states that the year 2013 was successful in the fight against corruption as it saw 27 convictions and 27 arrests being recorded countrywide. A total of 1,987 cases were also received of which 425 were authorized for investigations. Among the achievements include the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2013 which saw Zambia moved a point upwards from 37 in 2012 to 38 in 2013 out of a score of 100 signifying a steady progress in fighting corruption.

In addition, Government’s continued commitment to offer relentless support in the fight against graft saw His Excellency the President of the Republic of Zambia Mr Michael Sata remove from office of two Deputy Ministers namely Mr. Ronald Chitotela, and Mr. Rodgers Mwewa for Labour and Agriculture respectively due to alleged involvement in corruption in the utilization of Constituency Development Funds as stated in the 2011 Auditor General’s Report on Constituency Development Funds.

The conviction of former Youth and Sports Deputy Minister Mr. Steven Masumba by the Courts of law was also encouraging to the Commission and sends a strong message to all that the law will visit anyone regardless of the social position. This is contained in a statement released to the media on 7th January 2013 by the Anti-Corruption Commission spokesperson Timothy Moono. Mr Moono said by close of the year, there were a total of 902 cases under investigations and 205investigations cases were concluded and closed during the year. The Commission recorded 27 arrests country-wide during the year while 27 convictions and 10 acquittals were recorded. There were also 8 withdrawals, 12 appeals and 64 prosecutions cases before the courts of law.

Some highlights of high profile arrests and convictions which occurred during the year are as follows:

i. The arrests of Copper belt Police Commissioner Ms. Mary Tembo

ii. The arrest of former Zambia Railways Limited Chief Executive Officer Prof. Clive Chirwa

iii. The arrest of Mr.Wilfred Serenje, the former Chief Executive Officer for Rural Electrification Authority.

iv. The arrest of Mongu Town Clerk, Mr. Enoch Kandingwe

v. The continued trial of Mr Henry Kapoko, former Human Resources Manager at the Ministry of Health and nine others. Mr. Kapoko and nine others were recently placed on their defence with regard to one of the corruption cases that they are facing before the courts of law.

International Corruption Perception Index for 2013

Zambia has improved on the International Corruption Perception Index for 2013 conducted by Transparency International. The country has scored a possible 38 compared to 37 out of 100 for last year representing a 1 point slight improvement. In percentage terms, the slight improvement represents a 1% upward improvement which Transparency International Zambia considers as not very significant[189]. Zambia on the entire CPI shows that 70 countries performed better than Zambia while Zambia performed better than 98 countries out of 177 countries. 7 countries namely El Salvador, Mongolia, Trinidad and Tobago, Peru, Burkina Faso and Liberia had the same score with Zambia of 38. In the Africa context, 13 countries performed better than Zambia while Zambia performed better than 38 countries on the 2013 CPI

The CPI results are posing a serious clarion call on all Zambians in particular the current Patriotic Front Government to double its efforts in the fight against corruption. Slight improvement needs to be doubled if such efforts are seen to be bearing fruit. The PF government needs to move beyond mere political rhetoric to adopting practical and visible mechanisms in the fight against corruption. A score below an average of 50, calls for more introspection and a candid evaluation on what is working well and what is not working well and what needs to be done better. What is needed is swift and vigorous action and punishment meted out on corrupt officials.

There is need for the government to ensure that delayed laws such as the Access to Information law should be enacted with the urgency they deserve and not the slow pace that is being sugar coated with a variety of unconvincing reasons. The Government should realise that such a law which encourages openness and flow of information can boost the fight against corruption and enhance accountability as citizens will be empowered to access public records and monitor public commitments especially financial expenditure[190].

TIZ is cognisant that the fight against corruption is not only a moral issue but a socio economic problem that continues to undermine sustainable development and good governance. All Zambians of good will need to be courageous enough and join the fight against corruption in both private and public sectors. TIZ has particularly enjoined the media to be resolute and expose corrupt tendencies whether committed by the powerful or the weak in society. If corruption is jointly tackled Zambia will be a far better country in the African continent. The results of the CPI over the years demonstrate that there have not been any drastic efforts at eliminating corruption. Corruption is a unique scourge that will not leave society using the business as usual approach. We want to see a culture of integrity and ethical conduct in the private and public sectors so that all citizens can have equal opportunities in accessing and exploiting the resources in our country” He said.

Anti-Corruption or Political Witch Hunt

President Michael Sata’s anti-corruption campaign is running into criticisms that it is politically motivated. Since coming into power by a narrow margin in 2011 Sata’s Patriotic Front party has brazenly implemented its agenda[191]. Companies and banks have been re-nationalised, anti-corruption probes have proliferated, and new districts and ministries have been created at a surprising pace. While Sata’s supporters applaud this “man-of-action” approach, his opponents and critics decry a campaign of persecution under the cover of Patriotic Front’s anti-corruption drive. They warn of a “political witch hunt” that threatens to drag Zambia back to the days of a one-party state – a development that has foreign investors alarmed[192].

Frustration culminated on February 22, as the opposition staged a walk out of parliament, just days before a visit by the UN Secretary-General. They alleged that the president was abusing due process by establishing districts and ministries without the consent of the legislature. And furthermore, Sata has also come under fire for the controversial nationalisation of several privatised assets. Among his campaign promises, Sata pledged that he would crack down on the alleged corruption of past privatisations and reverse deals that disadvantaged the state. He didn’t wait long to act. Several Commissions of Inquiry, handpicked by the ruling party, delivered their reports within a month of Sata taking power. The new government moved swiftly to reverse the sales of First National Bank and the telecommunications firm Zamtel, and now have their eyes on Zanaco Bank as well as the cancellation of a tax deferment deal with a Pepsi distributer, Varun Beverages. The Sata government has also issued a slew of corruption accusations, investigations, and search warrants targeting mainly MMD members and their families – the opposition alleges political persecution.

Some of the government’s accusations have bordered on the absurd. Maxwell Mwale, the former MMD Minister of Mining, was arrested in early February and accused of stealing 20 bicycles. Former Finance Minister Situmbeko Musokotwane is the target of a probe related to the Pepsi tax deferment as well as Zamtel. The home village of former Vice President George Kunda was raided by police who were looking for suspected stolen government property. Instead they came away with seizures of 46 bags of maize, 15 bicycles, two sewing machines, two oxen ploughs, two mills, and clothing fabric left over from the last campaign that would have been used in the next by-election campaign. Former Energy Minister Kenneth Konga has had numerous properties seized by the police, including a multi-million dollar hotel investment, and was accused, but later cleared of, having circulated counterfeit currency.

Many of the corruption allegations against the opposition stem from the conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry reports on Zamtel and the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), which are available online. But the opposition claims disputes the objectivity of the Commission’s reports, not least because they are chaired by Patriotic Front party members. The Zamtel report, for example, recommended that the government immediately reverse the $257 million sale to LAP Green, because the buyer supposedly failed to meet pre-qualification criteria, that the asset was undervalued, and that the negotiations were riddled with irregularities. In particularly aggressive language, the report stated that the sale of Zamtel by the previous government was “a clear case of economic sabotage which pervaded and compromised key GRZ institutions to the extent that GRZ decisions and policy were being managed by a foreign consultant.”

In a recent interview, however, Former Finance Minister Musokotwane scoffed at the conclusions of the report. Musokotwane claims that not only did LAP Green fulfil all requirements and present the highest bid, the Commission report ignored the fact that Zamtel was audited and evaluated by Ernst & Young, which found the company to be insolvent with a negative net worth. What the Commission did, says Musokotwane, and was to take the asset valuation but ignore the liabilities, such as tax liability, debts to suppliers, and an unfunded pension liability. “They have used massive propaganda in newspapers such as The Post to give the Zambian people the impression that there was fraud or corruption in relation to these companies, and now they have used that as an excuse to nationalise the assets,” said Musokotwane. “And for investors, both in Zambia and from abroad, they read beyond propaganda and see the details contained in the report, and now they are legitimately worried that anyone’s investment can be taken by this government without the protection of the law[193].”

There have been similar complaints over Sata’s reversal of the sale of First National Bank, which had been purchased by South Africa’s FirstRand for $5.5 million last year. After taking back the bank in early October 2011, Sata handed it back over to the former owner Rajan Mahtani, believed to be one of the president’s largest financial supporters. And now, with another Commission of Inquiry due to present its report soon on Zanaco, which was sold by President Levy Mwanawasa in 2007 to the Dutch entity Rabobank for $8.25 million, the opposition is expecting a similar outcome.

Government officials strongly deny any suggestion that President Sata’s anti-corruption drive is aimed at punishing his opponents. “If you look at the privatisation programmes of the last few years by the former government, you will see that they are riddled with irregularities and improprieties,” said Commerce Minister Bob Sichinga. “We have zero tolerance for corruption. We said it before the election, and now we are doing it after the election. There was a huge outcry on behalf of Zambian people against the privatisations, and the only people who are complaining are the ones who want to protect wrongdoing.” The Commission of Inquiry claims to have uncovered underhand methods and ulterior motives in the sale of Zamtel and no receipt of funds for First National, said Given Lubinda, the PF’s Foreign Affairs and Tourism Minister. “I want to deny all these allegations that there is a witch hunt,” Lubinda said. “Has anybody been charged, put on trial, or imprisoned? No – and if someone were to be found in violation of the law, they would be given a trial and presumed innocent until proven guilty.”

Accommodating wider dissent

Nevertheless, there are public figures outside of the MMD who retain some doubts that Sata’s anti-corruption drive can be taken at face value. “There is no doubt that there is a need to fight corruption, nobody questions that. But what we want is a professional and transparent fight against corruption; a fight that will ensure that there is no selectiveness, and no vindictiveness. Unfortunately, at the moment it is very clear that the fight against corruption is being used to settle political scores,” said Hakainde Hichilema, head of the United Party for National Development (UPND), another opposition party which formerly held a pact with Patriotic Front.

When UPND and PF were joined in their pact, Hichilema says that Sata wanted to gain the trust of moderate voters and the support of the investment community, but ultimately his plan was move the country toward nationalisation. Hicilema, who has become a vocal critic of the Sata government, suffered an attack on his house two weeks ago by an organised cadre allegedly sent by the ruling party. The police failed to intervene and protect the house, says Hichilema, because they are afraid they would be dismissed by the government.

Protecting foreign investment

All across Zambia’s political spectrum, investment is recognised as the key to economic development and employment. How the new government handles the review of privatisations and its anti-corruption drive will depend upon the impact on foreign investment. Both Sichinga and Lubinda are keen to emphasize that Patriotic Front is open to working with any and all foreign investors, despite past statements by the president – on the campaign trail in 2006, Sata denounced Chinese labour standards, and describing foreign investors as “foreign infestors”. He substantially toned down his criticism in the 2011 campaign and held his first public meeting after winning the election with China’s ambassador, Zhou Yuxiao, where he stressed the importance of China’s investment to the country and also the sanctity of Zambian labour and investment regulations. “Our government is not one that is going to be selective in the manner that it treats foreign investors or foreign governments,” said Lubinda. “We do not look North, South, East, West, up or down. For us, we treat investors equally irrespective of their origins, and we consider ourselves to be a neutral player in the global economy and in global politics.”

Yet the opposition insists that by pursuing these expropriations without adhering to constitutional norms, President Sata risks losing the trust of the investment community, the stability of the Kwacha, and all the progress made over the past 20 years[194]. “Sata has promised civil servants in the health sector a 100% salary increment, and of course, soon all other public sector workers will demand similar treatment, creating unprecedented inflation in Zambia,” said Mr Musokotwane. “It is difficult to see the new direction the government is taking; no one knows what their policy is. They say ‘more money in people’s pockets,’ but that can only happen when you create business opportunities and employment opportunities.” The political challenge Zambia is facing is familiar to many developing countries that are dependent on resource exports. Under former President Rupiah Banda, Zambia’s GDP growth surged from 5.68% in 2008 to 7.61% in 2010 while inflation dropped to a single digit number. Yet despite a growing job market, many young citizens have yet to be incorporated into the economy.

More than half of Zambia’s 13 million people are under the age of 20, and most of them graduate from school with little hope of finding work. In such an environment, Mr Sata’s campaign promises to transform the country in 90 days and put more money in people’s pockets finds a very receptive audience, especially among the youth. And if the Zambian people run out of patience, the “Don’t Kubeba” slogan could take on a whole new meaning.

CONCERNS ABOUT PRESIDENT SATA AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT

Serious concerns over alarming conduct by the new government of President Michael Sata and the Patriotic Front party have been raised by of the opposition movement. They argue that argues that the Patriotic Front’s economic mismanagement has discredited many institutions of government which may be responsible for administering foreign aid resources[195]. The opposition raised a number of questions surrounding the Patriotic Front’s management of the economy – including the appointment of members of the president’s family to the Ministry of Finance[1] and several no-bid contracts allegedly awarded to companies owned by members of government.

In addition to these conflicts of interest, President Sata has begun personally rewarding his political cadres with positions in state-owned companies, when by law the candidates for such positions should be nominated and selected only by the board of directors. At several key public companies, such as ZESCO, ZNBC, the Zambian National Building Society (ZNBS), Food Reserve Agency (FRA), National Pension Scheme (NAPSA), and the Workers Compensation Fund, Sata has appointed new chief executive officers and other positions. The competency of the individuals chosen for these important positions has been called into question – for example, Sata appointed the secretary general of the party, Wynter Kabimba, to act as interim head of Zamtel, the re-nationalized telecom, despite a total absence of any experience in telecommunications.

The opposition also raised the seizure of a bank formerly belonging to an alleged financial supporter of the president, while also raising alarm over the confrontation between the administration and the judiciary. Contributing to the crisis of confidence in Zambia’s public institutions was President Sata’s rushed decision to repossess Finance Bank from its South African owners, First National, and hand the financial institution back to the bank’s former owner, Rajan Mahtani, one of Sata’s largest financial supporters. This transaction was executed on October 3, 2011 – just ten days after Sata’s inauguration – while two charges of forgery against Mr. Mahtani concerning his management of Finance Bank were mysteriously dropped without reason by the new government.

The seizure of Finance Bank by the Patriotic Front government calls into question the independence of banking regulation in Zambia. On December 31, 2010, the Bank of Zambia (BOZ), whose Governor is tasked with public oversight of the country’s financial institutions, issued a Government Gazette outlining all the violations of law by the management of Finance Bank that prompted the State to intervene[196]. The findings of the BOZ investigation of Finance Bank, which included fraudulent representation of shareholdings and numerous violations of the Banking and Financial Services Act, CAP 387 (BFSA), have never been disputed or retracted.

The repossession of Finance Bank and transfer back to the former owner was conducted in violation of normal judicial process. Dr. Caleb Fundanga, the highly regarded Governor of the Bank of Zambia, was removed from his post by President Sata. The position was left vacant for a period of three months, essentially rendering Zambia in the unique position of having no acting regulator over the banking sector for a considerable period of time. The opposition also stated that President Sata has limited freedom of expression by filing numerous defamation lawsuits seeking more than $1 million in damages from opponents, while at least one citizen has been jailed for criticizing the president.

The patriotic front’s attack on the independence of the judiciary

Accompanying this takeover of Zambia’s economic institutions has been a parallel campaign to take political control over the judiciary, damaging the ability of Zambia’s courts to administer justice, and leaving the system vulnerable to abuses benefitting friends and allies of the president[197]. As clearly stated in the Patriotic Front’s 2011-2016 Manifesto under Section 22, page 42, the government declares its intention to install PF members throughout all positions of the judiciary, which by definition contravenes the principle of judicial independence.[198] In the brief eight months since Sata has been in office, there have been numerous instances of executive interference in judicial matters, as the president has sought to circumvent due process through politically appointed commissions of inquiry, persecuting opponents with false cases, tribunals, and calling for the removal of independent judges.

This worrying confrontation between the executive and the judiciary culminated in May 2012, as President Sata brought judge with whom he has a personal relationship from Malawi to sit on a judicial review tribunal aimed at clearing out members of the judiciary he deems as insufficiently loyal to the Patriotic Front. Even before the Tribunal could sit, and providing no stated reason, Sata suspended one Supreme Court judge and two High Court judges for their involvement in a ruling in the case of Development Bank of Zambia (DBA) vs. JCN Holdings, Nchito, Nchito, and M’membe.

One of these judges had found that the defendants, which include newspaper editor Fred M’Membe – Sata’s close political ally – and Mutembo Nchito – who works as Sata’s Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), were liable for the repayment of a 14 billion kwacha debt to the publicly owned financial institution following the bankruptcy of Zambian Airways. The president intervened to suspend the judges for this “unfavorable” judicial finding, and appointed a Tribunal to remove the judges despite the fact that the case in question had not yet gone through the appeals process, representing a constitutional violation. On May 17, a High Court judge issued an injunction on Sata’s Tribunal pending the outcome of two of the suspended judges’ appeals for judicial review, postponing until May 30 a decision whether or not the unlawfully formed Tribunal will be able to proceed. In response, the Patriotic Front’s Minister of Justice Sebastian Zulu lashed out at the judiciary with pointed threats, saying that they had acted out of “panic.”[199]

The government’s attacks against judicial independence have increased in recent weeks. The Deputy Minister of Mines Richard Musukwa was quoted in The Post Newspaper on June 4, 2012, arguing for the complete dissolution of the judiciary, leaving Zambia entirely without any legal system for a period of months while a new politically loyal judiciary would built anew. Days earlier, Justice Minister Zulu threatened that the Patriotic Front would be willing to dissolve the judiciary in the event that they are unable to accomplish their agenda. Such statements are deeply troubling to foreign investors and cause significant damage to Zambia’s reputation of stability and sanctity of contracts.

Amid calls by Patriotic Front members for the Chief Justice and other members of the judiciary to resign en masse and then “reapply” for their positions, Justice Minister Zulu remarked “This growing trend where we are having a dictatorship of the judiciary is a recipe for anarchy, and if not nipped in the bud may lead to serious problems in this country.”[200] These events occur within the context of an ongoing campaign to apply pressure on the judiciary and instrumentalize the courts with pre-determined verdicts.

During the swearing in ceremony of Mr. Nchito to the position of DPP[201], President Sata violated the constitutional separation of powers by giving specific instructions regarding prosecution. President Sata stated the following:

“Today we have a very deadly legal joint with attorney general, the solicitor general and yourself. We expect you to assist the judiciary because don’t blame the judiciary if they are acquitting people if you don’t prepare your cases properly. If you are you have half-baked cases, you have to improve. Look at some of the old cases privatisation of Roan Mine, privatisation of Kagem, privatisation of Lima Bank, privatisation of Intercontinental Livingstone. All of those are cases stinking with corruption. You have all been called back. Your former chairman is now permanent secretary and the minister of home affairs and I’m sure that with the attorney general who was once harassed because they didn’t like his hands stinking or that he was going to round them up, we expect to leave Zambia better than we found it. There are still some Chinese companies which are funding MMD. If you get in touch with the people the in drug enforcement they’ll give you the details, and they will give you the names, and when you go to Zamtel don’t look at Zambians only. These Libyans are the one who corrupted Zambians so don’t go for Zambians you must also go for the Libyans from “Lap Green”. They are the ones who have dirty money and dirty hands. Sort them out!” (Emphasis added)[202]

In the first eight months of the Patriotic Front’s administration, no fewer than eight separate Commissions of Inquiry have been appointed. These handpicked commissions have served as a convenient tool to circumvent normal judicial processes to justify both the seizure of assets and persecutions of opponents. Concluding that “President [Sata] had a pre-determined idea” in establishing his commissions of inquiry, Zambia’s Centre for Policy Dialogue has found that “the commissions of inquiry constituted by President Michael Sata to investigate the alleged corruption activities by the MMD are a waste of public funds”[203]

The credibility of several of these Commissions of Inquiry has been called into question for the independence of the appointed chairpersons. The commissions are rarely chaired by politically neutral judicial figures. The commission studying oil supply deals is chaired by the aforementioned Mr. Kabimba of the Patriotic Front party, while the commissions on the revenue authority and Zamtel (which was already expropriated) were chaired by Justice Minister Zulu. Another Commission of Inquiry has investigated the sale of Zanaco bank, which has raised fears that another expropriation could be forthcoming.[204] These fears of expropriation have resulted in two successive credit rating downgrades by international rating agency Fitch.

Beyond the judiciary, President Sata is determined to appoint members of the Patriotic Front throughout every level of public institutions. Since his election to the presidency, Sata has repeatedly violated protocol by naming the Secretary General of the party, Mr. Kabimba, as third in command behind Vice President Guy Scott and ahead of the speaker of parliament – despite Mr. Kabimba not having an official portfolio in the cabinet.

President Sata’s crackdown on opposition and freedom of expression

In conjunction with the installation of family members throughout the Ministries of Finance, Commerce, and Defence and the campaign to eliminate judicial independence, President Sata has embarked on an increasingly open war on the rights of the political opposition and freedom of expression. Under the disguise of an “anti-corruption campaign,” the Patriotic Front has persecuted numerous political opponents on implausible grounds. The report by the Commission of Inquiry set up to look into the Zambia Revenue Authority has been the main source of allegations mounted against former Finance Minister Musokotwane as well as the former President Rupiah Banda. President Sata has exerted clear pressure over this commission to deliver the desired results. On December 23, 2011, Sata publicly berated the chairman of the Commission for failing to take action against the former government over scanners, over which he was personally convinced of wrongdoing despite the absence of an investigation and a normal judicial process. Following that intervention, the Chairman of the Commission returned on January 27, 2012 recommending that Rupiah Banda, Musokotwane, and eleven other government officials be sanctioned over the procurement of scanners and a tax deferment.[205]

The government’s manipulation of the investigative wings has had a profound impact on the ability of opposition parties to operate. Despite very few formal charges or concluded trials, the Patriotic Front has seized hundreds of vehicles, thousands of bicycles, and even bags of cornmeal and t-shirts from various opposition figures, preventing them from competing in upcoming by-elections. The anti-corruption campaign has also been used to launder reputations of members of the Patriotic Front. For example, the President’s son, Mulenga Sata, briefly appeared before the Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC) to answer questions regarding two luxury vehicles that were allegedly given to him in exchange for access to the president. He was promptly cleared without undergoing any serious investigation. Similarly, the PF Member of Parliament Sylvia Masebo was cleared by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in a case involving the procurement of funeral vehicles. While former members of MMD who switched parties to the PF have had their cases dropped, not a single member of the opposition has been cleared by the anti-corruption authorities, leaving some on the hook since October 2011, with their property seized and movements limited.

Although the President enjoys immunity from prosecution, he initiated a series of defamation lawsuits aimed at his critics that stifle freedom of expression among the Zambian media. In May, a civil servant employed by the Zambian government was convicted and sentenced to three months in jail for having allegedly defamed the president. Within a period of one week, the independent Daily Nation newspaper has received two legal suits from President Sata for defamation of character, demanding payments of more than US$400,000.

Moreover, intensified incursions on the freedoms of association and expression are raising the spectre of democratic backsliding in Zambia. Several independent journalists and political activists have recently been detained for reporting on sensitive topics. On 9 January 2013, freelance journalist Chanda Chimba III, creator of “Stand Up for Zambia,” a 2011 documentary series critical of President Michael Sata, was arrested on charges including unlawful printing and possession of property suspected to be proceeds of crime. Prior to his arrest, Chimba had published a series of articles questioning the government’s democratic trajectory. Two members of the opposition Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD), former Information Minister Ronnie Shikapwasha and former Permanent Secretary Samson Phiri, have been charged with defamation for instructing the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) to broadcast the documentary.

President Sata has also sued University of Zambia lecturer Choolwe Beyani over comments made in a news article. Hakainde Hichilema, an opposition leader of the United Party for National Development, has also been named in a lawsuit from President Sata for having commented publicly about the aforementioned no-bid contract to renovate State House. President Sata has also launched lawsuits against the independent radio station HOT FM, along with UPND member Douglas Siakalima. In total, the president is seeking payment of more than $1 million in these various suits, which, no matter what the outcome in the courts, place enormous financial pressure on the opposition and the few remaining independent media outlets in the country.

The involuntarily dissolution of a civil society organization should only be considered as a measure of last resort and subject to independent judicial oversight. The Zambian government is urged to reconsider its decision to deregister FODEP and hope the Patriotic Front government will make good on its campaign promise to guarantee an enabling environment for civil society.

Key among civil society concerns in Zambia is the existence on the statute books of a restrictive NGO law and whose application has been sporadic. The 2009 NGO Act requires all NGOs to register and empowers the government to refuse registration on broad grounds. The law also empowers government officials to dictate geographic and thematic areas of operation for NGOs and direct the harmonisation of NGO activities with officially dictated priorities, which impact upon the independence of the civil society sector.

There are serious concerns on the escalating campaign to silence independent dissent in Zambia, calling on the government to take immediate steps to protect media and civil society freedoms. A number of civil society organizations advocating for greater civic engagement in Zambia’s on-going constitution-making process have recently been threatened with deregistration. Moreover, in an apparent attempt to suppress voices critical of President Michael Sata and the ruling Patriotic Front several journalists and political activists have been arrested on various charges including defamation of the President and operating unsanctioned media outlets.

On 26 December 2012, the Office of Registrar of Societies informed the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), a non-governmental organization established in 1992 to promote and strengthen democratic governance in Zambia, that their registration would be discontinued in 28 days. The letter, which was sent without prior notification, reportedly makes several unfounded allegations of organisational misconduct including “pursuing objectives contrary to the objectives for which [FODEP] was formed” and “failing to furnish [the Office of Registrar of Societies] of such duly audited accounts”. FODEP has since issued an exhaustive response questioning the validity of the Office of Registrar of Societies’ assertions.

THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM-Individual Corruption

The Zambian judicial system is hampered by inefficiency, corruption, and a lack of resources, according to both the US Department of State 2012 and the Bertelsmann Foundation 2012. This perception is corroborated by the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2013, according to which, the judiciary is perceived by citizens to be among the most corrupt public institutions in Zambia[206].

Corruption is especially prevalent in the lower subordinate courts, according to the Bertelsmann Foundation 2012. Inefficiency in the system is partially due to corruption, but is also a result of understaffing and inadequately educated and trained personnel. In addition, the judiciary suffers from a huge backlog of cases. According to a March 2013 article published by Zambian Economist, a magistrate was arrested and charged with corruption and abuse of office. The magistrate allegedly received a bribe from a mother of a convicted criminal in order to pervert the course of justice in a criminal case concerning her son in April 2010. The article notes that the supplier of the bribe is also facing charges.

Business Corruption

Companies do not have much confidence in the judicial system and are sceptical as to whether the judicial system will enforce contractual and property rights in business disputes. Business executives surveyed in the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013 indicate that the judiciary is not completely independent and is sometimes influenced by members of government, citizens, or companies. According to the US Department of State 2013, enforcement of contracts and property rights is weak and final court decisions usually take a long time to be reached. The courts are further reported to be relatively inexperienced in relation to commercial litigation and there is a significant backlog of commercial cases.

Political Corruption

Zambia’s legislation provides for an independent judiciary; however, according to the US Department of State 2012, the government does not consistently respect judicial independence in practice. According to the report, government officials use their positions to circumvent standard judicial procedures. Nevertheless, the courts at times made judgments and rulings critical of the government in 2009. Also Bertelsmann Foundation 2012 points out that, although the country’s judicial system is relatively independent, the courts’ rulings are sometimes tainted by political interference by the government in politically sensitive cases.

Frequency

Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2013:

– 83% of households surveyed consider the judiciary to be ‘extremely corrupt’.

– Citizens give the judiciary a score of 4.3 on a 5-point scale (1 ‘not at all corrupt’ and 5 ‘extremely corrupt’).

The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2013:

– Enforcing a commercial contract in Zambia requires a company to go through an average of 35 administrative procedures, taking an average of 471 days at a cost of 38.7% of the claim.

World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013:

– Business executives give the independence of the judiciary from influences of members of government, citizens, or companies a score of 3.5 on a 7-point scale (1 ‘heavily influenced’ and 7 ‘entirely independent’).

– Business executives give the efficiency of the legal framework for private companies to settle disputes and to challenge the legality of government actions and/or regulations a score of 4.4 and 3.9 respectively on a 7-point scale (1 ‘extremely inefficient’ and 7 ‘highly efficient’).

HUMAN RIGHTS

Zambia has a reputation of a stable democracy with a small population and a history of reform, demonstrating a respectable human rights record. However, since the election to the presidency in 2011 of Michael Sata, a troubling pattern of repression of political opponents, civil society and disenfranchised members of the population has emerged[207]. Multiple political opposition party members have been arrested on pre-textual charges, such as defamation of the president or holding an illegal gathering, for their campaign activities. Political rallies have been blocked by riot police, youth meetings banned, and allegations of corruption occur with increasing regularity. It is to be noted some these actions also occurred under prior administrations; however it does not excuse the continuance, severity or frequency with which this oppression occurs. Freedom of the press is also a recurring concern in Zambia, often in conjunction with political oppression. From censorship of publications to allegations of the physical harassment of journalists, protecting the free flow of information in Zambia remains a top priority.

In May 2013, police arrested Phil Mubiana and James Mwansa for alleged same-sex conduct, illegal in Zambia[208]. They were subjected to anal examination without consent and forced to make confessions to speed up the trial. This follows an increasing pattern of hate speech towards members of the LGBT community by government officials and within state controlled media. Amnesty International is concerned about the safety of those arrested, as well as the LGBT community within Zambia as a whole. Direct foreign investment in Zambia’s burgeoning natural resource and consumer markets allow ample space for corporate abuse of individual rights in the areas of labour and consumer protection and an exploitation of the lagging regulatory framework in the country.

History
Zambia pledged itself, as a Member State of the United Nations to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect and observance of human rights and freedom in the nation[209]. It is in this vein that the Government of the Republic of Zambia established the Human Rights Commission (HRC).

The establishment of a permanent human rights institution was recommended by the Human Rights Commission of Inquiry (The Munyama Commission of Inquiry), which was appointed in 1992 by Former President, Dr. Fredrick Chiluba to investigate and establish violations of human rights during the Second Republic years (1972 to 1991) as well as violations that occurred in the Third Republic (after October 30, 1991 when the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) came to power.

The Munyama Commission of Inquiry noted that many witnesses who testified to the Commission appreciated the appointment of the Commission of Inquiry and expressed the need for the Government to establish a permanent institution to safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms. The idea of a permanent institution for the promotion and protection of human rights had also been recommended by the Mwanakatwe Constitution Review Commission, which was constituted to spearhead the introduction of constitutional amendments that were effected in 1996. So in 1996, the Government introduced a new constitution and one of the new aspects introduced in the constitution was Part XII entitled “Human Rights Commission.”

Article 125(1) established the Human Rights Commission. Article 125(2) stated that the Commission was to be an autonomous body. Article 126 provided that the functions and powers, composition, funding and administrative procedures were to be prescribed in an Act of Parliament. In 1996, the Human Rights Commission Act No. 39 of 1996 was created.
In April, 1997 the first set of commissioners were appointed by the then Republican President, Dr Fredrick Titus Chiluba. The next Commissioners were appointed in February 2004 by the late then President Levy Patrick Mwanawasa.

Zambian Human Rights Commission

The Zambian Human Rights Commission is a national human rights institutions established under Article 125 of the Constitution of Zambia and mandated by the Human Rights Commission Act No. 39 of 1996 to inter alia investigate and remedy human rights violations, conduct human rights education, monitor the conditions under which persons detained in prisons and police cells are kept and to monitor Government’s fulfilment of international and regional human rights treaties and human rights obligations under national law.

Its functions as provided by Section 9 of the Human Rights Commission Act No 39 of 1996 are to, investigate human rights violations, investigate any maladministration of justice, propose effective measures to prevent human rights abuses, visit prisons and other places of detention and related facilities with a view to assessing and inspecting conditions of the persons held in such places and make recommendations to redress existing problems, establish a continuing program of research, education, information and rehabilitation of victims of human rights abuse to enhance the respect for and protection of human rights and do all such things as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the functions of the Commission[210].

Mandate and Functions

The Commission is an independent Constitutional body established under Article 125 of the Constitution of Zambia. Its autonomy is guaranteed by Article 125(2) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Human Rights Commission Act No. 39 of 1996. The Commission has a broad mandate to promote and protect human rights outlined in its constitutive Act.

Its functions are basically protective, promotional, educative and advisory. In order to fulfil its broad mandate, the Commission is empowered by Sections 9 and 10 of the Human Rights Commission Act No. 39 of 1996 to protect and promote human rights for all in Zambia through:

Investigation of allegations of human rights abuses;

i. Investigation of any mal administration of justice;

ii. Visiting prisons and other places of detention and related facilities with a view to assessing and inspecting conditions of the persons held in such places and make recommendations to redress existing problems;

iii. A continuing programme of research, information and education to enhance the respect for and protection of human rights: and

iv. Facilitating the rehabilitation of victims of human rights abuses

The Commission also possesses a monitoring and advisory function, and is empowered to propose effective measures to prevent human rights abuses as well as do all such things as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the functions of the Commission.

Powers
The Human Rights Commission has powers to investigate any human rights abuses either by its own initiative, or on receipt of a complaint or allegation under the Human Rights Commission Act by –

i. An grieved person acting in his own interest;

ii. An association acting in the interest of its person; or

iii. A person acting on behalf and in the interest of a group or class of persons

The Commission also has powers to:

i. Issue summons for the production of any document relevant to any investigation by the Commission question any person on any subject matter under investigation before the Commission.

ii. Question any person on any subject matter under investigation before the Commission

iii. Require any person to disclose any information within such person’s knowledge relevant to any investigation by the Commission.

iv. Do all such things as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the functions of the Commission

The Human Rights Commission, where it considers it necessary, may recommend:

i. Punishment of any officer found by the Commission to have perpetrated an abuse of human rights

ii. The release of a person from detention

iii. The payment of compensation to a victim of human rights abuse, or to such victim’s family

iv. That an aggrieved person seek redress in a court of law; or

v. Such other action as it considers necessary to remedy the infringement of human rights

Structure

The structure of the Human Rights Commission, reflecting the provisions of the Human Rights Commission Act No.39 of 1996, is composed of the Commission and the Directorate.

a) Commission

The Human Rights Commission consists of seven Commissioners- the Chairperson, the Vice Chairperson and five other Commissioners – who are appointed by the President subject to ratification by the National Assembly. Commissioners hold office for a period of three years subject to renewal.

b) Directorate

The directorate, headed by the Director who is assisted by the Deputy Director, includes the following departments/sections and programmes:

i. Legal and Investigations

This department primarily investigates cases of human rights violations. It also facilitates visits by the Commission to prisons and other places of detention to assessing and inspecting conditions of persons held in such places and make recommendations to redress the problems. The department uses a variety of techniques in carrying out its investigative functions. These include field or on-site investigation, interviews at the offices of the Human Rights Commission either at the headquarters in Lusaka or at regional offices, telephone interviews or inquiries, including conducting public hearings.

ii. Information, Education and Training

In line with the Commission’s mandate under section 9(a) of the Human Rights Commission Act, this department carries out human rights education and sensitization and conducts training in human rights, to raise awareness and empower people with the necessary information, knowledge and skills in promoting and protecting human rights in Zambia. This is done largely through design and distribution of IEC materials; media training, human rights orientation workshops; TV/radio discussion and dramatized programmes; community theatre shows and a wide variety of other activities all designed to enhance the culture of human rights.

iii. Research, Advocacy and Planning

This department carries out research into identified human rights issues and undertakes advocacy to positively influence as well as monitor the development and observance of key national and international human rights standards by all stakeholders, for the protection and promotion of human rights in Zambia. It also ensures effective liaison and networking between the Commission and other organizations involved in research concerning human rights issues in order to harmonise efforts and maintain standards in the promotion of human rights.

iv. Office of the Commissioner for Children’s Rights

The Office of the Commissioner for Children was recently established with the support of Save the Children Norway and Sweden to enhance the promotion and protection of children’s rights in Zambia in line with the requirements of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). This office will execute its functions, within the mandate of the Human Rights Commission provided for under article 125 of the Constitution of Zambia, which include, but is not limited to investigation of violation of children’s rights, investigation of maladministration of justice, inspection of standards of childcare in prisons and institutions of care as well as research, awareness and sensitization on children’s rights.

Under the auspices of the Office of the Commissioner for Children’s Rigths, the Human Rights Commission carried out visits to state correctional facilities such as Katombora Reformatory School in Livingstone, Nakambala Approved School in Mazabuka, and Insakwe Probation Hostel for Girls in Ndola to assess childcare standards in order to ensure the quality of life for children. Earlier, the Commission had conducted a Public Hearing on violence against children, under the theme “our right to be protected from violence” though which it was learnt that vulnerable and disadvantaged children such as orphans and children on the street suffer the most violence.

Withe support of Save the Children Norway and Sweden, the Commission also visited a number of countries including Mauritius, Norway, Nigeria and Sweden, to learn about the establishment and functions of the Office of Commissioner for Children in those countries. The efforts to establish the Office of the Commissioner for Children have been supported by many other stakeholders working with the Commission on children’s rights, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Children In Need Network (CHIN).

v. Human Rights and HIV/AIDS

As a contribution towards a rights-based national response to HIV, the Human Rights Commission has initiated a pilot project which will deal with issues relating human rights and HIV/AIDS. Among other things, this project seeks to:

Create awareness on the relationship between HIV and human rights and on the role of the National Human Rights Commission of Zambia in the protection of HIV-related human rights;

Empower people infected and affected by HIV, including vulnerable and marginalised groups, to access the judicial and other avenues for the protection of their human rights; and

Contribute to strengthening the policy and legislative environment for the protection of the rights of people living with HIV.

vi. Human Resource and Administration

This section is responsible for staff recruitment, performance appraisals, staff orientation and everything to do with personnel and general administration.

vii. Finance and Accounts

All financial matters are handled by the Financial and Accounts section.

viii. Provincial Offices

As part of a decentralization programme, five provincial offices have been opened to enhance accessibility and visibility of the Commission. These include Chipata Office in Eastern Province, Kasama Office in Northern Province, Livingstone Office in Southern Province, Mongu Office in Western Province and Ndola Office on the Copperbelt Province.

c) Thematic Committees

In accordance with Section 15 of the Human Rights Commission Act the Commission has established five Thematic Committees as follows:

i. Gender Equality Rights Committee.

ii. Civil and Political Rights Committee.

iii. Children’s Rights Committee

iv. Economic, Social, Cultural and Solidarity Rights Committee

v. Education and Information Committee

Previously, the Human Rights Commission had a special committee on Access to Justice and Freedom from Torture which was merged with the Civil and Political Rights Committee, following the decision of the Commission meeting held on 7th January 2009, to allow for the formation of Education and Information Committee.

d) Programming

In designing and implementing its activities the Commission has been guided by the National Plan of Action which was developed with human rights stakeholders in Zambia for the period 1999 to 2009. The NPA is a guide and framework identifying priority areas, strategies, actions and goals for the effective promotion and protection of all human rights at all levels and for the building of a sustainable human rights culture in the country. In addition, the Commission is guided by its Strategic Plan (2007-2011) whose emphasis is about re-strategizing on the Commission’s activities and developing plans to upscale on some of the viable activities while introducing new activities where necessary.

Mission
The mission of the Human Rights Commission is to promote and protect human rights for all people in Zambia through investigations of human rights violations, rehabilitations of victims of human rights abuses, education of communities and advocacy for policy and legal changes influenced by evidence based research.

About human rights in Zambia

Zambia is a signatory to major UN and regional treaties protecting human rights. Although by ratifying international conventions Zambia has an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of all citizens, the provisions of these treaties are not locally effective if not incorporated into the domestic legislation.

The Bill of Rights embodied in Part III of the current Zambian Constitution provides for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. However, the rights pertaining to the improvement of the welfare of the citizenry such as education, health, housing, employment and social security are not placed in the Bill of Rights even though economic, social and cultural rights have been recognized to be important in the realization of political and civil rights. These rights are placed under Part IX of the Constitution, which deals with Directive Principles of State Policy, and may be may be attained in as far as State resources permit.

The challenge to progressively realize economic, social and cultural rights in accordance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCRs) which Zambia has ratified is actually enormous for a developing country like Zambia with inadequate resources to provide enough schools, hospitals, social security, decent shelter and clean water to the majority of the population.

Protection of human Rights

In Zambia, there are a number of institutions established to promote and protect human rights. The major institutions promoting and protecting human rights, directly or indirectly, are:

i. The Human Rights Commission established in 1997 in accordance with the Paris Principles. It is mandated, inter alia, to investigate human rights violations and maladministration of justice, and propose measures to prevent human rights abuses.

ii. The Judiciary is the primary institution charged with the protection of human rights through enforcing the Bill of Rights entrenched in the National Constitution. Anyone who feels that his or her human rights have been or are about to be violated can seek redress through the High Court which enforces the Bill of Rights.

iii. The National Assembly, which consists of elected and nominated Members of Parliament, carries out a wide range of important public responsibilities that enhance democratic governance in Zambia. These responsibilities include making laws (Acts of Parliament), approving proposals for taxation and public expenditure, and keeping the work of the Government under scrutiny and review.

iv. The Judicial Complaints Authority receives and investigates allegations of misconduct against judicial officers. In their adjudicative duties, officers are expected to conduct themselves with integrity, independence and impartiality in accordance with the Judicial Code of Conduct.

v. The Police Public Complaints Authority, established in 2002, addresses public complaints against police misconduct in order to protect the rights of citizens. It has been reported that a number of officers found to be violating or abusing human rights have been dismissed from Police Service as a result of the work of the Authority.

vi. The Zambia Police Service – Despite being charged with the responsibility to ensure protection of human rights, the Police Service is often a major violator of human rights. Some of the worst human rights abuses such as torture and extra-judicial killing of suspects have been committed by police officers, and these have been widely condemned by human rights defenders. Other common human rights abuses by the officers include false arrests, illegal and over detention without trial. However, within Police Service, a Victim Support Unit exists in almost all parts of the country to deal with violations of human rights, especially of women and children.

vii. The Commission for Investigations is empowered to investigate complaints of mal-administrative actions by pubic authorities brought to its attention. It can also recommend corrective action to the affected agencies and obtain redress for a deserving complainant.

viii. The Legal Aid Board-Article 18 (1) 9d) of the current Constitution provides that every person charged with a criminal offence “shall unless legal aid is granted to him [or her] in accordance with the law enacted by Parliament for such purpose be permitted to defend himself [or herself] before the court in person, or at his [or her] own expense, by a legal representative of his [or her] own choice.” It is for this purpose that the Legal Aid Board was established in 2002, to provide free legal assistance especially to the poor and vulnerable women and children who come in conflict with the law.

Partners

ix. The Human Rights Commission is partnering with a number of public institutions and civil society organizations in promoting and protecting human rights in Zambia. Among these are:

x. The Judiciary, as the primary institution charged with the protection of human rights, enforces the National Bill of Rights which is entrenched in the Constitution.

xi. The National Assembly, which consists of elected and nominated Members of Parliament, carries out a wide range of important public responsibilities that enhance democratic governance in Zambia. These responsibilities include making laws (Acts of Parliament), approving proposals for taxation and public expenditure, and keeping the work of the Government under scrutiny and review.

xii. Zambia Police Service is charged with the responsibility to inter alia protect life and property. The Police also has a Victim Support Unit in almost all parts of the country which deals with violations of human rights, especially of women and children.

Zambia 2012 Human Rights Report

Zambia is a constitutional republic governed by a democratically elected president and a unicameral national assembly. International and local observers considered national elections held in September 2011 to be generally free and fair. Security forces reported to civilian authorities. Serious human rights abuses occurred during the year. The most important were abuses by security forces, including unlawful killings, torture, and beatings; life- threatening prison conditions; and restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, and association.

Other serious human rights problems included arbitrary arrest, prolonged pre-trial detention, arbitrary interference with privacy, government corruption, violence and discrimination against women, child abuse, trafficking in persons, and discrimination against persons with disabilities and based on sexual orientation, restrictions on labour rights, forced labour, and child labour. The government generally did not take steps to prosecute or punish officials who committed abuses, and impunity remained a problem.

Section 1-Respect for the integrity of the person & freedom

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

There were several reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Senior officials encouraged police officers to use their weapons when apprehending suspects, despite a government directive that restricted the use of firearms by officers and a government pledge to retrain police on the use of force. On May 23, police officers beat Edrick Simbeye to death. He was arrested for building a house on someone else’s land. On September 5, police fatally shot 50- year-old Wesley Mpundu as he drove to his home.

Police claimed the shooting was accidental. An investigative committee reported to the president concerning the killing of two persons and the injury of several others during riots in Barotseland in January 2011. Although its findings were not released to the public, the media reported the committee determined that police had violated the human rights of the rioters and that the courts had treated those detained inhumanely and unjustly. In addition to compensation for police brutality and negligence, the committee recommended the government offer an unqualified apology to the victims and to the families of those killed. The government rarely punished perpetrators. No steps were taken to prosecute or punish officials who committed abuses.

b. Disappearance

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The constitution states that no person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment. However, there were reports that police frequently used excessive force, including torture, when apprehending, interrogating, and detaining criminal suspects. Undertrained and underequipped police officers often used force, up to and including deadly physical force. For example, in January Ceaser Chalwe testified to the local chapter of the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) that he and his friends were whipped with electrical cables, subjected to electric shocks, and threatened with death by police in an effort to force them to confess to theft of a motor vehicle.

Authorities also detained, interrogated, and physically abused family members or associates of criminal suspects to coerce them into identifying the location of suspects. For example, in February police falsely imprisoned and brutalized two relatives of Peter Berejana, who was wanted for armed robbery. Officers who beat or otherwise abused suspects generally were not disciplined or arrested unless the abuses led to death and became public. In contrast with 2011, human rights groups received no reports of police demanding sex from female detainees as a condition of their release, nor were there reports that police officers raped women and girls in their custody.

Prison and Detention Centre Conditions

Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening due to outbreaks of disease, food and potable water shortages, gross overcrowding, and poor sanitation and medical care. Delays in court proceedings caused by an inefficient judiciary contributed to the holding of large numbers of pre-trial detainees for extended periods.

Physical Conditions

The country’s prisons, which were built to hold 5,700 inmates, held approximately 17,000 in April, of whom an estimated 5,000 were pre-trial detainees, according to the Prisons Care and Counseling Association (PRISCCA). Approximately 3 percent of the detainees were women and 3 percent were juveniles, a significant decrease from 2011, when 18 percent were women and 10 percent were juveniles. These declines in the number of female and juvenile detainees were attributed to pre-trial nongovernmental organization (NGO) mediation, alternative sentencing, and presidential amnesties. The Lusaka Central Prison, which was designed to accommodate 200 prisoners, held more than 1,500. Juveniles often were held with adults and were victims of sexual abuse. Pre-trial detainees were held with convicted prisoners. Women and men were generally held separately.

By law police may detain suspects up to 24 hours in holding cells. The Zambia Prison Service operated 87 incarceration facilities nationwide, of which 53 were standard prisons, 33 open-air prisons, and one juvenile reformatory. Overcrowding, poor sanitation, dilapidated infrastructure, inadequate and deficient medical facilities, meager food supplies, and lack of potable water resulted in serious outbreaks of dysentery, cholera, and tuberculosis. Prisons generally had inadequate ventilation, temperature control, lighting, and basic and emergency medical care. Many prisoners were malnourished because they received only one serving of cornmeal and beans per day, called a combined meal because it represented breakfast, lunch, and dinner. As a consequence of these conditions, death in prison was believed to be a common occurrence.

There were 1,800 prison officers. Prison rules require prisoners receiving medical attention to be escorted by a prison officer. There were not enough prison officers to perform escort duty, so prisoners were routinely denied access to medical care. For example, on August 15, Weva Muchimba died from tuberculosis after prison authorities allegedly denied him access to medical care. There was a significant lack of prison health services; 25 clinical officers and one medical doctor staffed 19 prison clinics. The supply of tuberculosis drugs was erratic. Failure to remove or quarantine sick inmates resulted in the spread of tuberculosis and other airborne illnesses, leading to infection and death in prison populations.

Antiretroviral treatment was available to some prisoners infected with HIV/AIDS, but poor nutrition often rendered the treatment ineffective. PRISCCA acknowledged the prevalence of homosexual conduct in prisons. Because the law criminalizes sodomy, authorities denied prisoners access to condoms. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS among prisoners was 24.1 percent, compared with 14.3 percent in the general population. There were no facilities for breastfeeding and expectant mothers. Incarcerated women who had no alternative for childcare could choose to have their infants and children under the age of four with them in prison. However, prisons provided no food or medical services to children, and mothers had to share their meagre rations with their children in an environment lacking appropriate medical care that often exposed children to disease.

Administration

Recordkeeping was inadequate, and there were no alternatives to sentencing for nonviolent offenders. There were no ombudsmen to promote the interests of inmates. Prisoners and detainees had regular access to visitors and were permitted religious observance. The government did not actively investigate or monitor prison and detention centre conditions. Prisoners and detainees generally could not submit complaints to judicial authorities or request investigation of credible allegations of inhumane conditions.

Monitoring

During the year the government permitted prison visits by both domestic and international NGOs, including by religious institutions and the LRF.

Improvements

There were improvements in the handling of prisoners’ affairs during the year. Judges increasingly applied community service, fines, and other sentencing alternatives for minor offenses, especially for female and juvenile detainees. Pre-trial detention of juveniles was reduced by expedited reformatory placement.

Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

Although the constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, the government did not always respect these prohibitions.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The Zambia Police Service (ZPS) reports to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Divided into regular and paramilitary units, it has primary responsibility for maintaining law and order. The Zambia Security Intelligence Service (ZSIS), under the Office of the President, is responsible for intelligence and internal security. The Central Police Command in Lusaka oversees 10 provincial police divisions with jurisdiction over police stations in towns countrywide. Although the government identified a need for 27,000 police officers, there were only 15,283 officers on duty at year’s end, with 1,500 recruits in training.

The defence forces, composed of the army, air force, and national service totalled approximately 21,600 members. The commander of each service reports to the minister of defence. By law defence forces are to have domestic security responsibilities only in cases of national emergency. In addition to security responsibilities, the national service performs road maintenance and other public works projects and runs state farms for displaced children.

Paramilitary units of the ZPS, customs officers, and border patrol personnel watch over lake, river, and other border areas. The Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC) is responsible for enforcing the laws on illegal drugs, fraud, counterfeiting, and money laundering. ZPS, DEC, customs, and border patrol personnel operate under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Lack of professionalism, poor investigatory skills, and corruption–attributed to inadequate salaries, training, and equipment–remained serious problems. Civilian authorities maintained control over security forces.

The Police Public Complaints Authority (PPCA) encouraged aggrieved members of the public to report cases of human rights abuse by police. During the year the PPCA reviewed complaints regarding police conduct that were not resolved through internal police channels. However, many cases of abuse went unreported due to lack of public awareness of the PPCA and fear of retribution. Government investigation of corruption cases generally targeted leaders of the former ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), a move publicly perceived as politically motivated.

Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention

The constitution and law require authorities to obtain a warrant before arresting a person for most offenses. However, police are not required to obtain a warrant when they suspect a person has committed offenses such as treason, sedition, defamation of the president, or unlawful assembly. Police rarely obtained warrants before making arrests. Although the law requires that a detainee appear before a court within 24 hours of arrest, detainees were routinely held for much longer periods while prosecutors and officers collected additional evidence before presenting cases to a court. The law provides for prompt judicial determination of the legality of charges against a detainee; however, authorities often did not inform detainees promptly of charges against them. Although the law obligates the government to provide an attorney to indigent persons who face serious charges, many indigent defendants received no legal counsel.

Although there was a functioning bail system, prisons were overcrowded, in part because defendants could not afford bail or were held for offenses for which bail was not authorized, including murder, aggravated robbery, and violations of narcotics laws. For those arrestees who could not afford legal fees, the government’s legal aid office and the LRF provided some with legal services.

Arbitrary Arrest:

According to human rights groups, arbitrary arrest and detention remained problems. Police arbitrarily arrested family members of criminal suspects. Criminal suspects were arrested in many instances based on insubstantial evidence, uncorroborated accusations, or as a pretext for extortion. Police officials disciplined some officers for engaging in the extortion of prisoners by suspending them or issuing written reprimands, although dismissals of officers for extortion were rare. On August 13, police detained and then released on bail opposition political leader Hakainde Hichilema for allegedly “uttering words likely to cause public fear and alarm.” Hichilema had criticized the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) party for signing a memorandum of understanding with Sudan, allegedly to provide paramilitary training to PF youth. As of year’s end, Hichilema’s case had not been tried.

On December 16, police arrested and detained opposition political leader Nevers Mumba along with four other senior members of his party and erroneously charged them with unlawful assembly for holding a public meeting without a police permit. While the law requires seven days’ notification to police prior to holding a public gathering, it does not require a police permit. Mumba was released on bail but rearrested on December 26 and charged with “conduct likely to cause breach of peace” after he publicly alleged that the ruling party used bribery to destabilize the opposition.

Pre-trial Detention:

Prolonged pre-trial detention was a problem. Approximately 30 percent of prison inmates were in pre-trial detention. On average detainees spent an estimated three years in pre-trial detention, which often exceeded the length of the prison sentence that corresponded to their alleged crime. For example, on August 18, the High Court freed Mateo Mfula Kapotwe, who had been held for 11 years on charges of murder before the state decided not to prosecute him. Approximately one-third of persons in incarceration had not been convicted of a crime or had not received a trial date. Broad rules of procedure gave wide latitude to prosecutors and defence attorneys to delay trials. Judicial inefficiency, lack of resources, and lack of trained personnel also contributed to prolonged pre-trial detention.

Amnesty

On May 25, African Freedom Day, the president granted amnesty to 2,314 prisoners. On October 24, Zambian Independence Day, the president granted amnesty to an additional 260 prisoners.

Denial of Fair Public Trial

While the constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, the government did not consistently respect judicial independence, and the judicial system was hampered by inefficiency, corruption, and lack of resources. Police did not always follow court orders. For example, on September 9, police prevented a rally by the opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) despite an order from the Lusaka High Court authorizing it. However, the courts made some judgments and rulings against the government. In several instances the courts awarded damages in cases of police and other security force abuse or unlawful arrest. These court rulings were honoured.

Trial Procedures

Defendants enjoyed the right to a presumption of innocence. However, they were not always informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them. Trials were public but usually delayed. The law does not provide for trial by jury. Many defendants could not afford an attorney. Defendants enjoyed the right to consult with an attorney of their choice, to have adequate time to prepare defence, and to confront or question witnesses against them, although they had limited access to government-held evidence. There were no reports of defendants being compelled to testify or confess guilt. Defendants had the right to appeal.

Political Prisoners and Detainees

There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

Complainants may seek redress for human rights abuses from the High Court. Individuals or organizations may seek civil remedies for human rights violations and appeal court decisions to the African Court of Human Rights. There were no such appeals during the year.

Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The constitution and law prohibit such actions, but the government frequently did not respect these prohibitions. The law requires a search or arrest warrant before police may enter a home, except during a state of emergency or when police suspect a person has committed an offense such as treason, sedition, defamation of the president, or unlawful assembly. Police routinely entered homes without a warrant.

A 2011 LRF report stated that authorities routinely detained, interrogated, and physically abused family members of criminal suspects to obtain their cooperation in identifying or locating the suspects. The law grants the DEC, ZSIS, and police authority to monitor communications using wiretaps with a warrant issued on the basis of probable cause, and authorities generally respected this requirement.

Section 2-Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Although the constitution and law provide for freedom of speech and press, the law contains some provisions that the government used to restrict these freedoms.

Freedom of Speech

The government was sensitive to opposition and other criticism and was quick to prosecute critics using the legal pretext that they had incited public disorder. For example, on July 29, security officers cited security and public order concerns when they detained and later deported Rwandan Roman Catholic priest Father Viateur Banyangandora for criticizing the government’s agricultural policies during a church sermon.

Freedom of Press

The two most widely circulated newspapers and the only television station with national coverage were government-run. The third most widely circulated private newspaper was owned by a presidential ally. Opposition political parties and civil society organizations complained the three newspapers did not report objectively.

The independent media were active and expressed a wide variety of views. A number of privately owned newspapers questioned government actions and policies. They circulated without government interference. In addition to a government-controlled radio station, numerous private radio stations, including community radio stations, broadcasted. Some local private stations, including Radio Phoenix and SkyFM, broadcast call-in programs on which diverse and critical viewpoints were freely expressed. The government- owned Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) was the principal local-content television station. Four private domestic and foreign-owned television stations also broadcasted. International services were not restricted.

Violence and Harassment

Journalists were occasionally subjected to physical attack, harassment, and intimidation from pro-government and opposition political activists. On September 8, law enforcement officers briefly detained Post newspaper photojournalist Thomas Nsama on suspicion of espionage for allegedly taking pictures of accused prisoners and deleted the pictures from his camera. Police often arrested demonstrators of opposition political parties but failed to act if they were government supporters. On September 9, PF activists harassed and beat photojournalist Salim Dawood when he attempted to photograph their attempt to prevent the opposition UPND from holding a rally. Police were present at the scene but took no action to protect the journalist.

Censorship or Content Restrictions

The government remained sensitive to media criticism. On August 12, Clayson Hamasaka, head of media studies at a government journalism school, was fired because he allowed the interview of an opposition party leader at the school radio station. On September 4, the government threatened to close the University of Zambia’s radio station after it broadcasted a program featuring Richard Kapita, opposition UPND vice president. The government alleged that the radio station was advancing a partisan agenda under the guise of freedom of information and reduced the station’s broadcast radius to the university campus, purportedly to conform to the radius authorized by its license.

Libel Laws/National Security

Libel laws were used to suppress free speech and the press. On May 16, the president sued opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema and the independent newspaper Daily Nation for defamation. Hichilema and the newspaper alleged that the president awarded a contract to renovate the State House to a company owned by Finance Minister Alexander Chikwanda without following proper tender procedures.

Internet Freedom

Although access was not restricted and individuals and groups could freely express their views via the Internet, the government frequently threatened to deregister critical online publications and blogs. In October the government attempted to deregister the blog Zambian Watchdog but was unsuccessful because the blog was hosted abroad and therefore outside government control. According to the International Telecommunication Union, in 2011 there were 0.06 broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants and 11.5 percent of the population used the Internet.

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

There were no government restrictions on academic freedom or cultural events.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Freedom of Assembly

The constitution and law provide for freedom of assembly; however, the government restricted this right. Although the law does not require a permit to hold a rally, it requires organizers to notify police seven days in advance. Police are empowered by law to decide when and where rallies may be held and who may address participants. On occasion the government used this mandate arbitrarily to block meetings and public rallies of opposition political parties.

There were cases of police violently dispersing protesters. For example, on June 7, police beat 44 peaceful UPND protesters. Police refused to issue reports documenting injuries to five of the protesters until ordered to do so on June 25 by the Lusaka Magistrate’s Court.

c. Freedom of Association

The law provides for freedom of association, but the government placed some limits on this right. All organizations must formally apply for registration to the Registrar of Societies in the Ministry of Home Affairs. The registration process was long and allowed the registrar considerable discretion. Unlike in previous years, there were no known cases in which the registrar refused to register an organization. However, the registrar suspended the registration of organizations critical of the government on the grounds that they failed to pay registration fees or were operating outside their prescribed mandates. For example, on March 14, the MMD received a notice of deregistration for non-payment of dues. The Lusaka High Court intervened and prevented the deregistration action. On August 2, the registrar deregistered the Mount Zion Spiritual Church, alleging one of its pastors was involved in criminal activities[1].

d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of refugees

and Stateless Persons

The constitution and law provide for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights. The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees, asylum seekers, and other persons of concern.

In-country Movement

The government intermittently limited in-country movement. Although police generally used roadblocks to control criminal activity, enforce customs and immigration, check drivers’ documents, and inspect vehicles for safety compliance, there were reports police used roadblocks to limit participation in political gatherings. Police routinely extorted money and goods from motorists at roadblocks.

Protection of Refugees-Access to Asylum

According to the UNHCR, although the law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status, it also gives the minister of home affairs wide discretion to deport refugees without appeal. The UNHCR reported that there were a total of 26,269 refugees of various nationalities in the country at year’s end, a decline of 17,061 from the UNHCR’s reported total of 46,653 refugees in 2011.

The decline was largely due to the approximately 23,000 Angolans deemed no longer in need of refugee protection following the agreement of the UNHCR and host governments to invoke the cessation clause of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The majority of the remaining refugees were in the Maheba (17,332) and Mayukwayukwa (9,445) refugee settlements, while 14,427 were recorded as self-settled around the country.

Refugee Abuse

The UNHCR reported violence against girls and women– including defilement, rape, marriages of girls age 18 and under, and prostitution– continued to be a major problem affecting female asylum seekers and refugees in camps and among those residing independently, especially in urban areas. Gender inequality, economic dependence on men, and impunity of perpetrators were among the factors contributing to abuse. According to the UNHCR, girls reported sexual harassment by teachers in both community and basic schools in refugee settlements.

Access to Basic Services

Although the government provided basic services to refugees, the law does not accord equal access to education. However, the government provided primary and secondary education in refugee settlements. Refugees were provided access to police and court services. Refugees are required to have the government’s permission to move or live outside refugee camps, which was frequently granted. Government policy limited refugees’ legal employment options to refugee camps, unless refugees obtained specific government authorization to work outside camps.

Durable Solutions

The UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration assisted 1,085 Angolans to repatriate voluntarily during the year. On June 30, group status ended for refugees who fled Angola during that country’s independence and civil wars. The government collaborated with Angolan authorities, the UNHCR, and other stakeholders to facilitate voluntary repatriation of affected Angolans.

In October the government initiated a process to allow some Angolan refugees to apply for citizenship or legal residency. According to the UNHCR, approximately 22,000 Angolan refugees qualified for legal residency under the government’s broad criteria. Although 47 percent of the refugees registered in the settlements or urban areas were born in the country and most had strong social and economic ties to the country, they were not eligible for naturalization. The application process requires the applicant present an Angolan passport, which few refugees had. Government officials stated they were seeking cooperation from Angola to issue travel documents.

Temporary Protection

The government provided temporary protection to individuals who may not qualify as refugees. Provincial and district joint operations committees are responsible for establishing the identity of refugee status seekers and their reasons for leaving their country of origin. According to the UNHCR, the government intercepted several groups from the Horn of Africa at the border and within the country during the year. For example, on January 21, authorities intercepted and arrested 35 Ethiopian irregular immigrants in Muchinga Province near the border with Tanzania. They were deported.

Section 3-Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their

Government

The constitution and law provide citizens the right to change their government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right through periodic elections based on universal suffrage.

Elections and Political Participation-Recent Elections

In September 2011 Michael Chilufya Sata of the PF was elected president with 41.9 percent of the vote. Former president and MMD candidate Rupiah Banda received 35.4 percent, and UPND candidate Hichilema received 18.2 percent of the vote. The seven other contenders each won less than 1 percent of the vote. Of the 150 constituency-based parliamentary seats, the PF won 60, the MMD 55, the UPND 28, and the Alliance for Democracy and Development and the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) one each. Three independent candidates were elected and two remaining seats were filled in November; one went to the PF and one to the UPND.

The results of the elections were challenged for 69 parliamentary and four local government seats, mainly by losing PF candidates. Of the 69 parliamentary seats, the High Court nullified the results for 10 seats held by the MMD. Elections were repeated in some constituencies, while a decision on others awaited the outcome of a court appeal. Three parliamentary by-elections were held on February 16, July 5, and November 8 due to a resignation, a death, and a party expulsion, respectively.

Political Parties

Historically, political parties operated without restriction or outside interference, and individuals could independently run for office. However, the PF government interfered with the operations of opposition political parties. Several MMD officials faced police and legal harassment. Police arrested opposition officials, blocked public rallies, and dispersed participants in opposition political gatherings and public protests.

Participation of Women and Minorities

During the 2011 general elections, female candidates for parliament won 17 of 150 constituency-based seats and another woman won a seat in a by-election during the year. Three women were appointed to the 20-member cabinet and five to the 11-member Supreme Court. The vice president was from a minority group.

Section 4-Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government

The law provides criminal penalties for officials convicted of corruption, and the government attempted to enforce the law. However, it did not enforce the law effectively, and officials often engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. The World Bank considered corruption to be a serious problem in the country.

The government has a national anticorruption policy and a national anticorruption implementation plan. Under implementation during the year, the plan addresses resource mobilization, coordination of anticorruption programs in the public and private sectors, program monitoring and evaluation, and legal reform. The Anticorruption Commission (ACC), which reports directly to the president, is responsible for combating government corruption. In March the government reinstated the abuse of office clause of the Anticorruption Act, which the previous administration had removed. The government continued collaboration with the international community to improve capacity to investigate and prevent corruption. Parliamentary committees scrutinized operations of the executive branch and corrected some irregularities reported by the Office of the Auditor General. The ACC continued prosecutions and public awareness-raising activities.

During the year more than 15 former senior government officials were interrogated, and some formally charged, in connection with allegations of corruption-related offences. For example, on May 24, former labour minister Austin Liato was convicted of stealing 2.1 billion kwacha ($405,000). He was released on bail pending appeal to the High Court and rearrested July 25 on separate abuse-of- office charges. The president also dismissed several high-ranking government officials from the former regime, including ZNBC director general Eddie Mupeso, former armed forces commanders, and the directors of the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) and the Energy Regulation Board on allegations of corruption. Three former armed services commanders were tried on corruption charges, while the ZNBC and ZESCO directors were not charged. In a report released in January covering 2010, the auditor general revealed financial irregularities in all ministries and foreign missions totalling 221 billion kwacha ($42.6 million). The irregularities included abuse of petty cash, unauthorized or wasteful expenditures, overpayments, and revenue that had not been properly accounted for.

Government controls over public funds and property were often inadequate. Investigative units often lacked expertise, personnel, and authority. Investigators frequently demanded illicit payments in dealing with the public. In addition, the government had no clear policy for handling evidence in corruption cases, and the process to liquidate assets seized in these cases was not transparent. Some contracts were sole-sourced and tender procedures not followed. Petty corruption among police and other public authorities was particularly problematic. Police enjoyed a high degree of impunity and routinely extorted money at roadblocks, demanded gas money, borrowed bicycles (ostensibly to visit crime scenes or rescue victims of robberies), and sought payment for contrived document-processing fees.

The law does not require income and asset disclosure by appointed or elected officials; however, presidential candidates were required to disclose financial assets when filing their candidacies with the Supreme Court. The law does not provide for public access to government information; nonetheless, the government provided information to media and other interested parties, including foreign media, on an informal basis. The government withheld information related to defence and the security forces from the public for reasons of national security.

Section 5

Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Non-governmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A number of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Government officials were cooperative and responsive to their views.

UN and Other International Bodies

The government generally cooperated with local human rights observers and international human rights and humanitarian NGOs. The government cooperated with international governmental organizations and permitted visits by UN representatives and other organizations during the year.

Government Human Rights Bodies

The Human Rights Commission (HRC), an independent body established by the constitution, monitored human rights conditions, interceded on behalf of persons whose rights it believed the government denied, and spoke on behalf of detainees and prisoners. During the year the HRC identified three outstanding human rights concerns: increasing lack of police respect for human rights, poor prison conditions, and the PF’s intolerance of criticism by opposition parties. The HRC and other independent human rights committees across the country enjoyed the government’s cooperation without substantial political interference. The HRC attributed delays in publishing its annual human rights report to government bureaucracy.

Section 6-Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

The constitution and law prohibit discrimination based on race, ethnic group (tribe), gender, place of origin, marital status, political opinion, colour, disability, language, social status, and creed but does not address discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. The government did not effectively enforce the law; violence and discrimination against women and children, discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, and discrimination against persons with disabilities remained problems.

Women-Rape and Domestic Violence

The law criminalizes rape, and courts have discretion to sentence convicted rapists to life imprisonment at hard labour. Rape was nonetheless widespread. The government did not enforce the law effectively and obtained few rape convictions. The law does not prohibit spousal rape, and penal code provisions that criminalize rape do not extend to victims of rape by a spouse. However, the law criminalizes domestic violence between spouses and among family members living in one home.

In the first half of the year, the police’s Victim Support Unit (VSU) recorded 115 cases of rape. Some women’s groups recorded more cases than the VSU. However, these figures greatly understated the actual extent of the problem. According to the VSU’s records, of the 211 rape cases recorded in 2011, there were 41 convictions, two acquittals, and two withdrawn cases. The law provides for prosecution of most gender-based crimes, and penalties for assault range from a fine to 25 years in prison, depending on the severity of injury and whether a weapon was used during the assault. Domestic violence against women was a serious problem and spousal abuse widespread. Inspector General of Police Stella Libongani announced that a total of 9,612 recorded gender-based violence cases were recorded for the year, not including spousal rape.

According to the 2011 report of the UN special rapporteur on violence against women, 47 percent of women and girls above age 15 suffered had experienced physical violence. The VSU was responsible for handling cases of domestic assault, wife beating, mistreatment of widows, and property expropriation (“grabbing”) by a deceased husband’s relatives. However, police were often reluctant to pursue reports of domestic violence and preferred to encourage reconciliation. The law requires medical reports prepared by certified practitioners for prosecution of cases of violence against women, but there were few certified practitioners in rural areas. The law provides for protection orders for victims of domestic and gender violence. Protection orders were issued and enforced.

Harmful Traditional Practices

Polygamy is legally permitted under customary law. The practice of “sexual cleansing,” in which a widow is compelled to have sexual relations with her late husband’s relatives as part of a cleansing ritual, continued as a practice under customary law in many rural areas. However, some local leaders banned the practice. The penal code prohibits “sexual cleansing” of girls under the age of 16.

Sexual Harassment

Sexual harassment was common. The penal code contains provisions under which some forms of sexual harassment of women may be prosecuted. For example, legal provisions that apply to breach of peace were used to prosecute perpetrators of sexual violence against women. On September 18, police arrested UPND youth leader Paul Kalusa for threatening to organize party youths to gang-rape FDD leader Edith Nawakwi under the breach-of-peace provision of the law. The case was pending trial at year’s end.

Reproductive Rights

Although couples and individuals enjoyed the right to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing, and timing of their children, they often lacked access to information. Many women lacked access to contraception and skilled attendance during childbirth, including essential prenatal, obstetric, and postpartum care. According to UN data from 2011, 27 percent of girls and women between the ages of 15 and 49 used a modern method of contraception and 47 percent of births were attended by skilled health personnel. A 2012 UN report estimated the maternal mortality rate at 441 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2010 and a woman’s lifetime risk of maternal death at one in 37. Nearly 31 percent of such deaths were HIV/AIDS related. Barriers that limited access to reproductive health services included limited information, cost, religious reasons, and myths surrounding contraceptive use. In rural areas, 31 percent of women were attended by a relative or a midwife during delivery.

The number of women who received HIV testing and treatment increased substantially in recent years and many more women than men sought treatment.

Discrimination

The law generally entitles women to equality with men. Nevertheless, the government did not adequately enforce the law, and women experienced discrimination in employment, education, inheritance, and ownership of land and other property. Employed women often suffered from discriminatory conditions of service, including unequal pay. Women earned approximately 25 percent less than men.

Although the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources, and Environmental Protection set aside special land quotas for women to redress the imbalance in property ownership, women lacked adequate access to credit to purchase land or property. In most cases women remained dependent on their husbands or male members of their family to co-sign for loans, although some financial institutions allowed women to sign independently for loans. Few women owned their own homes or businesses. The Ministry of Gender and Child Development (formerly the cabinet- level Gender and Child Development Division within the Presidency) is the primary agency charged with promoting the status of women. The president appointed several women to high-profile positions, including Inspector General of Police Stella Libongani, Anti-corruption Commissioner Rosewin Wandi, and Acting Chief Justice Lombe Phyllis Chibesakunda.

Local customary law generally discriminates against women. Despite constitutional and legal protections, customary law subordinates women with respect to property ownership, inheritance, and marriage.

Customary law dictates that rights to inherit property rest with a deceased man’s family. Statutory law prescribes that a man’s children equally share half of an estate, the widow 20 percent, other dependents 10 percent, and the deceased’s parents 20 percent. In a polygamous marriage, a widow’s share must be divided proportionally with other wives, based on the length of time each has stayed in the marriage. Property grabbing from widows remained widespread. Courts generally considered property grabbing a criminal offense and mandated up to three years’ imprisonment as punishment. However, because of high legal costs and delays in adjudication due to an overloaded judicial system, most property grabbing cases were settled by local customary law courts, which do not have the power to impose prison sentences. With very few exceptions, most property grabbing cases revolved around family disputes. Fines imposed by customary courts were low.

Children-Birth Registration

Citizenship is derived from one’s parents or, with the exception of refugees, by birth within the country’s territory. Failure to register births did not result in the denial of public services, such as education or health care, to children.

Education

Although government policy provides for tuition-free education through grade seven, education was not compulsory, and many children did not attend school. Contrary to government policy, many teachers and school administrators required students to purchase uniforms or pay a fee before allowing them to attend classes, preventing some children from attending school. The numbers of girls and boys in primary school were approximately equal; however, fewer girls attended secondary school.

Child Abuse

The punishment for assault causing bodily harm to a child is imprisonment for five to 10 years, and the law was generally enforced. For example, on September 20, the court sentenced Samson Nkosi to two years in prison for beating and forcing his 15-year-old son to chew and swallow a condom. Although the law prohibits sexual harassment of children, child abuse and violence against children were common problems. The VSU reported 1,089 cases of child sexual abuse in the first two quarters of the year.

Child Marriage

Although a person must be at least 16 years old to marry under formal law, there is no minimum age under customary law. Some local leaders spoke against child marriage and took steps to discourage it, but most condoned the practice. According to a 2011 report of the UN special rapporteur on violence against women, approximately 50 percent of women were married by the age of 18, and more than one-quarter of girls and young women between the ages of 15 and19 were bearing children. The rate was higher in rural areas.

Harmful Traditional Practices

Female genital mutilation/cutting is prohibited under the penal code and rarely occurred. Although there were no cases reported during the year, it was believed to occur in small communities of immigrants from other parts of Africa.

Sexual Exploitation of Children

The law provides penalties of up to life imprisonment for statutory rape. The minimum age for consensual sex is 16. Defilement, which the law defines as the unlawful carnal knowledge of a child under the age of 16, was common. The law provides penalties of up to life imprisonment for persons convicted of defilement; the minimum penalty is 15 years in prison. The VSU recorded 1,089 defilement cases in the first two quarters of the year, compared with a total of 1,339 in 2011. There were 511 convictions and 23 acquittals in 2011.

The police and magistrates’ courts intervened in cases of gross child abuse. The law criminalizes child prostitution and child pornography and provides for penalties of up to life imprisonment for perpetrators. The law provides that child prostitutes who are 12 and above may be charged and prosecuted. However, the law was not enforced effectively, and child prostitution was common. Boys and girls were recruited into prostitution by women who formerly engaged in prostitution.

Displaced Children

A large number of children were displaced and institutionalized. According to Zambia Orphans of AIDS, the country had approximately 1.1 million orphaned children under the age of 18, most due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Orphaned children faced greater risks of child abuse, sexual abuse, and child labour. According to the most recent data available, from the 2007 Zambian Demographic and Health Survey, an estimated four in 10 children under the age of 18 were not living with both parents, one in five was not living with either parent, and 15 percent were orphaned. An estimated 200 children’s care homes accommodated approximately 5,000 children countrywide.

Due to the deaths of adults related to HIV/AIDS and the breakdown of the family safety net in rural areas, a growing number of orphans migrated to urban areas, increasing the population of street children. According to UNICEF, there were 1.2 million orphans under the age of 15, of whom an estimated 20,000 worked and/or lived on the streets. In order to survive, many orphans engaged in various forms of work. Street children were especially vulnerable to commercial sexual exploitation, and the problem of child prostitution was growing.

The Ministry of Education, Science, Vocational Training, and Early Education; the Ministry of Community Development, Mother, and Child Health (MCDMCH); and the police’s Child Protection Unit worked jointly to identify and assist street children. The ministries’ District Street Children Committee authorized the protection unit to reunite street children with their families and arrange for schooling and to place others, including orphans and neglected children, in shelters operated by the government and NGOs. The MCDMCH also maintained a cash- transfer scheme for vulnerable families who might otherwise send minors into the streets to beg or work.

The Ministry of Gender and Child Development continued its efforts to rehabilitate street children by providing education and vocational training at two converted Zambia National Service camps in Kitwe and Chipata. Since its inception in 2004, 648 former street children (82 girls and 556 boys) and other vulnerable young persons graduated from the program. Enrollment at mid-year was 454, of whom 145 were girls. After they graduated from the camps, the ministry placed the children in youth resource centres throughout the country where they received training in carpentry, tailoring, farming, and other trades.

Anti-Semitism

There were approximately 30 persons in the Jewish community and there were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.

Persons with Disabilities

The law prohibits discrimination in general, but no law specifically prohibits discrimination against persons with physical, sensory, intellectual, or mental disabilities in employment, education, air travel and other transportation, access to health care, and the provision of other government services. Although the government did not restrict persons with physical or mental disabilities from voting or otherwise participating in civic affairs, the law prohibits those with mental disabilities from holding public office. Persons with disabilities faced significant societal discrimination in employment and education.

The Ministry of Education, Science, Vocational Training, and Early Education and the MCDMCH have responsibility for ensuring the welfare of persons with disabilities. However, public buildings, schools, and hospitals rarely had facilities to accommodate such persons. By law the government must provide reasonable accommodation for all persons with disabilities seeking education and ensure “any physical facility at any public educational institution is accessible.” Five schools were designated for children with special needs. Some children with physical disabilities attended ordinary schools. No patterns of abuse of persons with disabilities in schools and prisons were reported.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

The country’s seven major ethnic groups–Bemba, Kaonde, Lozi, Lunda, Luvale, Ngoni, and Tonga–are divided into 73 ethnic subgroups. The government protected the civil and political rights, including rights under the law to share in revenue from the exploitation of natural resources on tribal lands of all ethnic groupings. The government generally permitted autonomy for ethnic minorities and encouraged the practice of local customary law. Some political parties maintained political and historical connections to tribal groups and promoted their interests.

The government grants special recognition to traditional leaders, including the Barotse Royal Establishment as the political authority of the Lozi ethnic group. However, the government does not recognize the 1964 Barotseland Agreement signed by the United Kingdom, Northern Rhodesia, and the Barotse Royal Establishment immediately prior to the country’s independence that granted the Lozi political autonomy. Some Lozi groups demanded official recognition of the Barotseland Agreement.

On September 6, hundreds of Barotseland activists invaded the District Administration Office in Mongu, Western Province. They objected to the circulation of local-language copies of the country’s draft constitution, which they claimed should not apply to the Barotseland nation. They attempted to return 500 copies. Following the district commissioner’s refusal to accept the copies, activists destroyed them. On September 10, the ZPS arrested and charged 12 Barotseland activists with malicious damage of public property and with conduct likely to cause a breach of peace. The activists were put on trial and initially denied bail but were released on bail October 16. Their trial was not concluded by year’s end.

Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on Sexual

Orientation and Gender Identity

The law criminalizes consensual same-sex sexual activity and provides penalties of 15 years to life imprisonment for individuals who engage in unnatural acts. A lesser charge of gross indecency carries penalties of up to 14 years’ imprisonment. The government enforced the law against same-sex sexual activity and ignored societal discrimination against gay men and transgender persons. Societal violence occurred, as did societal discrimination in employment, housing, and access to education or health care.

According to the 2012 VSU report, there were 11 cases of “unnatural offenses” and five convictions in 2011. Two groups, formally registered with the government as charitable non-profit organizations since 2008, promoted lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights. The groups held private social gatherings but did not participate in open demonstrations or marches due to societal stigma against LGBT persons. On October 29, a Livingstone court tried Pascal Courouble, a 49-year-old Livingstone resident and Belgian national, for sodomy, to which he pleaded not guilty. Courouble was released on bail and reportedly left the country. In two separate incidents on September 27 and 28, two transgender individuals were beaten and raped for being associated with an LGBT group.

Other Societal Violence or Discrimination

The government actively discouraged discrimination against persons with HIV/AIDS. Most employers adopted non-discriminatory HIV/AIDS policies. However, societal and employment discrimination against such individuals persisted. Government officials discouraged such discrimination, but they did not publicly acknowledge cases of HIV/AIDS among government officials. The government made little headway in changing entrenched attitudes of discrimination and denial of the problem. According to the UN’s Millennium Progress Report for 2010, the number of individuals seeking counselling and treatment with antiretroviral drugs was 383,323 adults and 30,644 children.

Section 7-Worker Rights

a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining

The law provides for the right of workers to form and join independent unions, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. The law allows workers to form and belong to trade unions of their choice without previous authorization or excessive requirements, but police officers and military personnel could not form unions. The law allows unions to conduct activities without interference.

No organization may be registered unless it has at least 25 members and, with some exceptions, no trade union can be registered if it claims to represent a class of employees already represented by an existing trade union. Unions may be deregistered under certain circumstances, but the law provides for notice, reconsideration, and right of appeal to an industrial relations court.

With the exception of workers engaged in a broadly defined range of essential services, the law provides the right to strike if recourse to all legal options is first exhausted. Essential services providers who are not permitted to strike include the defence force, judiciary, police, prison, health services, and ZSIS personnel. The law further defines essential services as any activity relating to the generation, supply, or distribution of electricity; the supply and distribution of water and sewage removal; fire departments; and the mining sector. The process of exhausting the legal alternatives to a strike is lengthy. The law does not limit the scope of collective bargaining. The law also prohibits antiunion discrimination and employer interference in union functions, and it provides remedies for workers dismissed for union activity, including reinstatement of workers fired for union activity.

Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining were generally respected. The government generally protected unions’ right to conduct their activities without interference. The government enforced the law prohibiting antiunion discrimination and employer interference in union functions. All categories of workers except police and military were free to form or join unions. Domestic workers and shopkeepers were not unionized. Workers exercised most of these rights. Workers’ organizations were independent of government and political parties.

In April 2011 two Chinese managers at the Chinese Collum Coal Mine in Sinazongwe shot and injured 13 protesting miners. On August 4, miners erupted into violent protests, killing Chinese supervisor Wu Shengzai and wounding several others. The protests were sparked by the mine’s delayed implementation of the new minimum wage law. The government intervened to address the workers’ demands and to provide for the safety of Chinese personnel at the mine. The government took some steps to improve working conditions at the mine.

The government increased the minimum wage for domestic workers without holding consultations with the Federation of Employers, leading to conflict between the government and employers and noncompliance by the employers. Some employers reportedly refused to bargain with unions and often employed casual workers or workers on short-term contracts in order to avoid hiring workers on a long-term basis, which would provide them with more bargaining power.

While the law provides for the right to strike, due to lengthy procedural requirements, most unions chose to strike illegally. Workers who engage in illegal strikes may be dismissed by employers; the government at times intervened for political reasons when such dismissals occurred. For example, on July 5, the Zambia Sugar Company suspended 60 workers for an illegal strike over wages. Pay negotiations between the company and the union began in January but collapsed in May after the company stated that it could not meet the workers’ demands. The company subsequently took the matter to court, but the workers went on strike before the court issued its ruling, prompting the company to suspend and dismiss 60, and subsequently 1,000, workers.

b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labour

The law prohibits all forms of forced or compulsory labour. The law authorizes the government to call upon citizens to perform labour in specific instances, such as during national emergencies or disasters. The government also may require citizens to perform labour associated with traditional civil or communal obligations. Women and children from rural areas were exploited in urban domestic servitude and subjected to forced labour in the agricultural, textile, and construction sectors and in small businesses such as bakeries. While orphans and street children were the most vulnerable, children of well-off rural families sent to live in urban areas were also vulnerable to forced labour.

There were reports of Chinese, Indian, and Lebanese nationals in forced labour in textile factories and bakeries; of Chinese and Indian men recruited to work in Chinese or Indian-owned mines in Copper belt Province, who were kept in conditions of forced labour; and of migrants from Malawi and Mozambique, who were forced into labour or prostitution. Transnational labour trafficking of Indians and Bangladeshis through the country linked to criminal groups based largely in South Africa continued.

There were reports of abuses in labour-intensive work, including domestic service, hospitality, and construction. Forced labour also occurred in agriculture and mining but was not common. According to the 2011 Human Rights Watch report You’ll Be Fired If You Refuse, mine supervisors forced miners to handle hazardous material without adequate protective clothing. Miners who refused to work in unsafe conditions were fired[211].

c. Prohibition of Child Labour and Minimum Age for Employment

The law prohibits the employment of children at any commercial, agricultural, or domestic worksite or engaging a child in the worst forms of child labour as defined in international conventions. According to the Employment of Young Persons and Children Act, the minimum age for employment is 15; for hazardous work, the minimum age is 18. Restrictions on child labour prohibit work that harms a child’s health and development or that prejudices a child’s attendance at school. The law also prohibits slavery and the procurement or offering of a child for illicit activities.

Child labour was a problem in agriculture, domestic service, construction, farming, transportation, prostitution, quarrying, mining, and other sectors where children under the age of 15 often were employed and the law was not always effectively enforced. The production of crops such as cotton, tobacco, maize, coffee, and sunflowers exposed children to dangerous pesticides, fertilizers, snake and other animal bites, and injuries from carrying heavy loads and using dangerous tools and machinery. According to the Zambia Labour Force Survey released in August 2011, more than one-third of children between the ages of seven and 14–or an estimated 950,000 children total–worked in 2008. This figure was down from the nearly 48 percent of children who were employed in 2005. Of those employed, approximately 92 percent worked in agriculture.

The Ministry of Labour and Social Security chaired the National Steering Committee on Child Labour which was responsible for the implementation and enforcement of child labour laws and regulations. Penalties for violations range from a fine to 25 years’ imprisonment, or both. Labour inspectors may enter homes and agricultural fields to check for violations of the child labour law.

While the labour commissioner effectively enforced minimum age requirements in the industrial sector, where there was little demand for child labour, minimum age standards were seldom enforced in the informal sector, particularly in mining, agriculture, and domestic service. Because more than 92 percent of child labour occurred in the agricultural sector, most often with the consent of families, inspectors from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security focused on counselling and educating families that employed children. Authorities did not refer any cases of child labour for prosecution during the year. Due to the scarcity of transportation, labour inspectors frequently found it difficult to conduct inspections in rural areas.

In cooperation with NGO partners, the government continued its efforts to remove children from abusive situations. Vulnerable children, mainly orphans, were placed in formal and transitional classes, while others were given vocational skills training. Local governments maintained district child labour committees to perform outreach, plan activities for vulnerable and working children, increase awareness of child labour laws and the harmful effects of child labour, mobilize communities to eliminate the worst forms of child labour, and monitor the implementation of child labour programs at the district and village levels. While the government continued to provide awareness and training activities for officials charged with enforcing child labour laws, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security reported that resource constraints prevented it from providing all required training. The government participated in several projects to combat child labour.

d. Acceptable Conditions of Work

There is no legally mandated national minimum wage, although the law gives the Ministry of Labour and Social Security authority to set wages by sector. Otherwise, the minimum wage and conditions of employment were determined by the category of employment. However, parts of the workforce, including foreign and migrant workers, are not covered by minimum wage and other provisions regarding acceptable conditions of work. For unionized workers, wage scales and maximum workweek hours were established through collective bargaining. Almost all unionized workers received salaries considerably higher than the nonunionized minimum wage. Most minimum wage earners supplemented their incomes through second jobs, subsistence farming, or reliance on extended family. The Ministry of Labour and Social Security is responsible for enforcing the minimum wage, and its inspectors received and resolved complaints. Employer compliance was still problematic, since some resisted government imposition of the minimum wage increases without stakeholder consultation. The law requires equal pay for equal work.

According to the law, the normal workweek should not exceed 48 hours. The standard workweek is 40 hours for office workers and 45 hours for factory workers. There are limits on excessive compulsory overtime, depending on the category of work. The law provides for overtime pay. Employers must pay employees who work more than 48 hours (45 hours in some categories) in one week for overtime hours at a rate of one-and-a-half times the hourly rate. Workers receive double the rate of their hourly pay for work done on a Sunday or public holiday. The law requires that workers earn two days of annual leave per month without limit.

In July the government raised the monthly minimum wage (including allowances) for domestic workers from 250,000 kwacha ($48) to 522,400 kwacha ($101), while the minimum wage for shop workers was raised from 419,000 kwacha ($81) to 1,132,400 kwacha ($218), based on a legal maximum workweek of 48 hours. The law regulates minimum occupational safety and health standards in industry. City and district councils were responsible for enforcement. The inspector of factories under the minister of labour handled factory safety. The Ministry of Labour and Social Security conducted labour inspections during the year and ordered businesses to close when it found significant violations of labour laws. The government enforced workweek standards but staffing shortages limited its effectiveness.

Miners reportedly developed serious lung disease, such as silicosis, due to poor ventilation and constant exposure to dust and chemicals. Throughout the year the government engaged mining companies and took some steps to improve working conditions in the mines. Through its social welfare programs, the government provided social security protection to some categories of vulnerable persons in the informal economy.

Despite legal protections, workers did not exercise the right to remove themselves from work situations that endangered their safety or health. The government acted when well-known occupational health problems existed, such as by requiring that underground mine workers receive annual medical examinations. However, a November 2011 report by Human Rights Watch noted that many mine accidents were not reported to the government and estimated that, on average, 15 fatalities occurred each year. For example, on August 6, Julius Chanda died instantly when he fell into a pit while working underground at the Mopani mine.

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LBGT) rights in Zambia

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons in Zambia face legal challenges not faced by non-LGBT citizens. Same-sex sexual activity is illegal for both males and females in Zambia[212]. Formerly a colony of the British Empire, Zambia inherited the laws and legal system of its colonial master upon independence in 1964. Laws concerning homosexuality have largely remained unchanged since then, and homosexuality is covered by sodomy laws that also proscribe bestiality[213]. Social attitudes toward LGBT people are mostly negative and colored by perceptions that homosexuality is immoral and a form of insanity. In 1999, the non-governmental organization Zambia against People with Abnormal Sexual Acts (ZAPASA) formed to combat homosexuality and homosexuals in Zambia.

Arguably the largest recipient of Fundamentalist Evangelical missionaries during British colonial times, societal attitudes towards homosexuality heavily mirror these influences. A 2010 survey revealed that only 2% of Zambians find homosexuality to be morally acceptable; nine points below the figure recorded in Uganda (11% acceptance).[214] In 2013, Christine Kaseba, the wife of President Michael Sata, said that “silence around issues of men who have sex with men should be stopped and no one should be discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation.”

Laws regarding same-sex activity

Same-sex sexual activity is proscribed by Cap. 87, Sections 155 through 157 of Zambia’s penal code. Section 155 (“Unnatural Offences”) classifies homosexual sex (in the vague description “carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature”) as a felony punishable by imprisonment for 14 years.[215] Any person who- (a) has carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature; or … (c) permits a male person to have carnal knowledge of him or her against the order of nature; is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years.

Section 156 imposes imprisonment for seven years for any “attempt to commit unnatural offences”. Finally, Section 157 applies to “any act of gross indecency” committed between males, “whether in public or in private”, and classifies such acts as felonies punishable by imprisonment for five years. The provision also extends to “attempts to procure the commission of any such act [of gross indecency]”.[216] Any male person who, whether in public or private, commits any act of gross indecency with another male person, or procures another male person to commit any act of gross indecency with him, or attempts to procure the commission of any such act by any male person with himself or with another male person, whether in public or private, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for five years.

Although Zambia’s penal code contains no explicit reference to consensual sex between females, Cap. 87, Section 155 legally covers lesbianism.[217] However, like all former British East and Southern African colonies, Zambia enacted its constitution in the 1990s, overriding much of the pre-1964 criminal code, and there are very broad protections against discrimination, with much of the language lifted from the UN Charter on Human Rights.[218] It can be argued that homosexuality is constitutionally protected under Article 23 of the 1996 Constitution:

23. Protection from discrimination on the ground of race, etc.

(1) Subject to clauses (4), (5) and (7), no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.

(2) Subject to clauses (6), (7) and (8), no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of any public office or any public authority.

(3) In this Article the expression “discriminatory” mean, affording different treatment to different persons attributable, wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, sex, place of origin, marital status, political opinions colour or creed whereby persons of one such description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such description are not made subject or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of another such description.

Considering that any constitution overrides all other laws, it is relevant that few if any prosecutions for homosexuality have taken place, which would allow the criminal code laws to be tested and, if found to contravene the Constitution, be struck from the books.

Recognition of same sex relationships

Zambia provides no recognition of same-sex couples. In 2006, Home Affairs Minister Ronnie Shikapwasha stated that Zambia would never legalize same-sex marriage, claiming that it is a sin that goes against the country’s Christian status.[219] In February 2010, the National Constitutional Conference (NCC) unanimously agreed to adopt a clause that expressly forbids marriage between people of the same sex[220].

Constitutional protection against discrimination

There is implicit but no explicit legal protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation in the Zambian Constitution. The Constitution of 1991, as amended by Act no. 17 of 1996, contains an anti-discrimination clause, present in Article 23 of the document. According to Article 23(1), “no law shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect”. Article 23(2) further prohibits discrimination “by any person acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions of any public office or any public authority”, and Article 23(3) defines discrimination as extending to differential treatment of persons on the basis of “race, tribe, sex, place of origin, marital status, political opinions, color or creed”.

Living conditions

According to a report submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Committee by Global Rights and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, the criminalization of consensual homosexual sex in Zambia “has a devastating impact on same-sex practicing people in Zambia”. The report asserts that LGBT people are subject to arbitrary arrest and detention, “discrimination in education, employment, housing, and access to services”, and extortion–often with the knowledge or participation of law enforcement authorities[221].

According to a report by Behind the Mask, a non-profit organization dedicated to LGBT affairs in Africa, most LGBT people in Zambia are closeted due to fear of targeting and victimization. Lesbians are especially vulnerable, according to the report, due to the patriarchal structure of Zambian society[222]. The U.S. Department of State‘s 2010 Human Rights Report found that “the government enforced the law that criminalizes homosexual conduct and did not respond to societal discrimination” and that “societal violence against homosexual persons occurred, as did societal discrimination in employment, housing, and access to education or health care.

Restrictions on advocating for LGBT rights

The Zambian government does not permit advocacy of LGBT rights^. In 1998, in a statement to the National Assembly of Zambia, the then Vice President Christon Tembo called for the arrest of individuals who promote gay rights, citing a need to “protect public morality”. Then President Frederick Chiluba described homosexuality as “unbiblical” and “against human nature”.Later, then Home Affairs Minister Peter Machungwa ordered the arrest of any individual or group attempting to formally register a gay rights advocacy group. Then Herbert Nyendwa, the Registrar of Societies, stated that he would refuse to register any LGBT organization or civic group[223].

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Constitution development in Zambia began during colonial times with the creation of the Federation of Nyasaland and Rhodesia (Constitution) Order in Council (1953)[224]. It, among two other things, defined the powers of the federal government and those of the territorial governments. This was followed by the 1962 Constitution, designed by the colonial administration to accommodate the participation of both the white settlers and the Africans in the Legislative Council whilst ensuring that the former had electoral advantage over the latter. The goal was to bring about a Constitution based on adult suffrage and granting of independence to Northern Rhodesia outside the federation. The federation was dissolved in 1963, after Nyasaland was allowed to secede[225].

The 1964 Constitution was worked out as a result of negotiations among the major political players of the day to resolve the conflicting interests of the indigenous Africans, the settler white community and the colonial government. The Constitution came into being through the Zambia Independent Order of Council[226]. Essentially, like previous Constitutions, this Constitution was not a creation of the people of Zambia, as they were not involved in its making. Instead, it was based on a Westminster model designed for the emerging nations of former British Colonies and Protectorates[227].

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEWS

The 1973 Constitution

The 1973 Constitution was highly influenced by political factors, including inter-party political violence. The objective, then, was to eliminate political conflicts, build a united political order and introduce a One-Party State Constitution. It was argued that elimination of political pluralism would lead to unity and foster socio-economic development[228].

The transition to one-party state was carried through a Commission of Inquiry, headed by the then Vice President Mainza Chona. The Chona Commission was mandated only to recommend the form of one-party state that Zambia could adopt, not to suggest whether it was desirable or not. The Commission made many recommendations, including that the President’s length of office should be limited to two terms. Under article 4 of the 1973 Constitution, only the United National Independent Party (UNIP) was to exist and accordingly, no one was to form or attempt to form any political party or organisation. Also, the UNIP Constitution was annexed to the country’s Constitution for reference. Because of this Constitution, the President became a dominant player in the political scene, exercising considerable influence over the Legislature. This dominance was further strengthened by the state of emergency, declared by the last British Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir Evelyn Hone on 25 July 1964. For example, the President was given power to detain without trial, declare curfews and control assemblies. The state of emergency lasted for twenty-seven years after independence[229].

The 1991 Constitutional Amendment

The legitimacy of the one-party rule came under a sweeping challenge in the late 1980s and early 1990s, culminating in the 1991 Constitution that re-introduced multiparty politics. It became clear that one-party system of government could no longer withstand popular pressure mounted by a coalition of several interest groups who were advocating for a return to multi-party democracy[230].

By September 1990, President Kenneth D. Kaunda appointed a Constitution Review Commission chaired by Professor Mphanza Patrick Mvunga, the then Solicitor General. The Mvunga Commission was appointed to design a Constitution that would mark a departure from a one-party Constitution and usher in a regime suited to plural politics[231]. The government’s proposed Constitution Bill gave rise to serious differences among the political players of the day, who all threatened to boycott the elections. The Church, under the Chair of the Anglican Church Bishop Stephen Mumba, organised an interparty dialogue during which a compromise was achieved. This facilitated the enactment of the Constitution Act that came into force on 30 August 1991. Multi-party elections were subsequently held under a new Constitution on 31 October 1991. And so, the 1991 Constitution was seen as transitional instrument to answer the immediate pressures of the time since there wasn’t enough time to do a comprehensive review of the Constitution.

The 1996 Constitution Amendment

President Fredrick J.T. Chiluba renewed a search for a lasting Constitution after the landslide victory of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD). In 1993, President Chiluba appointed a Constitution Review Commission, chaired by Mr. John Mwanakatwe, State Counsel (SC), a former Minister in the First and Second Republics. The Mwanakatwe Commission was mandated to effectively draft a Constitution that would stand the test of time. The drafted Constitution did in fact make substantive and progressive recommendations.

Unfortunately, the final 1996 amendment to the Constitution was considered to lack popular legitimacy, as it did not take into account most of the submissions made by the people. The government rejected most of the recommendations. Notable, among them, were widening the scope of the Bill of Rights to include women’s rights; children’s rights; economic, social and cultural rights (e.g., health, education, food, clean water and sanitation); introduction of a Constitutional Court; and adoption of the Constitution through a Constituent Assembly as insisted by civil society groups[232]. Government’s rejection of most recommendations of the Mwanakatwe Commission refuelled a deep constitutional crisis in the nation. However, contending political parties in the 2001 elections pledged immediate review of the Constitution after the elections[233].

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

Since independence in 1964, Zambia has seen four attempts at reforming the constitution. Most of these attempts occurred just prior to elections and each effort was largely rejected by Zambians because the processes lacked significant public consultation. However, President Sata kept his campaign pledge to resume the constitution-making process. He appointed the Technical Committee on Drafting the Zambian Constitution (TC), chaired by retired High Court Judge, Justice Annel Silungwe, with an initial mandate to deliver a constitution within a 90-day period. Unfortunately, this has not resulted close to 16-months of its appointment.

The exercise is being spearheaded by a Technical Committee of Experts appointed by the Government of the Republic of Zambia and is in response to demands for a more democratic political system in the country. The Technical Committee on Drafting the Zambian Constitution started sitting on 1^st December 2011. The Technical Committee on Drafting the Zambia Constitution has recognised that the constitution-making process is a very important national issue and should, therefore, involve the participation of all Zambians. The route of coming up with an acceptable or people-driven Constitution has been a long one. It is now over 20 years since Zambia started making attempts, some of them very costly, at developing a democratic Constitution, which meets the aspirations of her people. The draft constitutional document was supposed to be completed within 90 days[234].

The TC produced the first draft of the constitution on April 30, 2012, at which point the public consultation period began. Comments from the consultation period were to be incorporated into the second draft of the constitution. This was the first phase of the consultations with the Zambian public, both local and international. This process required time, and the TC heeded advice from various stakeholders to provide for more debate and opportunity for the public to engage in the constitutional reform process. After this phase, albeit a delayed one, the TC has hosted forums in all 72 districts – through district-based 3-day forums – at which various stakeholders deliberated the constitution and provided their positions on the content of the draft constitution. This process was further augmented through Provincial Conventions, which were held between November 2012 and February 2013, while the National Convention is expected at the end of April 2013.

This follows an assertion that the 50 per cent + 1 vote clause in the Constitution is the only way to stop President Rupiah Banda and his MMD from dubiously winning the 2011 presidential elections. President Sata declared that the person who stopped 50+1 was former president Frederick Chiluba in 1996. Chiluba said that Zambia must stick to the commonwealth where the President gets the first past the post. The 50+1 clause was already in the Constitution. Sata said he wanted a 50+1 to be enshrined in the Constitution so that the winner was elected by majority Zambians.

At the core of the demands is a call for the development of viable institutions of state that promote participation of the people in governance, transparency, and accountability. Criticisms about excessive concentration of power in the executive helped to place constitutional and institutional reforms on the national agenda.

In terms of facilitating for outreach and participation, the current constitutional making process has been the most engaging, providing for various citizens to bring in their perspectives in the anticipated new constitution. There is general agreement that the citizen’s voice – even at this stage – is consistent in their debate and resolve to maintain most of the provisions in the draft constitution. It is worth highlighting that across the country, issues pertaining to: need for an expanded Bill of Rights; credible electoral process; greater mechanisms for transparency and accountability; reduced powers of the presidency; and devolved system of governance remained a priority.

There is no explicit engagement and position of the respective political parties in the constitutional making process. Most political leaders have not commented or guided their constituents and perspectives on the content and process of the constitution. Mostly, views that have been advanced on platforms especially during the district forums and provincial conventions were not party but individual positions, and invariably were inconsistent in different areas and largely influenced by the levels of understanding by the party representative. For parliamentarians, especially from the ruling party now, they expressed worries around provisions seen to be reducing the powers of the president, the costly nature of enacting the constitution through a referendum, and the implementation of a new electoral regime – mainly preferring the current first-past-the post system. Some of the positions, also are indicative of the need to guard the process of the constitutional making process, because it is possible that a well-meaning, well-crafted and debated document can fail to be enacted based on the decision of a few legislative representatives. This gives credence on the worries many stakeholders continue to highlight, particularly around the need for a legal framework to safeguard the process.

A key issue, therefore, in this constitution reform project is the demand for constitutional governance with restraint on presidential powers. The current constitution is perceived to create an “imperial presidency”—one that subordinates all institutions of state to itself. Awareness of this problem turned a spotlight on provisions in the current draft constitution that deal with presidential powers. Experience worldwide has shown that a presidential system is likely to lead to dictatorship and pose a danger for political freedom unless there is an effective system of checks and balances, undisputed rule of law, constitutionalism, free and critical public opinion, and a fair and democratic electoral system. It is against the background of these key conditions for development of a democratic state that this review undertakes to evaluate the Draft Constitution[235] issued by the Technical Committee for public comment. The review looks at both the general and contextual issues involved in constitution- making and additionally makes specific comments on the constitutional draft.

At the start of the latest constitutional making process, enthusiasm characterized the process, especially with the release of the first draft of the constitution, which in many ways was well-received by many stakeholders and seen to have incorporated a number of issues, including progressive provisions made in the Mung’omba draft constitution. The euphoria, however, started to wan taking into account many challenges that the constitutional making process faced, including lack of sensitization, which raises public concerns about the extent to which ordinary Zambians would be involved in the process of finalizing the constitution. There is also lack of clarity on how the process will meet all the people’s aspirations amidst reaching consensus on key issues in the constitution. There is also a major concern on the absence of a legal framework that would protect the process and the content.

Other commentators have also raised concern on the prevailing uncertainty around the referendum. There is conflicting position, even, within government itself on whether or not a Referendum would arise, and how this will be conducted. It must be borne in mind that the PF government did promise that the constitution would be subjected to a Referendum, but for the moment there is a lot of uncertainty, and the Zambian public await assurance on this aspect. Whether or not a Referendum Commission will be appointed is a matter that needs addressing suffice to say that this is the vehicle that Zambian’s prefer before the new constitution can be enacted by Parliament.

Despite these setbacks, government continues to assure the Zambian people that the country will have a constitution that will reflect the calls and wishes of the masses. Recently, newly appointed Justice Minister, Wynter Kabimba, reiterated that government is not going to manipulate the constitution-making process as it wants justice and fairness to prevail for all Zambians to have their voices heard and respected. He further emphasized that the Patriotic Front (PF) government wants to see a constitution that is people-driven and not one which is government inclined.

A brief analysis of the constitution-making process and the ‘leaked’ final draft constitution

On the 15th of January 2014 the Zambian Watchdog and Lusaka Times released a ‘leaked’ copy of the final draft constitution which was reportedly handed to President Sata[236]. One of President Sata’s promises in the run-up to his election in 2011 was the adoption of a new Constitution. Keeping to this promise, President Sata appointed a Technical Committee to draft a new Constitution on 16 November 2011. A first draft of the Constitution was released by the Technical Committee in April 2012 reflecting one of the most progressive constitutional documents in the world. Since then, much has changed.

In 2012, the Technical Committee released Guidelines on the Constitution Consultative Process. To understand the subsequent concerns expressed by civil society regarding the constitution-making process, it is useful to keep in mind section 41 of these Guidelines, which provides that –

I. The Secretariat of the Technical Committee shall, after receiving the recommendations from the National and Sector Groups Convention, submit them to the Technical Committee.

II. The Technical Committee shall, within nine days of receipt of the recommendations under paragraph (1), consider the recommendations and submissions from the experts on the draft Constitution and draft the final draft Constitution.

III. The final draft Constitution shall be subjected to a Referendum for adoption by the people of Zambia.

A year later, in April 2013, the National Constitution Convention heralded the final stage of the constitution-making process. Debates at the Convention were heated and it is perhaps not surprising that the Technical Committee took longer than nine days to finalise the final draft Constitution. Delegates at the Convention emphasised that the next step in the constitution-making process should be a referendum. The Technical Committee’s work was due to end on 30 June 2013. After much anticipation, on 31 October 2013, the Technical Committee issued a statement saying that the draft Constitution had been finalised and would be printed on 1 November. However, a week later, the Technical Committee issued a strongly worded press release in which it broke ranks with the government. The Technical Committee used its statement to inform the public that it had been instructed by the Ministry of Justice to print only ten copies of the Constitution and to hand these over to the President. The Committee claimed that it was tasked by its Terms of Reference to hand over a copy of the final draft Constitution simultaneously to the President and the public.

Making matters worse, on 30 November 2013, President Sata was reported as saying that the constitutional process is not needed and that the current Constitution simply requires amendment. Since then, there has been widespread condemnation of the government’s failure to release the draft Constitution. President Sata has shown a remarkable lack of interest in the constitution-making process after the final draft Constitution was leaked.

The President’s apparent ambivalence towards the constitution-making process should be seen within the broader political context in Zambia. Since 2012, there have been increased incidents of police repression in Zambia targeting individual activists, journalists and opposition leaders who have been critical of President Sata, the ruling party or government policy. In this context, it is not surprising that the President would want to defensively scrutinise a constitutional document which has had broad public input, including from civil society. The President would do well however to release the final draft Constitution and defer its adoption to a public referendum. To do otherwise exposes him to criticism. The reality is that the final draft Constitution, or at least the version that has been leaked, does not challenge the political status quo much.

The final draft Constitution, as leaked, has taken a position on some of the debates which raged during the constitution-making process. Not surprisingly, the document proclaims Zambia a Christian Nation, but qualifies this by upholding a person’s right to freedom of conscience, belief or religion[237]. Unfortunately the document is replete with references to ‘morality’, a vague term which has often been manipulated in southern Africa. These references are however always contextualised by principles of human dignity, equity, social justice, equality and non-discrimination. Despite widespread advocacy during the consultative process, the final draft Constitution retains the death penalty. The death penalty is excluded in the case of pregnant women, children and where extenuating circumstances are present. Of concern is that the final draft Constitution has removed provisions on the right to dignity and the rights of marginalised groups which were included in the first draft Constitution. This was no doubt as a result of the misguided submissions of the Human Rights Commission.

Some provisions in the draft Constitution bodes well for civil society groups that have been struggling to uphold freedom of expression in Zambia. The final draft Constitution requires State recognition of the role of civil society in promoting the Bill of Rights. Freedom of expression is protected and explicitly does not extend to hate speech or the incitement of violence. Freedom of the media is protected and the State is ostensibly excluded from control of the media, except where necessary to regulate signals and signal distribution. The final draft Constitution frames the right to privacy in a broader manner than elsewhere in the region and includes the right not to have information relating to a person’s family, health status or private affairs unlawfully revealed.

The draft document is particularly significant for its emphasis on economic, social, cultural, environmental and consumer rights. However, these entitlements are subject to progressive realisation and the Constitutional Court is prohibited from interfering with the State’s decisions on resource allocation. Children are entitled to a range of socio-economic rights including the right to free primary and secondary education. Significantly, the draft Constitution specifically states that the State shall protect a child who is homeless or spends time on the streets. The final draft Constitution extends rights relating to the family to include maternity and paternity leave, maternal and child health care, and the right to a non-custodial sentence for a pregnant or nursing woman. Predictably, the document limits marriages to opposite sex couples.

As with the existing Constitution, rights can be limited if reasonably required in the interest of public defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health etc. However, the draft Constitution emphasises that any limitation of rights may not negate the core or essential content of the right and must be reasonable and justifiable in a democratic society. The draft Constitution allows individuals to challenge an infringement of constitutional rights which affects them or another person. Unlike other constitutions in the region, the final draft Constitution is silent on the application of international law in Zambia and the extent to which courts must take cognisance of foreign and international law. The final draft Constitution limits the Presidential tenure to two terms. Perhaps given Zambia’s political history, there is an unusually long section on the protection of the President from legal proceedings in the draft Constitution.

The final draft Constitution provides for a range of commissions including the Gender Equality Commission, Human Rights Commission and Police Public Complaints Commission. A major shortcoming, however, is the lack of powers provided to these commissions to enforce their mandate. The Public Protector is able to summons persons to give evidence and compel the production of documents, but the same power is not afforded to other commissions. What is most interesting is that the draft Constitution provides that any Bill to amend the Bill of Rights must be approved by a referendum. This is in line with the current public discourse on the Constitution being a people-driven document. Whether that is in fact the case will depend on whether the adoption of the final draft Constitution is subject to a referendum[238]

Critical analysis of how much can a new constitution really change

After countless missed deadlines, Zambia is finally making progress towards a new constitution. A little over two years ago, when Michael Sata was campaigning for Zambia’s top office, he promised that, if elected, he would finally bring to an end a decade of abandoned legal reform and deliver the country a definitive new constitution[239]. Not only that, but he would do it within90 days of taking power. Sata’s election campaign was successful, and soon after taking office in September 2011, the new president − along with his Patriotic Front (PF) government − tasked a committee of lawyers and academics with drafting the document.

Things soon slowed down however, and it is only now − several shrugged-off deadlines later − that Zambia seems to be nearing the completion of its constitutional process. Though that’s not to say things are necessarily moving smoothly. In December 2013, the government blocked the constitutional committee from releasing its final draft to the public, insisting it be sent to the government alone, while allegations have emerged that Sata has changed his mind about Zambia’s need for a new constitution, believing instead that the existing one can simply be amended.

The government has rejected these claims, asserting that Sata’s commitment to a new constitution remains “unshakeable” and his two-year-old promise continue to loom large in the psyche of an increasingly outraged brigade of critics. After the 2014 budget revealed a skew of alarming numbers and the global rating agency Fitch downgraded the country’s credit rating, the PF’s economic success story lost its celebrated momentum, leaving it with little more than a narrative of heavy-handed autocracy. Many of the government’s opponents have closed in on the constitution as a panacea for all that ails the country, a movement that culminated in a major demonstration at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Lusaka and which took a sensational twist on 15 January when the outspoken Zambian Watchdog published what it claims is a leak of the final draft.

A torrent of official statements followed as the drafting committee denied originating the leak, the police vowed to clamp down on what they termed a ‘cybercrime’, and the government vowed to track down and punish the perpetrators of the leak. The cabinet, which is meant to be deliberating the final draft, also claimed it hasn’t yet received its copies of the document.

Talking the talk

While the authenticity of the leaked constitution is uncertain, it doesn’t stray far from the publicly available first draft, or even from previous drafts commissioned under past administrations. Zambia’s electoral system is addressed, requiring candidates to garner over 50% of the vote to hold presidential office, while parliament would be composed of members elected through a combination of first-past-the-post and proportional representation. The draft Bill of Rights − which includes classical first generation rights as well as social, economic and cultural rights − is also more clearly articulated than it is in the existing constitution, and it seems to be these protections, more than technical changes to governance structure, that the opposition is longing for. They complain that their protests have been menaced by police and ruling party thugs, that critical media outlets have been persecuted by the government, and that the general population, especially outside the capital Lusaka, slogs through a life of poverty, illiteracy and environmental degradation.

Indeed, tackling these problems is crucial, but here’s the rub: there’s more than enough substance in the existing constitution to transform human rights in the country. That’s not the issue. The real problem is that successive administrations, including those headed by members of the now opposition Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), simply cast off their legal responsibilities when it suits them. What needs to be tackled is Zambia’s tradition of impunity, which dates all the way back to the era of its independence president, Kenneth Kaunda. When Zambia was granted independence in 1964, it started its new life with a multiparty framework, led by Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP), which had won 55 of 75 seats in the pre-independence elections. But this wasn’t to last. In 1972, keen outmanoeuvre political opponents both inside and outside the ruling party, Kaunda banned all political parties apart from UNIP. In 1973, he formalised one-party rule in a new constitution that also that consolidated state power in the president’s office.

It was only 18 years later when Zambia was choked by debt and was facing mounting pressure from the international community that Kaunda commissioned a hasty legal review. That move led to the establishment of the 1991 constitution and multiparty elections that brought MMD leader Fredrick Chiluba to power. Not a lot has changed since then, despite the reform commissions that have been mandated, the reports that have been produced, and the many amendments proposed. One amendment that has been passed was a provision barring candidates with foreign parentage from running for the presidency. Chiluba, assisted by Sata, who was then a member of the MMD, managed to force through this provision in 1996, effectively blocking Kaunda, whose father was born in neighbouring Malawi, from returning. The amendment still exists today, but the kinds of reforms that would hold leaders more closely to account has remained elusive.

A tradition of impunity

However, in many ways, the existing constitution does a lot of things right. It contains all the baseline requisites such as human dignity, equality before the law, protection from inhuman treatment, freedom from slavery, and freedoms of religion and expression. It also explicitly protects young people from various forms of exploitation. And under the Policy section, its clauses address employment, shelter, disability, and education. It does use some derogatory language, but so too do the current drafts of the new constitution. The problem is that despite these legal mandates, correctional facilities are overcrowded and access to justice fails many prisoners in remand; there’s a long track record of beating, arresting, and criminally charging journalists, civil society leaders, and political figures who criticise government; poverty is endemic in rural areas, where education and healthcare facilities are also inadequate and the means of pursuing a gainful livelihood are largely absent.

When it comes to social and economic rights, many developing countries explain their failures in terms of cost. How can a poor nation like Zambia be expected to improve the lot of its direly undeveloped rural areas? How can it extend its meagre health and educational resources that far? How can it afford what human rights theorists call ‘positive rights’, those measures that require government action to protect and maintain? Part of the answer is to dam the ever-bubbling backwaters of corruption, which divert enormous sums from the country’s development agenda. While corruption charges and trials do occur – usually motivated by political reasons – leaders from Chiluba to Sata have done little to substantively affect the diversion of public money from development to private bank accounts, while Chiluba in particular oversaw the country’s most notorious chapter of embezzlement.

Steak on the table

In the short term, real change won’t emerge from the government’s legal apparatus. It will have to come from outside. Protesting Zambians have chalked up victories before, as when public demonstrations played a role in dissuading Chiluba from seeking an unconstitutional third term. And if NGOs, beleaguered though they are by looming registration reforms, were to focus their efforts on mobilising not just urban Zambians, but also those people living in undeveloped areas, more tangible results could be achieved. But it’s not just a case of focusing their efforts. It’s a case of refocusing them. The fight for a new and improved constitution is certainly a worthy one, but civil society organisations have made a holy grail of constitutional reform, as if delivery will automatically slacken the state’s grip on an array of levers it freely abuses, from stacking the judiciary with supporters to deploying waves of violent thugs in by-election campaigns.

The current opposition, meanwhile, is only too pleased to ally itself with activists, but given the MMD’s own history of unjust governance, the teaming up is clearly for self-serving reasons. Rather than giving politicians such an elevated podium from which to reinvent themselves, civil society would do better to zero in on specific rights violations and protest those on the same scale as they do constitutional reform. The other piece of this puzzle is the international community. That’s a difficult prescription for a continent whose leaders routinely play their populations against what they frame as foreign interference, but sustained pressure from multilateral organisations able to reference even the current set of constitutional guarantees would help consolidate demands made in the streets.

None of this is to say that robust laws can’t lay the groundwork for a future of mature, responsive governance. A strong legal framework, no matter its current irrelevance, will make for useful terms of reference in a more developed future, and human rights theorists habitually point to ambitious laws as key components to equitable progress. Indeed, what is a pie in the sky today could very well become steak on the plate tomorrow. The point is that it will take more than a good-looking tablecloth to make that happen.

Zambia’s draft Constitution

The final draft of Zambia’s new Constitution, which had been hidden from public view by President Sata until it was leaked to the Zambian Watchdog and the Lusaka Times, has taken a position on some of the key debates that raged during the constitution-making process[240].

Not surprisingly, the document proclaims Zambia a Christian Nation, but qualifies this by upholding a person’s right to freedom of conscience, belief or religion. Unfortunately the document is replete with references to ‘morality’, a vague term which has often been manipulated in southern Africa. These references are however always contextualised by principles of human dignity, equity, social justice, equality and non-discrimination.

Despite widespread advocacy during the consultative process, the final draft Constitution retains the death penalty. The death penalty is excluded in the case of pregnant women, children and where extenuating circumstances are present. Of concern is that the final draft Constitution has removed provisions on the right to dignity and the rights of marginalised groups which were included in the first draft Constitution. This was no doubt as a result of the misguided submissions of the Human Rights Commission.

Some provisions in the draft Constitution bodes well for civil society groups that have been struggling to uphold freedom of expression in Zambia. The final draft Constitution requires State recognition of the role of civil society in promoting the Bill of Rights. Freedom of expression is protected and explicitly does not extend to hate speech or the incitement of violence. Freedom of the media is protected and the State is ostensibly excluded from control of the media, except where necessary to regulate signals and signal distribution.

The final draft Constitution frames the right to privacy in a broader manner than elsewhere in the region and includes the right not to have information relating to a person’s family, health status or private affairs unlawfully revealed. The draft document is particularly significant for its emphasis on economic, social, cultural, environmental and consumer rights. However, these entitlements are subject to progressive realisation and the Constitutional Court is prohibited from interfering with the State’s decisions on resource allocation. Children are entitled to a range of socio-economic rights including the right to free primary and secondary education. Significantly, the draft Constitution specifically states that the State shall protect a child who is homeless or spends time on the streets.

The final draft Constitution extends rights relating to the family to include maternity and paternity leave, maternal and child health care, and the right to a non-custodial sentence for a pregnant or nursing woman. Predictably, the document limits marriages to opposite sex couples. As with the existing Constitution, rights can be limited if reasonably required in the interest of public defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health etc. However, the draft Constitution emphasises that any limitation of rights may not negate the core or essential content of the right and must be reasonable and justifiable in a democratic society. The draft Constitution allows individuals to challenge an infringement of constitutional rights which affects them or another person. Unlike other constitutions in the region, the final draft Constitution is silent on the application of international law in Zambia and the extent to which courts must take cognisance of foreign and international law.

The final draft Constitution limits the Presidential tenure to two terms. Perhaps given Zambia’s political history, there is an unusually long section on the protection of the President from legal proceedings in the draft Constitution. The final draft Constitution provides for a range of commissions including the Gender Equality Commission, Human Rights Commission and Police Public Complaints Commission. A major shortcoming, however, is the lack of powers provided to these commissions to enforce their mandate. The Public Protector is able to summons persons to give evidence and compel the production of documents, but the same power is not afforded to other commissions.

What is most interesting, is that the draft Constitution provides that any Bill to amend the Bill of Rights must be approved by a referendum. This is in line with the current public discourse on the Constitution being a people-driven document. Whether that is in fact the case will depend on whether the adoption of the final draft Constitution is subject to a referendum.

MEDIA FREEDOM

MISA Zambia is the Zambian chapter of the Media Institute of Southern Africa. It is an organization designed; for all intents and purposes, to promote Zambian media rights and responsibilities, as well as tolerance, freedom and pluralism[241]. In order to do this, MISA Zambia monitors the media environment through a variety of avenues, including efforts to decrease the number of defamation cases against the media, combating challenges of media freedom and maintaining a proactive engagement with civil society and government. MISA Zambia works with numerous different institutions and organisations around issues that have a direct bearing on not only the quality of journalism in the country, but also the freedoms of the media. As an advocacy organisation, MISA Zambia believes that while people have the freedom and rights to express their views, there are certain responsibilities that come with this particular freedom. MISA Zambia also believes that it is the right of the people within a society to know how the government functions and that it is not only the right of the media, but also the responsibility to convey such operations to the general public.

The role of the MISA chapter

i. On an annual basis the chapter develops a state of media freedom and freedom of expression report on Zambia. This chapter is included in MISA’s overall state of media freedom publication, So This Is Democracy?

ii. For more in-depth analysis on the media in Zambia, the chapter conducts the African Media Barometer (AMB) research (add AMB link). The chapter also hosts annual awards to promote excellence in journalism. Occasionally, MISA Zambia also conducts training to develop the capacity of media professionals to do their work.

iii. Besides taking part in annual research efforts, increasing MISA’s visibility in Zambia, and continuously monitoring the media, MISA Zambia’s core activity has been to focus on the country’s recent attempts to put in place a new constitution that will address issues of access to information (or indeed its effort to have the FOI Bill enacted.)

iv. Zambia is once again working towards a new constitution under a body called Technical Committee on the Drafting of the Zambian Constitution.

v. The Ministry of Information Broadcasting and Labour in Zambia has appointed a Committee on the Freedom of Information for this purpose. Its main principle, as outlined in the Terms of Reference, is to provide final recommendations for the redrafting of the FOI Bill on behalf of the Ministry of Information and to devise and implement a strategy for sensitising the public on access to information to ensure enactment of a robust and democratic ATI Bill by 2012. The committee comprises government, civil society, legal experts and the cooperating partners.

Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) board unveiled

The newly-constituted Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) Board of directors has been unveiled following its ratification by Parliament for the first time in compliance with the ZNBC Act. This is the first time ZNBC has a Board ratified by Parliament in line with the provisions of the ZNBC Act Cap 154 as amended by Act number 16 of 2010[242].

The reportorial and editorial freedom had been restored to the newsrooms. ZNBC programming and news coverage was now a marvel to watch and listen to, and that the corporation had since recaptured its audience nationwide. The committee advised that the Government should nominate an engineer and one from the civil society with a media background for the remaining two slots of board members.

The ZNBC board is supposed to have nine members but Government forwarded only seven names. Mr Kapeya was confident that the new board would use vast individual competence, experience and expertise to make ZNBC operate viably, profitably and to the satisfaction of the public. The corporation was faced with huge operational challenges and was financially unstable, with heavy reliance on Government funding. From 2011 to date, the Government had given ZNBC K40 million to meet various critical operations.

The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) Zambia is concerned with the confusion in the issuance of broadcast licences and the vague mandate of the Independent Broadcast Authority (IBA) that was established this year. Following a Ministerial statement by the Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS), Mwansa Kapeya in Parliament, it is clear that while the IBA is operational, its mandate is inexplicit or limited. Currently, applicants are not sure which institution to approach for licence applications.

MISA is appealing for the immediate appointment of the IBA board in order for it to take up the responsibility of issuance of licences. While MISA Zambia supported the appointment of the IBA Director General without a board, the organization does not subscribe to encroachment by government on IBA’s mandate. We urge the government to quickly address this issue and resolve the confusion that is affecting the independent operations of both the broadcast sector and the IBA by fully operationalizing the independent broadcast regulator including the reinstatement of the Appointments Committee in the IBA Act of 2010.

Further, the revocation of the nationwide coverage licences to Radio Phoenix and QFM is going against the objectives of the IBA which is to promote media pluralism and diversity. So far, government has not alluded to parts of the law that prohibit the nationwide coverage for private media. The stance is equally against the consolidation of Zambia’s democracy and good governance which can only exist where free flow of information is guaranteed.

Freedom of the Press 2013

After several years of threats to press freedom under President Rupiah Banda and the long-ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), the September 2011 presidential election victory of opposition Patriotic Front (PF) leader Michael Sata prompted hope for openings in the media environment[243]. However, the PF government has generally failed to fulfil its promises to advance press freedom, and has targeted critical journalists and outlets with numerous legal and other actions.

The constitution guarantees freedom of speech, but the relevant language can be broadly interpreted. Journalists and media outlets face restrictions under criminal and civil defamation laws, sedition and obscenity laws, and provisions of the penal code such as the Official Secrets Act and the State Security Act. In 2012, Sata demonstrated intolerance of criticism and sought redress through the courts. In one prominent case, the president in May filed a defamation of character lawsuit against the leader of the opposition United Party for National Development (UPND), Hakainde Hichilema, for issuing a press release that accused Sata of corruption. The defamation suit also included editors of two critical publications, Lloyd Himaambo of the online newspaper Zambian Watchdog and Richard Sakala of the newspaper Daily Nation, for printing stories about the press release. The two outlets faced several similar lawsuits during the year.

A freedom of information bill that had been shelved by previous administrations received support from the new government in 2011. Although the government continued to pledge that it would pass such legislation in 2012, no bill had been put forward by year’s end. In a separate setback for media access to government information, Sata held no official press conferences during 2012.

The 2010 Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (Amendment) Act allows the information minister to select the corporation’s board without first receiving nominations from an appointments committee. However, the selections must be ratified by the parliament. The board is tasked with choosing the head of the state-owned Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC). The new government has vowed to reintroduce the appointments committee. Nevertheless, Information Minister Fackson Shamenda unilaterally named economist Chibamba Kanyama as the director general of ZNBC in March 2012, four months before the parliament received a list of board members for approval. The 2002 Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) Act was modified in 2010, granting the information minister similar powers of direct appointment for the IBA, the broadcast media regulator. However, by the end of 2012 the IBA had yet to be established, and no new board members had been appointed.

In October 2012, Zambia’s registrar of societies threatened to deregister the Zambian Watchdog, which is hosted outside Zambia, for allegedly failing to submit a postal address and pay required fees. The issue of media regulation had been contentious under the Banda government, as the MMD made repeated threats to impose statutory regulation. A consortium of groups within the industry made progress on self-regulation in 2010, agreeing to establish a voluntary, independent Zambia Media Ethics Council (ZAMEC) and drafting a code of ethics that the proposed council would enforce. However, under Banda, ZAMEC’s launch was repeatedly postponed, and the participation of public media workers was prohibited. In a positive step under the new administration, ZAMEC was officially launched in July 2012 with the full participation of the public media, which employ an estimated two-thirds of Zambia’s media workers.

Upon taking power, the Sata government pledged to free the public media—consisting of the ZNBC and the widely circulated dailies Zambia Daily Mailand Times of Zambia—from government control. Throughout 2012, the government made pronouncements that the public media had been depoliticized. However, according to reports by media monitoring groups, these outlets have generally continued to report along pro-government lines, and their journalists continued to practice self-censorship. The only other major daily is the privately owned Post, which has long been a vocal supporter of the PF and a critic of the MMD. As a result, all major print publications now favor the government.

Intimidation and physical harassment of journalists occurs occasionally, and perpetrators include members and supporters of both the ruling party and the opposition. In April 2012, three MMD supporters received three-year prison sentences with hard labour for assaulting a crew from independent Muvi TV and stealing their equipment in 2011. In May, the Zambian Watchdog claimed that its website was the target of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. In July, Defense Minister Godfrey Mwamba said the PF government would “sort out” theZambian Watchdog in response to its highly critical reporting. In August, UPND politician William Banda attempted to strangle Muvi TV cameraman Lloyd Kapusa outside a police station in Lusaka. The case was later settled out of court. In September, a group of PF supporters attacked a photojournalist from the Post who attempted to photograph them while they were helping police break up an opposition rally in Lusaka. In October, party cadres from the UPND attacked a ZNBC reporter and camera operator who were at Lusaka’s police headquarters to conduct an interview with a police official. The cadres, who accused the journalists of bias against the UPND, threw stones and bricks at them and issued death threats until they took refuge inside police headquarters.

Political actors’ intolerance of independent voices also extended to civil society. In September, the PF youth chairman for Copperbelt Province, Kabwe Chanda, accused the Zambia chapter of the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) of becoming politicized. MISA denied the accusation, noting that it had supported the PF’s efforts to disseminate its views while in opposition.

In 2011, the Banda government had cracked down on media coverage of a growing separatist movement in Barotseland, in western Zambia. In one incident, security forces closed local station Radio Lyambai and confiscated its equipment after it aired an advertisement for a banned secessionist meeting. Radio Lyambai was subsequently allowed to reopen. However, in April 2012, authorities warned that its coverage of a March separatist council meeting was treasonous.

There are three daily newspapers with wide circulation: the Zambia Daily Mail, the Times of Zambia, and the Post. Several smaller independent papers, such as the Daily Nation, also publish. The ZNBC is the primary broadcast outlet covering domestic news. A growing number of private radio stations, including dozens of community radio stations, operate freely, as do four private television stations. International broadcast services are not restricted. Some local private stations, including Radio Phoenix and Sky FM, carry call-in shows that express diverse and critical viewpoints. In August 2012, the government issued 10 full licenses and 16 construction licenses to new radio and television stations.

Also in August, the permanent secretary for information and broadcasting, Amos Malupenga, threatened to revoke the licenses of outlets that attacked the government’s reputation. In September, the Zambia Information and Communication Technology Authority reduced the transmission strength of University of Zambia (UNZA) Radio from 1,000 watts to 260 watts, effectively limiting its reach to the campus itself. The station had previously aired interviews with opposition figures. The move sparked protests by university students.

Radio remains the medium of choice in most of the country because of its relatively low cost of access, but many stations face financial difficulties due to their dependence on sponsored programming and the small advertising market. Reception of both state and private television signals throughout the country remains poor. The costs of newsprint and ink (including high import duties and taxes), printing, and distribution remain very high, hampering print outlets’ ability to increase their readership. The government sometimes uses advertising as a tool to influence media content and coverage. Only 13 percent of the population accessed the internet in 2012 due to high costs

Freedom of the Press 2014

Press freedom in Zambia experienced a series of setbacks in 2013. President Michael Sata and his ruling Patriotic Front (PF) government arrested and harassed independent journalists and news outlets, blocked critical websites, and made politicized decisions regarding the broadcast regulator and the issuing of nationwide licenses. Meanwhile, the government and the PF continued to dominate the broadcast and print outlets that reach a majority of Zambians[244].

The constitution guarantees freedom of expression, but the relevant language can be broadly interpreted. Journalists and media outlets face restrictions under criminal and civil defamation laws, sedition and obscenity laws, and provisions of the penal code such as the State Security Act. In 2013, Sata’s government continued to demonstrate intolerance of critical media, exacting retribution through the courts as well as extrajudicial harassment. Officials specifically targeted the online news site Zambian Watchdog, which employs anonymous reporters and often uses inflammatory language in its criticisms of the government. In early July, the authorities raided the homes of two journalists suspected of writing for the Zambian Watchdog—Clayson Hamasaka and Thomas Zyambo—ostensibly to search for seditious material and drugs. The police confiscated their computers and other equipment, and the two journalists were detained without charge for over 24 hours. Zyambo was ultimately charged with sedition in connection with documents about Sata that were found in his home, and Hamasaka was charged with possession of pornography. Another journalist allegedly associated with the site, Wilson Pondamali, was arrested in mid-July and faced several charges, including malicious damage to property and attempted escape from lawful custody. He was held for two weeks before being granted bail. Separately, Richard Sakala, the owner of the Daily Nation, one of Zambia’s few remaining independent print outlets, appeared in court with two others in December to face a charge of publishing false news; he also faced several separate cases of civil defamation during the year for printing remarks made by opposition leaders that were critical of Sata. None of the cases had been resolved by year’s end.

A freedom of information bill that had been shelved by previous administrations received support when Sata and the PF took power in 2011. Although the government repeated its pledges to pass the legislation in 2013, it had yet to submit the existing bill to the parliament at the end of the year. In another impediment to the media’s access to government information, Sata has never held an official press conference as president. The governance structure of both the state broadcaster and the broadcasting regulator leaves them vulnerable to political interference. The 2010 Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (Amendment) Act allows the information minister to select the corporation’s board without first seeking nominations from an appointments committee, though the selections must be ratified by the parliament. The board is tasked with choosing the head of the state-owned Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC). In December 2013, Information and Broadcasting Services Minister Mwansa Kapeya unveiled the new ZNBC board after it had been approved by lawmakers. Lawyer John Mulwila was named as the board’s chairman. The ZNBC had been operating without a board prior to the appointments. Later in December, the board confirmed Chibamba Kanyama, a journalist and economist, as director general; he had been appointed by Sata earlier in the year, in apparent violation of the ZNBC Act.

The 2002 Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) Act was modified in 2010, granting the information minister similar powers of direct appointment for the board of the IBA, the broadcast media regulator. However, the authority remained without a board in 2013, and in June the government appointed Josephine Mapona, a former journalist, as IBA director general. In October, Information and Broadcasting Permanent Secretary Emmanuel Mwamba approved the nationwide broadcasting license applications of several local and regional radio stations. However, later that month Sata ordered Mwamba to revoke the nationwide licenses issued to privately owned Radio Phoenix and Q-FM because they had aired statements by opposition politicians. (The two stations retained their licenses to broadcast locally.) Sata said only the ZNBC and religious stations should be allowed to have nationwide licenses. Mwamba was later fired. Media freedom groups, including the Committee to Protect Journalists and the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), criticized the decision to revoke the licenses; MISA said it ran counter to the IBA’s mission to “promote media pluralism and diversity.” The organization also expressed concern over the government’s continued failure to appoint an IBA board, its interference in the broadcast licensing process, and a general lack of clarity regarding the IBA’s mandate.

In 2012, the PF government approved the launch of the voluntary, independent Zambia Media Ethics Council (ZAMEC) with the full participation of the public media, which account for an estimated two-thirds of Zambia’s media workers. ZAMEC was responsible for drafting a code of ethics that its national governing council would enforce. In March 2013, ZAMEC adopted a constitution and appointed a governing council, but it had yet to become fully operational due to a lack of funding. Upon taking power, the Sata government had pledged to free the public media—consisting of the ZNBC and the widely circulated dailies Zambia Daily Mail and Times of Zambia—from government control. However, according to media monitoring groups, these outlets have generally continued to report along pro-government lines. Self-censorship at public media outlets reportedly remains common, and journalists from mainstream outlets often turn to anonymous blogging to express themselves freely due to the threat of legal action and attacks by PF cadres. The only large-circulation private daily, the Post, has long been a vocal supporter of the PF, meaning all major print and broadcast outlets currently favor the PF government. Smaller, independent print and online outlets, such as the Daily Nation, the Zambian Watchdog, and another news website, Zambia Reports, have faced increasing legal and extrajudicial harassment.

In late June 2013, the Zambian Watchdog site, which is hosted outside the country, was blocked by internet service providers in Zambia. It eventually became completely inaccessible via web browsers inside Zambia and, for some periods, outside the country as well, although its content could be viewed on mobile phones, using circumvention tools, and on its Facebook page. Zambia Reports was also blocked at various times during the year. In 2013, journalists were faced with harassment and physical attacks, both in the course of their work and in retaliation for their reporting, and media practitioners reported a general climate of increased intimidation. In arresting Hamasaka and Zyambo, police raided their homes in the early morning, accompanied by drug enforcement agents. Pondamali spent nearly a week in the hospital during his detention, and while there he was reportedly chained to his bed. In February, MISA reported that several district commissioners had been threatening local community media outlets and their personnel with physical violence and the withdrawal of licenses after the outlets reported critically on the officials. In May, two photojournalists—one from the Post and one working independently—were treated roughly by army personnel while trying to photograph dignitaries during an official ceremony. And in June, men suspected of being PF supporters beat journalists who were covering a protest led by civil society activists and clergy members against the government’s recent decision to remove subsidies on fuel and maize. The men also attacked the protesters. There were several other incidents during the year in which PF party cadres attacked reporters or photojournalists.

Although the media industry is dominated by the ZNBC, the two state-owned papers, and the pro-PF Post, there are several private television stations with smaller audiences, some independent papers, and a growing number of private radio stations. There are also at least 70 community radio stations, though they are limited to broadcasting within a 150-kilometer radius. International broadcast services are not restricted. Some radio stations, including Radio Phoenix, UNZA Radio, and Pan African Radio, carry call-in shows that express diverse and critical viewpoints. Radio remains the medium of choice in most of the country because of its relatively low cost of access, but many stations face financial difficulties due to their dependence on sponsored programming and the small advertising market. Reception of both state and private television signals throughout the country remains poor. There is also a state-owned national news agency, the Zambia News and Information Services (ZANIS).

The costs of newsprint and ink (which include substantial import duties and taxes), printing, and distribution remain very high, hampering print outlets’ ability to increase their readership. The government sometimes uses advertising as a tool to influence media content and coverage. In 2013, for example, government ministries and agencies were prohibited from advertising in the Daily Nation due to its critical reporting. There have also been reports of private companies avoiding such outlets out of fear of government retaliation. Despite the blocking of websites in 2013, the internet remains one of the freest spaces for journalists and bloggers to express criticism of the government. However, few Zambians are able to access the medium; internet penetration in 2013 was only around 15 percent of the population, due mainly to high costs.

government performance OVERVIEW

In its first full year in office, President Michael Sata’s government began taking some outwardly positive steps to fight corruption, open up the media environment, and reform the constitution. However, it had not followed through with many concrete measures by the end of 2012[245]. Meanwhile, Sata proved to be highly intolerant of dissenting viewpoints, using questionable legal tactics and politically motivated prosecutions against the opposition and critical journalists.

In the September 2011 presidential election, the PF’s Michael Sata defeated President Rupiah Banda, 43 percent to 36 percent. Banda accepted the result, marking the second time in Zambian history that an incumbent peacefully surrendered the presidency after losing an election. In concurrent parliamentary elections, the PF won a plurality, taking 61 seats, to 55 for the MMD and 29 for the United Party for National Development (UPND). Although the elections were characterized by fierce campaigning, the misuse of state resources by the MMD, and isolated rioting that claimed at least two lives, the polls were deemed free and credible by international observers.

In 2012, the Sata administration made halting steps to fulfil campaign promises, including constitutional reform, anticorruption efforts, and press freedom initiatives. In April, a draft of the new constitution was unveiled, containing provisions including a requirement that a presidential candidate gain more than 50 percent of the vote to win. It would also make the electoral commission more independent and create a bill of rights. However, critics have asserted that the draft awards too much power to the president, especially regarding the appointment of key government officials. The charter’s approval process has been criticized for delays and a lack of clarity in the way provincial and national consultations are conducted, as well as in the timeline for a national referendum. The final version of the constitution was scheduled to have been submitted by September; that date has been pushed back to 2013, and a referendum date has yet to be set. In September, Justice Minister Wynter Kabimba called for workshops being organized by civil society groups on the constitution-making process to be halted, on the grounds that only the government’s technical committee should convene such meetings.

Under the Sata government, the climate of highly charged, polarized politics seen during the Banda administration continued. In a move condemned as politically motivated, the registrar of societies deregistered the MMD at a political party in March because it had not paid its registration fees going back 20 years, and declared its parliamentary seats vacant. However, the MMD won a stay of the de-registration days later, and a high court judge overturned the suspension in June. Since taking office, Sata has filed a number of defamation lawsuits against his critics, including UPND leader Hakainde Hichilema and opposition news outlets.

Several by-elections were triggered during 2012 as a result of successful PF court challenges of seats it had lost in 2011, resulting in the PF gaining at least four more seats in the National Assembly at the expense of the MMD. The PF has also increased its power by encouraging MMD members to defect through offers of government posts.

Political rights and civil liberties

Zambia is an electoral democracy. The long-ruling MMD relinquished control of both the presidency and the parliament in 2011, and local and international observers declared the voting to be generally free and credible. The president and the unicameral National Assembly are elected to serve concurrent five-year terms. The National Assembly includes 150 elected members, as well as 8 members appointed by the president.

The major political parties are the ruling PF, the MMD, and the UPND; the MMD was weakened considerably during 2012 due to infighting and a concerted effort by the PF to co-opt its members. Corruption is believed to be widespread, though the government of President Michael Sata has taken some steps to fight graft. In June 2010, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis had suspended $300 million in funding, mainly out of concern over corruption in the Health Ministry, but it restored $100 million in June 2012 after several officials were fired. In April, the PF-controlled National Assembly reinserted an “abuse of office” clause into the Anti-Corruption Act, which had been removed by the MMD-dominated body in 2010.

The clause allowed for the prosecution of public officials for violations such as abuse of authority or misuse of public funds, and was key to fighting government corruption. Meanwhile, Sata’s administration launched corruption investigations against several former MMD ministers and officials, as well as Banda’s family, and controversially reversed certain deals with foreign companies made by the MMD government on the grounds that they had been improperly awarded. However, the PF’s own anticorruption credentials were called into question following cases in which party allies were acquitted of corruption. In one instance, Henry Kapoko, a distant relative of Sata, was acquitted in separate trials in November and December 2012 of engaging in theft and money laundering while he was a human resources officer at the Health Ministry; Kapoko had been involved in the scandal that triggered the Global Fund to Fight AIDS to suspend its funding. In October, however, the Anti-Corruption Commission opened ongoing corruption investigations of Justice Minister Wynter Kabimba and Defense Minister Geoffrey Mwamba, both leading members of the PF. Zambia was ranked 88 out of 176 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index.

Freedoms of speech and the press are constitutionally guaranteed, though the Banda government had restricted these rights in practice. Sata and the PF pledged to open up the media environment, but their accomplishments have been uneven. One of those promises was to free the editorial boards at the public media—consisting of the widely circulated Zambia Daily Mail and Times of Zambia, as well as the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC)—from government control. However, these outlets have generally continued to report along pro-government lines, and journalists practice self-censorship. The other main daily is the independent but pro-PF Post; as a result, all the major print publications now favour Sata’s government. The ZNBC dominates the broadcast media, although several independent stations have the capacity to reach large portions of the population. The government has the authority to appoint the management boards of ZNBC and the Independent Broadcasting Authority, which regulates the industry and grants licenses to prospective broadcasters. Sata’s government has made repeated promises to pass an access to information law, but had not done so by the end of 2012.

Independent and critical journalists continue to face intimidation from law enforcement officials and PF supporters, as well as the threat of legal action, and there have been numerous cases of attacks on journalists by opposition supporters. Sata and PF members have filed several criminal libel and defamation suits against journalists and opposition figures in response to critical stories and public statements. In one prominent case, Sata in May filed a defamation suit against UPND leader Hakainde Hichilema; Lloyd Himaambo, editor of the critical website Zambian Watchdog; and Richard Sakala, editor of the independent opposition Daily Nation newspaper, in connection with a May press release issued by Hichilema in which he accused Sata of corruption. The two media outlets—which were the subject of several other similar lawsuits in 2012—were targeted for publishing stories about the press release. The case was ongoing at year’s end. Also in May, the Zambian Watchdog claimed to have suffered harassment and distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks in response to its reporting.

Constitutionally protected religious freedom is respected in practice. Sata became the country’s first Catholic president in 2011. The government does not restrict academic freedom.

Under the Public Order Act, police must receive a week’s notice before all demonstrations. While the law does not require permits, the police have frequently broken up “illegal” protests because the organizers lacked permits. The police can choose where and when rallies are held, as well as who can address them. The opposition has alleged that Sata’s government often employs the Public Order Act to break up its protests. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are required to register and reregister every five years. The law also established a board to provide guidelines and regulate NGO activity in the country.

The law provides for the right to join unions, strike, and bargain collectively. Zambia’s trade unions are among Africa’s strongest, and the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions operates democratically without state interference. However, there is significant labour exploitation in some sectors of the economy. Tensions between workers and management at Chinese-owned mines have been increasing. Labour abuses in Chinese-operated copper mines, including unsafe working conditions, resistance to unionization, and much lower pay than at other Zambian mines have been reported. In August 2012, a Chinese mine manager was killed during a protest at the Collum Coal Mine in which workers were demanding that their wages be increased to equal Zambia’s new national minimum wage for labourers.

Judicial independence is guaranteed by law. However, Sata’s critics charge that he has interfered in the judiciary. Upon taking office, Sata replaced most top judges and judicial officials, alleging that the system was corrupt and needed reform. In April 2012, Sata suspended three top judges for misconduct, a move that critics alleged was in retribution for a judgment they had issued against the president’s allies. Legislation passed in 2009 allowed the executive to increase the number of judges serving on the High and Supreme Courts. However, the courts lack qualified personnel and significant trial delays are common. Pre-trial detainees are sometimes held for years under harsh conditions, and many of the accused lack access to legal aid owing to limited resources. In rural areas, customary courts of variable quality and consistency—whose decisions often conflict with the constitution and national law—decide many civil matters.

Allegations of police corruption and brutality are widespread, and security forces have generally operated with impunity. There are reports of forced labour, abuse of inmates by authorities, and deplorable health conditions in Zambia’s prisons. The death penalty was included in the new draft constitution, but a network of civil society organizations is lobbying for its removal.

Barotseland, a traditionally poor and marginalized region in western Zambia, has repeatedly demanded to secede from Zambia. Sata had pledged, if elected, to honor the 1964 Barotseland Agreement, which gave the region limited local self-governance and provided for future discussions of greater autonomy or independence. In March 2012, Sata reneged on his campaign promise, and Barotseland’s governing council subsequently declared independence. In October, Barotseland’s king inaugurated a caretaker government. Later that month, reports emerged that prison guards and paramilitary police severely beat jailed Barotse activists.

Societal discrimination remains a serious obstacle to women’s rights. Women won just 17 of the 150 elected seats in the National Assembly in the September 2011 polls; 2 were later appointed to the 20-member cabinet, and 5 to the 11-member Supreme Court. Women are denied full economic participation, and rural, poor women often require male consent to obtain credit. Discrimination against women is especially prevalent in customary courts, where they are considered subordinate with respect to property, inheritance, and marriage. Domestic violence and rape are major problems, and traditional norms inhibit many women from reporting assaults. Consensual sexual activity between members of the same sex is illegal and punishable by prison sentences of up to 15 years. There are no registered civil society organizations that advocate for LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) rights. People living with HIV/AIDS routinely face discrimination in society and for employment.

Zambia won international praise in 2011 for free and fair elections that led to a peaceful transfer of power to the long-time opposition party—a rarity in Southern Africa. However, recent democratic setbacks in the country, overshadowed by threats to freedom in larger countries like Mali, Kenya, and South Africa, have yet to attract much attention abroad.

Over the past two decades, Zambia has successfully moved beyond outright dictatorship and made important gains in economic development, the rule of law, and the emergence of a dynamic civil society. However, as in some other developing democracies, these hard-won advancements have eroded because governing elites have failed to undertake second- and third-generation reforms that would tackle ineffectual institutions, de facto exclusion of many segments of society from political life, entrenched corruption, weak checks on executive power, and tilted electoral playing fields. The relatively stable and peaceful democracy that Zambians have worked hard to build is now being threatened by an increasingly defensive government intent on consolidating power and stifling dissent.

President Michael Sata and his Patriotic Front (PF) came to power two years ago after enduring sometimes violent repression by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), which had ruled the country since 1991. While Sata has received credit for making well on some of his promises of economic reform, his government has reneged on almost all of its pledges regarding good governance, legal reform, and human rights. In fact, the PF appears to be dragging Zambia back toward abusive practices not seen since Kenneth Kaunda’s one-party rule in the 1970s and 80s.

In part by applying hated colonial-era public order laws, the government has moved methodically to silence critics in opposition parties and civil society. It has also decided to implement a restrictive law on nongovernmental organizations (NGO), which it had vehemently opposed while in opposition. The legislation gives the government sweeping powers to deregister organizations and allows substantial interference with freedom of association.

Sata and the PF have repeated specious and hackneyed accusations that prodemocracy and human rights activists are doing the bidding of hostile, foreign interests, creating a permissive climate that emboldens the government’s more radical supporters. In May 2013, peaceful demonstrators were prevented from protesting in a public space. Gathering in a church, they were besieged and beaten by thugs armed with hoe handles, machetes, and chains. The assailants were believed to be members of the ruling party’s youth wing.

The government’s growing intolerance for criticism has extended to the media. Journalists have been unlawfully arrested, websites shut down, and nationwide broadcasting licenses revoked in a thinly disguised campaign by the authorities to circumscribe free speech and encourage self-censorship.

There are also concerns about corruption, another area in which the PF had promised reforms during the 2011 election campaign. By most reliable accounts, after some initial steps to reduce endemic corruption, the Sata government has pulled back from investigating graft by senior officials and PF supporters. Most citizens now regard the Anti-Corruption Commission with cynicism, while the politicization of the judiciary ensures impunity for those who use public office for private gain.

Opposition parties, journalists, and activists have not been idle in the face of the PF’s abuses. The opposition is using the private media—mostly radio and online outlets—to challenge the government’s attempts to close democratic space. And despite rapidly dwindling funds, opposition parties are vigorously contesting the many by-elections engineered by the PF through court cases, and have won some notable victories in 2013. Consequently, the PF’s legally dubious efforts to change the balance in the parliament have yet to win it a two-thirds majority, leaving in place an important but shaky check on its power.

For civil society, the battle lines are now being drawn around a new constitution and NGO act. Movements have sprung up to ensure that the new charter includes some essential reforms. Recent statements by the president suggesting that the government will stall on long-awaited constitutional revisions are likely to fuel rather than quell civic activism. Civil society is also mobilizing to force the government to create a more liberal regulatory environment for NGOs, and there are some indications that the government may entertain a less restrictive version of the current law.

There is reason to hope that these efforts will be successful, as they have precedents in Zambia’s recent past. Perhaps most memorably, a grand coalition of civil society and opposition parties blocked the MMD’s Frederick Chiluba from seeking a third presidential term in 2001.

However, the domestic struggle to defend and expand Zambians’ democratic rights must be accompanied by external pressure. Unfortunately, regional institutions that could play a role, most notably the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), cannot be counted on to help. The African Union, with its even smaller share of democratic member states, is still less likely to take any meaningful steps or voice concerns about Zambia’s negative trajectory.

The resources of donor governments outside Africa are constrained, but surely it would be prudent to help already democratic countries prevent or reverse a slide into authoritarianism. Diplomatic pressure in tandem with political and financial support for domestic proponents of democratic change could form part of a promising strategy to counter the recent reversals in Zambia. The United States and European donors together have the requisite combination of carrots and sticks to encourage the Sata government to abandon its present course and embrace the reform agenda on which it campaigned in 2011.

One obvious point of leverage is the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which provides generous U.S. funding to countries whose governments achieve adequate progress on a range of economic and governance reforms. MCC officials only recently communicated their concerns to the Zambian government, warning that the country is on a path inconsistent with its commitments under an MCC agreement. The compact, which is worth $354 million and entered into force in mid-November, is potentially at risk if the Zambian government continues to regress on governing “justly and democratically.”

Sata was long viewed as the outspoken champion of the people and a steadfast opponent of the corrupt MMD regime. His rapid fall from democratic grace once in office has been extremely disheartening. But the strong domestic resistance suggests that Zambians will not tolerate a return to the authoritarian past, and timely outside pressure would hasten the correction and limit the damage from this unfortunate backsliding.

MDG PROGRESS REPORT

The Millennium Declaration and Development Goals

The 2013 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Report for Zambia tracks achievements on the 8 goals and 39 indicators in the context of the country’s development. The report is an essential tool for Zambia’s leaders, citizens and partners for reviewing the progress of national policies and programmes that address each of the 8 goals. In some of the areas, as highlighted in the report, we see significant achievements. In others, progress remains slow[246].

Concerns remain in those areas where Zambia is not on track to achieve its MDG targets. In a country endowed with natural resources, the outlook for MDG 7 (environmental sustainability) is worrying due to the degradation of land, forests, water and wildlife. Similarly, for MDG 1 (reducing poverty and hunger): Zambia has grown economically at an average of 6.5 percent for the past six years, yet cannot show a significant reduction in poverty, inequality and malnutrition in the rural and peri-urban areas most in need of this. Accordingly, national priorities and policies will have to be reset and institutions realigned to gain ground in these areas.

The Millennium Development Goals are based on the Millennium Declaration, signed by 189 countries – including 147 heads of State and Government – in September 2000, and from further agreement by member states at the 2005 World Summit. To assess progress on the commitment made in the Millennium Declaration over the period from 1990 to 2015, relevant targets and indicators were agreed upon. The goals and their targets are interrelated and should be seen as a whole. They represent a partnership between the developed countries and the developing countries “to create an environment – at the national and global levels alike – which is conducive to development and the elimination of poverty”.

In the 1990s, UN member states went through an intense, historically unprecedented UN conference process, aimed at “building consensus” on development priorities for the 21st century. A consensus was proclaimed, even if the acrimonious debates that marked some of the conferences (1994 Cairo conference on population and 1995 Beijing conference on women in particular) were proof of the fakeness of the consensus. At the end of the 1990s, governments experienced “conference fatigue”, and those actors at the rudder of global governance feared the process launched by the conferences was losing steam.

In September of 2000 the largest gathering of world leaders in human history gathered for the Millennium Summit at United Nations headquarters in New York. In that pivotal year, representatives from 189 Member States of the United Nations met to reflect on their common destiny. The nations were interconnected as never before, with increased globalization promising faster growth, higher living standards and new opportunities. Yet their citizens’ lives were starkly disparate. As some States looked ahead to prosperity and global cooperation, many barely had a future, being mired in miserable, unending conditions of poverty, conflict and a degraded environment.

To begin addressing these crises back in 2000, the convened leaders set down the Millennium Declaration, a series of collective priorities for peace and security, poverty reduction, the environment and human rights – essential steps for the advancement of humankind, as well as for the immediate survival for a significant portion of it. Human development, they agreed, is the key to sustaining social and economic progress in all countries, as well as contributing to global security. Following further meetings with many world agencies, the delegation also drew up a blueprint for a better future: the Millennium Development Goals. By 2015, the leaders pledged, the world would achieve measurable improvements in the most critical areas of human development. The goals establish yardsticks for measuring these results, not just for developing countries but for countries that help to fund development programmes and for the multilateral institutions, like the World Bank or the United Nations Development Programme, that help countries implement them.

A year later, in August 2001 the UN Secretariat published the 8 Millennium Development Goals. The goals were devised, not by governments through an open debate as would have been desirable, if the goals were to express the will of the people in developing countries, but by a “working committee drawn from a range of UN bodies, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UNICEF, the Population Fund and the World Health Organization, as well as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development”. The goals were not the object of a formal resolution of the UN General Assembly, but it was taken for granted that they reformulated the intergovernmental Declaration and were to frame international development cooperation until 2015. The history of the goals’ origin makes it clear that they are not, strictly speaking, an intergovernmental product, but an initiative driven by the UN Secretariat and its “experts”.

The MDG Process

The UN Secretary General invited heads of state and government for a Summit at the opening of the General Assembly in September 2005 in New-York, in order to review progress towards the goals. 170 heads of state and government participated in the event. Ever since 2005, the UN Secretariat has issued a yearly Millennium Development Goals Report. The report is based on a master set of data compiled by an Inter-Agency and Expert Group on MDG Indicators, led by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the UN Secretariat.

In 2002, the UN Secretary General commissioned the Millennium Project, an independent advisory body, to develop a concrete action plan for the world to achieve the MDGs. In 2005, the Millennium Project, directed by economist Jeffrey Sachs, presented its final recommendations to the Secretary General in a report entitled Investing in Development – A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals. As of January 1st, 2007, the advisory work formerly carried out by the Millennium Project is being continued by an MDG support team integrated under the UN Development Program (UNDP). The UNDP, which is present in 166 countries, now plays a central role in tracking the MDGs (global progress, country progress and UNDP’s work with donors), campaigning and mobilizing, researching and sharing best strategies, and supporting governments in operational activities.

The MDGs inspires a global lobby, the End poverty 2015 millennium campaign, which describes itself as a “growing global movement of people who are demanding that their government honour their commitments to achieve the MDGs by 2015.

The history of the MDG process since its origin reveals that sovereign governments are not in the driver’s seat, but are themselves driven by a host of “partners” whose identity often remains nebulous: experts appointed or consulted by the UN Secretariat, statisticians, the UN Secretariat and other UN bodies, other international organizations, financial institutions, bilateral agencies, the “private sector”, NGOs and pressure groups. This tacit acceptance of governance by experts, not by the people for the people, is a symptom of the current western crisis of democracy. The West exports its crisis to global governance. As a consequence, global governance processes such as the MDGs tend to often be opaque – a situation which facilitates power-grab by special interest groups

Summary

The 2013 Millennium Development Goals Report for Zambia provides an opportunity for the country to reflect upon and assess its progress towards achieving the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). With the 2015 deadline approaching, Zambia’s progress on many of the MDG targets is encouraging. Nonetheless, the country is still confronted by challenges that hold back key policy and institutional reforms, and consequently the overall pace of implementation. Issues of policy direction and consistency, as well as institutional capacities to deliver, must therefore underpin efforts to both accelerate and widen progress[247].

In this regard, particular attention must be paid to lessons learnt as well as interventions required to fast-track the attainment of the MDGs in Zambia. This year’s report has therefore identified selected ‘triggers for acceleration’ that will help gain ground as well as sustain progress achieved so far for the MDGs. These triggers have been identified based on available data and trend analysis, a review of on-going national policies and programmes, and lessons learnt at both national and global level.

It is important to point out that many targets have seen movement in the right direction. Gains have been made for HIV and TB prevalence, underweight children, and gender equality in primary school. In some areas, however, the pace of improvement has been slow. Yet with political commitment and the right policy and investment choices, the pace can be accelerated dramatically before 2015. Other targets have seen some reversal, including those for improved sanitation, some areas of environmental sustainability, and gender equality in political representation. Here, there is a need for special measures.

Finally, MDG targets per se do not take into consideration some of the underlying causes of lack of progress. These causal factors, which drive poverty, inequality, unsustainability and non- inclusive development, are the cornerstones of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, which set out the foundation for the MDGs. If these factors are not addressed, achieving the MDG targets becomes a hollow victory.

MDG 1:

Extreme poverty is decreasing but at a very slow pace Extreme poverty has reduced from 58 percent in 1991 to 42.3 percent in 2010. However, Zambia is still far from reaching the MDG goal of 29 percent by 2015. Yet, the past twenty years have seen improvements, and the depth of poverty in urban areas has diminished: Copper belt Province has already reached its MDG target and Lusaka Province is very close to doing the same. In contrast, the rural provinces of Luapula, Western, Eastern and Northern remain very distant from their goals. Deliberate efforts to bring these out- lying provinces back on track will be needed. Zambia, with a Gini coefficient of 0.65, is among the most unequal countries of the world today. Specific attention to these growing disparities must be high on the agenda of policy makers[248].

MDG 2:

Universal primary education is within reach Zambia has made steady progress on primary school enrolment, which has increased from 80 percent in 1990 to 937 percent in 2010. The improvement can be linked to the boost in primary education infrastructure and the introduction of free education. Similarly, progress has been made in improving primary school completion rates. The proportion of pupils reaching Grade 7 has increased from 64 percent in 1990 to 90.9 percent in 2010. Disaggregation by sex shows that the improvement was higher for girls. How- ever, concerns remain on the quality of education received, as well as the enrolment and completion rates in secondary school subsequently[249]

MDG 3:

Gender equality and the empowerment of women require special measures The good news is that Zambia is on track to achieve gender parity in primary school enrolment as well as in literacy among 15-24-year- olds. The Programme for Advancement of Girls’ Education introduced in 1994 has provided effective advocacy and support in this regard.

However, accelerated intervention is required if gender parity is to be achieved in secondary and tertiary education. In addition, the country has moved backwards on women’s participation in government in both local councils (6%) and parliament (11%). Zambia will have to introduce special measures to even come close to the MDG target of 30% women in parliament – or the AU/SADC target of 50 percent[250].

MDG 4:

Child mortality remains high Child mortality has declined by almost 30 per- cent since 1992, but is still unacceptable high. The mortality rate of children under five dropped from 190.7 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1992 to 137.6 per 1000 live births in 2010. Similarly, the mortality rate for infants (death before first birthday) reduced from 107.2 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1992 to 76.2 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2010. Progress in reducing child mortality has been brought about by increases in immunization coverage, exclusive breast-feeding, vitamin and mineral supplementation, and malaria prevention and treatment. These and other interventions must be sustained and accelerated if this goal is to be met by 2015[251].

MDG 5:

Improving maternal health requires renewed emphasis Thirty-eight mothers die each month due to complications of pregnancy or childbirth. Al- though maternal mortality in Zambia has been falling, the decline is insufficient to reach the 2015 target of 162.3 deaths per 100,000 live births. The number of women dying during pregnancy and childbirth has decreased from 649 per 100,000 live births in 1997 to 483 in 2010. Interventions that have been successful, and need to be scaled up, include improved use of contraception for birth spacing, prevention of early marriages, improved referral systems and provision of and access to emergency obstetric care, and the deployment of more trained mid- wives and birth attendants. Investing in mothers’ education and nutritional status has a direct impact on the health and well-being of children and households[252].

MDG 6:

Gains on HIV&AIDS, malaria and other major diseases must not be lost. The number of Zambians infected with HIV has dropped to 14.3 percent of the population. Zambia has therefore already achieved and surpassed the MDG target for HIV prevalence of 15.6 percent. However, prevalence rates in Lusaka, Copper belt, Southern and Western Provinces remain higher than 14.3 percent. This is of particular concern in Lusaka due to its high population. In addition, HIV incidence (new infections) remains high throughout Zambia, and is alarmingly on the rise among young people. Therefore, the focus must be redirected to prevention, including intensifying prevention of mother-to-child transmission, male circumcision, voluntary counselling and testing, and ART as a preventative measure. The fact that HIV incidence is consistently higher in women than in men demonstrates that the underlying causes of income and gender inequality need to be ad- dressed as well. Concerns are also raised with regards to the sustainability of the response, as cooperating partners fund approximately 87 percent of HIV&AIDS interventions. The move to a sustainable model of domestic financing for HIV&AIDS is a necessary national priority[253].

Zambia made significant gains in malaria control and prevention up until 2009. However, the drop-off in resources in the health sector has resulted in a reversal of these gains in recent years. With malaria, one cannot take a time-out. Given the weather patterns and eco-systems in Zambia, continuous attention is required to combat malaria. The malaria fatality rate is of particular concern in this regard, as it remains over three times the target. Today, three children die every day of malaria. The distribution and effective use of ITNs and indoor residual spraying must continue.

While there has been a concerted effort to treat TB and other infectious diseases, of growing concern in Zambia today are non-communicable diseases. Mortality and loss of productivity due to heart disease, diabetes and hypertension are on the rise, and constitute the next big health challenge the country faces.

MDG 7:

Gaining lost ground on environmental sustainability Land covered by forests in Zambia reduced from 59.8 percent in 1990 to 49.9 percent in 2010. This decline stems from over-exploitation through logging for wood fuel and encroachment for agriculture and settlements. There have been recent efforts to stem this tide, including a national tree planting campaign and a temporary ban on timber export, as well as integrated land use assessment and reclassification of protected areas. These efforts will help regenerate both flora and fauna and protect the eco-systems and biodiversity under threat in Zambia. As it takes time for trees and species to mature, this is a leg- acy for generations to come, and this MDG will underpin the issue of sustainability for a post- 2015 vision for Zambia.

Zambia has observed improvements in the pro- vision of clean water: The proportion of the population without access to an improved water source has decreased from 51 percent in 1990 to 36.9 percent in 2010.

However, the proportion of the population with- out access to improved sanitation facilities is not getting any better. On the contrary, it worsened from 26 percent in 1991 to 67.3 percent in 2010. Zambia is therefore well off track to achieve the MDG target of 13 percent by 2015. This disturb- ing trend is partly explained by the increase in informal human settlements without basic sanitation facilities, the high cost of sanitation infrastructure and the low returns to these in- vestments for the private sector, especially in rural areas, partly by a methodology change. The need for public engagement and state action in this area is of paramount importance. Massive sanitation infrastructure investments and social campaigns on healthy sanitary behaviour can turn around this trend. Poor sanitation is the breeding ground for day-to-day ill health, low productivity and large epidemics that destroy communities[254].

MDG 8:

An evolving global partnership for development as Zambia transitions to a middle-income country Zambia has implemented reforms since the 1990s that have seen the development of a fairly open, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory trading and financial system. These re- forms have among other things seen the country obtain debt relief. This coupled with a global rise in copper prices has increased the country’s fiscal space.

Zambia has also graduated from a low-income to a lower middle-income country, which means the country now has less access to concessional lending and overseas development assistance. The latter is therefore expected to remain below 5 percent of GDP in the remaining years to 2015. Instead, Zambia is turning more and more to international financial markets. In addition, the country has succeeded in attracting increasing inflows of foreign direct in- vestment (FDI), peaking at $1.73 billion in 2010, although inflows have fallen since then. Most of the FDI in 2010 went into the mining sector, and copper remains the main source of export earnings, accounting for about 65 percent of total exports. Yet, non-traditional exports are growing as well. In fact, Zambia’s external trade has grown extensively since the early 1990s in response to globalization, with many more products being exported today[255].

ERADICATE EXTREME POVERTY AND HUNGER

Target 1.A

Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty

Indicators

Proportion of population living in extreme poverty (percent)

Poverty Gap Ratio (incidence x depth of poverty) (percent)

The current pace of poverty reduction in Zambia is too slow for the country to achieve MDG target 1. The proportion of people living in extreme poverty has decreased from 58 percent in 1991 to 42.3 percent in 2010. This took 19 years. In addition, the pace has slowed down in recent years. Extreme poverty has reduced by only 05 percentage points in the 4 years from 2006 to 2010. Yet, it will have to decline by 13.3 percentage points in the 5 years from 2010 and 2015 to attain the MDG target. Specific accelerators are therefore required in the form of policy changes and targeted rural investments.

Extreme poverty in Zambia is concentrated in rural areas. In fact it is four times higher in rural areas (57.7%) than in urban ones (13.1%). Typical rural provinces such as Luapula (64.9%), Western (64.0%) and Eastern (587%) are therefore the worst affected. Rural poverty is due to limited access to physical and social infrastructures, such as roads, electricity and medical facilities, which impede development.

TARGET ACHIEVED

The MDG target, urban areas have, on average, attained it. Urban provinces such as Lusaka (11.5 percent) and Copper belt (18.3 percent) recorded the lowest rates of extreme poverty in 2010 (see Figure 3). This is because Zambia’s strong economic growth has been concentrated to an expansion of industrial and service sector activities in urban areas primarily. In fact, over 80 per cent of Zambia’s real GDP in 2010 was generated in urban areas, according to the Central Statistical Office. These trends suggest that in the past decade poverty has mainly reduced through migration from the economically depressed, rural areas to the low-cost peri-urban areas closer to the economic opportunities in the cities.

Poverty Gap Ratio: This indicator shows how far below the poverty line the poor are. The wider the poverty gap ratio, the more the resources required for poverty reduction programmes. Zambia has reached its goal for the poverty gap ratio, although this disguises differences between urban and rural areas, as the latter is still to reach its goal. As poverty re- mains deeper and wider in rural provinces such as Western, Luapula, Eastern and Northern Provinces, these areas need targeted poverty reduction programmes.

Obstacles to Poverty Reduction Higher poverty amongst female-headed households

Poverty afflicts men and women differently. In 2010, extreme poverty was higher in female-headed (60.4 percent) than male- headed (57.1 percent) households. The loss of a male spouse, typically via death or divorce, results in less labour capacity and income, which makes female-headed households vulnerable to poverty and food insecurity

Low labour productivity in particular in agriculture, which provides work for most people in rural areas, has negative implications for inclusive growth. Despite the sector absorbing around two-thirds of the labour force, it only accounts for 6.7 percent of Zambia’s real GDP. Lack of reliable electricity, coupled with the fact that electricity access is very low and unequal, further exacerbates the problem of low productivity. According to the 2010 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, only 22 percent of Zambian households are connected to electricity.

High population growth rate: Zambia has one of the fastest growing populations in sub-Saha- ran Africa. The growth rate reached 2.8 percent per annum during 2000-2010, up from 2.4 per- cent during 1990-2000. This has not been ac- companied by the requisite social and economic development planning and investment, in effect weakening the link between economic growth and poverty reduction. A rapidly growing population puts pressure on public expenditure, thereby straining vital public services, particularly education and health. Matching population growth with appropriate planning is fundamental to raising the low quality of Zambia’s human capital and to speed up poverty reduction.

Low growth elasticity: The significant economic growth rate over the last decade has not translated into poverty reduction because of the low growth elasticity of poverty in Zambia. The absolute value of elasticity was less than 1.0 during 2000-2007. This means there is a weak connection between growth sectors of the Zambian economy and those which employ the poor.

Wide income inequality: The responsiveness of poverty to economic growth is weakened by income inequality, which reduces the growth gains that accrue to the poor. Zambia’s Gini co- efficient, which measures income inequality, has worsened, from 0.60 in 2006 to 0.65 in 2010, and mostly in rural areas. Most economic activities are concentrated in urban areas, while the rest of the country is fairly underdeveloped and de- pendent on subsistence farming. Thus, economic growth must be accompanied by progressive redistribution of income in favour of the poor.

ACCELERATION REQUIRED

The proportion of underweight children under five years of age declined from 25.1 percent in 1992 to 13.3 percent in 2010, with both rural and urban areas recording significant improvements. In fact, in rural areas, the 2015 target has been reached, while in urban areas, a further reduction of just 0.4 percentage points is required. MDG target 1 is therefore likely to be met. According to the 2010 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, only three provinces (Copper belt, Southern and Central) have not yet met the target on underweight U-5 children (see Figure 5), which calls for further investments in child nutrition programmes in these provinces. In addition, the incidence of stunting (caused by chronic malnutrition) declined from 54.2 percent in 2006 to 46.7 percent in 2010. These improvements are mainly due to government intensifying programmes for breast feeding, nutritional supplements and immunization during this period.

Nutrition: There is a direct correlation between nutritional levels of the population, especially among young women and children, and food prices (food inflation). Poor people spend most of their income on food and have little capacity to adapt to rising prices. To cope, they limit their consumption of more nutritious but expensive foods. In Zambia, the annual food inflation rate decreased from 180 percent in 1992 to -0.2 per- cent in 2006. In the same period, the proportion of underweight children almost halved, from 25.1 percent in 1992 to 13.3 percent in 2006.

MDG 1-End Poverty and Hunger

Despite Zambia’s impressive macroeconomic performance over the last decade, it has had little impact on extreme poverty, as acknowledged by the country’s Sixth National Development Plan (2011-2015). Ensuring that economic growth is ac- companied by rapid poverty reduction is therefore a key focus of both government and its development partners. As extreme poverty and inequality is particularly pronounced in rural areas, the analysis below focuses on how to accelerate reduction of poverty and inequality in rural Zambia, largely drawing on international experiences outlined in the global MDG Report 2012: Assessing Progress in Africa toward the Millennium Development Goals.

Rural areas have suffered chronic lack of investment in infra- structure and services – both hard (roads, energy and ICT) and soft (skills, health and markets). Specific policies to promote inclusive growth, with a particular focus on agriculture and the informal sector, have the potential to improve the growth elasticity of poverty. Countries such as China, Brazil and Ethiopia have succeeded in reducing rural poverty through implementing a wide range of pro-poor programmes to improve agricultural technologies, expand agricultural extension services, commercialize smallholder agriculture, develop rural infrastructure and to enhance access to social protection especially through programmes for productive safety nets and provision of credit.

Policies to mitigate and sustainably manage high population growth and to promote social protection are also vital. Global evidence suggests that successful national employment strategies, which expand the number of jobs and labour productivity in growth sectors, have focused on widening access to credit, machinery and other equipment to facilitate value-addition production, on easing the business environment, boosting physical and institutional infrastructure, and on improving working conditions. The large increase in the minimum wage in Zambia in 2012 will work towards minimizing inequality in the formal sec- tor. However, 90 percent of the workforce is in the informal sec- tor. Therefore, it is key to implement policies and instruments that target the informal sector and the non-working poor.

Food security requires short- and long-term strategies and interventions. In the short term, these should focus on improving nutritional outcomes, for example by linking comprehensive national nutritional programmes to health services, on promoting home visits by health workers, and on facilitating distribution of therapeutic food supplements to vulnerable groups, especially children and women. Long-term interventions, which recognize and respond to the impact of climate change through the promotion of sustainable agricultural practices, should be institutionalized. These should, amongst other things, promote better use of fertilizer and wider access to drought and disease-resistant seed. Encouraging all-season farming and easier access to market and insurance information via mobile phone technologies are other long-term interventions to consider[256].

Learning from both the Zambian experience, as well as what has worked globally, the primary accelerators suggested to reduce extreme poverty and hunger in Zambia are as follows:

i. Promote long-term planning of and investment in sustainable energy and equitable access to energy, especially amongst the poor. On-grid rural electrification efforts could be supplemented by off-grid interventions such as mini-hydro, natural gas and solar energy, where cost-effective and available. Such interventions can be implemented within a short period to avoid beneficiaries having to wait for the power grid to be extended to rural areas, which often are costly to reach and maintain.

ii. Allow for greater private sector participation in the maize market, to promote agricultural diversification, and hence more income opportunities for the rural poor.

iii. Review the Farmers Input Support Programme in a trans- parent manner to assess its direct benefits to small-scale farmers and poor households. If correctly targeted, this input subsidy programme could potentially have a more immediate impact on hunger and income deprivation among the poorest rural households, especially if it was combined with cash transfers.

iv. Ensure access to cheaper credit and insurance, skills up- grading and appropriate technology to enable scale-up and improvement of small-scale agricultural and labour productivity.

v. Intensify investments in rural and peri-urban economic and social infrastructure, with priority given to feeder roads, secondary schools, clinics, water and sanitation.

vi. Provide public transportation that connects rural com- munities to markets, to enable cheaper transportation of goods and services, and hence cheaper food for poorer households.

vii. Implement legislative and regulatory instruments that will promote the introduction of protein- and vitamin-rich foods into the staple diet, and teach young mothers to optimize provision and preparation of low-cost nutritional foods for infants and children[257].

MDG 2-Universal Education

Literacy Rates (15-24-year-olds) has increased from 64 percent in 1990 to 90.9 percent in 2010. Disaggregation by sex shows that the improvement in the same period was higher for girls (32.6 percentage points) than for boys (19.8 percentage points). This was partly on account of the Programme for Advancement of Girls’ Education and the re-entry policy. The latter may by now be showing a positive, albeit minor, impact. Similarly, the completion rate for Grade 9 (basic school) increased from 35.3 percent in 2002 to 53.2 percent in 2010 (see Figure 9), while that for Grade 12 (secondary school) increased from 14.4 percent in 2002 to 31.7 percent in 2010. In both instances, the completion rate has improved faster for girls than for boys. In fact, girls have over- taken boys in completing basic school. However, this says little about the quality of this education and its ability to make graduates ‘fit for work’. Both Grades 9 and 12 have low pass rates.

Youth literacy: National youth literacy has improved from 74.9 percent in 1990 to 88.7 per- cent in 2010. It has increased faster for girls, by 15.3 percentage points in the same period, than for boys, by 12.3 percentage points. Illiteracy presents a real challenge to the attainment of MDG target 2.A, and to the overall issue of addressing the transition to employment and increasing labour productivity. A focus on functional literacy for young adults is required, with- out which vocational and technical training and skills upgrading efforts are undermined.

MDG 2 TRIGGERS FOR ACCELERATION:

Moving to secondary school and literacy targets by improving its primary school enrolment and completion, Zambia has en- countered a new challenge: How to ensure that its primary education is of a quality high enough for pupils to progress through secondary education. In addition, the country is faced with the issue of equal access for girls and boys at secondary and tertiary levels of education.

i. To further improve the Grade 7 completion rate, government needs to secure greater balance between interventions that focus on improving educational access and gender parity in enrolment, on the one hand, and those that address retention and completion rates, on the other.

ii. Although the completion rate for Grade 12 has been improving rapidly since 2009, primarily due to major improvements in school infrastructure, it is still very low. Enhancing this will require massive investments in the construction of secondary and post-secondary educational facilities, and higher recurrent budgets for the provision of books, lab and computer equipment.

iii. Quantitative improvements in education outcomes, while necessary, are not sufficient. Improved enrolment and progression rates should be accompanied by quality teaching staff and upgraded school facilities to improve the overall quality of education (including improving the dwindling pass rates). The commitment by government in its 2013 national budget to provide more resources for the educational sector, including for the recruitment of more teachers and retention incentives for those to serve in rural areas, is encouraging[258].

iv. To address illiteracy, government must work with its stakeholders and partners, including civil society organizations, private sector, academia and parent-teacher associations in pursuing policies and programmes that improve youth literacy rates, especially for females. Civil society has experience in designing flexible programmes for specific community groups, lobbying for the interests of vulnerable populations and monitoring performance. The private sector has a particular interest in an educated workforce and must be encouraged to offer more apprenticeship programmes, as well as workplace literacy and skills development.

v. Average class sizes in Zambia’s schools have increased from 37 to 57 over the past two decades (UNESCO).

ACCELERATION REQUIRED

Status Gender parity in education:

The ratio of girls to boys in primary education has increased from 0.90 in 1990 to 0.99 in 2010, which is very close to the target of 1. In effect Zambia has attained gender parity in primary school enrolment. The Programme for Advancement of Girls’ Education, introduced in 1994, and to a lesser degree the re-entry policy, is considered a major driver in this regard. Gender parity by province shows that Lusaka and Copper belt Provinces have attained equality in primary education. Being urban provinces, they have a high number of schools places, and are less susceptible to traditions working against girls getting an education

MDG 3-Gender Equality

Gender parity in secondary education has, however, fallen from 0.92 in 1990 to 0.86 in 2010, primarily driven by a high drop- out rate for girls. Girls are being socialized to become wives, mothers and care-givers, which results in more domestic responsibilities (chores and care tasks), teenage pregnancies and early marriages. Once in secondary school, girls are also vulnerable to sexual harassment and violence and related diseases such as HIV&AIDS. HIV&AIDS worsens gender-based differences in access to land and other productive resources such as labour, technology, credit and water. These gender differences become more acute when productive resources are eroded, making female- and youth-headed households the most vulnerable of the rural poor. Zambia has a relatively high percentage of households headed by girls of school-going age[259]. HIV&AIDS has no age boundaries, and the loss of adult labour has forced families to withdraw older children from school to take care of younger siblings and/or help in food production.

Gender parity in tertiary education has remained almost unchanged from 2005 (0.74 percent) to 2009 (0.75 percent). Many young women do not enrol in colleges and university, or find it difficult to continue attending classes after getting married or becoming pregnant. However, within some tertiary institutions, such as the University of Zambia, great improvements have been made. The obvious exception is the Copper belt University, which had a ratio of females to males of 0.39 in 2011. This is likely to be caused by this institution offering primarily scientific and mathematical courses.

Women in parliament: Zambia has continued to perform poorly with respect to political representation of women in government. Women made up 52 percent of the voting block in the 2011 general elections, yet they hold a low pro- portion of seats in both local councils (6.3 per- cent) and parliament (11.4 percent). In fact, Zambia’s representation of women in parliament is one of the lowest in Africa; far short of the MDG target of 30 percent and the even more ambitious target of 50 percent set by both the AU and SADC (Zambia has signed the SADC Gender Protocol for 50/50 representation). Experience shows that countries, which have performed well on female representation in politics, such as Egypt, Rwanda, South Africa and Uganda, have adopted legal frameworks that guarantee parliamentary seats for women. In addition, political parties have a strong role to play in accelerating gender inclusiveness in politics at local, regional and national levels.

MDG 3 TRIGGERS FOR ACCELERATION

Reaching for gender equality in the economic, social and political spheres

Despite awareness-raising and other interventions to promote gender equality, Zambia has not focused sufficiently on addressing the underlying causes of women’s economic, social and political marginalization. Waiting for the pervasive cultural norms and discriminatory attitudes to change is a wait too long. Zambia needs to actively advance policies and laws that reinforce gen- der parity and equality in access to education, labour market, public services and political representation. Many countries within the region and in other parts of the world have shown that affirmative action initiatives are needed to correct for age-old biases and behaviours in order to provide a level playing field for girls and boys, women and men. Specific triggers include the following:

i. A continued focus on specific initiatives that target the educational needs of under-served and under-privileged girls (and boys) in order to increase their educational access

ii. Promoting women’s skills development to improve access to higher skilled and productive jobs, including in non-traditional work areas

iii. Provision of subsidized child care services, in particular made more easily available to poorer women to enable them to participate in remunerative economic activities.

iv. Directly and aggressively address the issue of gender violence and early marriages through implementation of laws, advocacy and campaigns that include traditional leadership, and through actual banning of hurtful cultural practices.

v. A concerted effort to attain gender parity in secondary education would entail confronting the preference to educate boys rather than girls and practices such as early marriages. Extensive advocacy, household incentives, school bursaries and more girls’ hostel facilities would make a difference, as would continue efforts to reduce HIV prevalence and incidence.

vi. Minimum thresholds of male and female representation throughout the political cycle – from party lists to seats in parliament – could be introduced to incentivize the change and ensure greater gender parity in political representation at all levels.

Reduce child mortality

Status Child mortality:

The observed declines in child mortality rates in Zambia are insufficient to reach MDG target 4.A. Under-five mortality dropped from 190.7 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1992 to 137.6 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2010, while infant mortality (death before a child’s first birthday) reduced from 107.2 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1992 to 76.2 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2010.

U-5 mortality rate (deaths per 1000 live births) Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births) One-year-olds immunized against measles (%). Child mortality has declined by almost 30% in the past two decades. Yet, 1 in 8 children die before they turn 5 years.

MDG-Child Health

Similarly, neonatal mortality (deaths during the first 28 days after birth) has according to UNICEF reduced from deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 27 deaths in 2012. The leading causes of death among children are complications arising during pregnancy and birth, and later, respiratory infections, diarrhoea diseases, malaria, measles and malnutrition, often in combination. Many countries have therefore successfully reduced child mortality by implementing the Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI) strategy, a holistic approach to child health developed by UNICEF and WHO. Zambia has also adopted IMCI, but its child mortality rates suggest an urgent need to revise its child health interventions. The country needs to improve the prevention and management of diarrhoea, pneumonia, malaria and HIV infection in children, including scaling up of high-impact advocacy on the importance of exclusive breastfeeding and appropriate feeding of young children as well as hygiene, hand- washing and unsafe drinking water. Measles immunization: One effective intervention has been the immunization against measles, with coverage growing from 77 percent of all one-year-olds in 1992 to 94 percent in 2010.

Measles are part of the full immunization package in Zambia. Figure 15 shows that full immunization coverage has varied across provinces. Generally, urban provinces (Lusaka and Copper- belt) are in the lead, while remote rural provinces such as North-western and Western have the lowest coverage. Although there has been an improvement in the availability of logistics, vaccines and cold chain storage, driven by efficient interventions such as the Expanded Programme on Immunization and the National Vaccine Cold Store, some facilities still get cut off during the rainy season. In addition, aggressive social mobilization will have to correct for the worsening turn-out for immunization in urban provinces.

Government is also supporting the introduction and expansion of new vaccines into Zambia including pneumococcal, rotavirus and measles second dose vaccines, as well as other new vaccines in the future.

MDG 4 TRIGGERS FOR ACCELERATION

Saving more children from birth to five years

i. Expand interventions that target the main causes of death in U-5 children as well as the most vulnerable new-borns, infants and children. This includes promoting breast feeding and appropriate nutrition and ensuring full immunization coverage, especially against measles. In this regard, the bi-annual Child Health Week has shown good results, but more resources must be put into outreach activities to follow up on mothers de- faulting on immunization programmes[260].

ii. Empowering women and increasing awareness and education levels of young mothers will have a direct impact on the lives, health and nutritional status of their children.

iii. Diarrhoea remains a dominant threat to the lives of infants and children in Zambia. Access to clean water and improved sanitation facilities both in homes and schools effectively addresses this threat.

iv. Countries that have significantly reduced neonatal deaths have focused on having trained midwives at all deliveries, increased pre-natal check-ups and nutrition- al care, and maternity waiting homes near clinics to reduce travel distances, especially if complications set in.

Maternal Mortality Ratio

Improve maternal health

Status Maternal mortality: Although maternal mortality has declined in Zambia, the magnitude of the problem is still unacceptably high. According to the Ministry of Health, 38 women die every month on average during pregnancy and childbirth. The maternal mortality ratio has improved from 649 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1996 to 483 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2010. This is a lot higher than the MDG target of 162.3 deaths per 100,000 live births by 2015.

The major direct causes of maternal mortality in Zambia are complications arising during pregnancy and birth, such as haemorrhage, septicaemia (blood infection), obstructed labour, hypertensive conditions, as well as unsafe abortions. Zambia has sought to reduce maternal mortality by ensuring universal access to family planning, skilled attendance at birth, and basic and comprehensive emergency obstetric care. However, maternal mortality is rooted in gender inequality, which manifests itself as poor education for girls, early marriages, and adolescent pregnancies

MDG 5 TRIGGERS FOR ACCELERATION

A mother’s health is a community’s wellbeing

Efforts to decrease maternal mortality cannot be undertaken in isolation, as it is closely linked to other MDG indicators such as mothers’ education, nutrition and diseases such as HIV&AIDS and tuberculosis. An aggressive effort to reduce maternal mortality should include efforts by government and its partners to:

i. Scale up long-term methods of family planning that are encouraged and supported by families, health facilities and local communities.

ii. Continue expanding – and sustain basic and comprehensive emergency obstetric care, including improved referral systems, for an immediate and direct impact on mothers’ lives at child birth.

iii. Improve pre-service training of midwives and the capacity of other health care providers in emergency obstetric care, and facilitate the return of retired nurses to fill the gap until trained midwives have been deployed.

iv. Continue sensitization of pregnant women, and their partners, on the importance of attending and seeking early antenatal care. This includes scaling up safe motherhood action groups to all districts to provide the needed sup- port.

v. Construct maternity waiting homes where there are none, with priority given to districts with few health centres, where expectant mothers travel long distances.

vi. Reduce the high number of unsafe abortions, both by preventing unplanned pregnancies, and by tackling barriers that prevent women from accessing safe services. Community interventions could increase awareness about the moral and legal rights of women to access abortions under certain circumstances.

Lack of access to sexual and reproductive health information and services

This is related to the problem of unsafe abortions. According to the University Teaching Hospital, unsafe abortions account for nearly 30 percent of all maternal deaths in Zambia, with young women particularly at risk. Zambia may have one of the most progressive abortion laws in sub-Saharan Africa, but there are many barriers to access safe services, including moral prejudices against abortions, even amongst healthcare providers. The result is that women, and girls, go to great lengths to end pregnancies in secret.

Assisted deliveries: This is one of the most critical interventions for ensuring safe motherhood. It hastens the timely delivery of emergency obstetric care as well as new-born care when life-threatening complications arise. Several typically rural provinces such as North-western, Eastern, Luapula and Northern did well due to their high proportion of home births assisted by trained traditional birth attendants. As a temporary measure, traditional birth attendants help to bridge the gap until more midwives are trained.

The increase in rural health centres, which pro- vide a hygienic environment for deliveries, has had a positive impact on maternal health, as has the increase in healthcare providers equipped with in-service emergency and obstetric care skills. Other factors include community sensitization on how institutional deliveries can save both mothers’ and babies’ lives. Yet, many women still deliver at home, especially poor women in rural areas with little education. These women also have fewer and lower-quality antenatal care visits. On average, Lusaka and Copper belt Provinces had the highest proportions of institutional deliveries due to an easier access to health centres. Northern Province had the lowest proportion of institutional deliveries[261].

HIV & AIDS and Malaria-Reversing the spread

HIV Prevalence Rate Status HIV prevalence and incidence:

Zambia is likely to achieve the 2015 target for the HIV prevalence rate, as it fell to 143 percent in 2007. Although the national MDG target has been met, this masks great differences in HIV prevalence rates amongst provinces. Lusaka, Copper belt and Central Provinces are all above 15.6 percent. Therefore extra attention must be paid to provinces with high prevalence.

However, focus is increasingly shifting to reduction of new infections (the incidence rate). From 1990 to 2011, the rate of new infections was more than halved in the Zambian adult population, to 0.96 percent amongst males and to 1.25 percent amongst females. The increase from 1998 to 2002 was caused by a range of factors, such as lack of awareness and use of services, the window period of HIV and scale-up of VCT. Although the incidence rate amongst adults over 15 years of age is projected to continue falling from 2011 to 2015, by HIV incidence has stabilized in Zambia, yet the absolute number of new HIV infections is increasing due to an expanding population. Large cities host a disproportionate share of the HIV epidemic in Africa, and Zambia is no exception. HIV&AIDS is a major health and social problem in large cities in the form of high prevalence and associated need for treatment and care.

MDG 6-HIV&AIDS and Malaria

2.2 percent for men and 2.1 percent for women, it is still much higher than the death rate of 0.34 percent per year amongst adults over 15 years of age. A disease only wanes significantly if there are fewer new infections than deaths from the disease, and in the case of Zambia this can only happen once new infection rates are below 0.2 percent per annum.

The key drivers of new infections in Zambia are multiple and include con- current sexual partners, low and inconsistent use of condoms, low rates of medical male circumcision, poor coverage of vulnerable and marginalized groups such as sex workers, prisoners and migrants, and mother-to-child transmission. Since the introduction of voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC) in 2007, over 167,000 VMMCs have been performed in Zambia, of which 89 per- cent took place in 2010 and 2011.50 Yet, the VMMC programme has fallen short of its target of 150,000 circumcisions annually.

In this connection, it is encouraging that the number of people accessing Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) has been increasing steadily over the years, from 511,266 in 2008 to 1,772,043 in 2011. However, more women than men are utilizing VCT in Zambia Behaviour change for men in a highly male-driven culture remains a significant challenge, as does the poor availability of test kits.

YOUNG PEOPLE WITH KNOWLEDGE OF HIV&AIDS

Comprehensive knowledge of HIV&AIDS amongst young people (15-24 years) is vital to improve their health-seeking behaviour and ability to access relevant health and support services. The proportion of young people with comprehensive knowledge of HIV&AIDS has improved from 31 percent in 2002 to 40.2 percent in 2009. However, HIV prevalence re- mains high amongst people with comprehensive knowledge of HIV&AIDS, suggesting that socio-economic and gender inequalities as well as cultural factors are important drivers of the HIV epidemic. Research has indicated that transactional sex (the exchange of favours for sex) is common in Zambia, even among young people.

School attendance of orphans: The vulnerability of children orphaned by the HIV&AIDS epidemic is immense, not only to HIV infection, but also to poverty, drugs and engaging in sex work and other illegal activity. Effective mitigation efforts include ensuring that they do no end up on the streets and supporting their education. The ratio of orphans to non-orphans aged 10-14 years attending school has increased from 71.8 per- cent in 2000 to 92 percent in 2009, close to the 2015 target of 100 percent[262].

Universal access to HIV&AIDS treatment: With free paediatric ARVs and an adult ART policy, Zambia has made significant progress towards achieving universal access to treatment for HIV&AIDS. The treatment coverage increased from 23.5 percent in 2005 to 77.6 percent in 2011, equivalent to over 415,000 people accessing ARVs in 2011. The rapid expansion has had a significant impact on mortality among adults in Zambia, with an estimated 50,000 lives saved in 2011. However, treatment is mostly extended to adults. In 2011, coverage reached 90 percent of adults in need of treatment, but only 28.1 percent of children less than 15 years. More females are accessing treatment compared to males, and antiretroviral treatment coverage is higher in urban areas than in rural ones. Achieving universal access would also have an effect on new infections, as efficacious ART lowers the level of HIV virus in the body and hence the transmission risk.

Free services for prevention of mother- to-child transmission (PMTCT) have reduced new infections among new-borns. The number of HIV-infected pregnant women (delivering in health institutions) who received antiretroviral drugs to avert transmitting HIV to their babies increased from 72 percent in 2004 to 84.5 in 2011

New Malaria Cases Status Malaria

Malaria is both preventable and cur- able, but after some years of success in the anti- malaria campaign, the reduced resources for this effort have resulted in Zambia having an in- crease in both new cases and deaths from 2009 to 2010. New cases increased from 255 per 1,000 populations in 1990 to 330 in 2010. Similarly, the fatality rate increased from 11 per 1,000 population in 1990 to 34 in 2010 – despite the proportion of household with insecticide-treated mosquito nets (ITNs) increasing from 9.3 percent in 2000 to 64.3 percent in 2010. This deterioration in malaria indicators could also be attributed to the malaria parasite’s resistance to the first- line treatment drugs. Zambia has now adopted Artemisinin-based combination therapies in line with the recommendations of WHO. Other contributing factors include inadequate availability of malaria prevention drugs, inadequate regular indoor residual spraying and human resource and infrastructure constraints for diagnosis and treatment in high malarial areas.

At provincial level, Eastern Province is the worst affected, followed by Luapula and North-western Provinces. These provinces receive relatively high rainfall, which in Eastern Province is exacerbated by many permanent small water bodies, producing ample breeding spots for mosquitoes. In addition, these provinces are all rural, with housing conducive to malaria transmission but logistical challenges to malaria control. Central Province had the lowest incidence of malaria in 2010 due to its indoor residual spraying programme.

The lack of mass ITN distribution in 2009 led to the national distribution target of ITNs per household not being met. In addition, the correct use of mosquito nets still remains low. This, together with shortages of Rapid Diagnostic Tests in many districts, contributed to the in- crease in the malaria incidence in 2010.

Tuberculosis

Tuberculosis control efforts are starting to bear fruit in Zambia. Since reaching a peak of 545 new cases per 100,000 people in 2004, the notification rate has been falling steadily to 372 new cases in 2011. Zambia has also reached the WHO targets for both TB case detection (70 percent) and treatment success rate (85 percent). In 2011, Zambia’s TB case detection rate was 73 percent and its treatment success rate (the percentage of new, registered smear- positive (infectious) cases that were cured or in which a full course of treatment was completed) reached 89 percent.

While there has been a concerted effort to treat TB and other infectious diseases, of growing concern in Zambia today are non-communicable diseases. Mortality and loss of productivity due to heart disease, diabetes and hypertension are on the rise, and represent the next big health challenge in Zambia.

MDG 6 TRIGGERS FOR ACCELERATION

Breaking the cycle of transmission and new infections despite the reported challenges, Zambia is poised to attain MDG 6, as long as the country consolidates its past gains for malaria prevention and control. In this regard, government and its partners need to promote high-impact interventions, which are targeted at breaking the transmission chain. They also have to intensify their efforts towards achieving universal coverage for malaria testing, treatment and preventive tools (ITNs/IRS). Specific triggers include:

i. Rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) allow for diagnosis of malaria by people with no knowledge of laboratory techniques, and in situations where laboratory equipment is not available. RDTs must be supplied sufficiently and consistently. RDTs must be backed by training of staff and communities in their correct use and by technical support to health facilities managing malaria and Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI).

ii. Improved coverage of indoor residual spraying (IRS) is required to ensure that all malaria-prone areas are sprayed frequently. One break in the cycle and the incidence rate shoots up again. Continued advocacy campaigns to convince all households of the importance of indoor residual spraying must be supported through community leadership. This goes hand-in- hand with the mass distribution of ITNs, and creating awareness of and monitoring their appropriate use at community level.

iii. To lower HIV prevalence and incidence, Zambia must scale up the pro- vision of Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT), as this serves as the principle entry point for knowledge of own status, and hence ability to access appropriate HIV&AIDS interventions. Door-to-door HIV testing campaigns are well underway in urban areas, but need to be supported with more resources in rural areas. Rapid HIV test kits must be more widely applied, especially as government has encouraged couple VCT, self and routine testing, and even universal testing as a policy.

iv. Voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC) is a proven method of pre- venting HIV transmission. To reach the national target of 150,000 circumcisions annually, government must focus on both service delivery and demand generation as outlined in the male circumcision operational plan. Both have hitherto been mainly driven by cooperating partners.

v. Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission (PMTCT) during pregnancy, labour, delivery and breastfeeding has a huge potential to significantly reduce new HIV infections. Although the rate for PMTCT is high in Zambia, the service is only extended to women who deliver in a health facility.

vi. The easy access to ARVs has been a significant driver in reducing the prevalence rate as well as helping to break the transmission cycle. Donor- driven programmes have hitherto ensured ARV supplies. Accordingly, national plans for financing mechanisms for ARVs must be supported to ensure coverage for all who need it, even in the remotest rural areas.

Refocusing these proven high-impact HIV&AIDS interventions, while enhancing synergies with relevant sectors for response coordination and mitigation pillars (such as social protection, education, community development, local government and empowerment schemes) is critical to maintain the gains attained so far for HIV&AIDS[263].

MDG 7-Environmental Sustainability

Status Environmental sustainability has a significant bearing on whether or not a country will reach many of its other MDGs, as it provides the foundation for a greener, cleaner growth path. Zambia’s environmental resources are under pressure by the need for economic growth, through the exploitation of its natural resources. The country currently faces challenges of de-forestation and land degradation. The resulting negative impact on agricultural productivity, biodiversity and water purity is being keenly felt.

Deforestation: Land covered by forests reduced from 59.8 percent in 1990 to 49.9 percent in 2010, driven by over-exploitation and con- version of forests to other uses. In addition, the quality of the remaining forest is getting poorer. Many trees are cut by communities for wood fuel, due to poor availability of other affordable energy sources. In 2010, the vast majority (81.3 percent) of the rural population used firewood for cooking, while over half of the urban population used charcoal. Charcoal production is in fact the largest driver of deforestation in Zambia, followed by land clearing for agriculture, settlements and firewood.

The proportion of protected land in Zambia has remained relatively stable, albeit increasing slightly. This category includes local and national forests, 20 national parks and 36 game management areas (GMAs), of which most are fully or partly wooded, thereby providing a potential pool of forest cover, if the protection can be maintained. However, inadequate capacity to enforce existing laws and policies has led to Zambia is losing 250,000 to 300,000 hectares of forest to deforestation every year (Integrated Land Use Assessment 2010); an area about the size of Zanzibar. In 2010, it had about 38 million hectares of forest left.

The depletion of both woodland and wildlife in many protected areas

Government has there- fore recently banned timber exports and hunting of big cats and elephants, temporarily, to al- low for integrated land use assessment, wildlife census and forest valuations initiated in 2013. Government has also increased the budgetary allocation to the forestry sector, and is currently implementing a Tree Planting Programme which aims at raising 25 million tree seedlings in 2013/14. Combined with the implementation of the plan for reclassification of protected are- as, these efforts will help regenerate both fauna and flora and protect the eco-systems and bio- diversity that are under threat in Zambia.

Climate change: Zambia remains very vulnerable to climate change due to its low capacity to respond and adapt. The lack of a reliable data- base makes it difficult to predict climate variability and provide early warning of related disasters such as floods, droughts and diseases. It also has an impact on the capacity to develop responsive and relevant policies and strategies, including a national early warning system.

CO2 emissions: Zambia is a low emitter of greenhouse gasses such as carbon dioxide (CO2), relative to both its population size and to other countries. Carbon dioxide emissions were re- ported to average 0.2 tons per capita from 1990 to 2007, but jumped to 21.9 and 17.4 in 2008 and 2009, respectively, after emissions from de- forestation and land use change were included. This indicates that deforestation and unsafe land use practices are the largest contributors to car- bon dioxide emissions in Zambia. Other factors include industrialization, driven by the mining sector. Zambia has also seen an increase in the number of vehicles, which trebled between 2004 and 2011 to more than 380,000 newly registered vehicles, according to the Ministry of Transport, Works, Supply and Communications.

Ozone-depleting substances: The Montreal Protocol of 1987 requires countries to phase out chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and their transitional replacements, hydrochlorofluoro carbons (HCFCs). Zambia has ratified the protocol, and has therefore implemented regulations to fully phase out consumption and production of these. However, whereas the country’s consumption of CFCs and most other ozone-depleting substances is close to having been eliminated, Zambia is still consuming HCFCs, equivalent to 9.23 ODP tons in 2011.

Status Safe drinking water: Zambia has made progress in increasing access to improved drinking water since 1990, but the rate of progress is too slow to achieve the MDG target of 25.5 percent by 2015. The proportion of the population without access to an improved water source decreased from 51 percent in 1991 to 36.9 percent in 2010. In order to improve progress on this target, government has undertaken national water reforms and created commercial water and sewerage utility companies in urban and peri-urban areas. These companies have improved the quality of service, but coverage and financial viability remain low, particularly because approximately 50 percent of their water is unaccounted for.

In rural areas, the National Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme has sunk boreholes since 2006, and as a result the proportion of the rural population without access to an improved water source has improved from 58.1 percent in 2006 to 48.6 percent in 2010. The greatest provincial improvements are therefore also observed in rural provinces, with Luapula Province in the lead, followed by Eastern and North western Provinces.

Significant reforms and investments required

Approximately 2 million Zambians have no access to sanitation facilities and defecate in the open. It would require less than 420,000 latrines to eliminate open defecation in Zambia, according to the global Water and Sanitation Programme. Water source worsened from 11.8 percent in 2006 to 15.3 percent in 2010. This increase is partly attributed to rapid urbanization and growth of slums and unplanned settlements in Lusaka, as this is the only province which showed a decline in access to safe drinking water between 2006 and 2010. It is however expected that government’s agreement with the Millennium Challenge Corporation for a grant of $354.8 million for the improvement of water supply, sanitation and drainage in Lusaka will reverse some of this decline.

Basic sanitation: The proportion of the population without access to an improved sanitation facility56 worsened from 26 percent in 1991 to 67.3 percent in 2010; however a significant part of this decline may be explained by the fact that definition of improved sanitation changed in 2010, from including to excluding pit latrines without a slab. At this rate, Zambia is unlikely to achieve the MDG target of 13 percent by 2015. The decline is further explained by the increase in human settlements without basic sanitation.

The typically used sanitation in Zambia is pit latrines. A total of 73.1 percent of all households used pit latrines with or without slab in 2010, but only 19.5 percent of the national population had access to pit latrines with slabs (and therefore to improved sanitation). As shown in Figure 35, Lusaka Province had the highest proportion of people with access to pit latrines with slabs (45.4 percent), while Western Province had the lowest (4 percent). In fact, 44 percent of all households in Western Province have no access at all to sanitation facilities. Flush toilets are much less wide- spread in Zambia. 13.1 percent of Zambians have access to flush toilets, with the highest proportion found in Copper belt Province (40.1 percent) and the lowest in Luapula Province (1.5 percent). These figures reflect the fact that sanitation infrastructure is relatively expensive with a low return on investment for the private sec- tor, especially in rural areas.

Zambia loses $194 million, equivalent to 1.3 per- cent of GDP, every year due to poor sanitation, ac- cording to the Water and Sanitation Programme, a multi-donor partnership administered by the World Bank. The loss is caused by deaths due to diarrhoea ($167 million), loss of productivity while sick ($1 million), healthcare ($10.6 million) and time ($16 million). Bringing water and sanitation closer to its users, for example by moving a well or borehole closer to communities or by installing piped water supply in houses, yields significant time savings, especially for women and girls, releasing time for educational and productive opportunities. Given that water is a necessary prerequisite for many businesses, the increased availability of this resource also drives the start-up or expansion of small enterprises and thus increases both disposable household and national incomes.

MDG 7 Triggers for Acceleration: Getting to a more sustainable development path

A sustainable development approach, based on sound long-term environmental management, requires a level of institutional coordination among national authorities that is hard to come by. It requires clear definition of roles and responsibilities, coupled with harmonization of laws and policies, to ensure that Zambia’s natural resources are managed for the benefit of both current and future generations. While public-private partnerships have demonstrated their efficacy in other countries, a central oversight authority is vital. This would entail equipping the Zambia Environmental Management Agency with the necessary scope and capacity.

The adoption of the National Policy on Environment in 2011 by government is a good move towards addressing environmental issues. The policy provides a framework for environmental protection and management of natural resources on a sustainable basis. It is premised on the fact that a country can grow, create jobs and reduce poverty, without doing undue damage to its environment. In fact, countries that have implemented sustainable development strategies over a long period of time have demonstrated that wise management of natural resources leads to a healthier and more prosperous country, with a greener and cleaner growth trajectory for the benefit of all.

Zambia needs to consider a number of actions to trigger greater environmental sustainability:

i. Implement policies that link environmental protection with creation of jobs and in- come for poorer communities, in the areas of forestry, logging, fishery and livestock development. These are labour-intensive industries, where conservation can be combined with sustainable livelihoods.

ii. Involve the private sector and communities in the management of natural resources, with an emphasis on community-based natural resource management. Utilize innovative public-private partnerships to re-generate and manage protected areas, bringing in new financing to sustain this effort.

iii. Revise the Wildlife, Lands and Forestry Acts to take an integrated ecosystems approach encompassing sustainable land use and forest management, and the conservation of waters, fisheries and wildlife.

iv. Finalize the National Climate Change Response Strategy, which is currently being developed, as it will provide a framework for coordinated implementation of existing and future climate change initiatives, while providing a long-term vision for low-emission development. This includes Zambia’s entry into the global carbon markets, as well as in the development of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions necessary for the country to access international climate funds, including the Green Climate Fund.

v. Continue efforts to develop a national REDD strategy to set Zambia on a path to low- emission development. An economic valuation of Zambia’s forests is a necessary part of what is needed to make this happen.

vi. Continue the adoption of the Sustainable Energy for All Initiative to address Zambia’s growing energy needs in a clean and sustainable way through renewable and clean energy as well as optimal hydropower generation. Private sector and cooperating partners must support government’s efforts in this regard, to help realize this ambitious effort at moving to clean and sustainable energy for all.

vii. Finance and implement the Lusaka Master Plan. Rapid urbanization is often accompanied by unplanned crowded settlements that contribute to the decline in the proportion of the population with access to safe drinking water, basic sanitation and waste disposal facilities.

viii. Clean water and sanitation needs a larger budget allocation and incentives for private sector and communities to engage more in these areas of essential service delivery. Significant investments are required in the provision of a wide range of appropriate and affordable water and sanitation technologies to meet this MDG target.

Global Partnership

Although Zambia has no official 2015 targets for MDG 8, it has observed gains in almost all the indicators of this goal, including the following:

Status Official development assistance: Official development assistance (ODA) into Zambia peaked at 5.9 percent of GDP in 2009 before falling to 3.0 percent in 2010 (see Table 12).The reduction can be partly attributed to a temporary freeze of some aid to the health and road sectors in 2009 as a result of corruption findings confirmed by the Auditor General. Zambia’s recent graduation to a lower middle-income country also means that its access to concessionary loans and ODA could diminish. However, the decline in traditional bilateral ODA has been somewhat off-set by the ODA flows from the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and others. Yet, the overall trend strongly advocates for the country to develop and implement innovative and sustainable domestic financing mechanisms. In this context, Zambia turned to national and global financial markets to finance key developments, and in 2012, the country successfully launched its first sovereign bond for $750 million.

Foreign direct investment: Zambia has increasingly turned to foreign direct investment (FDI), which has seen significant growth over the past ten years. Although discrepancies exist between FDI figures from different state actors, there is no doubt that Zambia has seen a substantial growth in FDI inflows in recent years. The Bank of Zambia estimates that FDI grew fourteen-fold between 2000 and 2010 (See Figure 36). The increase was primarily due to an improved in- vestment climate emanating from prudent economic management by government during this period. In 2011, FDI slowed to $1.1 billion, as investors held back, awaiting the outcome of the general elections, which resulted in a change of governing party. Competitive and stable interest rates and exchange rate policies that at- tract both domestic and foreign investment and trade will be significant factors that define continued robust FDI flows into Zambia, as the country competes in an increasingly attractive investment climate in Africa[264].

The substantial increase in FDI inflows has, amongst other things, resulted in a much needed increase in employment. The largest number of jobs created by FDI inflows between 2007 and 2010 was in the manufacturing sector (9,313), followed by agriculture (3,261), service (2,825) and mining (1,978). Whilst considerable FDI inflows have gone into the mining sector, this is a far more capital-intensive sector than agriculture and manufacturing, which in Zambia remain largely labour-intensive. Government has also been creating jobs as well as increasing wages in the public sector. Accordingly, the rapidly increasing public wage bill could consume well over half of government revenues in the 2014 national budget. Increased trade and investment financing in productive sectors, together with progressive and well-ad- ministered tax policies, could help enlarge the revenue pie.

Access to markets

Since 1991, Zambia has been removing barriers to trade and embracing a multilateral trading system. The country has removed foreign exchange controls, reduced import duties, eliminated import and export licence requirements, abolished export bans and introduced a number of export incentives, and removed price controls. Whilst there have been some recent inconsistencies on some of these policy directions, Zambia is now a more open, non-discriminatory and rules based trading economy (Global MDG target 8.A). However, it is imperative for continued economic growth and expansion that Zambia continues to pro- mote mutually beneficial international and regional trading relations.

Additionally Zambia has played an active role in addressing the special needs of least developed countries (Global MDG target 8.B), especially during the current WTO Doha Development Agenda negotiations, where Zambia coordinated the work of 50 Least Developed Countries. At a regional level, Zambia is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Additionally, Zambia is currently engaged in negotiations for an economic partnership agreement with the EU under the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) configuration.

Zambia remains largely dependent on copper exports, which currently account for about 65 percent of total exports earnings. Despite this, Zambia has witnessed some economic diversification in the past decade, as non-traditional exports have grown by an average of 20 percent annually between 2002 and 2008. In 2011, the value of non-traditional exports reached $1.8 billion. The volume of exports of goods and services in Zambia grew by an average of 11 percent per year between 2001 and 2011, and is estimated by the IMF to grow by an average of 14.3 percent between 2012 and 2017.

The World Bank has pointed out that Zambia’s rankings on its Ease of Doing Business Index 2012 are relatively solid (84th out of 183 nations worldwide and 7th out of 46 in sub-Saharan Africa). However, the country’s strong performance masks a number of weaknesses. Zambia’s scores for cross-border trading are among the lowest in the world, an extraordinary liability for a land- locked country. The high costs associated with international trade present serious obstacles to broad-based growth in both the urban and rural sectors. For example, the effective premium on imported fuel products diminishes the competitiveness of manufacturing and the profitability of Zambia’s large domestic transport industry, while agricultural exports – already hampered by weak transportation infrastructure – face additional administrative expenses and time de- lays that reduce farm incomes and discourage investment in new productive technologies.

Debt sustainability

As a result of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief and prudent debt management in its aftermath, Zambia’s current stock of public debt is at fairly low levels. The WTO estimates that external public debt in Zambia fell from 179 percent of GDP in 2002 to less than 10 percent of GDP in 2007, and the IMF puts it at 11.6 percent of GDP in 2011.

Even though the issuing of the $750 million sovereign bond increased the stock of net external debt to 13.3 percent of GDP in 2012, The IMF rates Zambia as being at ‘low risk of debt distresses. The internationally acceptable bench mark for debt in developing countries is 40 percent of GDP. The low debt stock, combined with rising cop- per prices and a nearly six-fold increase in FDI inflows between 2003 and 2007, has enabled the country to increase its international reserves and allowed for greater fiscal space. The IMF, however, emphasizes the need for the country to develop a comprehensive debt management strategy coupled by strong national project appraisal capability to guide the country on the type and quantity of debt it should contract in order to ensure debt sustainability.

Communications

As in the rest of Africa, the substantial cellular phone penetration in Zambia has made fixed telephone lines more or less obsolete. The number of fixed lines has there- fore not changed much since 2000 (see Figure 38). The number of cellular subscribers, on the other hand, has grown from 50,000 in 2000 to over 8 million in 2012, having already exceeded ZICTA’s projection for 2015 of 300 per 1,000 in- habitants. Mobile phones are more widespread in urban areas, where many people have active SIM cards to more than one of the three current cellular service providers (Airtel, MTN and Zam- tel). This makes it difficult to pinpoint the exact number of physical subscribers.

The importance of cellular phones cannot be exaggerated. The World Bank estimates that increased cellular phone penetration between 1990 and 2005 increased per capita economic growth in Africa by nearly 1 percent.61 In Zambia, cellular phones, especially in rural areas, have increased access to otherwise unavailable services, providing the rural population with access to markets, knowledge/skills and public dialogue. For example, the ZNFU4455 commodity pricing platform, an initiative implemented by the Zambia National Farmers Union with sup- port from the International Fund for Agricultural Development, provides small-scale farmers with up-to-date information on commodity prices and buyers. Another initiative, Project Mwana, implemented by the Ministry of Health with the support of UNICEF and its collabourating partners, reduces delays in transmitting HIV results for newborn babies to rural health facilities via SMS message.

Internet connectivity has equally grown in many parts of the country, although it is difficult to tell by how much, as most people connect via their mobile phones or SIM-card dongles on their computers. Although mobile phone coverage and to a lesser degree internet coverage have grown rapidly in past years, Zambia remains behind relative to both global and regional averages. Based on World Bank estimates, in 2011, countries such as Libya (156), Seychelles (146), Botswana (143), South Africa (127), Gabon (117) and Morocco (113) all had more than 100 mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, while Zambia had 61 subscriptions.

MDG 8-Global Partnership-Triggers for Acceleration:

Global partnerships for technology, new financing and innovation Zambia has fared fairly well on MDG 8. However the absence of specific 2015 targets for this goal makes it rather complicated to attach any conclusive analysis on the country’s progress towards 2015. In this regard, it is important to suggest that, although there are only three years to go before 2015, the country develops targets for this important goal.

Suggested triggers for acceleration focus on increasing Zambia’s participation and competitiveness in regional and global markets, and on establishing a firmly grounded and consistent set of economic policies for inclusive growth, and include:

a. Implement a national debt management strategy coupled with strong national project appraisal capabilities to guide the country on the type and quantity of debt that it should contract. It is advisable that debt is contracted through the national budget and not through sub-national entities. This would ensure that debt is geared towards long-term investments in human development, job creation and industrial development in accordance with national plans.

b. Pursue the national vision of transforming Zambia from a land-locked to a land-linked country, through innovative initiatives that induce the private sector to invest in Zambia as a hub of logistics and transport in the region. Whilst the road network remains important, there are arguably great gains especially in terms of savings relating to less road maintenance and traffic accidents if haulage is moved from road to rail. The recent investments in revising Zambia’s rail system are therefore welcome.

c. Develop an ambitious industrial development strategy that recognizes that while the mining industry remains an important anchor of growth, industrial diversification will drive medium- to long-term economic development of Zambia. The development strategy should aim to harness the positive spill-over of linking resource extraction with infrastructure development that improves transport and energy grids nationally and regionally in order to avoid enclave development. Linkages to a more diversified agricultural production base will provide the much dis- cussed value-addition and job creation through industrial expansion.

d. Expanded innovation hubs and business incubators, with the support of government and the private sector, have been engines of new service sector growth poles in many countries, promoting both local and foreign investment in the process. Increased competition in the ICT industry, combined with effective regulation to ensure business efficiencies and wider coverage at lower costs, would be a facilitator for such a strategy.

e. Develop a regulatory framework to increase access to current and alternative financial instruments such as blended packages of ODA and investments, hedging and futures instruments, insurance and climate financing. Addressing the underlying structural issues that keep business costs and interest rates high must be addressed to ensure investment financing does not taper off. Incentives to attract a higher level of remittances to the country, currently at levels way below the regional average, would supplement household income and development financing.

f. Address illicit financial flows to narrow the funding gap for accelerated attainment of the MDGs. According to a recent estimate, Zambia lost at least $173 billion (in real 2010 prices) on this ac- count in the period 1970-2010, averaging 9 per- cent of GDP annually. An amount far higher than Zambia’s total debt stock of $3.7 billion in 2010. The main components of capital flight in Zambia are ‘leakages’ from the Balance of Payments (capital that should have entered the country but is unaccounted for), trade mis-invoicing (mainly manipulation of transfer prices of trade between companies of the same multinational group based in different tax jurisdictions), and to a lesser extent unrecorded remittances. National efforts at strengthening tax administration and collection, including audit capacities, and closing loopholes in existing legislation, especially in relation to multinational corporations, are critical.

Conclusion

This MDG report, the fifth of its series, has reflected on Zambia’s progress towards the achievement of its MDG targets. The report has reviewed 39 MDG indicators, of which Zambia has 2015 targets for 23 of them. Of these 23, the analysis shows that 7 are on track to be achieved or have been achieved, another 7 can be achieved with acceleration, and 9 would require significant reforms and investments to be met by 2015.

The report shows that particular focus must be paid to the areas of secondary education (MDG 2), reducing child and maternal mortality (MDGs 4 and 5), and ensuring environmental sustainability (MDG 7). Although improvements have been registered in these goals, they remain insufficient to achieve the 2015 targets. In addition, improvements on these targets are closely linked to eradicating extreme poverty and hunger (MDG 1), which has remained stubbornly resistant to significant change in Zambia.

Zambia has made significant progress in reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major diseases (MDG 6), as long as the country consolidates its past gains in malaria prevention and control. However, while Zambia has reached its target for HIV prevalence, its HIV incidence remains very high. This emphasizes the need to address significant income and gender inequalities (MDG 3).

Overall, the report notes the country’s remarkable progress over the past decades in achieving certain targets – but emphasizes the need to sustain these gains, while greater policy focus and investments are required to improve progress on other targets. It is worth remembering that progress does not necessarily follow a linear trajectory. Initial gains, which can be achieved fairly rapidly, must be supported by a longer and harder push to consolidate them. These efforts require increased re- sources as well as institutional, policy and legal reforms.

However, by leveraging on both global and local knowledge and experience, the report has identified specific ‘triggers of acceleration’ which would assist in fast-tracking progress towards attaining more of the MDGs, if not by 2015, then soon after. Zambia is part of the global move to define a development framework beyond 2015, as efforts to further human development will continue unabated[265].

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[1] Constitution of Zambia Part XIII, Section 127 (As amended by Act No. 18 of 1996)

[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_of_Chiefs#cite_note-3

[3] The independence constitution provided for multiparty politics, and though UNIP was the dominant party, it faced formidable opposition from the Africa National Congress and United Party.

[4] Elections are one form of participation that citizens have continued to have their voice heard on national matters.

[5] Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (2008) Elections and Democracy in Zambia, Edited by Claude Kabemba

[6] Mostly, the presidential candidate was made to stand against a creature, including but not limited to a frog. The vote was mostly ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for the president.

[7] Kaunda repealed Article 4 of the Zambian Constitution – opting for this route in contrast to a call for a referendum.

[8] Goodwell Lungu & Francis Mwale (2012) Accountability & Democracy in Zambia, TI-Z Report

[9] The American-based Carter Centre in its Election Observation report for the 2001 Zambia Elections, , observers reported serious problems in critical aspects of the electoral process, in particular regarding a lack of transparency in the tabulation of votes and the verification of final results. Consequently, the legitimacy of the electoral process was clouded.

[10] Observers indicate that the high levels of polarization between Michael Sata and Rupiah Banda in the run-up to the elections creating an environment, with unlikeliness of the election results being accepted if they went the way of the then ruling party (MMD) as they would have been considered to have been rigged.”

[11] Get to state that other elections in Africa either had incumbents retaining their seats or coup de tats taking precedence.

[12] German Technical Assistance (2011)Post-Election Analysis on Zambia’s 2011 Elections, Unpublished

[13] EU-Elections Observer Mission to Zambia (2011) Elections Report, Southern Africa Development Community-PF Report on Zambia’s 2011 September Elections and Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) etc.

[14] 1Institute for Democracy In Southern Africa (IDASA) Afrobarometer Working Paper, Issue Paper No. 81

[15] Various local and international civil society organizations in Zambia have called for an expanded Bill of Rights to cover for social, economic and cultural rights but more importantly ensure that basic needs provisions is included have a constitutional provision. An opportunity exists through the on-going debate on the content for Zambia’s new constitution which has provided for the same in the Bill of Rights. The question is whether such a progressive recommendation shall be considered and maintained as suggested.

[16] Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflections (2008) The Case for Social, Economic and Cultural Rights in Zambia, Lusaka

[17] Institute for Democracy In Southern Africa (IDASA) Afrobarometer Working Paper, Issue Paper No. 81

[18] Goodwell Lungu & Francis Mwale (2012), Accountability & Democracy in Zambia, TI-Z report.

[19] One of the critical aspects around previous constitutional making processes has been how the process would ensure that there is balance of power among the three arms of government. The executive still wields a lot of power, in particular presidential powers. If this has to be addressed, it requires a legal framework intervention, especially constitutional provisions. There is an on-going constitutional making process, and it is hoped this is a matter that may be addressed.

[20] The Democracy Index is an index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (a private business) that measures the state of democracy in 167 countries.

[21] European Union Delegation – Zambia (2008) Zambia – European Community, Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008- 2013, Lusaka

[22] There was an upswing of government undertaking and allocating resources to projects such as building of roads, schools and health facilities two years prior to the 2011 elections. Even then most of those projects remained poorly funded despite high visibility provided to their commissioning by high ranking officials, including former President Banda warranting them to be labelled as political-expediency projects.

[23] Poverty levels still remain high at 63.8% of the Zambian population living under the poverty line of US$1 per day and 87.2% of the Zambian population live under the poverty line of US$2 per day (CSPR 2012)

[24] Central Statistical Office (2011), Living Conditions Monitoring Survey 2010, Government of the Republic of Zambia

[25] Simon, D.J. (2002) ‘Can Democracy Consolidate in Africa amidst Poverty? Economic Influences upon political participation in Zambia’. Michigan: Gale Group

[26] Simutanyi, N. (2010). The State of Zambian Democracy: Left Organisations and their Role in Political Struggles, paper presented to the SACP Democracy Conference on the Lefts Experience of Participatory Democracy in Africa: Tasks and Challenges. Lusaka: Centre for Policy Dialogue

[27] http://www.zda.org.zm/

[28] http://www.usaid.gov/zambia/history

[29] http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACR843.pdf

[30] http://dai.com/our-work/projects/zambia%E2%80%94market-access-trade-and-enabling-policies-program-matep

[31] http://fsg.afre.msu.edu/zambia/

[32] http://www.usaid.gov/zambia

[33] http://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/ae709e/ae709e00.pdf

[34] http://fsg.afre.msu.edu/zambia/4_ZAMACE_Facilitates_Development_Commodity_Exchange.pdf

[35] http://www.acf.org.zm/

[36]http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2117942?uid=3739368&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104235468203

[37] http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/zambia/overview

[38]http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Zambia%20Full%20PDF%20Country%20Note.pdf

[39] http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/287015/Industrial-Development-Corporation

[40] http://www.zambiaembassy.de/news-events/item/92-zambia-germany-inks-agro-deal.html

[41] http://www.oilreviewafrica.com/downstream/downstream/zambia-to-get-a-new-oil-refinery-in-2016

[42]http://www.esaanet.com/reports/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1281:zambiasmallholder-farmers-receive-support-&catid=48:articles&directory=131

[43] http://www.zambia-mining.com/mining.html

[44] http://zambiamining.com/

[45] http://zambiamining.com/ministry-of-mines/

[46] http://www.zambia-mining.com/law.html

[47] http://www.zambia-mining.com/mining.html

[48] http://zambiamining.com/mining-in-zambia-2/

[49] http://www.mines.org.zm/index.php/about

[50] http://www.saiia.org.za/policy-briefings/the-zambia%E2%80%93china-cooperation-zone-at-a-crossroads-what-now

[51] Figures for 2000 and 2009 according to the World Trade Atlas, ‘Index for Chinese trade data’, accessed through tralac; 2010 figure according to the Chinese Ambassador for Zambia in an interview for the Times of Zambia, 13 July 2011. Interview transcription courtesy of the Chinese Embassy in Lusaka

[52] Chinese Ambassador, ibid.

[53] People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Commerce,2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201109/1316069658609.pdf

[54] Interview, ZDA representative, Lusaka, 11 July 2011.

[55] Information on this and the following paragraphs according to the ZCCZ official brochure, http://www.zccz.org.cn , and an interview with a ZCCZ investment promotion representative, Lusaka, Zambia, 13 July 2011.

[56] Interview, ZDA representative, op. cit.; interview, ZCCZ investment promotion representative, ibid.

[57] Interview, Zambian independent researcher, Lusaka, 11 July 2011; interview, former head of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Kitwe, 5 July 2011.

[58] Interview, ministry of finance official, Johannesburg, 1 July 2011.

[59] Interview, National Union of Miners and Allied Workers, Kitwe, 8 July 2011.

[60]https://www.google.co.za/?gfe_rd=cr&ei=szghu9p2h6bd8gfr14dwcg#q=policy+effectiveness+and+china%e2%80%99s+investment+in+the+mining+sector

[61] http://www.saiia.org.za/

[62] http://www.everyculture.com/To-Z/Zambia.html

[63] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_of_Zambia

[64] http://www.boz.zm/(S(2y31acfl5wgwr02sz5t0o0zz))/GeneralContent.aspx?site=30

[65] http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1698/zambia-educational-system-overview.html

[66] https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/mdg-2-universal-primary-education-in-zambia

[67] http://www.unicef.org/zambia/education.html

[68] http://www.right-to-education.org/sites/right-to-education.org/files/resource-attachments/RTE_Country_Factsheet_Zambia_2012.pdf

[69] http://www.right-to-education.org/sites/right-to-education.org/files/resource-attachments/RTE_Country_Factsheet_Zambia_2012.pdf

[70] http://www.zambian-economist.com/2011/04/pf-manifesto-education.html

[71] http://www.right-to-education.org/sites/right-to-education.org/files/resource-attachments/RTE_Country_Factsheet_Zambia_2012.pdf

[72] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Languages_of_Zambia

[73] http://www.unicef.org/zambia/5109_8462.html

[74] http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186%2F1472-6963-7-58#page-1

[75] http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0

[76] UNAIDS (2012) ‘ Global Report 2012: AIDSinfo’

[77] UNDP (2013) ‘ Human Development Report 2013: The Rise of the South’

[78] file:///C:/Users/Sgcibelo/Downloads/75650-172177-1-PB.pdf

[79] UNAIDS/WHO ‘ Epidemiological Fact Sheet – 2009, Zambia‘

[80] Government Republic of Zambia (2010, April) ‘ Zambia Country Report: Monitoring the Declaration of Commitment on HIV and AIDS and the Universal Access Biennial Report‘

[81] AIDS Care (2008) ” The epidemiology of HIV infection in Zambia” 7 August

[82] Zambia Ministry of Health/National AIDS Council (2008) ‘Zambia country report’

[83] AIDS Care (2008) ” The epidemiology of HIV infection in Zambia” 7 August

[84] UNAIDS (2010) ‘ UNAIDS report on the global AIDS epidemic‘

[85] The Times of Zambia (2006) “The Church’s Uncompromising Stance On Condom”, 8th January

[86] The Times of Zambia (2006) “The Church’s Uncompromising Stance On Condom”, 8th January

[87] UNAIDS (2012) ‘ Global Report 2012: AIDSinfo’

[88] UNAIDS (2012) ‘ Global Report 2012: AIDSinfo’

[89] The Lancet (2008) ‘Zambia’s health-worker crisis’, Pp 639, Vol 371

[90] PlusNews (2010) ‘ ZAMBIA: Health funding frozen after corruption alleged‘

[91] Ann Danaiya Usher (2010) ‘ Donors lose faith in Zambian Health Ministry‘ The Lancet 376(9739): 403 – 404

[92] The Global and Mail (2010, November 5th) ‘ Canada suspends health aid to Zambia‘

[93] Ann Danaiya Usher (2010) ‘ Donors lose faith in Zambian Health Ministry‘ The Lancet 376(9739): 403 – 404

[94] WHO (2005) [pdf] ‘Zambia’

[95] Bureau of Hygiene & Tropical Diseases (1987), ‘AIDS Newsletter’, Issue 16, October

[96] Africa Recovery (2003) “Famine and AIDS batter Southern Africa’, News release February.

[97] Stephen Lewis (2005) “Zambia: ‘A constellation of change and commitment’ in response to AIDS”, February

[98] http://www.who.int/hiv/HIVCP_ZMB.pdf

[99] www.who.int/hiv

[100] www.who.int/hiv

[101] http://www.everyculture.com/To-Z/Zambia.html

[102] A council to settle problems of succession and inheritance if a prominent member of the household dies.

[103] CEDAW (2010) p.50

[104] CEDAW (2010) p.16

[105] Sichikwenkwe, P. (2009) p.32

[106] CEDAW (2010) p.49

[107] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2008)

[108] CEDAW (2010) p.50

[109] CEDAW (2002b) para 12

[110] Demographic and Health Survey (2007)

[111] CEDAW (2010) p.49

[112] CEDAW (2010) pp.50-51

[113] CEDAW (2010) p.19

[114] Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (2004) p.148

[115] Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (2004) p.148

[116] Central Statistical Office of Zambia (2006)

[117] Central Statistical Office of Zambia (2006)

[118] Demographic Health Survey (2007) p.260

[119] Htttp://genderindexindex/country/Zambia , OMCT (2007) p.20

[120] http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/ZMB.pdf

[121] http://genderindexindex/country/zambia ,

[122] CEDAW (2010) p.12

[123] Demographic Health Survey (2007) p.278

[124] Demographic Health Survey (2007) pp.275-278

[125] Demographic Health Survey (2007) pp.263-265

[126] Human Rights Watch (2010)

[127] US Department of State (2010)

[128] OMCT (2007) p.9

[129] US Department of State (2010)

[130] OMCT (2007) p.15

[131] World Economic Forum (2010) p.316

[132] Central Intelligence Agency (2012)

[133] CEDAW (2010) p.44

[134] CEDAW (2010) p.44

[135] Sichikwenkwe, P. (2009) p.51

[136] Demographic Health Survey (2007) p.260

[137] CEDAW (2010)

[138] http://www.everyculture.com/To-Z/Zambia.html

[139] http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/171645.pdf

[140] http://www.sarpn.org/CountryPovertyPapers/Zambia/FirstDraft/Chapter11.pdf

[141] http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/surveys/sur_soc.php

[142] http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/about_us/abt_us.htm

[143] http://www.polity.org.za/article/zambia-election-report-2011-09-29

[144] http://allafrica.com/stories/201307051548.html

[145] http://www.osisa.org/hrdb/blog/saying-bye-elections-democracy-zambia

[146] http://www.eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/english/eueom_zambia_2011_preliminary_statement_en.pdf

[147] “China’s stake in Zambia’s election”, BBC, 19 September 2011

[148] http://www.global-briefing.org/2012/01/we-are-social-democrats-we-seek-to-bring-about-fundamental-political-change-that-must-bring-about-the-greatest-good-for-the-greatest-majority/

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[150] “Profile: Zambia’s ‘King Cobra'”, BBC News, 29 September 2006.

[151] “Vote out president, Chiluba says”, BBC News, 18 September 2006.

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[154] Zambia elections, Angus Reid

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[157] Shapi Shacinda, “‘Coup smear’ blocks trip to Malawi”, Reuters (IOL), 17 March 2007

[158] “Malawi violated my rights, says party leader”, AFP (IOL), 6 April 2007.

[159] “Zambia opposition leader’s passport withdrawn”, AFP (Mail & Guardian Online, South Africa), 11 November 2007.

[160] “Zambian opposition leader, first lady clash”, AFP (IOL), 25 August 2008.

[161] “Zambian opposition leader ‘stable'”, Sapa (IOL), 26 April 2008.

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[164] ‘There is no way MMD can win'”, Sapa-AFP (IOL), 30 October 2008.

[165] “Zambia: Banda sworn in, riots spread”, Sapa-DPA (IOL), 2 November 2008.

[166] Sata: I have not lost this election”, Sapa-DPA (IOL), 4 November 2008.

[167] Shapi Shacinda, “Sata warms to Chinese investment in Zambia”, Reuters (IOL), 8 September 2008.

[168] Long queues in tight Zambian poll BBC

[169] Sata to help local investors News24

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[177] http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/sectors-zambia/civil_society/

[178] http://www.africalegalnetwork.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Legal-Notes_April-2010_ZAMBIA.pdf

[179] http://zambianewsfeatures.com/webblog/index.php/controversial-ngo-bill-now-law/

[180] http://zambianewsfeatures.com/webblog/?p=38

[181] http://www.diakonia.se/globalassets/documents/diakonia/where-we-work/africa/1303_zambia-diakonia-political-governance-study.pdf

[182] http://www.actionaid.dk/sw159271.asp

[183] http://zambiadailynation.com/2012/12/15/ngos-take-swipe-at-pfs-inertia-over-ngo-act/

[184] http://zambiadailynation.com/2012/12/15/ngos-take-swipe-at-pfs-inertia-over-ngo-act/

[185] http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jul/29/zambia-legislation-ngos-civil-society

[186] http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/zambia

[187] The Anti-Corruption Act No 3 of 2012

[188] http://www.acc.gov.zm/?page_id=302

[189] http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2014%20Global%20Peace%20Index%20REPORT.pdf

[190] http://www.transparency.org/country

[191] http://thinkafricapress.com/zambia/anti-corruption

[192] http://thinkafricapress.com/zambia/anti-corruption-or-political-witch-hunt

[193] http://thinkafricapress.com/zambia/anti-corruption-or-political-witch-hunt

[194] https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=All+across+Zambia%E2%80%99s+political+spectrum%

[195] https://www.zambianwatchdog.com/opposition-issue-warning-to-donor-community-over-sata-bad-government/

[196] https://www.zambianwatchdog.com/opposition-issue-warning-to-donor-community-over-sata-bad-government/

[197] http://zambiareports.com/2012/06/06/zambian-opposition-issues-warning-to-donor-community-over-sata-government/

[198] Under Section 22 of the Manifesto, the ruling party declares its intention to “Deploy government sponsored law graduates to public legal institutions, such as the magistrate’s courts, attorney-General’s and DPP’s chambers, Public Defender’s chambers as well as local authorities.” Source: http://www.scribd.com/Zambian-Economist/d/52257938-Patriotic-Front-2011-16-Manifesto

[199] http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=27286

[200] http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=506338&version=1&template_id=39&parent_id=21

[201] “Sort Out Lap Green, Sata Orders Nchito,” The Post, Jan. 14, 2012 (http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=24703)

[202] The video of President Sata’s comments to the Director of Public Prosecutions Mutembo Nchito was uploaded by MuviTV on January 12, 2012 (http://youtu.be/Pz46kPD1t9Q)

[203] “Fitch revises Zambia outlook to negative,” Reuters, March 2, 2012. http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE82105320120302

[204] On April 26, 2012, Mr. Kabimba was given “a position” in the cabinet, but no one is sure what his duties are, while Mr. Kabimba himself has subsequently denied that he has any role in the government (http://www.lusakatimes.com/2012/05/18/role-government-kabimba/).

[205] “Prosecute Rupiah, urges ZRA inquiry,” The Post Newspaper, Jan. 27, 2011. (http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=24824)

[206] http://www.business-anti-corruption.de/country-profiles/sub-saharan-africa/zambia/corruption-levels/judicial-system.aspx

[207] http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/11/04/you-ll-be-fired-if-you-refuse

[208] http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/zambia-urged-release-two-men-charged-same-sex-sexual-conduct-2013-05-08

[209] http://www.hrc.org.zm/about.php

[210] Human Rights Commission: [www] http://www.hrc.org.zm/ [opens new window] (accessed 9 Mar 2010).

[211] 2011 Human Rights Watch report You’ll Be Fired If You Refuse, Thomas Lekfeldt/Moment/Redux, Human Rights Watch, 350 fifth Avenue, 34th floor, New York, NY 10118-3299

[212] Numwa, Regina. “Zambia”. Behind The Mask. Retrieved 1 June 2008.

[213] Ottosson, Daniel (May 2008). “State-sponsored Homophobia: A world survey of laws prohibiting same sex activity between consenting adults”. International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA). p. Page 43. Retrieved 5 May 2009.

[214] Biggest Ever Studies on Attitudes to Religion and Morality in Africa Released”. News time Africa. Retrieved 2014-04-11.

[215] Fabeni, Stefano, Cary Alan Johnson, and Joel Nana (July 2007). “The Violations of the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Persons in Zambia”. Global Rights and International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission.

[216] “Special Issues and Campaigns: Lesbian and Gay Rights”. World Report 1999. Human Rights Watch. 1999. Archived from the original on 23 July 2008. Retrieved 6 August 2008.

[217] Zambia”. The World Factbook 2008. Central Intelligence Agency. 15 May 2008. Retrieved 1 June 2008.

[218] Mhlambiso, Nthateng (26 July 2007). “Hope for Zambian MSM”. Behind The Mask

[219] “Zambia will never legalize gay marriages-gov’t”. African Veil. 10 December 2006. Retrieved 1 June 2008.

[220] NCC to adopt clause that forbids same sex marriage

[221] abeni, Stefano, Cary Alan Johnson, and Joel Nana (July 2007). “The Violations of the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Persons in Zambia”. Global Rights and International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission.

[222] Numwa, Regina. “Zambia”. Behind The Mask

[223] Fabeni, Stefano, Cary Alan Johnson, and Joel Nana (July 2007). “The Violations of the Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Persons in Zambia”. Global Rights and International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission

[224] Zambia (2005), Mung’omba Constitution Review Commission, Final Report, 29 December, Lusaka.

[225] JCTR (2005), Zambia’s Constitutional Review: What sort of Principles and Issues, Third Quarter Policy Brief, JCTR, Lusaka.

[226] Hasungule, Michelo (2004), “Experiences at constitution-making in SADC: The Zambian Experience,” in Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, Edition 4, Issue 3, November, pp. 28-32.

[227] JCTR (2005), Zambia’s Constitutional Review: What sort of Principles and Issues, Third Quarter Policy Brief, JCTR, Lusaka.

[228] JCTR (2005), Zambia’s Constitutional Review: What sort of Principles and Issues, Third Quarter Policy Brief, JCTR, page 60,Lusaka.

[229] JCTR (2005), Zambia’s Constitutional Review: What sort of Principles and Issues, Third Quarter Policy Brief, JCTR, Lusaka.

[230] Mwale, Simson (2005-a), “Constitution-making process at crossroads?” The Post, 11 August, Lusaka.

[231] Zambia (1991), Mvunga Commission: Governments’ Reactions to the Summary of Recommendations, National Archives, Lusaka.

[232] Mwale, Simson (2005-d), “Conflicting Interests in Constitution Process,” The Challenge Magazine, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 6-7.

[233] Mwale, Simson (2005-b), “Constitutional Hiccup,” The Post, 30 August, Lusaka.

[234] http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/2014/01/16/a-brief-analysis-of-zambias-constitution-making-process-and-the-leaked-final-draft-constitution/

[235] http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/2014/01/16/a-brief-analysis-of-zambias-constitution-making-process-and-the-leaked-final-draft-constitution/

[236] http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/2014/01/16/a-brief-analysis-of-zambias-constitution-making-process-and-the-leaked-final-draft-constitution/

[237] http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/2014/01/16/a-brief-analysis-of-zambias-constitution-making-process-and-the-leaked-final-draft-constitution/

[238] http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/2014/01/16/a-brief-analysis-of-zambias-constitution-making-process-and-the-leaked-final-draft-constitution/

[239] http://thinkafricapress.com/zambia/how-much-can-new-constitution-really-change

[240] http://allafrica.com/stories/201401180028.html

[241] http://www.misa.org/who-we-are

[242] http://allafrica.com/stories/201312180730.html

[243] After several years of threats to press freedom under President Rupiah Banda and the long-ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), the September 2011 presidential election victory of opposition Patriotic Front (PF) leader Michael Sata prompted hope for openings in the media environment.

[244] http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2014/zambia#.U8_IL_mSzE4

[245] In its first full year in office, President Michael Sata’s government began taking some outwardly positive steps to fight corruption, open up the media environment, and reform the constitution. However, it had not followed through with many concrete measures by the end of 2012.

[246] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, page 8, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[247] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, page 10, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[248] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, page 10, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[249] ibid

[250] ibid

[251] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, page 8, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[252] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, page 11, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[253] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, page 12, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[254] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, page 11, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[255] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, page 12, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[256] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, page 12, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[257] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[258] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, page 12, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[259] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[260] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[261] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[262] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[263] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[264] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia

[265] Millenium development Goals, Progress Report, Zambia, 2013, Alick Nkhata road, Lusaka, Zambia